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ABSTRACT 
In low income countries the majority of health care is sought in the private sector, often through 
drug retailers, but little information is available on retail competition and regulation. This thesis 
addresses this gap, in the context of the market for fever and malaria treatment in rural 
Tanzania, investigating how market structure, provider conduct, regulation and consumer 
demand influence treatment outcomes. 
Data were collected in three districts, where the main treatment providers were public and 
private health facilities, drug stores and general shops. Following a census of retailers, data on 
supply were collected from facilities and shops through in-depth interviews, a structured survey, 
and retail audits. Data on demand were collected through a household survey. Analysis focused 
on retailers, supplemented by data on facility services and consumer demand, where this was 
central to an understanding of retailer behaviour. 
Retailers were an important source of fever/malaria treatment, with the majority of retail 
antimalarial sales occurring through drug stores. Retail providers increased the accessibility, 
range and reliability of drug stocks, but several market failures were evident. Market 
concentration was high, price competition was weak, information on treatment quality was poor, 
and negative externalities arose from inappropriate drug use. These failures contributed to low 
antimalarial coverage, use of ineffective antimalarials, under-dosing, and inequitable access to 
quality care. Government failures were also evident, in the form of poor quality public sector 
treatment, and inadequately implemented regulation. 
To optimise the planned introduction of antimalarial combination therapy, public facility care 
must be improved. However, facility-only provision will not improve treatment for the majority 
of fever/malaria visits, which are likely to remain to shops. Implications for widening 
combination therapy provision to the retail sector are outlined, including the selection of 
appropriate retailers, maintenance of affordable prices, effective communication with 
consumers and providers, and a constructive role for regulation. 
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PART I 
BACKGROUND TO THE THESIS 
Part I introduces the thesis, reviews relevant literature, 
and provides background information on Tanzania 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Role of the Private Sector 
In low income countries the private sector is a very common source for many health products 
and services (Mills et al. 2002; Waters, Hatt and Peters 2003). Within the private sector, the 
retail sector accounts for a high proportion of care for common health problems, such as 
malaria, acute respiratory infection, sexually transmitted infections and tuberculosis (Berman 
2000; Brugha and Zwi 1999; McCombie 2002; Uplekar et al. 1998). For other health 
interventions, such as contraception, the private sector is less widely used, but represents a 
potential resource for rapid expansion of coverage (Hanson, Kumaranayake and Thomas 2001). 
For both sets of services the retail sector may hold the key to the substantial expansion in 
coverage required for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. However, there 
is widespread concern that retail sector care is of low quality, particularly among those 
providers most accessible to the poor. 
Health care policy in Africa has traditionally been made by and for the public health system, at 
most including commercial and not-for-profit facilities. Despite its importance, the retail sector 
has been largely ignored, with initiatives generally limited to haphazard and poorly 
implemented regulation. It is increasingly recognised that to improve the majority of treatment 
for many common health problems, the government has to look beyond the public sector and 
facilities, acknowledge the reality of widespread retail sector use, and address the ways in which 
government policy intentionally and unintentionally influences private sector behaviour (WHO 
1998). The policy focus is therefore starting to shift towards partnerships with private providers 
at all levels, from drug importers and manufacturers to retail sellers such as pharmacies and 
other shop owners (Brugha, Chandramohan and Zwi 1999). A range of strategies have been 
proposed to improve the general quality of retail sector treatment, such as training of providers, 
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consumer education, social marketing, pre-packaging of drugs, franchising, subsidies and 
strengthening regulation. If policy makers are to design effective strategies, they need to 
understand the determinants of current household and provider behaviour in the retail sector, but 
existing knowledge is highly inadequate (Bloland and Ettling 1999; Brugha, Chandramohan and 
Zwi 1999; Goel et al. 1996; Le Grand, Hogerzeil and Haaijer-Ruskamp 1999). Moreover, no 
studies have used an economic framework to analyse the retail market for health care in Africa, 
although such a framework is likely to be well-suited to improving our understanding of these 
commercial providers. This study addresses this knowledge gap, in the context of the market for 
fever and malaria treatment in Tanzania. 
1.2 The Malaria Disease Burden 
Malaria is a routine part of the daily life of millions of rural Africans, and a leading cause of the 
burden of disease, frequently accounting for over a third of all outpatient visits and inpatient 
admissions (Chima, Goodman and Mills 2003). In endemic areas, young children and pregnant 
women have the lowest immunity and are at most risk (WHO & UNICEF 2003). The symptoms 
of mild or uncomplicated malaria include fever, chills, headache and nausea, and patients are 
generally treated on an ambulatory basis. The coverage of blood tests for diagnosing malarial 
parasitaemia is low across sub-Saharan Africa. The vast majority of cases are treated 
presumptively, on the basis of fever alone, although many febrile patients are not parasitaemic 
(Bloland, Kachur and Williams 2003). The recommended treatment consists of a course of 
antimalarials, supplemented by antipyretics to help reduce fever and pain. In many settings 
more than half the patients buy drugs from shops, often obtaining treatment contrary to national 
guidelines. Prompt access to appropriate treatment is essential because P. falciparum malaria 
can rapidly progress to severe disease (Greenwood et at. 1987), with symptoms such as 
convulsions, coma and severe acidosis, and a high case fatality rate. Around a million deaths in 
Africa each year are believed to be the direct result of severe malaria (Snow et al. 1999). Access 
to effective treatment in Africa is currently very poor. At a meeting in Abuja in 2000, African 
Heads of State set a target that 60% of children with fever should obtain appropriate treatment 
within 24 hours by 2005. However, in 2004 the Roll Back Malaria partnership reported that 
only 42% of febrile children received an antimalarial, and that many of these treatments were 
delayed or contained an inadequate dose (WHO & UNICEF 2003). 
The urgency of this issue has been increased by the crisis posed by antimalarial drug resistance. 
For several decades, chloroquine has been the most widely used antimalarial in Africa, but 
resistance to chloroquine is now common, with clinical failure rates documented in the 1990s 
of, for example, 31-48% in Zambia, 50% in Kenya, and 28-72% in Tanzania (Bloland et al. 
1998; Ministry of Health 1999). As a result, some countries have adopted other relatively cheap 
16 
antimalarials as their first line drug, such as sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine (SP) and amodiaquine. 
However the growth of resistance to these alternatives has already begun, and is expected to 
accelerate with wider use (Greenwood 2004). The development of resistance has undoubtedly 
harmed the quality of facility and retail sector treatment (Trape 2001; Zucker et al. 1996). In 
addition poor quality retail treatment in the form of unnecessary drug use, under-dosing and 
sub-standard products is argued to have contributed to the growth of resistance itself (Basco 
2004; Bloland et al. 1993; ten Ham 1992; White 1999). 
In response, the introduction of artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT) as first line 
therapy has been proposed to improve treatment efficacy. Moreover, it is argued that the use of 
ACT will slow the development of resistance to both component drugs, and so prolong their 
useful lives (White et al. 1999). Over the last five years the political will behind these proposals 
has grown. By March 2004,15 African countries had decided to adopt ACT as their first line 
therapy, and 6 had begun deployment, mainly using funds from the Global Fund for AIDS, TB 
and Malaria (WHO RMB 2004). 
1.3 Thesis Outline 
To improve the quality of malaria treatment, and maximise the benefits from ACT 
implementation, an understanding of the retail market for fever and malaria treatment is 
essential. This thesis uses insights from economic theories of competition and industrial 
organisation to investigate how the interplay of market structure, provider conduct, regulation 
and consumer demand influences treatment outcomes. The study is set in three districts in rural 
Tanzania: Kilombero, Ulanga and Rufiji. It forms part of the Interdisciplinary Monitoring 
Project for Antimalarial Combination Therapy in Tanzania (IMPACT-TZ), and uses a variety of 
data collection methods to gather information from households, health-care workers and retail 
staff. 
Part I of the thesis continues with a review of the empirical literature on fever and malaria 
treatment and the retail sector (Chapter 2), and the economic literature on markets and 
competition (Chapter 3). Background information is provided on Tanzania and its policy on 
malaria and the retail sector (Chapter 4). In Part II, the study design and methods for data 
collection and analysis are described (Chapter 5). Part III comprises five results chapters on 
treatment obtained, market structure, product differentiation and non-price competition, pricing 
and price competition, and retail regulation (Chapters 6-10). Part IV explores the implications of 
the results. Chapter 11 examines the methodological strengths and limitations, and in Chapter 
12 the findings are analysed and discussed in the light of the existing literature. Chapter 13 
addresses the policy implications of the results and analysis. As Tanzania and many other 
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countries plan to introduce ACT in the near future, the policy implications are considered 
mainly in the context of an ACT-based strategy. Finally, Chapter 14 concludes the thesis with 
an assessment of new knowledge gained and research priorities for the future. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON FEVER AND MALARIA TREATMENT 
AND THE RETAIL SECTOR IN SUB-SAIIARAN AFRICA 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature on fever and malaria treatment and the role of the retail sector 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Fever and malaria are considered together because most malaria 
diagnoses are based on febrile symptoms alone. The review begins with an assessment of the 
demand for treatment, exploring methods for data collection, patterns of provider utilisation, 
drugs obtained, and influences on demand. Section 2.3 reviews the methods and findings of 
studies of retail supply, and considers likely determinants of provider behaviour, including 
government regulation. In Section 2.4, evidence on interventions to improve retail care is 
assessed. Finally, Section 2.5 summarises the current state of the literature, and highlights its 
limitations. 
2.2 The Demand for Fever and Malaria Treatment 
2.2.1 Methods for Studying Household Demand 
The literature on treatment seeking behaviour for fever and malaria is extensive (McCombie 
1996; McCombie 2002; Williams and Jones 2004). It consists mainly of evidence from cross- 
sectional household surveys and qualitative interviews/discussions. The latter encompass 
individual interviews, illness narratives, ranking or categorising activities, and focus group 
discussions, which generally cover local understanding of disease aetiology, associated 
symptoms, and factors influencing treatment choice. In addition, there is a limited amount of 
longer-term ethnographic research, investigating the context and complexities of treatment 
seeking in more depth (Hausmann Muela, Muela Ribera and Tanner 1998; Oberlander and 
Elverdan 2000). Large-scale cross-sectional household surveys are generally used to describe 
treatment-seeking patterns, and sometimes drugs obtained, and to perform quantitative analysis 
of relationships between behaviour and individual, household and community-level 
characteristics. Such standardised surveys permit some degree of generalisation from a 
representative sample of households to the larger population. After reviewing the literature, 
McCombie argues that most weight should be placed on surveys of reported behaviour, as 
opposed to those of likely actions in a hypothetical situation, as the latter are of limited utility in 
estimating actual treatment rates (McCombie 1996). Behaviours are generally reported for 
treatment sought for fever episodes in the previous two or four weeks, and most consider 
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children under 5 or 10 years only. While the majority of studies focus on bivariate analysis, a 
minority have used econometric techniques to perform multivariate analysis on the relative 
importance of influences on provider choice, and the magnitude of their marginal impact. 
A first step in such studies is to investigate the local terms used for malaria. This is complex as 
they may be broader than the biomedical concept of malaria, encompassing other common 
illnesses, or narrower, focusing on specific malaria symptoms (McCombie 2002). The 
symptoms of uncomplicated malaria are usually associated with local terms for common febrile 
illness and malaria, although these may capture many other causes of fever as well. In Uganda, 
local terms for fever had a "broad spectrum definition", including any condition of feeling 
cold/shivering, feeling hot, joint pain, headache, dizziness and lack of appetite (Adome, Whyte 
and Hardon 1996). Symptoms of severe malaria are often associated with different local terms. 
For example, in Kenya and Tanzania there were specific local terms for splenomegaly (enlarged 
spleen) (Minja et al. 2001; Nyamongo 2002). Convulsions may be perceived as unrelated to 
malaria and mild fevers, resulting from supernatural intervention via spirit possession, magic 
spells or bad luck (Ahorlu 1997; Hausmann Muela and Muela Ribera 2000; Mwenesi, Harpham 
and Snow 1995; Oberlander and Elverdan 2000; Winch et al. 1996), although no such 
supernatural causes were cited in Burkina Faso (Muller et al. 2003). Household surveys are 
generally not large enough to capture a representative sample of severe cases, so most surveys 
focus on fever as the best indicator of uncomplicated malaria. 
2.2.2 Choosing Providers 
The evidence shows that most reported febrile illnesses are treated. Several studies found 
overall treatment rates of 90% or more (Deming et al. 1989; Mwabu 1986; Molyneux et al. 
1999; Mwenesi, Harpham and Snow 1995), with most others finding rates of over 70% 
(McCombie 2002). Rather than being passive recipients of care and advice, consumers take an 
active role in the choice of outlets, and in some cases choice of treatment, often based on their 
own self-diagnosis (Leonard 2000; Williams and Jones 2004). Women are generally the primary 
care-givers, but often consult senior male household members before selecting providers and 
remedies (Molyneux et al. 2002; Mwenesi, Harpham and Snow 1995; Oberlander and Elverdan 
2000; Tanner and Vlassoff 1998). Treatment seeking takes place within a pluralistic health 
system, encompassing health facilities in the public, non-governmental organisation (NGO) and 
commercial private sectors, community health workers, traditional healers and retailers 
(Williams and Jones 2004). Drug retailers may include pharmacies and drug shops, general 
stores, market vendors and itinerant sellers. While some patients use just one treatment source, 
recourse to multiple providers is common, and patients may combine modem and traditional 
remedies during one episode (Agyepong and Manderson 1994; Ahorlu 1997; Alilio and 
20 
Tembele 1994; Baume, Helitzer and Kachur 2000; Hausmann Muela and Muela Ribera 2000; 
Oberlander and Elverdan 2000). Several studies describe a trial and error approach to treatment 
choice, where perceived failure of one strategy may lead to a re-evaluation of the diagnosis and 
appropriate response (Williams and Jones 2004). 
McCombie notes that there are almost as many ways of categorising treatments as there are 
studies, and comparability is certainly hampered by variation in the way providers are grouped 
in survey reports (McCombie 2002). In particular, a category of home or self-treatment is often 
used, although its definition varies between studies, potentially including tepid sponging, local 
herbs, drugs kept at home or obtained from neighbours, and drugs purchased from general shops 
or pharmacies, even though the latter may involve consultation with retail staff. In their review 
of behavioural issues in malaria treatment, Williams and Jones conclude that some sort of 
home/self-treatment is generally the first response to illness, and that it is widely used, even in 
areas with good access to health facilities and traditional practitioners (Williams and Jones 
2004). Many studies found that people tended to begin with home treatment, proceeding to the 
official sector when home treatment strategies were perceived to have failed (Nyamongo 2002), 
although home treatment remained an important option at all stages of illness. However, the 
prominence of home treatment is not universal across Africa. McCombie defines the official 
sector as health facilities, private practitioners and village health workers (McCombie 1996). 
Her review found that it was used by between 19% and 87% of patients, with considerable 
variation both between and within African countries. In some areas the share of initial actions 
involving health facilities and home treatment was relatively similar (Amin et al. 2003), but in 
other areas home treatment was rare. For example, in The Gambia home treatment was used in 
less than 10% of cases (Clarke et al. 2003; Menon et al. 1988; von Seidlein et al. 2002), and low 
rates were also found in Zambia and Zimbabwe (Baume, Helitzer and Kachur 2000; Tsuyuoka, 
Wagatsuma and Makunike 2001). 
Shop visits can be distinguished in a sub-set of household surveys, which show that buying 
drugs from retailers is generally very common. The median percentage using shops during 
recent childhood illness is roughly 50%, although experience is varied, ranging from 15% to 
82% across studies (Brieger et al. 2004b). For example, on the Kenyan coast, shop-bought 
medicines were used first, or only, in 69% of childhood fevers treated (Molyneux et al. 1999). 
In Togo, only 20% of children under 5 years with fever were seen at a health centre during their 
illness, while 83% were treated at home with an antimalarial, mainly chloroquine obtained from 
a street or market vendor (Deming et al. 1989). Very few studies categorised retailers by type of 
shop. An important exception was a Ugandan study which estimated that of all medicines 
obtained, 15% were from drug shops, 37% from ordinary shops, and 6% from markets (Adome, 
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Whyte and Hardon 1996). The percentages were very similar if only antimalarials were 
considered. 
In some settings it is common to maintain drug stocks in the home. For example, in cities in 
Nigeria and Congo, over half of households kept antimalarials (McCombie 2002). The drugs 
may be left over from previous episodes, or purchased deliberately as reserves from shops. In 
Western Kenya, 28% of fever episodes were treated with drugs already in the home (Ruebush et 
al. 1995). However, in other settings, only a small minority of households keep substantial drug 
stocks (Adome, Whyte and Hardon 1996). 
Generally speaking, reported use of traditional healers and traditional medicines for 
uncomplicated malaria is low (Amin et al. 2003; Deming et al. 1989; Hamel et al. 2001; 
Lindblade et al. 2000; Muller et al. 2003; Thera et al. 2000), though there are exceptions. For 
example, in Somalia 53% of respondents said they would use traditional medicine to treat 
malaria (McCombie 1996). The use of traditional treatment may be understated in surveys 
because of perceived disapproval, but the weight of evidence indicates that in most settings it is 
rarely used for fever and uncomplicated malaria. 
Initial treatment-seeking actions are generally taken between a few hours and two days after 
symptom onset (Williams and Jones 2004), although prompt appropriate treatment is rare. 
WHO defines appropriate treatment of childhood fevers as receipt of an antimalarial within 24 
hours of symptom onset (WHO & UNICEF 2003), but in Kenya this was achieved for only 5% 
of cases (Amin et al. 2003). There is some evidence that home treatment reduces the time to 
obtaining care (Hamel et al. 2001). For example, a study in Kenya found that most mothers 
purchased drugs from retail outlets within one day of noticing the symptoms of childhood 
malaria, but the average time lag before a health facility visit was 3 days (Mwenesi, Harpham 
and Snow 1995). 
McCombie notes that relatively little is known about variation in treatment by age, gender, 
endemicity, and personal experience with malaria (McCombie 2002). She finds some of the 
most striking variation in studies comparing rural and urban areas, with rural residents in some 
studies more likely to use traditional remedies and home treatment, and less likely to use 
facilities. However, in coastal Kenya mothers in rural and urban areas had similar treatment- 
seeking patterns, with the initial response in both groups being to buy drugs from shops 
(Molyneux et al. 1999). In an outlet-based study in Eastern Uganda splenomegaly was 
significantly more common in children visiting health facilities, than those visiting drug shops 
(Nshakira et al. 2002). A number of studies report greater use of the official sector for "severe" 
illness (Glik et al. 1989; Lindblade et al. 2000; Snow et al. 1992), but interpretation of these 
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data is hampered by the lack of standardised methods for categorising household reports of 
degrees of severity (McCombie 1996). As noted above, symptoms of severe malaria are often 
linked with supernatural causes, so traditional remedies may be viewed as complementary, or 
more appropriate than modern drugs for these cases (Baume, Helitzer and Kachur 2000; 
Hausmann Muela and Muela Ribera 2000; Mwenesi, Harpham and Snow 1995). Little 
difference in treatment seeking was generally found by gender (Armstrong Schellenberg et al. 
2003; Krause and Sauerborn 2000) although there were exceptions: for example in Western 
Kenya schoolboys were more likely to self-treat than schoolgirls (Geissler et al. 2000). Analysis 
of variation across age groups is hampered by the limited number of studies including patients 
over five years (Agyepong and Manderson 1994; Guyatt and Snow 2004; Krause and Sauerbom 
2000; Lindblade et al. 2000). Some studies found that young children were more likely to be 
taken to health facilities (Agyepong and Manderson 1994; Geissler et al. 2000; Krause and 
Sauerborn 2000). For example, in Western Kenya, school-age children were far less frequent 
among patients at the local health centre than infants and toddlers (Geissler et al. 2000). 
However, in epidemic-prone areas of Kenya and Uganda differences across age groups were not 
significant (Guyatt and Snow 2004; Lindblade et al. 2000). 
2.2.3 Drugs Obtained 
Data on therapies obtained or used are reported in a sub-set of studies. They indicate that the use 
of modem medicines is high, but first-line treatment often includes antipyretics/painkillers only 
(Williams and Jones 2004). McCombie estimates that overall only a third to a half of illnesses 
are treated with antimalarials (McCombie 2002). Particular concerns have been expressed about 
the quality of retail sector treatment, in view of the high prevalence of inappropriate prescription 
and dosage. In Kenya, 54% of care-seekers at government facilities received an antimalarial, 
compared with 33% of retail outlets (Amin et al. 2003). McCombie found that under-dosing 
during self-treatment ranged from 33% to 83% across studies, and over-dosing from 14% to 
39% (McCombie 2002). In a baseline survey in Kenya, only 4% of children given store-bought 
chloroquine received an appropriate dose and only 2% received this dose over the recommended 
3-day period. Aspirin was widely used, although it is not recommended for children, with 22% 
receiving potentially toxic doses (Marsh et al. 1999). While individual treatments are frequently 
inadequate, multiple treatment seeking over the course of an illness episode may result in 
cumulative over-dosing. Other problems believed to be widespread are polypharmacy, where 
providers prescribe additional unnecessary drugs, although evidence is limited. For example, 
rates of antibiotic use during fever episodes are very variable, with unclear justification. Among 
school-age children in Kenya, there was no use of antibiotics for fever-related complaints at 
shops or facilities, and in Burkina Faso, only 4% of drugs provided for childhood treatment 
were antibiotics, divided roughly equally between home and facility treatment (Geissler et al. 
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2000; Muller et al. 2003). However, in Uganda, 48% of febrile children were given antibiotics 
at drug shops, and 67% at government health facilities, although physical examination revealed 
that antibiotics were indicated for only 18% of febrile cases (Nshakira et al. 2002). 
Poor quality antimalarials on the private market have been documented in Cameroon, Nigeria, 
Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda (Amin et al. 2004; Minzi et al. 2003; Ogwal Okeng, Okello and 
Odyek 1998; Risha et al. 2002; Shakoor, Taylor and Behrens 1997; Taylor et al. 2001). For 
example, of samples collected from illegitimate outlets in urban and rural areas of Cameroon, 
12% of anti-folates (including SP), 38% of chloroquine and 74% of quinine samples had either 
no active ingredient, an insufficient active ingredient, the wrong ingredient, or an unknown 
ingredient (Basco 2004). A number of tablets sold as quinine contained chloroquine instead, and 
drugs sold loose were more likely to be of poor quality or counterfeit than packaged products. 
Many of these quality problems are also found during visits to official outlets, such as 
government health facilities. For example, in Uganda chloroquine doses prescribed for children 
were inaccurate in 77% of drug shop visits, and 61% of health facility visits (Nshakira et al. 
2002). Moreover, the evidence does not suggest that visiting health facilities inevitably leads to 
good outcomes. In Tanzania, of children under five believed to have died of malaria, 59% had 
visited a government or mission health facility as their first choice of care (de Savigny et al. 
2004). 
2.2.4 The Determinants of Consumer Demand 
Consumer demand is expected to depend on a number of factors, including their knowledge and 
beliefs, prices and incomes, their preferences for product characteristics, and their preferences 
for provider characteristics, such as accessibility, waiting times, drug availability and courtesy. 
Information on disease causation and treatment efficacy is widely believed to be crucial in 
explaining treatment demand. One might expect accurate knowledge to be correlated with 
general education levels, and higher educational attainment has been associated with higher use 
of health facilities (Slutsker et al. 1994; Tarimo, Urassa and Msamanga 1998). Among those 
self-treating in Malawi, those with higher levels of education were more likely to obtain an 
antimalarial (Slutsker et al. 1994). Inaccurate dosing may partly reflect the desire of poor 
consumers to conserve medicines for future episodes, but is also likely to stem from poor 
knowledge. McCombie found the proportion of consumers stating a correct antimalarial dose 
ranged from 3% to 58% across studies (McCombie 2002). For instance, only 20% of shoppers 
at drug stores in Dar es Salaam knew the correct dose of chloroquine for adults (Massele et al. 
1993). In Kenya, knowledge of correct doses was associated with reading ability (Nyamongo 
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1999). In addition, there may be confusion over the difference between antimalarials and 
antipyretics, and between brand name and generic products (McCombie 2002). Consumers may 
perceive two brands of chloroquine to be different drugs (Foster 1991), or switch from 
chloroquine tablets to chloroquine injections without realising that they are different 
formulations of the same drug (Williams et al. 1999). 
Very little is known about households' understanding of drug resistance. In north-eastern 
Tanzania in the late 1990s the presence of drug resistant malaria parasites was largely 
unrecognised by local people, and the concept did not exist in their explanatory models of 
disease (Oberlander and Elverdan 2000). However, in central Tanzania in 2000, when 
chloroquine treatment failure was over 50%, half of care-takers at health facilities were aware 
that chloroquine could fail, although some consumers perceived more effective antimalarials as 
"too strong" for young children (Tarimo, Minjas and Bygbjerg 2001). Higher education levels 
were associated with greater knowledge about antimalarials, the causes of treatment failure and 
appropriate responses. In Zambia, some caretakers perceived drug resistance as an individual 
property rather than a characteristic of a specific episode, saying that "chloroquine no longer 
works at all for me", or "my child became resistant to chloroquine tablets" (Kachur et al. unpub. 
report). It has been observed that medicines that have been widely available and valued for 
generations may still be preferred by community members, even after their efficacy diminishes 
(Van der Geest, Hardon and Whyte 1990). This was borne out in Malawi; four years after 
chloroquine had to be abandoned as official first line drug due to resistance, SP was ranked as 
superior on average, but chloroquine was still preferred by many consumers, widely available in 
shops and produced by local manufacturers (Kachur et al. unpub. report). 
In addition to perceived efficacy, other product characteristics are important to consumers, such 
as shorter or simpler dosage regimens, antipyretic action, fewer minor side-effects, a more 
pleasant taste, and even colour (Adome, Whyte and Hardon 1996). However, some apparently 
unpleasant characteristics may be linked with greater perceived efficacy (Williams et al. 1999). 
For example, while syrup formulations of chloroquine are generally preferred for young 
children, as they are easier to administer than bitter-tasting tablets (Tarimo, Minjas and 
Bygbjerg 2001), some communities associate the bitter taste of antimalarials with strength 
(Kachur et al. unpub. report). In Kenya some patients regarded chloroquine-induced itching as a 
signal that the drug was working (Nyamongo 1999). It is widely believed that injectable 
formulations are more powerful than tablets (Adome, Whyte and Hardon 1996; Agyepong and 
Manderson 1994; Hamel et al. 2001; Ruebush et al. 1995), but in some settings injecting a child 
who has a high fever is believed to precipitate convulsions or cause death (Ahorlu 1997; 
Makemba et al. 1996; Mwenesi, Harpham and Snow 1995; Oberlander and Elverdan 2000; 
Tarimo et al. 2000). There may also be a tendency to believe that more expensive therapies are 
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more effective (Nunley 1996). The emphasis to be placed on such factors needs to be 
investigated empirically. For example, there had been much concern that replacing chloroquine 
by SP as first line drug would adversely affect consumer confidence and treatment seeking 
behaviour because SP was less well-known, has less of an antipyretic effect, is not bitter tasting, 
and is not available in an injectable formulation (Williams et at. 1999). However, when the 
perceptions of caretakers were compared during a drug efficacy study in Zambia, parents whose 
children were treated with SP readily accepted the new drug and reported higher perceived 
efficacy than those whose children were treated with chloroquine (Williams et al. 1999). 
Patients' preferences for the characteristics of the providers from whom they obtain their drugs 
are very important in shaping their demand. Essential drugs are officially provided free or are 
heavily subsidised in most African public health systems but, as noted above, patients often 
choose to pay for drugs at private outlets. A key explanatory factor is accessibility; shops and 
vendors selling drugs are often a much more convenient source of drugs than public clinics 
(Adome, Whyte and Hardon 1996; Snow et at. 1992; Van der Geest 1987). In coastal Kenya, 
87% of rural households live within lkm of a shop, but only 32% within 2km of a government 
dispensary or private clinic (Molyneux et al. 1999). The accessibility of facilities may be 
particularly limited during the rainy season, when roads are impassable (Nyamongo 1999). 
Even where government facilities are easily accessible, the phenomenon of bypassing is 
frequently observed, where patients chose to visit a private provider even if it involves the same 
or even greater journey time (Akin and Hutchinson 1999). This can be explained by studies of 
patients' views, which document a range of problems with the perceived quality of public 
services (Adome, Whyte and Hardon 1996; Gilson, Alilio and Heggenhougen 1994; Ruebush et 
al. 1995; Snow et al. 1992), leading Leonard to argue that government facilities represent the 
low-quality, last resort part of the African medical market, with mission/NGO or private-for- 
profit facilities frequently preferred even though the cost is higher (Leonard 2000). Rude and 
insensitive staff, limited opening hours and long waiting times are common complaints, and 
lack of drugs is frequently identified as a major shortcoming (Williams and Jones 2004). A 
study of health services in Tanzania found that the most common reason for not using 
government services was that they had a poor drug supply (Abel-Smith and Rawal 1992). 
Second and third line drugs were generally not available at peripheral facilities, even where 
treatment failure with the first line remedy was high (Ruebush et al. 1995). Illicit activities have 
been reported at public facilities, including illegal charging for drugs during consultation, and 
leakage in the form of the sale of drugs by health workers in their private clinics or selling to 
informal drug sellers or shops (McPake et al. 1999). One might expect observable elements of 
quality, such as accessibility, drug availability and courtesy, to have a greater impact on choice 
of provider than less observable elements, such as accurate diagnosis and prescription. 
However, consumers can select practitioners subject to observable institutional arrangements, 
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such as mission affiliation, which have a reputation for high technical quality, because of the 
incentives and objectives of staff (Leonard 2000). Despite the many problems with government 
facilities, high levels of confidence in public sector providers persist in many areas, linked to 
their reputation and the belief that they have undergone appropriate training (Baume, Helitzer 
and Kachur 2000). 
Consumers choose between different private providers using similar criteria, such as 
accessibility, the availability of drugs, waiting times, the provision of examination, and the 
courtesy of staff. The provision of complementary services, such as diagnostics and 
examination, may be seen as an advantage by some consumers, especially for the treatment of 
certain patient groups, such as young children or the severely ill (Slutsker et al. 1994). Others 
prefer outlets without these facilities, if they are more accessible, service is much faster and 
other family members can be sent to collect the drugs (Adome, Whyte and Hardon 1996; 
Kachur et al. unpub. report; Snow et al. 1992). Patients may prefer shops if they find their staff 
friendly, and willing to negotiate charges and give credit (Williams and Jones 2004). Another 
reason for the frequent use of shops is that they are more likely than formal private clinics and 
pharmacies to sell an incomplete dose of antimalarial drugs. This may be appreciated by the 
patient when cash is not available to buy a full course of treatment (Adome, Whyte and Hardon 
1996; Van der Geest 1987). 
While patients are often more satisfied with drug availability and the interpersonal quality of 
care in private outlets, they frequently identify other problems with service delivery. Patients 
may perceive private providers to rely excessively on diagnostic tests and to charge very high 
prices, or they may be sceptical about the motivation of private providers, believing them to be 
primarily interested in generating income for themselves rather than in the welfare of their 
patients (Kamat 2001; Smithson, Asamoa-Baah and Mills 1997). In Uganda, consumers 
complained that in profit-oriented outlets, lab tests were always positive, in order to increase 
drug sales (Adome, Whyte and Hardon 1996). Drug vendors in Malawi and Zambia were seen 
as a valuable community resource because "they bring medicines close to the people", but were 
seldom consulted for advice, because they were not considered knowledgeable and because 
their motivation was usually suspect, since their primary motivation was perceived to be to sell 
medicines (Kachur et al. unpub. report). 
Last but not least, price and income levels are key factors affecting demand, influencing the 
choice of provider, the choice of drug, and the dose purchased. Cost is frequently mentioned as 
a reason for not using health facilities (Williams and Jones 2004). For example, in Kenya 
interviewees generally began with self-treatment as a cost-saving strategy, even though they 
perceived official sector care to be more effective (Nyamongo 2002). A separate Kenyan study 
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found median drug costs to patients in Kenyan shillings (Ksh) to range from Ksh 17 at retail 
outlets to Ksh 58 government clinics, Ksh 100 at government hospitals, Ksh 150 at private 
clinics and Ksh 215 at private hospitals (Amin et al. 2003). In Lagos, Nigeria, prices paid for 
drugs followed a similar pattern (Brieger et al. 2001). Total patient costs are generally cheaper 
at shops because there are no consultation or lab fees, or under-the-table charges, and small 
quantities of drugs can be purchased (Adome, Whyte and Hardon 1996). In addition to the cost 
of drugs and services, ability to pay may also be influenced by credit availability, the 
acceptability of payment-in-kind, and the availability of loans or gifts, for example through 
savings schemes or from the extended family (Hausmann Muela, Mushi and Muela Ribera 
2000; Mariam 2000). Even where there are no facility fees, the time and travel costs of visiting 
facilities may be much higher than for retailers (McCombie 1996). 
As one would expect, these factors lead to variations in demand by household wealth. In his 
analysis of sub-Saharan African Demographic Health Survey (DHS) data, Filmer found that 
higher socio-economic status (SES) measured using an asset index was associated with greater 
use of government hospitals, and private facilities (Filmer 2002). There was no clear pattern in 
the use of lower-level government facilities or shops across SES groups. In Tanzania, there was 
a positive association between SES and use of the official sector for fever (62% in the least poor 
quintile compared with 31 % in the poorest) (Armstrong Schellenberg et al. 2003). Children in 
the poorest quintile were half as likely to have been given antimalarials as those in the 
wealthiest. It is possible that such disparities in treatment lead to serious inequalities in health 
outcomes. In the same region of Tanzania, mortality in children following acute fever was 39% 
higher among the poorest compared with the least poor (Mwageni E. unpublished data, quoted 
in Barat et al. (Barat et al. 2004)). Barat et al. hypothesise that this might reflect both financial 
barriers to prevention and curative services, and non-financial barriers, such as education, 
distance from health services, and the opportunity cost of time lost at work. 
The last two decades have seen a substantial rise in the number of econometric analyses of 
health care demand'. Studies of the decision to seek care and/or choice of provider for general 
curative care in sub-Saharan Africa were identified from Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroun, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Tanzania (Akin, Guilkey and 
Denton 1995; Appleton 1998; Bolduc, Lacroix and Muller 1996; Chawla and Ellis 2000; Dor 
and van der Gaag 1993; Gertler and van der Gaag 1990; Lavy and Quigley 1993; Leonard and 
Leonard 1999; Mariam 2000; Mariko 2003; Mwabu 1989; Mwabu and Mwangi 1986; Ndeso- 
Atanga 2000; Sauerborn, Nougtara and Latimer 1994; Vogel 1994). Most analysts base their 
empirical models on the theoretical foundations of the random utility model (RUM) developed 
1 Econometrics is the branch of economics that uses the methods of statistics to measure and estimate 
quantitative economic relationships. 
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by (McFadden 1981), using discrete choice logit or probit models. Despite the recent 
proliferation of such studies, a number of theoretical and practical methodological issues remain 
open to debate, including approaches that allow the in-built assumption of the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives to be relaxed2, the potential endogeneity of illness reporting when certain 
groups are more likely to report episodes, and the appropriate measurement of price and quality 
for the treatment alternatives (Akin, Guilkey and Denton 1995; Akin et al. 1998; Appleton 
1998; Chawla and Ellis 2000; Gertler and van der Gaag 1990; Lavy and Quigley 1993). 
In general, such studies have found that price elasticities of demand' are very low, although 
some studies showed that poorer groups and children tend to have more elastic demand than the 
general population (Ching 1995; Dor and van der Gaag 1993; Gertler, Locay and Sanderson 
1987; Gertler and van der Gaag 1990). Several studies have also found quality measures to be 
important. For example, in Nigeria demand for outpatient health care was influenced by per 
capita facility expenditure, drug availability and the condition of the physical infrastructure 
(Akin, Guilkey and Denton 1995). In Tanzania, clinician knowledge, consultation performance, 
attentiveness and appropriateness of prescription all had a positive impact on demand (Leonard 
2000). In many studies travel time is found to be an important and significant determinant, and 
other variables found to be significant in some, though not all, studies include age, education of 
household head, gender, household size, severity, area of residence, assistance of relatives, or 
participation in savings mechanisms (Ching 1995; Gertler and van der Gaag 1990; Mariam 
2000; Nanda 1999). 
Econometric studies specifically focusing on treatment seeking for malaria/febrile illness are 
much more rare, and only three African studies were identified, two from Ghana and one from 
Benin (Asenso-Okyere, Dzator and Osei-Akoto 1997; Dzator and Asafu Adjaye 2004; Mensah 
2000). The studies all found that the choice of provider for fever/malaria was significantly 
influenced by treatment cost, but differed in their other findings. For example, in Benin, 
Mensah found gender, occupation, total household expenditure and credit scheme membership 
to be significant variables, but Dzator and Asafu-Adjaye found in Ghana that travel time, 
education, and household size were significant. They also showed choice of provider to be 
inelastic with respect to treatment costs and time costs, with demand more inelastic in drug 
shops than in facilities. All econometric studies of fever/malaria treatment have focused on the 
choice of provider, no such analysis was found of the choice of drug. 
s the restriction that the relative probability of choosing 2 existing alternatives is unaffected by 
(independent of) the presence of additional alternatives. 3 price elasticity of demand measures the responsiveness of demand to a change in price. 
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23 Retail Supply 
2.3.1 The Range of Providers 
Retail suppliers of fever/malaria drugs can include pharmacies, licensed and unlicensed drug 
shops, general shops, kiosks, market stalls and itinerant drug hawkers. The non-pharmacy 
retailers are known variously as drugs sellers, chemical sellers, patent medicine vendors or 
informal private providers. They operate on a commercial retail basis, selling drugs over-the- 
counter. No professional consultation is required for purchase, and staff are not required to be 
fully qualified pharmacists, but they are allowed to stock only non-prescription medicines. This 
section focuses on these non-pharmacy outlets, although it is recognised that there are many 
similarities with the operation of some formal pharmacies, which are not always staffed by 
appropriate personnel (Goel et al. 1996). There may also be other drug sources for consumers, 
such as clinics that sell drugs without consultation, facility staff who illegally sell drugs 
intended for facility patients, or householders who buy in bulk and sell to fellow-villagers 
(Adome, Whyte and Hardon 1996; Geissler et al. 2000; Van der Geest 1987). However, this 
review focuses on commercial retailers, such as shops, stalls and hawkers. 
2.3.2 Methods for Studying Retail Providers 
Methods for studying retail supply of public health commodities have been reviewed by Conteh 
and Hanson (Conteh and Hanson 2003). They document ten possible data collection techniques: 
structured questionnaires, unstructured interviews, direct observation, unobtrusive observation 
(under-cover care-seekers), record review, retail audits (sales level surveys), group discussions, 
point of purchase surveys (exit interviews), and diaries. They highlight a number of key issues. 
Firstly, it is often necessary to develop some kind of sampling frame of outlets where no official 
lists are available, and this is essential if representative data are required. Secondly, there are 
important trade-offs in the choice of method between the potential to capture representative 
quantitative data (e. g. structured questionnaires) and the potential to capture detailed qualitative 
information, and to develop a discussion and rapport (e. g. unstructured interviews, direct 
observation, group discussions). A mixture of data collection methods is generally appropriate, 
allowing information from different sources to be triangulated, and sources of discrepancy to be 
investigated. This is particularly important if providers are likely to put on their `best behaviour' 
before an open observer, or present a `wishful self-image' under questioning. 
4 under-cover care-seekers are research assistants with fictitious case scenarios, who visit providers and 
request their assistance, without informing the providers that they are involved in research, in order to 
collect data on typical provision. 
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A range of studies have looked specifically at the retail supply of antimalarials in sub-Saharan 
Africa (Alilio et al. 1997; Djimde et al. 1998; Faye et al. 1996; Jimmy, Achelonu and Orji 2000; 
Julvez 1999; Marsh et al. 1999; Massele et al. 1993; Molyneux et al. 1999; Nsimba et al. 1999; 
Ongore and Nyabola 1996; Tavrow, Shabahang and Makama 2003) and others have looked 
more broadly at retail sector drug supply (Adikwu 1996; Adome, Whyte and Hardon 1996; 
Brieger et al. 2004a; Cocks and Dold 2000; Fassin 1988; Geissler et al. 2000; Maiga et al. 2003; 
Mujinja, Mpembeni and Lake 2003; Murray et al. 1998; Oshiname and Brieger 1992; Reynolds 
Whyte and Birungi 2000; Van der Geest 1987). 
The studies are roughly equally divided between rural and urban/peri-urban areas, with several 
covering both settings. Most use structured questionnaires administered to sales staff, 
supplemented in some cases by in-depth interviews, undercover care-seekers, direct 
observation, outlet mapping, exit interviews and household surveys. For example, in Mali, 
structured questionnaires were conducted with health workers, pharmacists and drug sellers, 
supplemented by an undercover care-seeker assessment (Djimde et al. 1998). In coastal Kenya, 
all shops and pharmacies were mapped, an audit taken of antimalarials stocked, and semi- 
structured interviews held with a range of health care providers (Molyneux et al. 1999). 
Analysis of quantitative data has been limited to relatively simple descriptive work; only one 
study of pharmacy transactions in Mali used multivariate analytical techniques (Maiga et al. 
2003). Many studies report difficulties in collecting data from retail providers. Refusal rates 
were over 20% in some settings (Faye et al. 1996; Jimmy, Achelonu and Orji 2000; Mujinja, 
Mpembeni and Lake 2003), and others found evidence of a divergence between reported and 
actual provider behaviour (Alilio et al. 1997). 
2.3.3 Provider Characteristics 
There is considerable variation in retailer type across settings. In Senegal, Mali, Nigeria and 
Cameroon drugs are sold in static shops, but itinerant vendors are also important retail suppliers 
(Djimde et al. 1998; Faye et al. 1996; Oshiname and Brieger 1992; Van der Geest 1987). In 
Nigeria, medicine pedlars on motorcycles were found to provide the bulk of Western health care 
to remote hamlets (Oshiname and Brieger 1992). Itinerant sellers are less common in East and 
Southern Africa, where retailers are generally all static. In some areas of East and West Africa, 
drugs are sold by small drug shops specialising in pharmaceuticals, as well as general stores 
(Adikwu 1996; Adome, Whyte and Hardon 1996; Brieger et al. 2004a; Dzator and Asafu 
Adjaye 2004; Nsimba et al. 1999). However, in rural areas of western and coastal Kenya, there 
are no such drug stores, and all retail drug purchases are made from general retailers, sometimes 
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called ordinary provision stores, which also sell food and a range of household goods (Marsh et 
al. 1999; Molyneux et al. 1999; Tavrow, Shabahang and Makama 2003). 
Some similarities across drug retailers can be noted, particularly in stocking patterns. Nearly all 
stock modem manufactured medicines only, an exception being the Amayeza stores in South 
Africa's Eastern Cape province, which also stock a wide range of traditional remedies (Cocks 
and Dold 2000). Retailers tend to stock a wide variety of painkillers/antipyretics and the first 
line antimalarial, which at the time of most studies was chloroquine. Chloroquine was generally 
available under its generic (non-proprietary) name and under a variety of brand names (Adome, 
Whyte and Hardon 1996; Molyneux et al. 1999; Nsimba et al. 1999). In Kenya, 13 different 
chloroquine brands were identified (Ongore and Nyabola 1996). Other products found include 
antihelminthics, antihistamines, antiprotozoals, and cough and stomach ache remedies. Most 
drug stores stock prescription-only medicines illegally, such as antibiotics and tranquillisers, 
which are often kept under the counter (Adikwu 1996; Adome, Whyte and Hardon 1996; Fassin 
1988; Geissler et al. 2000; Murray et al. 1998; Oshiname and Brieger 1992; Van der Geest 
1987). In coastal Kenya, 7% of rural and 40% of urban general stores stocking drugs had 
prescription-only medicines (Molyneux et al. 1999). Drugs are often stored and handled in an 
inappropriate way, for example being kept in conditions of excessive heat, light and moisture, 
and stored in re-used, wrongly labelled containers (Geissler et al. 2000; Van der Geest 1987). 
The use of prescriptions from health professionals is very unusual, and in most cases sellers 
simply sell the drugs requested by customers (Adome, Whyte and Hardon 1996; Brieger et al. 
2004a; Fassin 1988; Geissler et at. 2000; Ongore and Nyabola 1996; Oshiname and Brieger 
1992). Customers may request products by their scientific name or by commonly recognised 
descriptions, such as "white capsules for diarrhoea" (Adome, Whyte and Hardon 1996). It is 
very rare for sellers to refuse to sell a drug. However, some sellers give a considerable amount 
of advice on drugs and doses (Brieger et al. 2004a). In Uganda, many customers asked for such 
advice, and drug shop staff often made instant diagnoses and drug recommendations, operating 
as storefront clinics (Adome, Whyte and Hardon 1996). Staff appeared to be influenced by 
practices in government outlets; 77% of drugs used in self-medication were on the essential 
drug list, and the advice given was often similar to government protocols. 
Education levels vary across providers, but most have little or no formal training in medicine or 
pharmacy. Drug shop staff may be untrained, or qualified as, for example, medical assistants or 
nurses, perhaps with some experience in the formal health sector (Adome, Whyte and Hardon 
1996; Nsimba et al. 1999; Oshiname and Brieger 1992). In some cases current government staff 
also work in drug stores (Adome, Whyte and Hardon 1996). In Nigeria it was the convention 
that patent medicine vendors had completed primary school, but this was not a legal 
32 
requirement and no other qualifications were required (Oshiname and Brieger 1992). Even 
where the official owner or licensee has health-related qualifications, outlets are often staffed by 
other less qualified assistants (Brieger et at. 2004a; Kumaranayake et at. 2003; Oshiname and 
Brieger 1992). Staff in general shops very rarely have any training or relevant experience, and 
in Uganda many were illiterate (Adome, Whyte and Hardon 1996). 
Relatively little is known about the distribution chain to drug retailers, beyond their immediate 
sources. Retailers usually obtain their drugs from general wholesalers, or large retail or 
wholesale pharmacies, although mobile distributors operate in some settings (Marsh et al. 
2004). In Western Kenya all pharmacies bought from large wholesale pharmacies, but 60% of 
shops/kiosks used wholesale general shops, and mobile vendors also frequently supplied rural 
shop/kiosks (Tavrow, Shabahang and Makama 2003). In Nigeria, sales representatives from 
pharmacies and pharmaceutical companies were the main source of drugs for patent medicine 
vendors in a peri-urban area (Adikwu 1996). Several studies report the presence of significant 
quantities of smuggled drugs in shops (Faye et al. 1996; Van der Geest 1987). 
Common information sources for shopkeepers are the radio, their wholesalers, and the 
instructions provided by manufacturers (Alilio et al. 1997; Ongore and Nyabola 1996). In most 
settings retailers are not members of professional associations, but there are exceptions. In a 
town in western Nigeria, the majority of drug sellers were members of the local branch of The 
Nigerian Association of Patent and Propriety Medicine Dealers, founded in 1951 (Oshiname 
and Brieger 1992). 
2.3.4 The Determinants of Provider Behaviour 
The determinants of provider behaviour are much less studied than those of consumer 
behaviour, but a couple of authors have tried to provide a framework for doing so. Tawfiq 
suggests that the behaviour of informal providers is influenced by four main factors: their 
knowledge and clinical skills, client expectations, profit margins, and pharmaceutical company 
promotions (Tawfik 2001). For retail pharmacies, Goel et al. propose a framework based on 
pharmacy staffing and organisational patterns, client expectations, physician practice and local 
regulatory factors (Goel et al. 1996). 
Most studies focus on provider knowledge, although it is recognised that knowledge is not a 
good predictor of behaviour (Williams and Jones 2004). The studies show that provider 
knowledge of drugs and doses is often very poor. For example, amongst retailers in rural 
Tanzania, knowledge of signs and symptoms of malaria was adequate, but 90% did not know 
precise chloroquine doses for children (Alilio et al. 1997). In Nigeria only one out of 49 patent 
33 
medicine vendor owners knew the correct dose of chloroquine for a three -year-old (Oshiname 
and Brieger 1992). 
Another important determinant of provider behaviour is their beliefs about patients' attitudes 
and preferences, which will in turn depend on the characteristics of their clients, such as 
education, socio-economic status, age and gender (Goel et al. 1996). For example, even if they 
are aware that an oral therapy would be appropriate, they may sell injectable formulations if 
they know that patients believe injections to be more effective. Careful interpretation of claims 
of such consumer pressure is required, as providers may choose to blame consumers for their 
own profit-maximising strategies. For example, private practitioners in Bombay reported strong 
pressure to respond to demand for N saline in order to retain patients (Kamat 2001). However, 
during observation in their clinics such patient demands were rarely heard, although several 
practitioners were observed persuading their patients to accept an IV drip! 
One would also expect retailer behaviour to be influenced by their cost structure, profit margins 
and competition from other providers, but there is very little evidence about such financial 
incentives. There are also a range of incentives that may feature in the objective function of staff 
which are not immediately financial (although some could be seen to some degree as long-term 
competitive strategies). For example, provider objectives may include promotion, serving the 
community, and being seen as a respectable, trustworthy citizen, or being seen as professionally 
competent by one's peers (Goel et al. 1996). The impact of these factors on provision will 
depend on the role of the different staff, and the degree of autonomy each member has. 
2.3.5 Retail Regulation 
The scope of retail outlet regulation concerns the availability, labelling, dispensing, and 
marketing of drugs, the qualifications of staff, the location and nature of the premises, and in 
some circumstances the prices charged. In Africa the main regulatory role is taken by 
government, as regulation by professional or consumer associations is very limited (Leonard 
2000). The legal status of retailers varies. Some operate entirely within the law, others are legal 
entities but perform some illegal activities, and others are completely illegal outlets. The legal 
boundaries for drug retailing vary across countries, so a legal activity in one country may be 
considered illicit elsewhere. 
Regulation is notoriously ineffective. Some retailers are required to be licensed by government 
at a national or local level, but many do not comply. For example, in Kano State, Nigeria, only 
15% of drug sellers were registered with the Federal Government (Tawfik 2001). In a study of 
drug stores and pharmacies in Dar es Salaam, 85% of undercover care-seekers obtained 
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prescription-only drugs without a prescription, and 24% of drug shop staff freely admitted 
operating outside the regulations (Kumaranayake et al. 2003; Mujinja, Mpembeni and Lake 
2003). In Uganda, 60% of chloroquine purchases reported in a household survey came from 
sources not authorised to provide antimalarials (Adome, Whyte and Hardon 1996). In Nigeria, 
all patent medicine vendors were aware that certain drugs were prescription-only, but only 13% 
believed the law was being obeyed (Adikwu 1996). 
Strengthening regulatory control has posed great challenges due to the lack of enforcement 
capability (Kumaranayake 1997; Tawfik 2001). In Dar es Salaam over half of pharmacy owners 
rated the government's effectiveness in regulating the pharmaceutical sector as low or very low 
(Mujinja, Lake and Mpembeni 1999), for example citing the failure to penalise shops flouting 
regulations, and the lack of regular inspections. This was argued to reflect inadequate staffing 
and transport. In a peri-urban area of Nigeria, only 33% of patent medicine vendors reported an 
inspection visit during the previous two years (Adikwu 1996). Implementation is likely to be 
even less adequate among the more informal outlets, especially in rural areas (Foster 1991; 
Tawfik 2001). 
2.4 Retail Sector Interventions 
There has been increasing interest from national and international policymakers in interventions 
to improve retail sector outcomes. For example, WHO now advocates strategies to improve 
home-based management for malaria, with retailer interventions seen as one possible channel 
for these strategies (WHO 2004). However, this enthusiasm is not universally shared. In many 
countries calls for a more active role for retailers have met with resistance from at least some 
government health personnel, who favour stricter enforcement of pharmaceutical laws or 
outright banning of drug retailers (Brieger 2002; Reynolds Whyte and Birungi 2000). 
Interventions to improve child health and malaria-related activities of African retailers have 
been reviewed by Brieger et al. (Brieger et al. 2004b). The review identified only 15 
interventions, all but two of which had taken place in the last five years, demonstrating that the 
widespread interest in this area is a relatively recent phenomenon. The interventions were 
geographically concentrated, with five in Kenya, four in Nigeria, and none outside Anglophone 
Africa (although this may reflect an anglophone bias in the search strategy employed). 
Brieger et al. categorise the activities used in these interventions into four areas. Firstly, 
training/capacity building strategies were implemented by all 15 programmes, including 
workshops, in-shop education and job aids. Secondly, eleven programmes addressed the 
enabling environment, for example, through changes in drug policy and regulations, or 
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improvements to product quality. Ten programmes included demand generation, through mass 
media or community volunteers to encourage appropriate use of retailers and medicine by 
consumers. Finally, six addressed quality assurance through franchising and accreditation, 
retailer associations, or monitoring and supervision. 
In Nigeria, for example, training was provided to patent medicine vendors on recognition and 
treatment of a range of common health problems (Oshiname and Brieger 1992). In Western 
Kenya, wholesalers who supplied drug retailers were given training, and supplied with 
information, education and communication (IEC) materials for distribution to their customers 
(Tavrow, Shabahang and Makama 2003). In Tanzania, drug stores were given the opportunity to 
join an accredited network, once they had fulfilled certain criteria, and their staff had attended a 
three-month training course (Sigonda-Ndomondo 2004). They benefited from the branding and 
marketing of this network, and were permitted to stock a wider range of products than other 
drug stores. 
Brieger et al. found the evidence base on retailer interventions to be weak; only 11 interventions 
had been evaluated, and in most cases evaluation outcome measures were limited. The only 
study which attempted to estimate the impact on care received took place in Kilifi, rural Kenya, 
where training workshops were held for general shopkeepers, accompanied by community 
mobilisation and monitoring/supervision activities. The proportion of shop-treated childhood 
fevers receiving an adequate amount of a recommended antimalarial rose from 2% to 15%, at an 
economic cost of US$4.00 per additional appropriately treated case (year 2000 prices). It was 
estimated that a modified district-scale programme could reduce this cost to $0.84 (varying 
between $0.37 and $1.36 in a sensitivity analysis) (Goodman et al. submitted; Marsh et al. 
2004). Brieger et al. concluded that retail sector interventions can increase the frequency of 
appropriate treatment, but the evidence for sustained impact is limited, and it is not possible to 
judge the relative merits of different strategies. 
2.5 Summary and Limitations of the Literature 
An extensive literature exists describing consumer perceptions of malaria, treatment-seeking 
patterns, and their determinants. It provides rich background information, drawing out common 
themes and patterns across different settings. Most studies focus on children under five, as the 
group most biologically vulnerable to malaria. While there is cross-country variation, in many 
settings self/home-treatment is a major source of care for fever/malaria, often using drugs 
purchased through shops. Treatment both from shops and facilities is often inadequate, 
characterised by inappropriate drugs, incorrect dosing, and poor quality drugs. Key 
determinants of treatment choice include consumer knowledge, SES, and preferences for the 
36 
characteristics of drugs and providers, including accessibility, speed of service, stock reliability, 
expertise, courtesy, and of course cost. 
The range of non-pharmacy retailers supplying drugs includes drug shops, general stores, 
kiosks, market stalls, and itinerant drug hawkers, with their relative importance varying across 
settings. They stock painkillers/antipyretics, and often have common antimalarials, as well as 
illegally stocked prescription-only medicines. Staff education levels and advice given to patients 
are highly variable. Little is known about the determinants of provider behaviour, but they are 
likely to include provider knowledge, patient expectations, financial incentives, and the 
maintenance of a good reputation. Retail regulations are poorly implemented, reflecting weak 
enforcement capacity. A number of interventions for improving retail care have been piloted, 
but the evidence base on their effectiveness remains limited. 
This review highlights a number of key gaps and unanswered questions concerning both the 
demand and supply of treatment of fever/malaria. On the demand side, a considerable quantity 
of qualitative or quantitative data has been collected on treatment seeking for fever/malaria 
among young children, but there is relatively little information about the practices for adults and 
older children. Although the under-five group experiences the highest mortality risks, 
antimalarial drug use is common across all age groups. Knowledge of treatment patterns in 
older age groups is important for understanding their health outcomes and overall drug pressure, 
and for quantifying drug needs for the future (Guyatt and Snow 2004). Secondly, there is a need 
for more investigation of factors affecting demand for non-facility outlets such as drug shops 
and general stores. In existing consumer-focused research these outlets are often grouped in the 
"self/home-treatment" or even "no treatment" category. Even where shop visits are categorised 
separately, few studies distinguish between shop types. 
Literature on retail supply of fever/malaria treatment is not nearly as extensive as that on 
demand. Conteh and Hanson conclude that methods for studying the behaviour of retail 
providers remain relatively under-developed, and particularly lack adaptation for informal 
outlets (Conteh and Hanson 2003). Although a number of studies have described informal 
outlets such as shops and kiosks, in view of their importance in treatment seeking, much more 
work is needed in this area. In addition, only a few studies incorporate the full range of 
providers from hospitals to informal kiosks, and allow an analysis of the substitutability and 
complementarity between these different provider types. 
There is a complete lack of accurate quantitative data on the actual size of the market in terms of 
sales volumes and values, and no established methods for estimating this. Nearly all reviews 
continue to quote the back-of-the-envelope estimates of the share of antimalarials distributed 
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through the private sector made by Foster over a decade ago (Foster 1991). In addition there are 
few representative studies of drug quality in Africa, especially in retail outlets, despite frequent 
perception that this is a serious problem. Although regulatory non-compliance is well- 
documented, there is little analysis of its underlying causes. 
Finally, most studies have had a medical focus, emphasising training and knowledge of 
providers, and whether their behaviour conforms to recommended treatment guidelines (Brieger 
2002). There is a lack of analysis of retailers as economic agents facing a wide range of 
financial and non-financial incentives, and almost no discussion of the influence of market 
structure or the nature of retail competition on these commercial providers (Conteh and Hanson 
2003; Goel et al. 1996). 
The research described in this thesis contributes towards addressing these gaps in several ways. 
Firstly, data are reported on demand for fever/malaria treatment for all age groups, providing 
descriptive information on behaviour amongst older children and adults, which is currently 
lacking. The demand analysis also distinguishes between drug and general stores. On the supply 
side, the focus of the thesis is on retailers, such as drug shops, general shops and kiosks. 
However, the full spectrum of formal and informal providers of drugs for fever/malaria 
treatment is included in data collection, to allow comparison across provider type. Market size 
and concentration are estimated in the study areas, and retail drug quality assessed. Finally, an 
economic framework is used to explore the operation of retailers, and the influences on their 
behaviour. The next chapter reviews the economics literature to draw out key concepts, theories 
and methods that may form part of this framework of analysis. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A REVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC LITERATURE ON 
MARKETS AND COMPETITION 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews economic theories of markets and competition which may provide insights 
for the analysis of the retail market for fever/malaria treatment. It begins in Section 3.2 with a 
review of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm and standard models of competition. 
Section 3.3 reviews methods for defining the market under consideration. The light that 
economic theory can shed on the determinants of market structure is considered in Section 3.4, 
and on provider conduct in Section 3.5. Finally, Section 3.6 summarises the evidence on the key 
features of competition in markets for health care and pharmaceuticals, and the African retail 
sector. 
3.2 The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) Paradigm and Standard Models of 
Competition 
The original SCP model associated with Joe Bain and Edward Mason was based on a 
deterministic relationship: structure (the number of sellers, degree of product differentiation, 
barriers to entry and vertical integration) determined firm conduct (business goals, strategies 
and competitive practices), and so yielded predictions about market performance in terms of 
efficiency, profitability, technical progress and growth (Clarke 1985). Broadly speaking, a more 
highly concentrated market structure' was associated with less price competition, higher prices 
and higher profits, termed the "market concentration doctrine" (Demsetz 1973). Different levels 
of market concentration were associated with particular models of competition, ranging from 
the least concentrated (perfect competition) to the most concentrated (monopoly). Although 
uncommon, these extreme forms of competition demonstrate the range of potential outcomes. In 
between these two extremes lies a continuum of imperfect competition, encompassing 
monopolistic competition (relatively low concentration) and oligopoly/duopoly (high 
concentration). The structure, conduct and performance associated with each of these four 
models are summarised in Table A1.1 in Annex 1. 
A key difference between the models lies in the degree of control individual firms have over the 
price they are paid. In a perfectly competitive market, theory predicts that the market price will 
equal the marginal cost of production. All firms will be "price-takers"; they have no discretion 
1 in a highly concentrated market a few large firms account for the majority of production or sales 
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concerning the price they charge because if they sell at less than the market equilibrium price 
they will make a loss, and if they choose a higher price, they will have no customers. By 
contrast, under imperfect competition, firms have some degree of market power. This may arise, 
for example, from product differentiation combined with heterogeneous consumer preferences, 
so that switching to another provider will reduce a patient's utility. Alternatively consumers 
may have imperfect information on product characteristics, but will not search the whole market 
due to search-related costs. As a result, individual firms face downward sloping demand curves 
and can raise price without losing all their customers. 
The main features distinguishing monopolistic and oligopolistic competition are that under 
monopolistic competition, entry and exit are possible, and there are a sufficient number of 
providers that each one in selecting its own action takes the actions of the competing providers 
as given (Chamberlin 1933). Although in reality the behaviour of any firm is likely to influence 
at least its close neighbours in geographical or product space, this assumption provides a useful 
abstraction from such strategic behaviour (Tirole 1988). In the short-run firms may charge a 
price greater than average cost, but in the long-run new firms will enter, to the point where each 
firm makes zero economic profits. However, price will generally remain above marginal cost as 
each firm operates at less than minimum efficient scale2. The societal costs of this inefficiency 
compared with perfect competition should be weighed against the societal benefits of product 
variety (Varian 1999). 
Under oligopolistic competition the number of firms is small enough that each firm factors into 
their decisions the knowledge that the quantity they sell depends on the pricing and capacity 
decisions of other producers, as well as their own price (Parkin, Powell and Matthews 1997). 
Scherer states "in general it is considered that when the leading four firms control 40% or more 
of the total market, it is fair to assume that oligopoly is beginning to rear its head" (Scherer 
1970). There is no one model of oligopoly that applies in all settings; in fact Tirole notes that 
"the proliferation of theories is mirrored by an equally rich array of behavioural patterns 
actually observed under oligopoly" (Tirole 1988). The different models vary in their 
assumptions about the choice of decision parameters and the sequence of decisions. In some 
models firms select the quantity to produce, and let the market determine the price through the 
interaction of demand and supply; in others they set price, and let the market determine the 
quantity sold. Some key oligopoly models are described in Box 3.1, illustrating the range of 
possible implications for price and quantity produced. 
2 the minimum efficient scale is the level of output that minimises average cost. 
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Box 3.1 Models of Oligopoly 
Three classes of models describing price and quantity setting under oligopoly are described 
below, based on simultaneous decisions by firms, leader-follower scenarios and collusion. In 
addition, the Kinked Demand model provides insights into the causes of price rigidity. The 
simpler case of duopoly is often used an illustration, as it has the virtue of simplicity while still 
capturing the main elements of oligopolistic competition. 
The Cournot and Bertrand models are based on the assumption of simultaneous decision- 
making by firms, over the quantity produced for Cournot, and over the price charged for 
Bertrand (Varian 1999). Firms choose their quantity or price to maximise profits, given their 
expectations about the decisions of other firms. For Cournot, firms will gradually approach 
equilibrium where their expectations about each other's behaviour are confirmed. At this point 
each firm is producing the output which maximises profits, given the output of the other firm. 
The output and price set lie between those in perfect competition and monopoly. As the number 
of firms increases, each firm's influence on market price decreases, market output rises, market 
price falls, and when the number of firms becomes large enough, the market approaches the 
perfectly competitive equilibrium. For Bertrand, with homogenous goods, firms will see it to 
their advantage to cut their price in each period, if they assume the other firm's price is fixed. 
This will continue until the perfect competition equilibrium is reached, a surprising conclusion 
in a oligopolistic structure. A weakness of these models is the assumption of zero conjectural 
variations; they assume each firm will take the other firm's choices as given from one period to 
the next, when in fact both continue to revise their choices until equilibrium is reached. In 
addition, the Bertrand conclusion is sensitive to the assumption of homogeneity of goods. 
A second class of models is based on a leader-follower scenario, argued to apply in situations 
where one firm clearly dominates the market (Varian 1999). In the Stackleberg model, the 
follower sets their quantity produced, given the output of the leader, and the leader chooses their 
quantity to maximise profits, given the reaction function of the follower. In Price Leadership 
models (also called Dominant Firm theories) the leader sets price, given the supply function of 
the follower. In the case of homogenous goods, in equilibrium the follower must then set their 
price equal to this market rate, and will produce up to the point where this price equals their 
marginal cost. 
The third class of models focuses on the potential for collusion between oligopolists. Firms in a 
cartel are hypothesised to co-operate to choose price or quantity supplied to maximise total 
industry profits, and therefore act collectively as a monopolist. The strategic interdependence 
and the high level of concentration under oligopoly increases the probability of price collusion, 
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although this will not necessarily be initiated nor sustained. In the short-run it is to the 
advantage of each individual firm to cheat on a collusive agreement by lowering price or 
increasing quantity in order to gain market share. The insights of game theory have been used to 
explore the incentives for cheating, and the characteristics of competitive interaction which may 
discourage this (Tirole 1988). Cheating is argued to be less likely where the number of firms is 
small, interaction is repeated, secret price cutting is not possible, the market is stable, firms sell 
homogenous products and face homogenous demand and cost conditions, and have multi- 
market contact (the same firms compete on several different products). Cheating may also be 
discouraged if firms adopt credible retaliation strategies to punish cheaters. 
Finally, the Kinked Demand model shows how prices may be rigid if firms believe that any 
price cuts they make will be matched by other firms, but that any price increases will not. As a 
result, for differentiated products the demand curve facing each firm will be more elastic for 
price increases than for price cuts, and for homogenous products the demand curve will be 
infinitely elastic for price increases (i. e. their sales will fall to zero). The resulting discontinuity 
in the marginal revenue function implies that firms may not change their price in the face of 
quite large changes in costs or demand. 
The implications for equilibrium price vary considerably across the different models (Varian 
1999). At one extreme, the Bertrand model predicts that price will fall to its perfectly 
competitive level; at the other extreme, under successful collusion the monopoly price will 
prevail. The Cournot, Stackleberg and Price Leadership models imply a price somewhere in 
between. The Kinked Demand model makes no specific prediction about how prices are set 
initially, but explains how existing prices may be sticky downwards. Ultimately the choice of an 
appropriate model cannot be made on a purely theoretical basis, but must reflect empirical 
evidence on how firms make their decisions in practice. 
The nature of the relationship between market structure and provider conduct has been a source 
of considerable debate in the industrial organisation literature over the last three decades. As a 
result, emphasis on the deterministic relationship between structure and conduct has diminished, 
with increasing recognition that the direction of causation between structure and conduct is two- 
way (Scherer 1970; Waterson 1984). For example, a firm's conduct can be targeted strategically 
at changing the structure of the industry through advertising or predatory pricing policies. 
Secondly, it is recognised that the nature of competition is shaped by potential competition 
rather than just current levels of market concentration (Baumol, Panzar and Willig 1988). In a 
perfectly contestable market, potential entrants and incumbents operate under identical cost or 
product quality conditions and the new entrant is able to enter and leave the industry at no net 
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cost. Where a market has high levels of contestability, firms may have very little market power, 
even if there are currently few firms in the market. 
In addition, all providers are not solely motivated by the objective of profit maximisation that 
underlies all four basic competition models. Firstly, in many firms there is a separation of 
ownership and control between managers and owners, and managers will aim to maximise their 
own utility, which may include their salary, job security, promotion, power and reputation, as 
well as company profits. Secondly, many health care providers have not-for-profit status, and 
therefore neither owners nor managers would be expected to pursue profit maximisation, but are 
likely to include the quality of patient health outcomes and the welfare of the community 
explicitly among their objectives. Even where firms have an official for-profit status, such 
objectives may be important to practitioners, who are concerned with patient welfare and/or 
influenced by strong codes of professional ethics. Finally, the model of staff as maximisers may 
be inappropriate; in reality they may exhibit "satisficing" behaviour, aimed at achieving 
satisfactory target levels rather than maximum levels of the variables in the objective function. 
Under any of these scenarios one would expect the relationship between structure and conduct 
to differ from the pure profit maximisation case. In particular, an organisation may not use its 
market power, for example to raise prices or induce demand, even where this potential exists. 
Incorporating these elements, the analysis of structure and conduct continues to provide a useful 
starting point for exploring the nature of competition in markets. The framework can be used to 
investigate what providers compete over, what strategies they use to enhance their competitive 
position and the intensity of this competition. Before discussing the key features of structure and 
conduct below, the difficult question of market definition is considered. 
3.3 Defining the Market 
The first step in any analysis of competition is to identify the competitors which make up the 
market. A variety of definitions of the term "market" are available, beginning with the simplest 
- any set of arrangements by which buyers and sellers are in contact to exchange goods and 
services. Economic theory is based on a rather more precise concept, with a well-defined market 
consisting of the set of suppliers and demanders whose trading establishes the price, quantity 
and quality of a good or service (Dranove and White 1998), or the group of sellers and buyers of 
a set of products who are in sufficiently close contact for their transactions to affect the terms on 
which the others buy or sell (Tirole 1988). 
The delineation of markets is generally considered along two dimensions - the product and the 
geographical area. Although much attention has been focused on the issue of health care market 
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definition for the purpose of antitrust cases in the US hospital market, there remain many 
methodological and empirical problems in identifying the providers to include. 
3.3.1 Defining the Product 
The range of products in a market can be considered from the perspective of substitutability in 
demand or supply (Zwanziger, Melnick and Eyre 1994). Products are substitutable in demand if, 
following an increase in price, the consumer could easily switch from one to the other (high 
cross price elasticity of demand), meaning that the products are good substitutes from the 
consumer's perspective. They are substitutable in supply if it is almost costless for a supplier to 
convert their production process from one product to another, meaning that the market 
definition should include providers which either produce the same product or could easily do so 
(reflecting the insights of contestability theory). 
In many health care markets identifying the product of interest is not straightforward. A central 
issue is the degree of aggregation to use. For example, in the analysis of hospital competition, 
product definition could be based on a single procedure, a single diagnostic related group 
(DRG), a major diagnostic category, a speciality, or even a group of specialities (Ashton and 
Press 1997). Such a "cluster market" approach has often been used, for example based on 
"general acute hospital services" (Gaynor and Vogt 2000), although it may not be clear that the 
whole cluster is substitutable in demand or supply. The choice of product definition will have an 
important impact on the analysis as, for example, the more aggregate the measure, the lower the 
expected concentration. 
3.3.2 Defining the Geographical Area 
Once the product/product group has been specified, the next step is to define the geographical 
area within which providers of this product operate in one market. In health care this will be 
highly dependent on the local context, and in particular how far people are prepared to travel to 
seek care. This is likely to vary with the urgency and severity of the condition and the ease of 
travel, with patients likely to be willing to travel a greater distance for more specialized 
services. 
There are several possible methods of market area definition: 
" Political boundary approaches, where an arbitrary geographical or political area is used, 
such as a district or metropolitan area (Joskow 1980) 
" Fixed radius approaches, where a provider's market is defined as the area surrounding it 
of a given radius (Robinson and Luft 1987) 
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" Shipment methods, which use utilisation data by patient origin to define the market area by 
minimising the proportion of customers who travel outside the area to purchase the product, 
and maximizing the proportion who remain within the area. In other words, the geographic 
market is expanded until "imports" and "exports" are a small proportion of total sales 
(Gaynor and Vogt 2000) 
" Price based approaches, where the geographic market is defined as the area within which a 
price movement at any one location causes related price changes everywhere else. 
Zwanziger et al. note that "Three basic approaches have been proposed or used to define 
geographic markets: ones based on political boundaries, price, and shipments. None of them 
adequately reflects the characteristics of hospital markets" (Zwanziger, Melnick and Eyre 
1994). While price based approaches could be considered as conceptually sound, being the most 
directly related to the economic definition of a market, they suffer from serious operational 
problems. It is difficult to look at "price" for a highly differentiated product, and difficult to 
isolate price change as a response to a competitor's price change from changes due to any other 
non-competitive factors (Zwanziger, Melnick and Eyre 1994). Moreover, a price based 
approach is of little use in markets where consumers and providers do not respond to price 
signals, which may be the case where health care insurance coverage is high. 
An advantage of shipment methods is that utilisation data by patient origin are generally 
relatively easily available. A disadvantage is that the cut-offs for imports and exports are 
essentially arbitrary. Also such data pertain only to the current mix of competitors serving a 
geographical area, ignoring contestability. For example, two areas may be defined as separate 
markets because no product currently flows between them, although such flows would take 
place if the provider in one area increased their price. Conversely producers in two different 
markets may sell highly differentiated products, so that there are considerable flows between the 
markets, but the producers are not in the same market. 
Approaches based on political boundaries are very simple to use, but Zwanziger et at. argue that 
they are "usually misleading proxies for hospital market areas" (Zwanziger, Melnick and Eyre 
1994). They do not account for local market conditions and provider characteristics, or the 
potential for different services to have different sized catchment areas. Zwanziger et al. argue 
that they tend to overstate competition, as all hospitals in the area are considered as competing 
with all others, although in reality they often compete with only a few close neighbours. 
Alternatively a competing hospital may be ignored because it is located just on the other side of 
a political boundary, although people regularly cross such borders to seek care. Fixed radius 
approaches suffer from many of the same critiques. In addition they take no account of 
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geographic boundaries, ease of travel, and the nature of population centres (Luft and Maerki 
1984). 
A general problem with all the non-price based methods is that they are designed to describe the 
range of competitors for one given provider. By contrast, defining a closed group of providers 
that comprise a defined market is much more difficult, because the spatial character of health 
care competition means that there are often overlapping sets of competitors. Moreover, some 
providers may serve customers in a local area only, but compete with others that serve 
customers from a wider region. 
In addition, with both product and geographic market definitions, the difference between 
distinct markets and market segmentation is difficult to define. Segmentation may occur where 
consumers differ in their preferences, leading firms to offer different quality products (Sutton 
1991). For product definitions it is difficult to draw the line between products in the same 
market and products that are considered to operate in different markets but to be substitutes to 
some degree. For geographic definitions it may be unclear whether two areas should be defined 
as distinct and separate markets or as different segments of the same market. 
These grey areas lead Tirole to argue that the notion of a market in economics is an 
"idealization or a limit case" (Tirole 1988). Due to the complexities and subjectivities involved, 
it may be appropriate to use a combination of methods to define markets, incorporating both 
quantitative shipment data and qualitative data on provider perceptions of the substitutability of 
different products and providers. 
3.4 Economic Theory and Market Structure 
In this section the main elements of market structure are considered, and in the following 
section, the main elements of provider conduct. As noted above, the links between the two are 
numerous, because structure influences conduct, and some provider conduct is aimed at 
changing elements of market structure. Structure can be considered to comprise not just the 
level of market concentration, but also the nature of the product, barriers to entry and exit, and 
the regulatory system. 3 
3 The structure of many health care markets is distinctive in the large role played by insurance providers 
or health maintenance organisations. A vast health economics literature exists documenting their 
behaviour and impact, and in developed countries and many developing countries, an analysis of their 
operation would be central to an understanding of the operation of the health care market. However, the 
focus of this thesis is a market in which the role of insurance or prepayment is very limited or non- 
existent, with most care delivered on a fee-for-service basis, through out-of-pocket payments. As a result, 
the impact of such institutions has not been covered in this review. 
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3.4.1 Market Concentration 
A market has higher horizontal concentration the fewer the number of firms in production or the 
more unequal the distribution of market shares (Clarke 1985). While there is no guarantee that 
competitive markets will have low levels of concentration and vice versa, it is expected that 
markets with low concentration are potentially more competitive. Moreover concentration is 
more amenable to measurement than many other aspects of competition. Most attention in the 
literature has focused on horizontal concentration, which is discussed first below. However, as 
vertical integration can also be an important source of market power, some consideration is also 
given to its nature and importance. 
As with market definitions, measures of horizontal concentration are subject to a number of 
methodological and empirical weaknesses. The simplest measure of concentration is the number 
of providers within the market area, but this gives no idea of their relative size. In order to 
incorporate firm size, the mainstream economics literature has employed measures of market 
share based on employment, net output or sales. For hospital markets a range of measures are 
used, including total revenues, inpatient revenues, bed numbers, admissions or patient days. 
It is then possible to examine the distribution of market shares among providers, or to plot the 
concentration curve - the cumulative percentage of output plotted against the cumulative 
number of firms ranked from largest to smallest (Clarke 1985). Market A is more concentrated 
if its curve lies everywhere above that of market B. When concentration curves cross, it is not 
possible to rank them unambiguously, and for empirical analysis, some summary measure of 
concentration is generally required which embodies the distribution of market shares across 
firms. 
Two types of summary measure can be distinguished: absolute measures which relate to both 
firm numbers and relative market shares, and inequality measures which consider only the 
dispersion of market shares. Inequality measures include the Gini coefficient, the co-efficient of 
variation (ratio of standard deviation of firm size to mean firm size), and variance of logarithms 
of firm size (Clarke 1985). However, absolute measures are more widely used, with the most 
common being the concentration ratio and the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI). 
The concentration ratio measures the proportion of output accounted for by the r largest firms, 
with r often set at 3,5 or 10, for example. Formally: 
CR, = 1: S, 
t=1 
47 
where S, is the share of the 1" firm in the market. Concentration ratios are widely used in 
descriptive empirical work, as they are easy to calculate and understand. Their disadvantages 
are that they consider only the r largest firms in the industry, and the choice of r is arbitrary. 
Only a single point on the concentration curve is considered, and where the concentration 
curves of two markets intersect, the concentration ratio will give a different assessment of their 
relative concentration for different r. 
The HHI is the sum of squared firm market shares of all firms in the industry, taking account of 
all points on the concentration curve, and depending on both market share inequality and on 
firm numbers. 
N 
HH1S2 2 
! =1 
where N is the total number of firms in the industry. The HHI ranges from 0 (large number of 
competitors with small market shares) to 1 (single monopoly supplier). US antitrust guidelines 
state that an HHI below 0.1 is considered unconcentrated, 0.1-0.18 moderately concentrated, 
and greater than 0.18 highly concentrated (Gaynor and Vogt 2000). Although these cut-offs are 
essentially arbitrary, the HHI can be a useful yardstick, especially when a combination of 
measures are used. 
Vertical integration refers to the extent to which a single business unit carries out successive 
stages in the processing and distribution of a product. Integration may be backward/upstream 
where a firm moves into production of raw materials and inputs, or forward/downstream where 
a firm moves into final production and distribution. Different degrees of integration can also be 
distinguished; even where full integration has not taken place there may be considerable on- 
going vertical coordination, involving cooperation, long-term contracts or vertical restraints on 
operation. For example, manufacturers may fix the retail price of drugs, delineate the area of 
operation of their distributors, or tie the distribution of two or more of their products together. 
Standardised measures of vertical integration akin to those for horizontal integration do not 
exist, although some attempts have been made to measure vertical concentration empirically. 
For example, integration in an industry may be measured as the average ratio of employment in 
auxiliary activities to total employment across firms (Clarke 1985). 
3.4.2 Information Characteristics of Products 
The nature of the product has a crucial impact on competition, a key issue being its information 
characteristics, which reflect the ability of consumers to observe product characteristics. These 
characteristics could be considered as either part of market structure, or a feature of consumer 
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demand. Products can be characterised as search, experience, reputation or credence goods, 
although many goods have a mix of attributes. Search goods can be evaluated by inspection 
prior to purchase, examples being clothing or furniture. If goods must be purchased before 
quality can be assessed, for example, food or cars, they are termed experience goods (Nelson 
1970). If consumers tend to rely on word of mouth information about the quality of a product, it 
is termed a reputation good. For some products, termed credence goods, consumers never 
discover their true need for the product or its quality, and sellers frequently act as experts, 
determining the customers' requirements (Darby and Karni 1973). Examples of credence goods 
include many medical, legal and financial services. These information characteristics affect the 
nature of competition in several ways. For example, with experience and credence goods, where 
it is not possible to observe quality before purchase, consumers are likely to be less sensitive to 
quality differences. Where sellers not only provide the product but also advise on customer 
requirements, as with many credence goods, there is potential for imperfect agency, where the 
provider influences the consumer's choice in line with the provider's self-interest (see Section 
3.5.3). 
The problems in observing quality differences can lead to the emergence of a "market for 
lemons" (Akerlof 1970). Consumers unable to observe quality at the time of purchase will be 
unwilling to pay any price higher than that corresponding to a good of average quality. All 
goods therefore change hands at a price associated with average quality, leading higher quality 
sellers to exit, reducing average quality and price, which could lead to eventual market 
disintegration. This informational problem could be attenuated if the seller can provide 
guarantees or indirectly signal high quality (see Section 3.5.2), or if government regulation 
enforces quality controls, minimum quality standards, occupational licensing and certification. 
In addition, repeat purchases potentially enable the customer to learn from experience about 
product attributes. Repeat purchases need not be narrowly defined as restricted only to 
purchases made by the same consumer of the same good. The effect may be obtained through 
word-of-mouth from other consumers, and brand names or chains can support the development 
of a reputation influencing the choice of similar goods. The impact will be more powerful where 
consumers learn quickly about the quality of the good, repurchase frequently, and the quality of 
the good remains constant over time (e. g. wine of given vintage and vineyard). If the producer 
can change product attributes (e. g. restaurant meals), repeat purchases will not be so informative 
about future quality. 
Consumers typically have highly imperfect information about health care. Even for products or 
services with search good characteristics, the scientific or technical aspects of the health 
problem may be poorly understood, and there may be little time to collect information because 
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the patient is in a crisis situation. Pauly and Satterthwaite have argued that physician care could 
be considered a reputation good, as demand depends on the doctor's reputation for technical 
ability and interpersonal relations (Pauly and Satterthwaite 1981). In their "Increasing 
Monopoly" model they hypothesise that an increase in the number of providers can decrease the 
consumer experience and information available about each provider, making consumers less 
price sensitive, and so providing providers with greater market power. This model is most likely 
to be relevant for types of care which are frequently used, and which are not particularly 
sophisticated, so that patients feel they are able to judge the quality of the service provided. 
However, for many health care goods and services, the ability of consumers to learn from 
experience is limited either by the infrequency of purchases (e. g. acute hospital care), 
technological change, or because quality or need cannot be judged even after use (Thomson 
1994). 
3.4.3 Barriers to Entry and Exit 
Bain provides one of the broadest definitions of barriers to entry, encompassing anything which 
allows incumbent firms to earn excess profits in the long-run without inducing potential entrants 
to enter (Bain 1956). 
Bain considers 3 basic sources of barriers: 
" Absolute cost advantages, which reflect the ability of incumbents to produce a given 
output level at lower unit cost than the potential entrant, for example due to access to 
cheaper input sources, or greater ease in raising capital 
" Significant economies of scale relative to market size, which imply that if the entrant 
enters at minimum efficient scale, there is likely to be a significant fall in price, but if they 
enter on a smaller scale, they will suffer a significant cost disadvantage 
" Product differentiation advantages, where established firms have advantage over entrants 
because of consumer preferences for their products. This differentiation may reflect the 
consumer goodwill connected to the reputation of established brand names and the 
cumulative effect of past advertising. However, such advantages may be of limited duration 
if new entrants are able to establish rival products after an initial "break-in" period. 
Other barriers to entry arise from entry regulation, for example through permits, licenses, 
patents or the granting of import licences (Djankov et al. 2000). The impact of entry regulation 
on competition is not clear-cut. On the one hand it may foster cartelising behaviour by 
providers, hindering competition. Moreover, it may cause further barriers to entry because of 
delay and corruption in the licensing process (de Soto 1990). However, regulations can also act 
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as a signal of minimum quality standards, which will enhance competition where information is 
imperfect. 
Less attention is generally paid to the ease of exit from a given market. Heavy investment in 
plant and machinery may act as a barrier to exit because exiting firms are likely to incur 
substantial costs if their assets cannot be resold. Exit potential will also be affected by the risk of 
revocation of licenses by government authorities, and the potential for an organisation to go 
bankrupt. For example, some not-for-profit entities will be able to continue to function even if 
they do not break even, by relying on additional contributions from donor agencies. 
3.4.4 Regulation 
The remit of regulation is broader than the entry controls described above, potentially also 
including other targets, such as product quality, input quantities, price, location, and non- 
competitive behaviour, such as price collusion and restrictive practices (Kumaranayake et al. 
2000). These variables need not always be targeted through formal legal controls. Other 
potential instruments include informal codes of conduct, financial incentives, such as taxes and 
subsidies, or non-financial incentives, such as the opportunity to join an accreditation 
mechanism4. 
In health care, regulation has focused on responding to imperfect information, and the lack of 
incentives to minimise cost in markets served by health insurance, generally through legal 
instruments (Folland, Goodman and Stano 1993). For example, in Tanzania, Kumaranayake et 
al. found that all but one of the regulations were legally based (Kumaranayake et al. 2000). The 
majority focused on entry requirements for health care personnel (licensing) and for facilities 
(registration), with relatively little regulation to promote competitive practices or protect the 
consumer. 
The actual impact of regulation on the desired targets will depend on the market structure, cost 
conditions, objectives of the firms and availability of information. In particular, the outcome 
will be highly dependent on the enforcement capacity of the regulatory agency, and the way in 
which providers respond, discussed below under provider conduct. 
4 accreditation occurs when an independent agency defines and monitors the standards of facilities who 
voluntarily participate in the scheme. 
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3.5 Economic Theory and Provider Conduct 
Provider conduct may be a reaction to market structure or an attempt to shape it. The key 
conduct variables are discussed below, encompassing the choice of price and non-price 
attributes of products, the provider's agency role, strategies to increase market concentration, 
provider collusion and other restrictive practices, and attempts to influence the regulatory 
environment. 
3.5.1 Price Setting 
As noted in Section 3.2, market structure is argued to influence price setting behaviour. Under 
perfect competition, firms cannot raise price above marginal cost without losing all customers. 
Under monopolistic or oligopolistic competition we may expect price to exceed marginal cost, 
because each provider has some market power, due for instance to product differentiation, 
imperfect information, barriers to entry, or local pockets of high concentration. 
Strategies that providers can use both to maintain price above marginal cost, and to expand 
demand for their own products, are discussed below. In many cases suppliers may not explicitly 
calculate the impact of such strategies on the elasticity of demand, setting prices by "rules of 
thumb", such as using a standard percentage mark-up over costs, or following the prices of 
market leaders. However, overall the market can be modelled as if they make such calculations. 
Providers may not charge just one price for a given product. A seller with market power may 
engage in price discrimination, where different buyers are charged different prices for the same 
good. Price discrimination could not be maintained if those offered lower prices could resell to 
those offered higher prices. The potential for such arbitrage will depend on the nature of the 
good, and the transaction costs involved in resale. Three types of price discrimination can be 
distinguished. Under first degree or "perfect price discrimination" prices may vary for different 
units of output and from person to person. Under second degree discrimination, prices vary for 
different units of output but not from person to person (e. g. bulk discounts); and under third 
degree discrimination prices vary from person to person but not for different units of output, 
examples being discounts for senior citizens or students, who have a higher price elasticity of 
demand than other groups. Even where the characteristics of groups with varying price 
elasticities are not easily observable, providers may be able to segment the market by charging 
higher prices for more luxurious services, encouraging groups with a higher willingness to pay 
to self-select to purchase those products. 
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There is widespread historical evidence of third degree discrimination in health care, with 
physicians using sliding scales of fees to charge richer patients more than the poorer ones 
(Jacobs 1997). Through cross-subsidisation, such a strategy increases the access of poor 
patients to care, as well as being profit maximising for the provider. It is possible to maintain 
such discrimination because, for much health care, the potential for arbitrage is limited because 
the output is embodied in the patients treated. 
3.5.2 Product Differentiation 
Product differentiation exists when "due to difference in physical attributes, ancillary service, 
geographic location and/or subjective image, one firm's products are clearly preferred by at 
least some buyers over rival products at a given price" (Scherer 1970). As described above, it is 
a key feature of monopolistic competition which, combined with heterogeneous consumer 
preferences, facilitates market segmentation and provides firms with a degree of market power. 
Some elements of product differentiation are inherent in the nature of the goods concerned, and 
could be considered as part of market structure. Many others are deliberately engineered by the 
provider to enhance their competitive position, and therefore fall under provider conduct. 
Product differentiation can be either horizontal or vertical. Under horizontal differentiation the 
differences are rooted in differences in consumers' tastes and do not imply any inherent 
superiority of one product over another (e. g. sweetness of desert, colour of car, location of 
shop). In a vertically differentiated product space, all consumers agree over the preference 
ordering of product characteristics, but some goods have more desirable characteristics than 
others (e. g. audio equipment ranging from basic tape players to deluxe music systems; public 
and private rooms in an government hospital). In reality, a range of characteristics are likely to 
be relevant in both horizontal and vertical differentiation (Lancaster 1966). In health care this 
range of characteristics might include clinical curative aspects, information provision and 
reassurance, caring and comfort (Bennett 1996). 
Horizontal differentiation on the basis of one key characteristic can be analysed by analogy to 
spatial competition, following the work of Hotelling (Hotelling 1929). Products and consumers 
are modelled as located along a linear or circular product space, their proximity indicating the 
degree of match between consumer tastes and product characteristics. According to the principle 
of differentiation, firms generally do not want to locate at the same place in the product space, 
as product differentiation gives each provider some market power over the consumers in its own 
market niche, softening price competition. In the simplest version of the Hotelling model, 
buyers' preferences are uniformly distributed around a circle and as a result, the alternative 
brands locate evenly round the circle, sharing the market out between them. 
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However, the Hotelling model may also lead to minimal differentiation under certain market 
characteristics. Agglomeration may occur because consumers are distributed unevenly in 
geographical or product space, so many firms have an incentive to locate where the demand is, 
even though this will increase price competition. Firms may even deliberately try to imitate the 
product of a current market leader by locating as close as possible to an existing successful 
brand. They may also benefit from gathering in areas where costs are lowest, such as close to a 
source of raw materials. The existence of positive externalities between firms may also 
encourage them to locate in close proximity, for example to reduce the search costs of 
consumers. Alternatively, where price competition is heavily restricted through regulation or 
resale-price maintenance, there may be little incentive to differentiate. 
The relative importance of price and non-price competition through product differentiation will 
depend on the relative responsiveness of consumers to price and quality (Dranove and 
Satterthwaite 1992). If product quality is very difficult to observe or "noisy", purchasers may be 
relatively price sensitive, but quality insensitive. Providers will have little incentive to provide 
high quality services, and the equilibrium level of quality may be too low (at the extreme 
leading to the "market for lemons" scenario described above). To some degree providers can 
resist such tendencies by signalling their overall quality to potential purchasers (Spence 1973). 
In health care such signals might include gaining qualifications, and use of procedures 
associated with higher levels of expertise, such as surgery. 
Where consumers are price insensitive (for example due to the existence of third party payers), 
but quality sensitive, a quality competition model may emerge. The equilibrium level of quality 
may be excessive, and an increase in competition may result in a rise in price due to the costs of 
higher quality, rather than the fall in price anticipated from traditional economic theory. If 
certain elements of quality, such as patient amenities and technologically advanced equipment, 
are more easily perceived than others, providers may over-invest in such aspects of care, while 
neglecting less observable elements of technical quality. 
Providers may also aim to increase product differentiation through advertising and promotion. 
Some elements of advertising act as a source of information, which decreases market power by 
reducing product differentiation associated with imperfect information (Nelson 1970). However, 
in practice, much advertising conveys little "hard" information (e. g. existence of product, price, 
distributors and appearance), but plenty of "soft" information (e. g. product image), and may 
therefore increase product differentiation. 
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3.5.3 Imperfect Agency and Demand Inducement 
In situations where consumer information is imperfect and asymmetry of information exists 
between consumers and better informed providers, a principal-agent relationship may arise 
where the consumer relies on the provider as their agent for advice on appropriate demand. A 
health care provider acting as a perfect agent would choose as the patient would choose if the 
patient possessed the information that the provider does (Folland, Goodman and Stano 1993). 
There is potential for imperfect agency, where the provider influences demand for their own 
self-interest, termed supplier induced demand (SID). For example, it is argued that, faced with 
an increase in provider supply, providers will respond by using their influence to increase 
demand, in order to maintain a certain target income level (Rice and Labelle 1989). However, 
even where the potential for such action exists, SID may be constrained by mechanisms to 
control imperfect agency, including licensing, threats of legal action, ethical constraints, and the 
presence of a sufficient number of informed consumers. Asymmetry of information is 
recognised as a common situation in the provision of some (but not all) health care services, but 
the extent of SID is very difficult to establish, due to problems with its empirical measurement 
(Folland, Goodman and Stano 1993). 
3.5.4 Strategies to Increase Market Concentration 
The most obvious way for a firm to increase market concentration is through a merger or 
acquisition of another firm. Horizontal mergers involve two or more firms producing competing 
products, and may be used to reap economies of scale and/or increase market power. Vertical 
mergers involve two firms at different stages of the production process, and can be profit 
maximising wherever the behaviour of firms at one stage in the distribution chain affects the 
profits of firms at another stage. It may also be motivated by a desire to reduce the transaction 
costs, for example of discovering market prices and negotiating market contracts (Coale 1937). 
Other potential motivations include avoiding sales tax, guaranteeing input supplies or output 
markets, or erecting barriers to entry by controlling the terms on which non-integrated entrants 
gain access to inputs or distribution networks. 
Incumbent firms can also influence concentration by using actual or threatened strategic 
behaviour to deter entry deliberately. Examples include limit pricing, where incumbents eschew 
short-term profit maximisation by maintaining low prices, in order to make the market look less 
attractive to newcomers. Alternatively, they may threaten or build a reputation for predatory 
pricing tactics if entry takes place, to drive a new entrant out of business. Other deterrent 
strategies include significant investment in spare capacity (Spence 1977), and product 
proliferation, where incumbents "pack" the market with many products or brands, so that 
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insufficient room exists for a new firm's product to compete profitably (e. g. as in the case of 
breakfast cereals (Schmalensee 1978)). 
3.5.5 Provider Collusion and Restrictive Practices 
Collusion involves an explicit agreement or implicit understanding among competitors to limit 
price competition by agreeing on the quantity produced and/or fixing the market price. Firms 
may also collude on the setting of terms and conditions, market shares, customers, or suppliers. 
Explicit agreements to restrict price competition are illegal, but cautious pricing behaviour 
directed at avoiding conflicts in price policies is not. 
As noted in Box 3.1, when concentration increases and providers are fewer in number, the 
probability of price collusion generally increases because with few suppliers, the cost of 
detecting cheating is relatively low, and the impact of one supplier's price cuts is less dispersed. 
However, collusive behaviour may also be found in less concentrated markets, if the providers 
are well organised. For example the market for physicians is often not concentrated, but 
organised medical associations are able to control members and prevent them from engaging in 
competitive practices such as price cutting or advertising (Jacobs 1997). 
Restrictive practices are not limited to agreements between fines, but may encompass a wide 
range of single firm practices aimed at restricting or distorting competition: Clarke observes that 
"The scope for single-firm anti-competitive practices is limited only by human ingenuity" 
(Clarke 1985). Finns use a variety of vertical restraints, including resale-price maintenance 
(RPM), where the price at which a retailer may resell a good is fixed, and exclusive dealing, 
where the downstream firm is prevented from selling brands that compete directly with the 
products of the upstream firm. 
The set of vertical restraints that can be used in practice will depend on the ability of the seller 
to observe the behaviour of the downstream firm, and to enforce their agreement. The 
willingness of downstream firms to agree to such restraints will also depend on the level of 
uncertainty and their attitude to risk. For example, a downstream firm will not agree to RPM if 
they fear a change in other retail costs. Finally all such restrictive or collusive arrangements will 
only be effective as long as new entrants are prevented from entering the market and 
undermining the current arrangements. 
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3.5.6 Influencing the Design and Implementation of Regulation 
One can distinguish two broad standpoints for the analysis of the design and implementation of 
regulation: the public interest and self-interest approaches. Within the public interest approach, 
regulation is viewed as being imposed independently on providers by outside agencies in order 
to further the public interest. However, based on the insights of the public choice literature, 
regulation may also be seen as an inherently political process with a range of groups and 
individuals with vested self-interests attempting to influence the design of the regulatory 
mechanism and its implementation (Peltzmann 1976; Stigler 1971). It has been argued that in 
some settings, regulation operates systematically in the interest of the suppliers, rather than 
consumers or the public in general. For example, qualified physicians may try to influence the 
regulator to tighten entry requirements such as licensing for their own profession and their 
potential competitors in order to reinforce their market power (Folland, Goodman and Stano 
1993). Attempts to influence the design or implementation of regulation take the form of 
political lobbying, advertising campaigns, legal action, or more informal interaction. Firms can 
also influence the potential for regulatory enforcement by deliberately concealing information. 
Over time, continued contact between regulator and regulatee may lead to the formation of a 
symbiotic relationship, where the regulator effectively promotes the interest of the industry 
under question at the expense of its consumers, termed "regulatory capture". This is particularly 
likely where the regulator is heavily reliant on the firms in question for information. 
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3.6 Evidence on Competition in Health Care, Pharmaceutical and Retail Markets 
No studies were identified applying these economic models and concepts to the retail market for 
drugs in the developing world. However, there may be insights from analyses in related areas, 
so a brief review is provided of studies of competition in health care and pharmaceutical 
markets, and in the African retail sector. 
3.6.1 Competition in Health Care Markets 
The majority of analysis of the nature of competition in health care markets concerns the US 
hospital market and its particular institutional arrangements, such as insurance, health 
maintenance organisations (HMOs), and physician networks (Dranove and Satterthwaite 2000). 
There is also a smaller literature relating to institutional arrangements in other developed 
countries, such as the UK and New Zealand (Ashton and Press 1997; Propper and Soderlund 
1998; Roberts 1993). In the developing world, there is a small set of studies on hospital markets 
from Thailand, India, Bangladesh, the Philippines and Zambia (Amin 2002; Bennett 1996; 
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Ginson-Bautista 1995; Muraleedharan 1999; Nakamba, Hanson and McPake 2002). The non- 
hospital sector is far less studied in both the developed and developing world. 
The available evidence indicates that the market for health care generally consists of many 
separate geographic markets that are further segmented by type of provider (Dranove and 
Satterthwaite 2000). Within these segments the vast majority of health care and pharmaceutical 
markets are neither perfectly competitive nor completely monopolistic (Dranove and 
Satterthwaite 2000; Jacobs 1997; Scherer 2000). Dranove and Satterthwaite argue that 
monopolistic competition describes the market for most health services "tolerably well" because 
providers compete with a substantial number of other firms whose services are good but not 
perfect substitutes for their own. They argue that markets are not generally oligopolistic, as for a 
specific provider no one or two competitors are central enough that it is worthwhile thinking 
how they will react to a change in price or service attributes. However, Gaynor and Vogt argue 
that while the US physician market is monopolistically competitive because most physicians are 
located in close proximity in urban markets, most hospital markets are characterized by a 
relatively small number of hospitals interacting over a long period, implying a differentiated 
product oligopoly (Gaynor and Vogt 2000). Silvia and Leibenluft note that even in the 
historically monopolistically competitive US physician markets, the growth of large group 
practices and networks may be increasing concentration and market power (Silvia and 
Leibenluft 1998). Hospital markets in Bangkok and Bangladesh were found to be relatively 
concentrated (Amin 2002; Bennett 1996), and strong market segmentation between high 
quality/high price and low quality/low price hospitals was found in both Bangladesh and 
Zambia (Amin 2002; Nakamba, Hanson and McPake 2002). 
The following features have been identified as central in maintaining some degree of market 
power for health care providers: product differentiation with heterogeneous preferences; 
asymmetric information (potentially leading to imperfect agency); barriers to entry as a result of 
both economies of scale and regulatory intervention; and institutional structures such as 
insurance, which reduce the sensitivity of consumers to price. This market power can be seen as 
both a primary cause of market failures (e. g. consumer insensitivity to technical quality), and the 
result of policy interventions designed to correct these failures (e. g. barriers to entry resulting 
from licensing of practitioners). 
Consumers in the US hospital market are believed to be insensitive to price, due to institutional 
structures which involve third party payers, low co-payments, and retrospective fee-for-service 
reimbursement of providers. It has been argued that a quality competition model therefore 
$ Market failure refers to the failure of an unregulated market to achieve an efficient allocation of 
resources. 
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prevails, with greatest emphasis placed on the most easily observable elements of quality, which 
may lead to the development of a "Medical Arms Race" (Robinson 1988). In support of this 
hypothesis, many econometric studies have found a significant inverse relationship between the 
degree of concentration and costs or quality measures (Chirikos 1992; Robinson and Luft 1987; 
Robinson et al. 1988; Wilson and Jadlow 1982). In Thailand, Bennett found evidence of a 
negative correlation between profits and concentration in the Bangkok market for hospital 
services, combined with some association between lower concentration and higher quality 
(Bennett 1996). However, a number of measurement problems remain in the literature, such as 
the definition of the relevant market, the accuracy of the quality proxies used, and the failure to 
allow for simultaneous price and quality competition (Dranove and Satterthwaite 2000; 
Dranove, Shanley and Simon 1992; Noether 1988). 
Other key market failures in health care are unrelated to market power, such as externalities and 
the public good characteristics of certain services6. In conjunction with equity concerns, these 
failures have led to the conclusion that markets for health care are very different to markets for 
most other goods. Moreover, health care markets also diverge from the competitive model 
because profit maximisation is frequently an inaccurate approximation of provider objectives. 
For example, Newhouse argues that a not-for-profit hospital can be viewed as aiming to 
maximise a utility function which reflects a combination of the quantity and quality of care 
provided (Newhouse 1970). Palmer and Mills found that the behaviour of private GPs in South 
Africa was strongly influenced by the desire to maintain a good professional reputation, and to 
serve the local community, as well as financial considerations (Palmer and Mills 2003). 
3.6.2 Competition in Pharmaceutical Markets 
There is an extensive literature on pharmaceutical markets, mainly focusing on competition 
between drug manufacturers, and their interactions with institutions responsible for health care 
provision in the developed world. Many analyses address whether and how drugs should be 
reimbursed by private and social insurance systems, the role of patent protection, the impact of 
generic entry, and pharmaceutical regulation (Ferrandiz 1999; Garattini and Tediosi 2000; 
Maynard and Bloor 2003; Mossialos, Walley and Mrazek 2004; Scherer 2000; Scott-Morton 
2000). There is a more limited literature on competition and regulation in the retail pharmacy 
market, focusing on remuneration and regulation, although this sector has been described as 
"heavily under-researched" (Huttin 1996; OFT 2003). Literature related to the developing world 
predominantly addresses concerns about the lack of effective drugs and their high cost, through 
6 Public goods are non-rival in consumption (one person's consumption does not reduce the quantity 
available for another) and non-excludable (it is impossible to exclude those who do not pay). Externalities 
represent benefits or costs of consumption or production that are not fully valued by the 
consumer/producer. 
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discussion of the role of essential drugs policies, patent law, and incentives for research and 
development for neglected diseases (Mrazek 2002; Mrazek and Mossialos 2003; 
Ratanawijitrasin, Soumerai and Weerasuriya 2001). 
Pharmaceutical markets are distinguished by a number of key features (Scherer 2000). First, 
drugs are divided into prescription-only and over-the-counter products, with many restrictions 
on the availability of the former. Secondly, demand for pharmaceuticals is generally inelastic, 
reflecting the predominance of third party payers, and a high willingness to pay for medicines. 
Thirdly, research and development costs are relatively high and, fourthly, patent protection 
plays a very important role in profitability. Finally, there is considerable use of government 
regulation, mainly to ensure the safety and efficacy of medicines, and the affordability of drugs 
through widespread price regulation (Maynard and Bloor 2003; Mossialos, Walley and Mrazek 
2004; Ratanawijitrasin, Soumerai and Weerasuriya 2001). 
In terms of structure, pharmaceutical markets generally consist of a high number of firms with 
very unequal market shares (Lobo 1979). As a broad generalisation, there are a small number of 
multinational "pioneer" firms that undertake research and development to discover new drugs 
and bring them to the market, and a large number of smaller generic or "imitator" firms, 
distributed more widely around the globe (Scott-Morton 2000). The market structure for retail 
pharmacies depends on entry regulation, with some markets dominated by chain stores, while in 
others independent pharmacies continue to predominate (OFT 2003). 
There are many sources of market power for pharmaceutical manufacturers, including patent 
protection, the need for regulatory approval of drugs, poor consumer information on alternative 
medicines, product differentiation and barriers to entry. Scherer notes that, as a result, well- 
established pharmaceuticals in the US generally have substantial price-cost margins (Scherer 
2000). These factors, combined with third party payment by insurance firms and the agency role 
of physicians in prescription, have led the market to be described as "unique with regard to the 
extent and depth of its failure to meet the criteria for a perfect market" (Mossialos, Walley and 
Mrazek 2004). Product differentiation is often enhanced by intensive marketing, through 
detailing visits to physicians, and direct-to-consumer advertising where permitted. While it is 
argued that there are few technical economies of scale in drug production, economies of scale in 
pharmaceutical advertising may present a significant barrier to entry, even in the absence of 
patent protection (Lobo 1979). 
While still under patent, the market is likely to be characterised as a differentiated oligopoly, as 
the drugs compete only with different chemical entities for the same health problem, which are 
imperfect substitutes. Following patent expiration, considerable entry generally takes place, by 
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manufacturers of both branded and unbranded generics. Monopolistic competition is likely to 
prevail, with all firms retaining some market power (Scherer 2000). A frequently observed 
phenomenon is the "generic competition paradox" that occurs when, following the expiry of a 
patent, generic alternatives enter the market, but the originally patented brand continues to be 
sold at a higher price (Scherer 2000). This gap is often maintained or even gets wider over time. 
There are essentially two markets or market segments: one of price insensitive consumers 
willing to pay high prices for the original brand, and another consisting of price sensitive 
consumers willing to shift to generics (Suh et al. 2000). Price insensitivity in the first group may 
arise because established products have built up accumulated goodwill and reputation during the 
patent period. Higher prices may also be maintained because consumers lack information about 
generics, because they are concerned about the quality of newer products, or because prescribers 
and patients are not directly affected by the financial consequences of their drug choice 
(Ferrandiz 1999). Several authors have argued that such first mover advantages also exist in the 
market for generics (which are often clearly differentiated by brand, even though the drugs are 
off-patent). Grabowski & Verno (1992) found that for virtually all products they studied, the 
market leader was an early entrant (Grabowski and Vernon 1992). 
3.6.3 Competition in African Retail Markets 
Markets play an extremely important role in product and service distribution in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Over the last three decades states have gradually abandoned post-colonial attempts at 
Soviet-inspired command economy models, which involved price regulation, and the 
prohibition of some private trading activities. It has been argued that the region is now more 
market-oriented than many advanced countries, as in the latter much resource allocation takes 
place within large firms and public entities (Fafchamps 1997). Sub-Saharan Africa has been 
characterised as having a dual industrial structure, with a small number of large enterprises, but 
a very large number of very small firms or micro-enterprises, with few medium-sized 
enterprises (Fafchamps 1994). The proportion of the workforce that is self-employed in their 
own business is much higher than in developed countries, with many entrepreneurs running 
several small businesses simultaneously (Fafchamps 1997). Micro-enterprises are argued to 
thrive for a number of reasons. Firstly they are able to find market niches where they do not face 
competition from large firms. Secondly, they can take advantage of better worker supervision, 
entrepreneurial motivation, and access to small venture capital. Finally, many laws and 
regulations, which increase costs for medium-sized firms, either explicitly exclude micro- 
enterprises, or are easy for them to evade (Fafchamps 1994). 
Micro-enterprises are often referred to as the informal sector, although there is no consensus on 
the definition of this term (Broom and Joyce-Clarke 1990). A 1972 International Labour 
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Organisation (ILO) report defined it to apply to markets which exhibit ease of entry, reliance on 
indigenous resources, family ownership of firms, small-scale operation, labour-intensive and 
adapted technology, skills acquisition outside formal education, and a lack of regulation (Broom 
and Joyce-Clarke 1990). There is some overlap with other terms frequently used, such as 
parallel markets, which arise to evade price and quantity controls, and black markets, which 
refer to illegal trade (Jones, Lindauer and Roemer 1991). However, many informal sector 
activities are legitimate, if unrecorded business. 
There are frequent complaints about the paucity of information on African markets, particularly 
as official statistics for micro-enterprises are poor or non-existent (Fafchamps 1997; Porter 
1990). Findlay and Paddison highlight the acute shortage of reliable data on retailing 
environments in all developing countries (Findlay and Paddison 1990). In a recent review of the 
characteristics and behaviour of product markets in Africa, Jerome and Ogunkola state that 
"Almost nothing is known about the nature of existing markets, the magnitude of commodity 
trade, facilities used and the cost of performing the relevant functions, the operating margin of 
assemblers, wholesalers and the processes of price determination" (Jerome and Ogunkola 2000). 
This appears somewhat extreme, as much has been written on the informal sector from a 
development economics perspective. The literature focuses on why the sector exists, its role in 
development, and how it can be assisted to grow, but mainly considers manufacturing and 
agriculture, rather than retailing (Paddison, Findlay and Dawson 1990). 
The retail sector has been more studied by geographers, marketing specialists, and occasionally 
anthropologists. Retailers are argued to have a central role in society in developing countries 
(Findlay and Paddison 1990). Two key characteristics of the sector are its diversity and 
dynamism. Retail outlets range from modem shopping centres and supermarkets to direct 
producer-consumer relationships, such as the hawking of home-made food. They are subject to 
considerable change, in response to population growth, urbanisation, general macroeconomic 
fluctuations, and improved accessibility through the development of transport networks (Jerome 
and Ogunkola 2000; Porter 1990). Reflecting the spread of globalisation, the goods marketed 
are increasingly produced by large, multinational companies, with examples being imported 
staples and soft drinks (Findlay and Paddison 1990). However, the market structure has not been 
replaced by Western retail models. Instead traditional practices have evolved to produce a 
hybrid market structure, which still exhibits continuity with some 19" century practices (Findlay 
and Paddison 1990; Porter 1990). Western retail is generally based on fixed shop units, and 
increasingly dominated by large distribution firms with multiple retail outlets (Paddison, 
Findlay and Dawson 1990). By contrast, in developing countries the sector remains dominated 
by the small-scale retailer, and there are many ambulatory sellers, and periodic markets. 
Specialist shops are relatively rare, exceptions being electrical and drug stores, where it is 
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argued that a certain level of expertise in sales and service 
is required (Porter 1990). The 
prevalence of small-scale, informal, non-permanent retailers 
does not mean that the sector is 
chaotic. In fact even casual street trading is usually highly structured 
(Paddison, Findlay and 
Dawson 1990). For example, periodic markets, held on one or more specified 
days per week, 
provide a well-organised supply of basic commodities to local people, and act as collection 
points for rural surplus (Hollier 1990; Jerome and Ogunkola 2000). 
It is argued that micro- 
enterprises make good business sense in the retail sector, because geographical 
dispersion 
generates information asymmetries, making it very costly for retail chains to monitor employee 
performance (Fafchamps 1994). 
In developing countries, retailing is more focused on basic needs such as food and clothing than 
in the Western world (Paddison, Findlay and Dawson 1990). Due to the low incomes of 
consumers, they are argued to be more sensitive to price than to quality, service or promotion. 
Marketing is not generally an important influence on distribution, although there are exceptions 
where consumers spend considerable sums on goods with prestige value (Paddison, Findlay and 
Dawson 1990). Barriers to entry are relatively low, as trading provides an opportunity for self- 
employment with minimal capital requirements and technical constraints. One might therefore 
expect the sector to be quite close to the perfectly competitive model. However, the literature on 
micro-enterprises raises a number of reasons why this may not be the case, despite the large 
numbers of buyers and sellers, and low entry barriers. The marketing infrastructure of transport, 
communications, credit and storage facilities in Africa is the poorest in the world, inhibiting the 
smooth functioning of the market (Jerome and Ogunkola 2000). Prohibitive transport costs and 
poor communication channels lead to fragmented markets, and incomplete credit markets limit 
entry and expansion (Jones, Lindauer and Roemer 1991). In these heavily segmented markets, 
competition is reduced, and the price of products fluctuates more than one would expect from 
differences in transport costs alone. 
In addition, there may be strong non-market-based links between providers, in the form of 
ethnic and family networks for information sharing, saving schemes and employment 
opportunities, and long-term relationships with wholesalers for advancing goods (Fafchamps 
1994). For example, Speece describes the "ethnodomination" of much retailing and wholesaling 
by Asian merchants in East Africa in the mid-20`h century (Speece 1990). Such links allow trust 
to develop over time, helping to reduce opportunistic behaviour, but may also reduce 
competition. Tripp notes that many of the poorest microenterprises do not appear to profit 
maximise, and instead prioritise norms of reciprocity, mutuality and fairness. They are "as 
likely to co-operate as to compete", for example by sharing information, assisting similar local 
businesses, or engaging in collective income generating activities (Tripp 2003). 
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In sum, retail markets are a vibrant distribution channel in Africa, generally dominated by 
small-scale outlets. While relatively little is known about retail market structure and provider 
conduct, there are indications that poor marketing infrastructure may lead to substantial 
divergence from the perfectly competitive model. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This methodological review shows the value of the industrial organisation literature in 
characterising competition in many markets, and developing hypotheses on their performance. It 
has been widely used to analyse markets for hospital services, mainly in developed countries, 
but little used in the retail sector in developing countries, with no studies identified on the retail 
pharmaceutical sector in sub-Saharan Africa. The review highlights many concepts of potential 
use in the analysis of the market for fever and malaria treatment in Tanzania, including product 
and geographical market definition, market concentration, models of oligopoly and 
monopolistic competition, information characteristics of products, barriers to entry and exit, 
price discrimination, product differentiation, imperfect agency, collusion and restrictive 
practices, and responses to regulation. 
The way these concepts are brought together into a conceptual framework for analysis is 
described in Chapter 5. However, before turning to the details of the study, some background on 
Tanzania and its policies on malaria and pharmaceutical regulation is provided in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 4 
TANZANIA AND ITS POLICIES ON MALARIA 
AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION 
4.1 The Tanzanian Economy 
Tanzania has a population of 34.8 million'. The country is divided into 21 regions and 121 
councils (rural Districts or municipalities). About 76% of the population live in rural 
communities, and agriculture dominates the economy, accounting for over 50% of GDP, and 
82% of the employed labour force (Government of Tanzania 2004a; IMF 2004). The second 
largest sector is trade, which accounts for 12% of GDP, and 7% of the employed labour force, 
of which 69% are workers in services or shops. 
The growth of the private sector is a relatively new phenomenon in Tanzania. From the Arusha 
Declaration in 1967 until the mid-1980s Tanzania followed a socialist economic model, with the 
restriction of private sector activities, and central government controls in all key areas, including 
price controls (Naschold and Fozzard 2002). This even included strong discouragement of 
private retailing. In 1976, "Operation Maduka" (shops) led to the closure of many private shops 
in favour of co-operative/village outlets, which in 1980 the Government announced should be 
publicly run in the manner of government schools and health facilities (Rutashobya 1998). By 
the early 1980s, the country was experiencing deep economic crisis. Since then, a programme of 
liberalisation has been gradually implemented. As a result markets operate more freely, and the 
private sector has expanded exponentially. 
However, Tanzania remains one of the world's poorest countries. Gross national income per 
capita is $290,36% of the population are below the basic needs poverty line, and 20% live on 
less than $1 per day (National Bureau of Statistics Tanzania 2002; UNDP 2004; World Bank 
2004). In 2001,29% of children under five were malnourished, under five mortality was 
165/1000, maternal mortality 1100/100,000, and life expectancy at birth 43.5 years (UNDP 
2004; World Bank 2004). HIV prevalence was estimated to be 9% of the population aged 15-45 
years in 2003 (UNDP 2004). The government is aiming to tackle these huge health problems 
with a Ministry of Health (MOH) budget of only $6.3 per person per year (2003) (Government 
of Tanzania 2004b). 
1 World Population Prospects Population Database, 2002 Revision: http: /esa. un. org/unpp/ 
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4.2 Malaria and its Treatment 
The whole population of Tanzania is at risk of malaria: 75% are subject to stable perennial or 
stable seasonal malaria transmission, 8% to unstable highly seasonal transmission, and 17% are 
at risk of periodic malaria epidemics (de Savigny et al. 2004). Over 90% of malaria infections 
are caused by Plasmodium falciparum, the most virulent strain of the Plasmodium species 
(National Malaria Control Programme 2003). Malaria is a primary cause of disease burden. It is 
the leading cause of outpatient and inpatient health service attendance at all ages, although the 
most vulnerable groups in areas of stable transmission are children under five years and 
pregnant women, whose immunity is low. The number of clinical malaria cases per year is 
estimated to be between 14 and 18 million, and the number of deaths per year at 100,000 to 
125,000, of which 80,000 are in children under the age of five years (National Malaria Control 
Programme 2003). 
The strategic plan of the National Malaria Control Programme (NMCP) is built around four 
pillars: 1) improved malaria case management; 2) national scale utilisation of insecticide treated 
nets (ITNs); 3) prevention of malaria in pregnancy; and 4) malaria epidemic prevention and 
control. Progress is being made on the two main preventive strategies. A nationwide social 
marketing programme to expand the commercial market for ITNs is in place, and intermittent 
preventive treatment for pregnant women (IPTp) is being expanded through antenatal care. 
However, coverage remains low: in 2002 only 29% of pregnant women received two doses of 
IPTp, and only 15% of the population were covered with ITNs (Malaria Consortium 2004). 
The government has set itself the target of raising the use of appropriate treatment for fever 
episodes in children under five within 24 hours from 19% to 60% by the 2007, in line with the 
target set by Heads of State in Abuja in 2000. A Roll Back Malaria consultative mission 
recently concluded that Tanzania was likely to achieve the Abuja targets for ITNs and IPTp by 
the end of 2005, but not the target for appropriate treatment (Malaria Consortium 2004). 
Tanzania changed its antimalarial drug policy in mid-2001. High levels of resistance led 
chloroquine to be abandoned as first line treatment in favour of SP2, prescribed with 
paracetamol. Amodiaquine was selected as second line, and quinine as third line and first choice 
in severe malaria. The policy took several months to be rolled out in all government facilities. 
SP initially received some negative media attention about adverse side-effects and drug quality, 
2 unless otherwise stated, the abbreviation SP is used in this thesis to cover drugs from both the 
sulphadoxine pyrimethamine and sulphamethoxypyrazine pyrimethamine (SMP) groups, which have the 
same indication and dosing requirements (Ministry of Health, 2000). 
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although it has been increasingly accepted over time (Williams et al. 2003). 
The useful life of SP as first line is not expected to be long. There is already some SP resistance 
in Tanzania, and experience elsewhere has shown it to grow rapidly (EANMAT 2003; 
Greenwood 2004). The government plans to introduce artemisinin-based combination therapy 
(ACT) in 2006, and has already submitted a successful application for funds for this policy 
change to the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria. 
Facility-based antimalarial treatment is provided through a network of dispensaries, health 
centres and hospitals. Health centres are generally larger than dispensaries, with a wider range 
of staff and, in some cases, a small inpatient ward. Of a total of 4844 health facilities, 59% are 
government, 6% parastatal, 18% mission/NGO and 17% private commercial (National Malaria 
Control Programme 2003). Dispensaries and health centres should provide treatment of 
uncomplicated cases, and pre-referral treatment of severe cases and treatment failures (Ministry 
of Health 2000). They should also deliver patient education, and identify anaemia cases. 
Diagnosis may be by blood smear, but is generally by clinical history and physical examination 
alone. While clinical diagnosis relies mainly on the presence of fever, health workers are also 
instructed to check for the following additional malaria symptoms: headache, joint pains, 
malaise, body weakness, vomiting, diarrhoea, chest pains and poor appetite. 
4.3 Pharmaceutical Regulation 
The regulation of pharmaceuticals is now covered by the 2003 Food, Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 
and overseen by the Tanzania Food and Drugs Agency (TFDA). However, at the time of data 
collection, pharmaceutical regulation was the responsibility of the Pharmacy Board, through the 
1978 Pharmaceuticals and Poisons Act and the 1990 Pharmaceuticals and Poisons Regulations. 
These covered the qualification and registration of pharmacists, and regulation of manufacture, 
importation, labelling, identification, storage and sale of pharmaceuticals. 
Although, fever/malaria drugs are frequently obtained from retailers in Tanzania, formal health 
care coverage is relatively good by sub-Saharan African standards, with over 90% of the 
population living within 10km of a facility (National Malaria Control Programme 2003). There 
are three types of retail outlets for drugs in Tanzania: Part I and Part II pharmacies, and general 
stores. Part I pharmacies must be run by registered pharmacist, and are allowed to sell both Part 
I (prescription-only) and Part II (over-the-counter) medicines. In 2003 there were 344 Part I 
pharmacies, 60% of which were in Dar es Salaam, with the rest distributed unevenly throughout 
the regions, always in urban areas (Battersby et al. 2003). 
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Drugs are widely available in both urban and rural areas from Part II drug shops and general 
retailers. In 2003, the Pharmacy Board had records of 5666 Part II stores, although the total 
number may be considerably higher because some are unregistered (Battersby et al. 2003). 
Under the 1978 Act, Part II pharmacies, or drug stores, could be run by anyone with basic 
medical training (e. g. nurse, pharmacy assistant). Established to address the lack of access to 
drugs for much of the rural and peri-urban population, they were supposed to be located only in 
areas currently "underserved". They were allowed to stock Part II medicines only, known as 
"baridi" drugs. These included common painkillers and a few oral antimalarials (before the 
2001 policy change these comprised chloroquine and amodiaquine tablets and syrup; after the 
policy change the chloroquine formulations were replaced with SP tablets). They were not 
permitted to sell any oral antibiotics, nor injectables of any kind. 
General retailers range from large shops to small roadside stalls, typically stocking a mixture of 
food products and household goods. The legal position on drugs in general stores was unclear at 
the time of the study because they were not covered under the 1978 Act. It seemed that general 
stores were not strictly allowed to stock any drugs, but in practice were permitted to sell some 
over-the-counter medicines, such as common painkillers, and chloroquine before the policy 
change. 
Drug registration came into force in 1999, and in theory all drugs should have been registered 
before they were made available for consumption. However, this was applied strictly only to 
imported drugs; locally manufactured products could receive temporary approval for 
distribution, while improvements to manufacturing standards were put in place. At the time of 
data collection, no locally manufactured antimalarials were registered. Regulations were 
enforced by the Pharmacy Board, with Regional Pharmacists and Regional Medical Officers 
designated as inspectors outside Dar es Salaam, who in turn passed this responsibility on to 
District Medical Officers in some regions. General stores were inspected by Health Assistants 
only, who are Ward-level environmental health staff. 
Tanzania is striving to improve both pharmaceutical regulation and community-based malaria 
treatment. The newly established TFDA is aiming to improve the quality of drugs throughout 
the distribution chain through collaboration with domestic manufacturers, and more frequent 
quality testing of imports. Specific goals and strategies have been defined for community-based 
malaria treatment, including increasing the proportion of households receiving educational 
interventions, improving the quality of first line antimalarials in shops, ensuring correct dosing, 
and increasing the knowledge of shopkeepers (National Malaria Control Programme 2003). It is 
hoped that this thesis may contribute to strengthening these reforms and new initiatives in 
malaria treatment and the pharmaceutical sector. 
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PART II 
METHODOLOGY 
CHAPTER 5 
STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter covers the study design, study sites and methods for data collection and analysis. 
Section 5.2 on study design specifies the aims and objectives of the thesis; the conceptual 
framework is described, and the scope of the study defined. Section 5.3 covers the selection of 
study sites, and their characteristics. In Section 5.4, methods for data collection and analysis are 
described, including ethical issues, and details of each data collection activity, their analysis and 
timing. 
5.2 Study Design 
5.2.1 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the market for fever and malaria treatment in three rural 
Tanzanian districts, with a particular focus on retail outlets, and to draw implications for the 
improvement of malaria treatment. 
Specific objectives are to: 
1. Describe treatment seeking and drug purchase for fever and malaria, and assess the 
appropriateness of care obtained 
2. Analyse the nature of competition in the fever and malaria treatment market, through an 
assessment of market structure, price and non-price competition 
3. Assess the impact of government regulation on the operation of retailers 
4. Analyse the implications of competition and regulation for the accessibility, quality and 
affordability of care obtained 
5. Identify policy implications for improving malaria treatment, and in particular for the 
delivery of artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT). 
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5.2.2 Conceptual Framework 
To meet the above objectives a framework was required which could provide analytical 
concepts and tools for the study of competition and its implications. The industrial organisation 
literature on markets reviewed in Chapter 3 was identified as having the potential to provide 
important insights in this area, the and to have been usefully employed in the analysis of health 
care markets in other settings. This led to the identification of the conceptual framework shown 
in Figure 5.1. It draws on the industrial organisation paradigm, which emphasises the links 
between market structure and provider conduct in determining market performance, 
acknowledging that the direction of causation between these elements can be two-way (Tirole 
1988). Following Conteh and Hanson (2003), the framework was adapted to include demand- 
side influences on provider conduct explicitly, and to recast the measures of performance in 
terms of goals related to public health. Within the context of government provision and 
regulation, the interplay of market structure, provider conduct and consumer demand is 
hypothesised to determine the nature of competition in the market for fever and malaria 
treatment, and to influence the nature of both market and government failure'. In order to adapt 
this framework to the specific market under study, potential incentives shaping provider and 
consumer behaviour were identified, drawn from both the industrial organisation literature 
reviewed in Chapter 3, and evidence from the behavioural, sociological and anthropological 
literature on treatment seeking and provider behaviour reviewed in Chapter 2 (Annex 2). 
Performance is defined primarily by the coverage of fever/malaria treatment, and its technical 
quality. In addition, the equity of treatment obtained is considered. Issues of horizontal equity 
may arise through unequal treatment by socio-economic group, gender, religion, or area of 
residence. Vertical equity issues are also relevant, in the greater importance of appropriate 
treatment for the most biologically vulnerable groups. Finally, drug pressure is a key market 
outcome because of its influence on the development of drug resistance, and therefore, the 
future effectiveness and cost of malaria treatment. The thesis assesses these outcomes, and then 
aims to understand them through an analysis of the nature of competition and regulation in the 
fever/malaria treatment market. 
I Government failure occurs when government policy fails to address a market failure, or creates an even 
more inefficient allocation of resources. 
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5.2.3 Defining the Scope of the Study 
The analysis addresses the market for fever and malaria treatment. The main focus is on the 
behaviour of drug retailers, but as retailers are potential substitutes and complements for other 
providers, such as public and private health care facilities, a comprehensive market analysis 
must consider all important fever and malaria treatment providers. The thesis aims to assess 
competition between providers directly interacting with customers, rather than between 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, although the pharmaceutical products stocked are considered. 
The term "private facilities" is used to refer to all non-governmental health facilities owned by 
missions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or private individuals. The "retail sector" is 
defined as all drug shops and general stores or stalls selling drugs; the "private sector" 
encompasses the retail sector and private facilities. The generic terms "outlet" and "provider" 
are used for any source of fever/malaria treatment. 
Treatment is assessed for the broadly defined health problem of fever and/or malaria. In 
Tanzania the biomedical concept of uncomplicated malaria overlaps with the local illness 
concepts of homa (usually translated as fever, although it can include other symptoms), and 
maleria or homa ya maleria (Minja et at. 2001; Winch et al. 1996). As uncomplicated malaria is 
generally treated on the basis of clinical symptoms alone, the market for malaria treatment 
cannot be distinguished from the more general market for the treatment of febrile illness, so the 
study is based on homa and maleria. A history of fever is a very sensitive indicator of 
uncomplicated malaria, but lacks specificity, meaning that a high proportion of fevers will have 
non-malarial causes. Some community members use other terms for the manifestations of 
severe disease, such as degedege for convulsions, and bandama for splenomegaly, which may 
not be captured under the homa and maleria umbrella (Minja et al. 2001). This was not a major 
concern, as the main focus of the research was uncomplicated malaria. Fever/malaria drugs 
were defined to include the two main categories of drugs used, antimalarials and painkillers. 
The latter may be used for pain relief and/or their antipyretic action. Key complementary 
services included diagnosis and medical advice. 
More detailed product and geographical market definitions are considered empirically in 
Chapter 7 on Market Structure. 
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5.3 Study Sites 
5.3.1 Study Site Selection 
The study sites were selected for the Interdisciplinary Monitoring Project for Antimalarial 
Combination Therapy in Tanzania (IMPACT-TZ). of which this study forms one component. 
IMPACT collaborators. objectives and data collection activities are summarised in Annex 3. 
The main aim of IMPACT is to evaluate the effectiveness of ACT in inhibiting antimalarial 
drug resistance. In addition. the wide range of complementary data collected by the project will 
help improve many aspects of malaria control. Between 200(1 and 2002 the IMPACT project 
collected baseline data. under a first-line regimen of chloroquine until August 2001 and SP 
thereafter. In early 2003 ACT (SP+3-day-Artesunate) was introduced as first line drug in 
facilities in Rufji District. The IMPACT evaluation is comparing ACT in Rufiji \yith SP 
monotherapy in the 3 districts of Morogoro-Rural. Kilombero and Ulanga. over a5 year period 
(Figure 5.2). 
Figure 5.2 Location of IMPACT study districts and demographic surveillance system 
(DSS) areas. 
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These four districts Nxere selected for the IMPACT evaluation for a number of reasons. Malaria 
endemicity is similar in all districts, and malaria is a leading cause of morbidity and mortalith 
Although the districts share borders. population mixing between Rufiji and the other districts is 
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very limited, due to the presence of the Selous Game Reserve along their common borders. The 
work of the Ifakara Health Research and Development Centre (IHRDC), the Tanzanian 
Essential Health Interventions Project (TEHIP), and the Adult Morbidity and Mortality Project 
(AMMP) has led to good knowledge of the epidemiological and health system characteristics of 
the districts, and the development of an excellent research infrastructure. In particular, each 
district has a large proportion of their population under continuous demographic surveillance, 
providing a reliable sampling frame for community-based research, and the potential for 
relatively objective quantification of disease burden. The majority of IMPACT data collection is 
taking place in these demographic surveillance system (DSS) areas. 
The data for this thesis were collected between mid-2000 and mid-2002, during the baseline 
phase of the IMPACT project. Data collection took place in the DSS areas of three of the 
IMPACT study districts: Kilombero, Ulanga and Rufiji. The fourth IMPACT district, 
Morogoro-Rural, was excluded for two reasons. Firstly it surrounds a large town (Morogoro- 
Urban), a separate administrative area, which forms the economic hub for the surrounding 
villages. To understand the market in Morogoro-Rural, detailed analysis of Morogoro-Urban 
would also be required which was felt to be beyond the scope of this protocol. Secondly, due to 
the relatively limited DSS infrastructure in Morogoro, the IMPACT household survey from 
which much of the data on treatment seeking were captured was not undertaken in this district 
in 2001. 
53.2 Characteristics of the Study Districts 
Kilombero and Ulanga Districts lie in Morogoro Region in southeastern Tanzania, 350-400km 
from Dar-es-Salaam. Rufiji District is to the south of Dar-es-Salaam in Coast Region. The 
districts have two main rainy seasons, the short rains in October-December and the long rains in 
March-May, although there is variation from year-to-year. There are very few paved roads, and 
some villages are difficult to reach during the long rains. Although buses run on main roads, 
most transport is by minibus-taxi, lorry or bicycle. The Tazara railway runs through Kilombero, 
carrying freight and passengers, with stations in many settlements. Most houses have mud walls 
and thatched or corrugated iron roofs. The main economic activity is subsistence farming, 
supplemented by limited cash-cropping. Major crops include rice, maize, cassava, millet, 
sesame, coconut and cashew nuts, and fishing is also common. Many families have a second 
house known as a shamba (farm) house in low-lying farmland areas where they stay during the 
rice planting and harvesting seasons. In Kilombero and Ulanga, median monthly household 
expenditure was under US$100 in 1997, of which about 75% was for food (INDEPTH Network 
2002). In addition to local languages, KiSwahili is widely spoken, but English is not commonly 
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used. Literacy rates for men were 88% in Kilombero/Ulanga, and 66% in Rufiji, and for 
women, 69% and 30% respectively (INDEPTH Network 2002). 
The districts were relatively well matched in terms of population density, general health status, 
and predicted intensity and duration of malaria transmission (Table A1.2 in Annex 1). Health 
services were also broadly comparable across the districts. However, three differences between 
the districts should be highlighted. Government facilities were officially free in Rufiji, but in 
Kilombero and Ulanga user fees had been introduced in dispensaries (but not in health centres). 
Fees were retained at facility level and could be used for minor expenditures, such as drug 
purchase during stockouts or facility repairs. They were not designed to provide financial 
incentives to government staff. Secondly, the WHO/UNICEF initiative for the Integrated 
Management of Childhood Illness (IMCI) was implemented in formal facilities in Rufiji (and 
Morogoro-Rural) from 1997, while standard case management remained in place in Kilombero 
and Ulanga Districts until 2002. Facility-level IMCI includes the development of clear 
guidelines for healthcare workers, 11-day training courses for staff treating children, and system 
support through improved supervision and commodity supplies (Armstrong Schellenberg et al. 
2004). Thirdly, there were differences in bednet coverage. Although all three districts were 
covered by social marketing programmes for treated mosquito nets, the Kilombero programme 
(KINET) had been in place for longer. As a result, around one-third of children under five slept 
under a bednet in Ulanga and Ruffiji Districts, compared with two-thirds in Kilombero. However 
there were fairly uniform (and low) rates of use of insecticide-treated bednets. 
According to health service data and the perceptions of local people, malaria was the foremost 
health problem for both adults and children in the study districts (INDEPTH Network 2002; 
Tanner et al. 1991). Anopheles gambiae and Anopheles funestus were the main malaria vectors, 
with an estimated 200-300 infective bites per person per year occurring in rural areas close to 
Ifakara Town, the District headquarters for Kilombero (1NDEPTH Network 2002). P. 
falciparum malaria transmission was intense and perennial, although mosquito densities peaked 
between November and May. Uncomplicated malaria was the leading diagnosis for outpatient 
visits in all districts. The vast majority were diagnosed on the basis of clinical symptoms alone, 
most commonly just the presence of fever, leading to substantial over-diagnosis. IMPACT 
facility surveys have shown that 51% of outpatients diagnosed with malaria were parasite 
positive at dispensaries, 39% at health centres, and 38% at hospitals (Causer et al. 2003). 
Mortality data from Rufiji DSS showed that acute febrile illness (including malaria) was one of 
the major causes of mortality, in addition to acute lower-respiratory infections, tuberculosis, 
AIDS and perinatal illnesses (INDEPTH Network 2002). 
75 
Chloroquine resistance, measured by total treatment failures in under fives, was found to be 
72% in Kilombero in 1999 (compared with an average of 52% across all Tanzanian sentinel 
sites) (Ministry of Health 1999). Chloroquine has not been tested since for ethical reasons. The 
IMPACT project has collected in vivo data for SP in Ulanga and Rufiji Districts on an annual 
basis. Total treatment failure with SP increased in Rufiji from zero in 2000, to 1% in 2001, and 
8% in 2002. In Ulanga the pattern was less clear, with a failure rate of 2% in 2000,5% in 2001, 
and zero in 2002 (MacArthur et al., unpublished data, IMPACT collaboration). 
5.3.3 Areas under Demographic Surveillance 
All three study districts contain an area covered by DSS. In Rufiji the DSS was co-managed by 
TEHIP and AMMP. The areas in Kilombero and Ulanga are managed by IHRDC under one 
DSS system. The Kilombero and Ulanga DSS areas are separated by the Kilombero River, 
which runs along the border between the two districts (Figure 5.2). Throughout the thesis the 
term DSS systems is therefore used to refer to the two systems of Kilombero/Ulanga and Rufiji, 
and the term DSS areas, to the 3 areas of Kilombero, Ulanga and Ruffiji. The DSS covered an 
area of 60km x 30km in Rufiji, 80km x 18km in Kilombero and 40km x 25km in Ulanga. In 
mid-2001 the DSS populations were 73,839 in Rufiji, 37,064 in Kilombero and 29,439 in 
Ulanga. Three rounds of DSS interviews are conducted per year in all areas, meaning that each 
household is visited every four months, to collect information on pregnancies, births, deaths and 
migrations. Between household visits, village-based key informants report births and deaths as 
they occur. Each household has a unique household number, which is marked discreetly on their 
buildings. 
In terms of administrative structure, rural areas in Tanzania are divided into sub-villages 
(vitongoji), villages (vj/j i) and wards (taw) (2 to 8 villages). The Kilombero/Ulanga DSS 
system contained 25 villages, and Rufiji, 31. There are no towns in DSS areas, although Ifakara 
Town is located a few kilometres from the start of Ulanga and Kilombero DSS areas. Important 
rural market centres are officially designated as "minor settlements"; there are two such market 
centres in Rufiji DSS (Ikwiriri and Kibiti), one in Kilombero DSS (Mchombe), and one in 
Ulanga DSS (Lupiro). 
The DSS areas are served by a mixture of government and mission health centres and 
dispensaries. The Government District hospitals in Ulanga and Rufiji are rarely used by DSS 
residents because of travel distance, being located in the District headquarters of Mahenge and 
Utete respectively (Figure 5.2). Instead both Ulanga and Kilombero DSS residents tend to use 
St Francis, the mission-owned Designated-District hospital in Ifakara town. Rufiji DSS 
2 Total treatment failure refers to clinical failure and parasitaemia by day 14 following treatment. 
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residents use Mchukwi Mission Hospital, located within the DSS. Manufactured drugs are also 
widely available from Part II drug stores and general stores in DSS areas. Typical examples of 
each type of drug provider are shown in Figure 5.3. 
5.4 Methods for Data Collection and Analysis 
5.4.1 Overview of Data Collection 
Data were collected from households and drug outlets within the 3 DSS areas, through the data 
collection activities summarised in Table 5.1. Demand-side data were collected through a cross- 
sectional household survey, drawing on the DSS household sampling frame, and previous 
qualitative and quantitative studies in the area for the questionnaire design. Due to the relatively 
limited amount of previous work on the supply-side, and on retail outlets in particular, a wider 
range of data collection tools were employed. A sampling frame for all private drug outlets was 
constructed through outlet censuses, and qualitative interviews were conducted in shops and 
private facilities. These activities were then followed by a larger scale quantitative outlet survey, 
and retail audits of antimalarial sales3. 
Data collection instruments were drafted in English, translated into KiSwahili by native 
speakers, and piloted in the study districts outside the DSS areas. All interviews were conducted 
in KiSwahili. English versions of all data collection instruments are contained in Annex 4. 
All data collection at drug outlets was designed and managed by the author. The household 
survey was conducted in collaboration with other members of the IMPACT study team (Patrick 
Kachur, Salim Abdulla, Rashid Khatibu, Ernest Smith and John MacArthur), as the data were 
collected for use in several separate analyses. Other team members were responsible for all 
laboratory investigations. However, all household survey analysis presented in this thesis was 
the responsibility of the author. Samples for drug quality testing were collected by the author, 
but analysis was conducted by IMPACT team members from the US Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta (Michael Green and Ernest Smith). 
3 data on the distribution chain to the retail outlets in the study sites were collected in a separate survey, 
but are not reported in the thesis 
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Table 5.1 Summary of data collection activities 
Activity 
Demand-side 
Household Survey, May-Sep 2001 
Quantitative data on parasitaemia, fever and 
reported household demand for treatment for 
households under DSS surveillance in 
Kilombero, Ulanga & Rufiji 
Sample 
Total sample size of 2500 randomly selected 
households, stratified by DSS system, of 
which 2191 were interviewed. Sample of 
1250 households allocated to detailed survey 
(Group A) for which data were collected on 
1101 households, 3853 individuals and 577 
provider visits 
Supply-side 
Outlet Censuses, May-Sep 2000 & 2001 
Census of all private drug outlets in DSS 
areas and drugs stocked at each outlet, 
updated in 2001 
Provider Qualitative Interviews, Aug-Sep 
2001 
In-depth semi-structured interviews with 
providers in shops and private facilities in 
DSS areas on their behaviour and its 
determinants 
Outlet Survey, Nov-Dec 2001 
" Quantitative data on retail provider 
behaviour and its determinants through 
structured interviews with providers in 
shops and public and private facilities in 
DSS areas 
" Antimalarial quality testing of quantity 
of active ingredient of SP tablets stocked 
Antimalarial Retail Audits, Feb/Apr & 
June/July 2002 
Measurement of antimalarial sales during 
two 2-week periods 
588 outlets interviewed in 2000,682 in 2001 
(private facilities, drugs stores & general 
stores) 
Purposively selected sample of 18 private 
providers, stratified by DSS system, outlet 
type, location and antimalarial stocking 
(private facilities, drug stores & general 
stores) 
All facilities and drug shops in DSS areas, 
and a random sample of general stores 
stocking drugs stratified by DSS system. 
Total sample of 331 outlets, of which 294 
were interviewed. 
All facilities and drug shops in DSS areas, 
and random sample of general stores 
previously reported to be selling 
antimalarials, stratified by DSS system. In 
Retail Audit 1 sample size of 122 and data 
collection completed for 112 outlets. In 
Retail Audit 2 sample size of 123 and data 
collection completed for 119 
5.4.2 Ethical Clearance and Informed Consent 
The study received ethical approval from the institutional review boards of IHRDC, the London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, and the Tanzanian Medical Research Coordinating 
Committee. The household survey component was also approved by the US CDC. 
Local DSS staff visited the households and drug outlets sampled for each data collection 
activity to inform them about the study, deliver a letter of invitation and make an appointment 
for the survey team. Sub-village leaders and staff of the District Health Management Team 
(DHMT) were also informed. 
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Before the start of all interviews, the interviewee was read an information sheet explaining the 
purpose of the research, the institutions involved, and the nature of their requested participation, 
and given the opportunity to ask questions. It was emphasised that the information collected 
would be confidential, and in drug outlets that no individual details would be passed on to 
regulatory authorities. Written consent was obtained from household survey interviewees, or 
from parents or guardians on behalf of children. In drug outlets, verbal consent was obtained, as 
experience with private sector actors suggested that some providers are threatened and 
discouraged by a written consent procedure, which may limit participation or bias the 
information collected. Consent was also sought specifically for the use of tape recorders during 
qualitative interviews. Care was taken in the presentation of results to avoid identification of 
any specific outlets or individuals. 
5.4.3 Household Survey 
The IMPACT 2001 household survey was based on a total sample of 2500 randomly selected 
households, drawn from the DSS databases. The sample was stratified by DSS system, 
comprising 1250 households from Rufiji DSS area and 1250 from Kilombero and Ulanga DSS 
areas combined. The DSS systems define households as "a set of people who eat from the same 
pot and recognise one person as their head". The DSS systems produce a dynamic set of data 
sets; the samples were drawn from the data files dated 1 May 2001 in Kilombero/Ulanga and 
from the data files dated 29 May 2001 in Rufiji. 
The sample size was determined on the basis of the needs of the main IMPACT evaluation, to 
estimate the prevalence of SP-resistance markers, although its adequacy for analysing treatment 
seeking behaviour was considered (Table A1.3 in Annex 1). Kilombero and Ulanga DSS areas 
are considered as one area for the purpose of the main IMPACT evaluation of resistance 
markers, due to their proximity. However, as the fever/malaria treatment markets in Kilombero 
and Ulanga DSS areas proved to be geographically distinct (see Chapter 7 on Market Structure), 
they are analysed as two separate areas within this thesis where appropriate. 
At the time of selection for the household survey, each household was randomly assigned to 
either Group A or Group X, with Group A completing a more detailed survey. Data reported in 
this thesis are drawn from Group A households (sample of 625 in Rufiji and 625 in 
Kilombero/Ulanga DSS systems), with the exception that the measures of relative socio- 
economic status described below are calculated across Group A and Group X households. 
Data collection was undertaken by DSS staff between May and September 2001. Participants 
were asked to take part in an interview and provide a blood sample. Households where one or 
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more members were not present were revisited once. Households that had closed, declined 
participation, or where individuals were not present on a second visit were not replaced. The 
interview was based on a structured questionnaire. The design and wording were informed by 
previous quantitative and qualitative work on treatment seeking behaviour undertaken in the 
study sites, such as the IMCI 1999 household survey, the IMPACT 2000 household survey, 
TEHIP Health Behaviours Research, anthropological work by Hausmann and others (Hausmann 
Muela and Muela Ribera 2000; Hausmann Muela, Muela Ribera and Tanner 1998), and 
previous DSS surveys in Kilombero and Ulanga (Armstrong Schellenberg et al. 2003). 
The questionnaire for Group A was divided into three parts. Module A was directed to the head 
of household, and covered socio-economic status variables including household construction 
and assets; education level, religion and ethnic group of head of household; proximity of nearest 
providers of each type; malaria-related knowledge and preference for chloroquine or SP. 
Module B was directed to each resident present at the time of the interview or their caretaker for 
a child. Individuals who reported fever in the previous 2 weeks4 were asked about its perceived 
severity, associated symptoms and treatment providers visited. Individuals not reporting 
fever/malaria were also asked about any medications they had taken during the recall period. 
One Module C was completed for each health care provider from whom participants had sought 
treatment for fever/malaria episodes, covering detailed information on the provider used, 
treatment obtained and costs incurred. The definition of provider was broad, including health 
facilities, shops, traditional healers and any other sources used. Households in Group X 
completed only a household questionnaire and shorter individual questionnaire. 
If a respondent reported more than one fever episode during the previous fortnight, information 
was obtained about all treatment seeking for fever during that period, and no attempt was made 
to collect data separately for each episode, because of the difficulty in distinguishing between 
new episodes and recrudescence. 
To test for malaria parasitemia, finger prick blood samples were obtained from each consenting 
household member for thick and thin blood films, which were read at laboratories in Kilombero 
and Rufiji. 
Of the total sample of 2500 households surveyed, data were obtained for 2191 households, 
giving an overall completion rate of 92% in Kilombero/Ulanga, and 83% in Rufiji (Table 5.2). 
Within these households, data were obtained on 7,630 individuals. The refusal rate was 1.5% 
(0.6% for individuals in Kilombero/Ulanga DSS system and 2.4% in Rufiji), and 7.2% of 
4 including episodes which began more than two weeks ago that continued into the recall period. 
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individuals could not be locateds. In Group A, interviews were completed at 1101 households 
and for 3851 individuals. Of these individuals, 628 (16.3%) reported a fever episode in the 
previous two weeks, and 468 of these (74.5%) had visited at least one provider, generating data 
on 577 provider visits. Basic data on household and individual characteristics of respondents are 
reported in Chapter 6. 
Table 5.2 Household survey interviews completed 
Modules 
Completed 
Group A 
detailed survey 
Group X 
abbreviated survey) 
Grand 
Total 
Kilombero 
/Ulanga 
DSS 
Rufiji 
DSS 
Total Kilombero 
/Ulanga 
DSS 
Rufiji 
DSS 
Total 
Household 585 516 1101 569 521 1090 2191 
Individual 1887 1964 3851 1880 1899 3779 7630 
Provider visited 266 311 577 _+ý 577 
Measuring socio-economic status 
A relative index of household socio-economic status (SES) was derived based on 19 
dichotomous variables using principal component analysis (PCA). This method was chosen due 
to the time requirements for collecting household income or expenditure data, and associated 
problems of recall bias and mis-measurement, for example of home-produced consumption. 
PCA indices have proved a reasonable measure of household wealth in Indonesia, Pakistan, 
Nepal, India, Argentina and Mexico (Filmer and Pritchett 2001; McKenzie 2003). The index 
was based primarily on the variables already collected by the Rufiji DSS for assessment of SES, 
as these had been selected on the basis of earlier qualitative work by the DSS team. This 
allowed us to avoid duplication of data collection in Rufiji, as information on these assets was 
accessible through the DSS database. The variables were a combination of household 
construction (walls, roof and floor), utilities (sources of water and cooking fuel, use of toilet), 
and ownership of assets (livestock, bed, clock/watch, mattress, iron, mosquito net, radio, 
clothing cupboard, bicycle, sofa, motorbike and car/tractor). In addition, we added light source, 
as this had proved an important indicator of SES in other Tanzania-based work (Hanson and 
Jones 2000). 
The index was calculated across both Group X and Group A households. Data were incomplete 
for 1 household in Ulanga and 87 households in Rufiji, which were therefore not assigned PCA 
scores (of which 46 households in Rufiji were in Group A)6. The first principal component 
explained 21% of the variability in the SES variables, a similar proportion to that explained in 
other such analyses (Armstrong Schellenberg et al. 2003; Filmer and Pritchett 2001; McKenzie 
s cover sheets containing the reason for non-participation were misplaced for roughly one-third of Rufiji 
households, so rates of refusal and failure to locate have been estimated from the remaining data. 6 the high frequency of missing data in Rufiji reflected problems in linking some households to their SES 
records in the Rufiji DSS database. 
82 
2003). The assets which made the greatest change to PCA score were ownership of a sofa or 
clothing cupboard, floor construction and cooking fuel. Households were classified on the basis 
of their PCA scores into SES thirds of poorest, middle or better off. Full details of the methods 
and results of the PCA are provided in Annex S. 
Assessment of the appropriateness of care obtained 
The household data were used to assess whether individuals reporting fever/malaria episodes 
had obtained appropriate treatment. As the vast majority of cases were not subject to diagnostic 
tests, the assessment of drugs obtained was based on their suitability for the reported symptoms. 
For several reasons it was not possible to judge treatment quality definitively from the drug data 
collected: 
" data were collected on drugs obtained, which may exceed the number of drugs and doses 
actually consumed 
" data on drugs obtained were subject to potential reporting error, as respondents may not 
have remembered or correctly identified all their medicines, and recall of quantities 
obtained may be particularly poor 
" data were collected on individuals reporting an episode of homa or maleria. Although 
homa, is the KiSwahili term most widely used for fever, it can be used to refer to illnesses 
of other types, such as stomach problems, which might not warrant malarial treatment 
(Tarimo et at. 2000; Winch et al. 1996) 
" while some episodes were completed, others were ongoing, and these individuals may have 
obtained additional treatment after the interview 
" while children under five with a fever should definitely be treated with an antimalarial 
according to WHO guidelines, this may not be appropriate for all mild fevers in older 
children and adults, as their higher levels of immunity increase the likelihood that the fever 
has another cause 
" without a clinician's assessment, it was difficult to judge whether any antibiotics and 
injectable antimalarials provided were required. 
However, given these provisos, it was possible to get an indication of the appropriateness of 
drugs by examining the proportion of individuals reporting fever/malaria who obtained an 
antimalarial, and the proportion who obtained at least the minimum dose. This is reported both 
for all antimalarials and for "effective antimalarials" only (which excluded chloroquine due to 
the higher levels of resistance to this drug). Minimum antimalarial doses were defined on the 
basis of the age-specific dosing schedules shown in Table Al. 4 in Annex 1. Adequate dosing 
was assessed per provider visit, or per individual (including drugs from all providers and 
home/neighbours). Where individuals had obtained more than one antimalarial of the same 
generic type (e. g. two sets of chloroquine tablets, or quinine tablets and quinine injections), the 
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doses were summed to assess whether an adequate quantity had been consumed. No attempt 
was made to assess the frequency of over-dosing, or the timing of doses, as data were collected 
on drugs obtained from providers, rather than those consumed. 
Analysis of the appropriateness of medication also encompassed unnecessary or inappropriate 
drugs obtained. Firstly, the proportion of individuals obtaining an antimalarial who did not 
report fever/malaria was investigated. Secondly, particularly high rates of antibiotic or 
injectable antimalarial use would be of concern, and some indication of their unnecessary use 
was assessed from the following reported symptoms. Injectable antimalarials might be required 
for patients with symptoms of severe febrile illness (vomiting, unable to eat, convulsions, or 
loss of consciousness). Antibiotics might be necessary for patients reporting cough, fast 
breathing, diarrhoea or the symptoms of very severe febrile illness (Ministry of Health, WHO 
and UNICEF 2002). Finally, aspirin is not recommended for children under five because of its 
association with the liver disorder, Reye's Syndrome. The percentage of under fives reporting 
fever/malaria receiving aspirin was therefore also described. No attempt was made to evaluate 
dosing for other drugs such as antibiotics. 
5.4.4 Outlet Censuses 
The first supply-side data collection activity was a census of all private sources of manufactured 
drugs in the DSS areas, which took place from May to September 2000, repeated in the same 
months in 2001. This was an essential first step of supply-side investigation, as no complete list 
of private providers previously existed. Private sources were found to comprise facilities, drug 
stores and general shops'. 
DSS field staff drew up a list of all outlets that might sell drugs, categorised by outlet type. The 
30 field staff in the Kilombero/Ulanga DSS system, and 39 in Rufiji, knew the areas very well 
since they worked in teams that covered a small geographical area, lived in the communities 
where they worked, and visited each household every four months. Any queries on the sampling 
frame were checked during their regular fieldwork, and lists were updated if any additional 
outlets were identified during data collection. The local knowledge of data collection staff 
facilitated the identification of outlets, but it is possible that a few were missed. To assess this 
we compared the results for the 2000 census with treatment sources recorded in the IMPACT 
household survey conducted over the same period. Less than 7% of shops specified by 
householders could not be matched with those listed in the census, and in some cases this may 
7 One traditional healer was found to stock an antibiotic in the 2001 outlet census in Rufiji, but as this was 
purely for use after circumcision ceremonies, he was not included in the analysis. No other traditional 
healers were identified stocking manufactured drugs. 
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have reflected the use of different names for a given shop. We concluded that we had identified 
nearly all retail pharmaceutical outlets used by the population at the time of the study. 
DSS staff visited each outlet and administered a structured questionnaire covering products 
stocked in three therapeutic classes (painkillers, antimalarials and antibiotics); and wholesale 
drug sources. Some features of the outlet census were common to all supply-side data 
collection. Firstly, the team aimed to interview the person most involved with the outlet's day- 
to-day management and supervision, which in some outlets was the owner, in others the 
manager, and in some the main seller. If this person was not available, any person staffing the 
outlet was interviewed. Secondly, interviews in shops were generally conducted in the outlet, 
with breaks each time a customer arrived. Facility interviews were generally conducted in staff 
offices. Thirdly, when collecting data on fever/malaria drugs stocked, a check list of common 
brand names was used to ensure that all relevant products were reported. The checklist was read 
out to the interviewee, who was also asked whether they had any other drugs in these categories. 
The interviewer checked visually that each drug reported was in stock. 
During the first outlet census we initially identified 612 private outlets, and 588 interviews were 
completed. Of those not interviewed, 13 had closed permanently, 5 were temporarily closed, 
and 2 were omitted in error. Only 4 outlets refused to participate (0.7% of functioning outlets). 
When the census was repeated from May to September 2001, the questionnaire was revised to 
update the drug checklist, and add questions on seasonal operation of shops. During the second 
census 816 outlets were initially identified, and 682 interviews completed. Of those not 
interviewed, 125 had closed permanently, 5 were temporarily closed, 3 were omitted in error, 
and 1 refused. 
The 2001 outlet census was used as a sampling frame for the other supply-side data collection 
activities. The census data on the identity of each outlet by village, sub-village, name of shop, 
name of owner, type of outlet, and location (DSS house number or number of nearest house) 
was used to identify the sampled outlets. 
5.4.5 Semi-Structured Qualitative Provider Interviews 
A number of studies have demonstrated the potential utility of qualitative data in understanding 
private provider behaviour (Adome, Whyte and Hardon 1996; Cocks and Dold 2000; Kamat 
2001; Kamat and Nichter 1997; Kamat and Nichter 1998; Van der Geest 1987), and qualitative 
methods are argued to have the potential to make an important contribution to health economics 
theory and analysis (Coast, McDonald and Baker 2004). A limited number of semi-structured 
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interviews were therefore conducted, with two broad aims. Firstly they informed the design of 
the outlet survey and retail audits, by generating hypotheses for quantitative investigation, 
providing background information for the audit methodology, and identifying the most 
appropriate and comprehensible wording to use. Secondly, they facilitated collection of data on 
subjective perceptions and opinions of outlet staff, and the exploration of sensitive commercial 
and regulatory issues, which are not readily addressed using quantitative methods (Conteh and 
Hanson 2003). 
The ontological approach taken in these interviews could be described as one of "subtle 
realismi8 (Mays and Pope 2000). We aimed to uncover insights into the underlying nature of 
competition between outlets, but recognised that these phenomena would be seen through the 
subjective perceptions of the interviewees, and reflect the dynamic of the interview setting and 
characteristics of the interviewers. The approach was primarily deductive, starting from ideas 
and hypotheses drawn from economic theory and evidence within the industrial organisation 
literature, as outlined in the conceptual framework in Figure 5.1. This framework guided the 
choice of research questions, sample selection, the design of interview guides, and the 
construction of the preliminary coding scheme. However, this was not followed rigidly; there 
was also a conscious attempt to be open to issues and theoretical ideas arising from the data 
during their collection, and interim and final analyses. Semi-structured interviews provided a 
flexible format for these discussions, while ensuring that comparable issues were raised during 
each interview (Russell Bernard 1995). Interview guides covered a range of issues related to the 
operation of the outlet, the customers, competition with other providers, and government 
regulation, with a focus on the provision of fever/malaria treatment. The information sought on 
each topic was a mixture of facts and perceptions/opinions. There were slight differences in the 
guides for shops and facilities, both in the language used in the questions (e. g. "patients" v. 
"customers"; "providing services" v. "running a business"), and in some of the topics covered 
(e. g. user fees and exemptions were relevant only to facilities; retail inspectors were relevant 
only to shops). 
A sample of 18 private outlets was selected purposively, stratified by DSS system, outlet type, 
location inside or outside a market centre and, for general shops, whether antimalarials were 
stocked during the outlet census. Other criteria for selection were that outlets stocked drugs at 
the time of the interview, were located in a range of different villages, and accessible by 
8 
a position of "subtle realism" acknowledges that all research involves subjective perceptions, but argues 
that there is an underlying reality which can be studied. This contrasts with an antirealist or constructivist 
ontological paradigm, often used in qualitative research, which denies the concept of a single unequivocal 
social reality or truth which is entirely independent of the researcher and the research process (Mays and 
Pope 2000). 
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vehicle9. Though not statistically representative, the resulting sample was theoretically informed 
and relevant to the research questions, and possible bias from selecting a sample on the basis of 
convenience was reduced. 
Of the outlets initially selected, two had closed down, one no longer stocked drugs, and staff at 
two outlets declined to participate10. These five outlets were replaced with others of the same 
type, and in the same village where possible. The final sample included 10 general shops, 5 drug 
stores, and 3 dispensaries (2 mission-owned and one commercial). Background characteristics 
of the interviewees and outlets are presented in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 Semi-structured qualitative provider interviews: Characteristics 
of interviewees and their outlets 
Characteristics General shops Drug stores Private facilities 
Interviewees 
n 11 5 5 
Sex: 
Male 9 1 4 
Female 2 4 1 
Age: 
<25 3 2 0 
25-50 8 2 5 
>50 0 1 0 
Role in outlet: 
Owner 7 1 0 
Employee 4 4 5 
Outlets 
n 10 5 3 
Number of staff: 
1 0 1 0 
2 7 4 0 
3 2 0 1 
>3 1 0 2 
Antimalarials in 
stock: 
Yes 3 5 3 
No 7 0 0 
Location: 
In market centre 5 4 2 
Outside market centre 5 1 1 
DSS area: 
Kilombero 2 1 1 
Ulanga 2 1 1 
Rufi'i 6 3 1 
"The number of interviewees is greater than the number of outlets as in two dispensaries and one general shop two 
staff participated in the interview, where different people were most knowledgeable about certain questions. 
9 By excluding outlets not accessible by vehicle the sample was biased away from a few very remote 
general shops. Excluding outlets with no drugs at the time of the interview may have biased the sample 
away from general shopkeepers who were intermittent stockers. 10 In one case they said they were too busy, and in the second the owner had recently died. 
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Each outlet was visited by the author and two research assistants in August-September 2001. 
The research assistants were Tanzanian university graduates with fluent KiSwahili, and were 
trained on the general principles of interviewing for qualitative research, and the meaning and 
purpose of the interview questions. In some cases, more than one respondent participated where, 
for example, different people were most knowledgeable about retail sales and wholesale 
supplies. The interviews took between 1.5 and 3.5 hours. Following each interview, the research 
team held a debrief session to discuss the issues raised, impressions about the interviewee's 
attitude and behaviour, and any responses needing clarification, which in some cases 
necessitated repeat visits. Between interviews some minor changes were made to the interview 
guide to make the questions clearer, and incorporate new areas of discussion or remove 
unfruitful ones. Informal analysis of the interview data began through the drafting of memos to 
summarise important findings, and emerging themes, research questions and hypotheses. 
The interviews were tape-recorded, fully transcribed in KiSwahili, translated into English, and 
the translations checked against the original KiSwahili manuscript. They were supplemented by 
notes on observations during the interviews. The general approach to data analysis followed a 
path of familiarisation with the data, construction of a preliminary coding scheme, followed by 
manual qualitative content analysis and interpretation. After initial open coding, each code was 
examined in great detail, the coding scheme was refined, and finally codes were grouped under 
key themes (Figure A1.1 in Annex 1). 
5.4.6 Outlet Survey 
The outlet survey aimed to collect representative quantitative data on the characteristics of 
outlets, their staff and the products they stocked, using a structured questionnaire. It was 
conducted at all government and private health facilities and drug stores and a sample of general 
shops stocking drugs in the DSS areas. 
The sample was stratified by DSS system (Kilombero/Ulanga and Rufiji) and by outlet type 
(government facility, private facility, drug store and general store)". As in the household 
survey, Kilombero and Ulanga were considered as one area for the purpose of sample 
stratification, but are analysed as separate areas where appropriate, as their markets proved to be 
geographically distinct. As there were relatively small numbers of facilities and drug stores, 
It As the category of general shops was highly heterogeneous, we considered stratifying by type (e. g. 
larger general shops versus smaller, less formal kiosks/stalls). However, during the outlet censuses we 
found such classifications to be unreliable as they varied between the research staff, with the perception 
of consumers during an earlier IMPACT household survey in 2000, and with official classifications for 
licence purposes. 
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they were over-sampled, by selecting all outlets in these groups12. The sampling frame for 
general shops included all those which during the 2001 outlet census had drugs when visited or 
reported stocking them in the previous 2 months 13. The sample size calculations determined that 
roughly 100 general shops would be required in each DSS system to detect certain key 
differences between two groups of roughly equal size (e. g. DSS systems, inside and outside 
market centres), with 5% significance and 80% power (Table A1.5 in Annex 1). We randomly 
selected 135 general stores in each DSS system (roughly 50% of the sampling frame), with the 
aim of obtaining data on at least 100 after wastage. We did not attempt to weight the sample by 
utilisation using probability proportion to clientele size because the primary purpose was to 
describe the average characteristics of each outlet type, rather than to describe the average 
characteristics experienced by customers across all outlets. 
Data collection was undertaken by a team of interviewers, moving sequentially through the DSS 
areas over a 6-week period in November and December 2001. Interviews at drug stores and 
facilities were done by pairs of interviewers because of the high number of drug products 
stocked. If an outlet had shut down completely, or the staff refused, the outlet was not replaced. 
If the outlet was temporarily closed, or the interviewee requested an alternative time, a second 
visit was made where logistically possible. If the outlet had changed ownership since the outlet 
census 2001, it was included under the new owner's name. 
We visited 331 outlets, and completed 294 interviews (Table 5.4). Of those not interviewed, 26 
had closed permanently, 7 were temporarily closed, and in one case no reason was recorded. 
Only 3 general stores refused to participate (1% of functioning outlets). Interviews were 
completed at 18 government facilities (4 health centres and 14 dispensaries), 8 private facilities 
(6 mission dispensaries, 1 mission hospital, and 1 commercial dispensary), 30 commercial Part 
II drug stores, 2 not-for-profit village-run drug stores, and 236 general stores (shops, kiosks & 
stalls). 
12 a first aid post run by a construction company in Rufiji was excluded, because it provided services to 
the company's workers only 13 two general shops were excluded from the sampling frame: one shop in Rufiji because their 
participation in a qualitative interview had been cut short when a neighbour became suspicious about the 
purpose of the interview; and one in Kilombero/Ulanga where they refused to participate in the 2001 
outlet census. 
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Aauicý. -T '7 I IL... a 
Outlet type 
-- 
Sam le size 
- 
Interviewed 
Kilombero 
/Ulanga 
DSS 
Ruffiji 
DSS 
Total Kilombero 
/Ulanga 
DSS 
Rufiji 
DSS 
Total 
Government facility 9 9 18 9 9 18 
Private facility 5 4 9 4 4 8 
Commercial drug store 12 20 32 11 19 30 
Village-run drug store 2 0 2 2 0 2 
General store 135 135 270 117 119 236 
Total 163 168 331 143 151 294 
Background characteristics of the interviewees and outlets are presented in Table 5.5. 
wees and outlets 
Characteristics General shops Drug stores Private Government 
facilities facilities 
n=236 n=32 n=8 n=18 
Interviewee 
Gender: 
Male 200 (85%) 5 (16%) 6 (75%) 12 (67%) 
Female 36(15%) 27 84% 2 25% 6 (33%) 
Age in years: 
12-15 11(5%) 00 00 00 
16-24 98 (42%) 15 (47%) 00 0 (-) 
25-50 118(50%) 16(50%) 7(88%) 17(94%) 
>50 9 (4%) 1(3%) 1(13%) 1 (6%) 
Role in outlet: 
Owner 116 (49%) 3 (9%) 0 (-) 0 (-) 
Employee 120(51%) 29(91%) 8(100%) 18(100%) 
Role in serving 
customers: 
Regularly 189 (80%) 31(97%) 6 (75%) 18 (100%) 
Occasionally 47 (20%) 1 (3%) 1 (13%) 00 
Never 0(-) 0(-) 1(13%)--- 0(-) 
Outlet 
Number of staff: 
1 25(11%) 0(-) 0(-) 0(-) 
2 176 (75%) 27 (84%) 00 4 (22%) 
3 31(13%) 5 (16%) 2 (25%) 3 (17%) 
>3 42% 0- 675% 11(61%) 
Antimalarials in 
stock: 
Yes 30(13%) 32(100%) 8(100%) 18(100%) 
No 206(87%) 0(-) 0(-) 0 (-) 
Location: 
In market centre 71(30%) 15 (47%) 4 (50%) 3 (17%) 
Rural village 136 (58%) 17 (53%) 4 (50%) 15 (83%) 
Farmin area 29(12%) 0(-) 0(-) 0(-) 
DSS area: 
Kilombero 64(27%) 11(34%) 2 (25%) 4 (22%) 
Ulanga 53 (22%) 2 (6%) 2 (25%) 5 (50%) 
Rufji 119(50%) 19(59%) 4(50%) 9(28%) 
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In the analysis of antimalarial prices, for ease of comparison antimalarial prices were calculated 
as the amount required to be purchased in order to treat a two-year-old child (Table Al. 6 in 
Annex 1). Tablets required were rounded up to the nearest whole tablet, as fractions of tablets 
could not normally be purchased. Syrups and injections were costed at the price for a whole 
bottle or vial/ampoule, as it was not usually possible to purchase less in shops. The contents of a 
bottle of syrup contained more than sufficient for a child's dose, and the vials for injectables 
were sufficient for an initial pre-referral dose, as recommended in the National Treatment 
Guidelines (Ministry of Health 2000)14. As there was no fixed dose for common painkillers, 
prices were compared per tablet or bottle. 
Drug quality testing 
Samples of SP tablets stocked during the outlet survey were collected to provide a general 
indication of the quality of products available at the retail level. Nine or ten tablets were 
obtained from each lot stocked at each outlet, and analysed at CDC, Atlanta (Green et al., 
unpublished data, IMPACT collaboration)'5. The content of sulphadoxine and pyrimethamine in 
each sample was assessed by high-pressure liquid chromatography under standard conditions'b. 
Samples were classified as failing if they had less than 90% of the specified quantity of active 
ingredient. Any excessive quantities of active ingredient were also noted, because they could 
potentially lead to an increased incidence of side-effects or toxicity. However, as they contained 
an adequate quantity for clinical efficacy, the analysis of the results focused on those with an 
insufficient quantity. 
5.4.7 Antimalarial Retail Audits 
The retail audits were designed to estimate annual antimalarial sales volumes in the DSS areas. 
A specific data collection activity was required because shops did not keep good written 
records, and it would have been unrealistic to expect precise recall on products, doses and 
packaging from the household survey. Data were collected during two 2-week periods in 2002. 
This design was selected because qualitative interviews with providers indicated that drug sales 
may vary on different days of the week and at different times of year, but intra-month variation 
in weekly sales was rarely reported. Two weeks was considered a reasonable recall period for 
wholesale deliveries. The first audit took place 28th February - 6"' April in Kilombero/Ulanga, 
and 6th-26th March in Rufiji; the second 24th June - 18th July in Kilombero/Ulanga, and 3rd- 
14 in practice referral may not have taken place and the purchase of additional oral or injectable 
medication would have been required to achieve a full dose. is these results were not based on an adequate quantity of tablets for United States Pharmacopoia (USP) 
standards, which require 20 tablets per test. 16 Dissolution tests were also conducted, but the results were not available at the time of writing. 
91 
23rd July in Rufiji. While additional audits would have been desirable, we were restricted to two 
due to logistical constraints. 
The retail audit sample included outlets that stocked antimalarials during the outlet survey or the 
outlet census 2001. This included all facilities, all drug stores, and around half the general stores 
stocking antimalarials during the outlet census 2001, or 10-13% of general stores stocking any 
drugs. In addition, any new drug stores or facilities that had opened since the outlet survey were 
also included, as they were likely to be significant sources of antimalarials. New drug stores or 
facilities that opened between the first and second retail audit were included in retail audit 2. 
For both audits in Rufiji and the first in Kilombero/Ulanga the DSS staff performed the 
interviews as part of their normal work. In retail audit 2 in Kilombero/Ulanga a separate team of 
4 interviewers was trained because DSS staff were unavailable. Interviewers visited each outlet 
twice, aiming for a two-week gap between visits. 
On the first visit of each audit, interviewers completed a checklist of antimalarial drugs in stock, 
and recorded stock levels for each one. For outlets with opened tins of loose tablets, the number 
of tablets in stock was estimated based on the number in a full tin and the ratio of the height of 
the tablets to the height of the tin (thus avoiding counting several hundred tablets and 
unnecessary handling of loose drugs). On the second visit interviewers again recorded stock 
levels, and any deliveries since their previous visit, plus any drugs that had been removed for 
other reasons e. g. thrown away or returned to wholesalers. Where possible, quantities received 
were checked using wholesale receipts, although these were rarely available. 
In retail audit 1 we visited 122 outlets, and completed 115 first interviews and 112 second 
interviews (Table 5.6a). Of the 7 outlets where no interviews took place, 3 general shops were 
permanently closed, 3 were temporarily closed, and one private facility refused. In two 
commercial drug stores and one village-run drug store first interviews took place, but no second 
interview because the outlets were temporarily shut at the time of the second visit. 
In retail audit 2 we added four newly opened drug stores (2 in Rufiji and 1 each in Kilombero 
and Ulanga), and excluded the 3 general shops permanently closed in retail audit 1, giving a 
total sample of 123 (Table 5b). First and second interviews were completed in 119 outlets. Of 
the 4 outlets where no interviews took place, 2 general shops and 1 drug store had closed down, 
and the private facility which declined to participate in retail audit 1 again refused. 
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Table 5.6 Antimalarial Retail Audit sample size and outlets interviewed 
(a) Retail Audit 1 
Sample size Outlets whe 
co' 
Kilombero Ulanga Rufiji Total Kilombero U12 
DSS DSS DSS DSS D 
Government 459 18 4 
facilities 
Private 32493 
facilities' 
Commercial 92 20 31 8 
drug shops 
Village-run 20021 
drug shops 
General 27 8 27 62 24 
stores 
Total 45 17 60 122 40 
b Retail Audit 2 
Sample size Outlets whe 
col 
Kilombero Ulanga Rufiji Total Kilombero Uli 
DSS DSS DSS DSS D 
Government 459 18 4 
facilities 
Private 32493 
facilities' 
Commercial 10 3 22 35 9 
drug shops 
Village-run 20022 
drug shops 
General 25 8 26 59 23 
stores 
Total 44 18 61 123 41 1 
1since the outlet survey one mission dispensary in Kilombero had reopened and was theref 
audits, but not in the outlet survey. 
Sample size Outlets where two interviews 
completed 
Kilombero Ulanga Rufiji Total Kilombero Ulanga Rufiji Total 
DSS DSS DSS DSS DSS DSS 
Government 4 5 9 18 4 5 9 18 
facilities 
Private 3 2 4 9 3 2 3 8 
facilities' 
Commercial 9 2 20 31 8 2 19 29 
drug shops 
Village-run 2 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 
drug shops 
General 27 8 27 62 24 7 25 56 
stores 
Total 45 17 60 122 40 16 56 112 
Sample size Outlets where two interviews 
completed 
Kilombero Ulanga Rufiji Total Kilombero Ulanga Rufiji Total 
DSS DSS DSS DSS DSS DSS 
Government 4 5 9 18 4 5 9 18 
facilities 
Private 3 2 4 9 3 2 3 8 
facilities' 
Commercial 10 3 22 35 9 3 22 34 
drug shops 
Village-run 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 
drug shops 
General 25 8 26 59 23 8 26 57 
stores 
Total 44 18 61 123 41 18 60 119 
In retail audit 1 there were 380 antimalarial observations, and in retail audit 2,408. Although all 
the outlets selected had stocked antimalarials in either the outlet survey or the 2001 outlet 
census, only 25 of the general stores selected (45%) had antimalarial drugs in stock during retail 
audit 1, and this had fallen to 18 (32%) during retail audit 2. 
The target gap between interviews was 14 days. In retail audit 1 the mean gap was 15.0, with a 
range of 10 to 26 days, with 97% of outlets between 10 and 21. In retail audit 2 the mean gap 
was 14.0, with a range of 13 to 17 days. 
Calculation of antimalarial sales volumes and values 
For each audit, sales of each antimalarial between the 2 visits were calculated as: 
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Sales = (Total at 1 °` visit) + (Deliveries between 18t and 2d visit) - (Stocks thrown away or 
transferred to other shops/facilities) - (Total at 2"d visit) 
To calculate fortnightly sales, sales volumes were scaled up or down pro rata, depending on the 
actual number of days between interviews for each outlet. To sum across different drug types to 
measure total antimalarial sales, volumes were calculated in terms of purchases required for 
equivalent adult treatment doses, based on the adult doses shown in Table Al. 6. For syrup and 
injectables, it was assumed that one whole bottle or vial would have to be purchased. The 
number of equivalent doses will be much lower than the actual number of customers, because 
46% of provider visits were for patients under 14 years (household survey) who should receive 
a lower dose, and many people of all ages will have obtained less than the full treatment dose. 
To estimate total sales volumes, data were extrapolated to cover observations with missing sales 
data and outlets not interviewed, using mean sales for each drug type by outlet type. To estimate 
yearly sales it was necessary to extrapolate from the two 2-week periods. The two audits were 
undertaken at different times of year with the aim of capturing seasonal epidemiological and 
economic variation in sales. However, the data did not show evidence of clear seasonal patterns. 
Annual sales were therefore estimated simply by summing the sales figures for the two surveys 
and scaling up pro rata to yearly sales estimates. It is possible that the timing of the 2 surveys 
did not capture seasonal variation at other times of year. 
The value of antimalarial sales was approximated based on outlet survey data on the median 
price for each drug category by packaging and outlet type (e. g. median price of loose SP tablets 
in commercial drug stores). For three items in village health stores and two in general stores 
there were no appropriate price observations. Their prices were approximated with the median 
price from commercial drug stores. As government drugs were either heavily or completely 
subsidised, their value was approximated using 2002 international reference prices (IRP) from 
suppliers (Management Sciences for Health 2002), scaled up 15% for importation costs, and 
15% for internal transport, and using an exchange rate of US$1=Tsh950.14. Methods for the 
calculation of annual sales volumes and values are described in more detail in Annex 6. 
5.4.8 Quantitative Data Entry and Analysis 
Data from the household survey, outlet censuses, outlet survey and retail audits were double 
entered using FoxPro 2.6a, and checked for logical consistency and coding errors. Analysis was 
performed using STATA 8. 
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Analysis of the household and outlet surveys was performed using STATA survey commands 
(e. g. svytab, svylogit). Differences in proportions were tested for significance using the Pearson 
chi-squared statistic with the Rao and Scott second-order correction to allow for survey design 
(Stata Inc. 2003). In the household survey these commands were used to adjust for clustering 
between individuals in the same household, and for the stratified survey design (separate 
samples drawn from Kilombero/Ulanga and Rufiji DSS systems). With such stratification, it 
may be necessary to weight observations to account for differences in sampling fractions across 
strata. However, in this case the number of individuals interviewed as a percentage of total 
population was extremely close in the two strata (2.8% in Kilombero/Ulanga and 2.7% in 
Rufiji), so population weights were not used. Analysis of a set of key variables with and without 
population weights demonstrated that the use of weights would have had only a minimal impact 
on parameter estimates 17,18. 
In the analysis of the outlet survey, STATA survey commands were used to adjust for the 
stratification of the sample between Kilombero/Ulanga and Rufiji DSS systems, and potential 
clustering of drug observations within outlets. As with the household survey, observations were 
not weighted to reflect differences in sampling fractions, as all facilities and drug stores were 
selected, and the sampling fractions for general stores were similar in the two strata (39% in 
Kilombero/Ulanga and 44% in Rufiji). Weighting general stores would have had a minimal 
impact on key variables19. 
Population ratios were calculated using population data from the DSS systems. For consistency, 
all ratios were calculated on the basis of populations enumerated during the second DSS round 
of 2001 (May-August). 
Regression models were used for multivariate analysis of variation in key outcomes. Logit 
models were used for the probability of obtaining appropriate antimalarials by individuals with 
fever/malaria. Ordinary least squares (OLS) log-lin models were used to analyse the price of 
antimalarial and painkillers tablets. STATA survey estimators were used for all regression 
analyses (svylogit, svyregress); they produce HuberlWhite/Sandwich estimators of variance, 
which control for design-based heteroscedasticity (Stata Inc. 2003). 
17 for example, the percentage of individuals reporting fever was 16.34% unweighted and 16.37% 
weighted; the percentage of febrile individuals visiting a government facility was 22.45% unweighted and 22.47% weighted. 18 The analysis of the household survey was restricted to those variables most pertinent to the thesis 
objectives. Data collected on other areas, such as ITN use, adverse drug reactions, and treatment seeking 
costs are being analysed by other IMPACT team members. A full econometric demand model of provider 
and drug choice is planned using the household and outlet survey data, but is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
19 for example, the percentage of general stores stocking antimalarials was 14.08% unweighted and 14.13% weighted; the percentage of general store staff with more than primary education was 13.21% 
unweighted and 13.28% weighted. 
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5.4.9 Timing of Data Collection Activities 
Table 5.7 clarifies the timing of the five types of data collection activity undertaken. The first 
outlet census was conducted in mid-2000. It was repeated in mid-2001, in tandem with the 
household survey. The remaining activities were undertaken sequentially over the following 
year. 
Table 5.7 Timing of data collection activities 
Data collection activity 
Household survey 
Outlet censuses 
Provider qualitative interviews 
Outlet survey 
Retail audits 
4 1 
2001 
2 1 
L L' 
National Policy 
Change to SP 
2002 
2 3 4 
The difference in the timing of the activities poses potential challenges for data analysis, as the 
market may experience seasonal variation, or undergo longer-term changes over time. Demand 
and supply may vary seasonally due to variation in malaria transmission, economic activities, 
cash availability, or geographical accessibility. It is therefore possible that, for example, outlet 
characteristics documented during the outlet survey in November/December may not reflect 
those faced by households during the household survey in May to September. Perhaps of even 
greater significance is the timing of the policy change in first line drug from chloroquine to SP, 
officially announced in August 2001 (Table 5.7). The household survey and outlet censuses 
took place almost entirely before the announcement, but the qualitative interviews, outlet survey 
and retail audits were spread over the following year. To complicate matters further, 
implementation of the policy change at facility level took place gradually and somewhat 
haphazardly, and was more rapid in Rufiji than in Kilombero and Ulanga. As a result the thesis 
is analysing a changing market, in particular with the importance of chloroquine waning, and 
that of SP growing over time. 
A number of steps have been taken to address these potential problems. The date of each data 
collection activity is included in the notes to each table and figure presenting results to aid 
interpretation. The potential influence of changes over time are flagged up where appropriate 
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during the results chapters, and the methodological challenges of analysing a market under 
change are discussed in Chapter 11. 
5.5 Summary and Plan of Analysis 
The aim of the thesis is to analyse the market for fever/malaria treatment, and to draw 
implications for the improvement of malaria treatment obtained. The thesis is concerned with 
how the interplay of market structure, provider conduct, regulation and consumer demand 
influences treatment outcomes. Data were collected in the DSS areas of 3 rural Tanzanian 
districts. Data on demand were collected through a household survey. Following censuses of 
private providers, data on supply were collected through in-depth interviews, a structured 
survey, and retail audits in government and private facilities, drug shops and general stores. 
The results are presented in the next five chapters. The results chapters have been organised by 
theme of analysis, rather than by data collection activity, in order to synthesise and triangulate 
data from different sources and provide a richer understanding of each theme. As a result, each 
chapter draws on at least three different data collection activities, and most use data from all 
five. The results begin in Chapter 6 with an assessment of fever/malaria treatment obtained in 
the study sites (Objective 1). This is followed by three chapters on the nature of competition, 
covering market structure (Chapter 7), product differentiation and non-price competition 
(Chapter 8), and pricing and price competition (Chapter 9) (Objective 2). Finally, Chapter 10 
reports results on retail regulation (Objective 3). The importance of consumer demand, the final 
key element of the conceptual framework, is woven into these five results chapters, where 
appropriate. As each data collection activity is drawn on in several results chapters, the 
methodological strengths and limitations are addressed together after the five results chapters, in 
Chapter 11. Chapter 12 draws together the findings from the five results chapters and considers 
them in the light of the existing literature, leading to an assessment of the nature of competition 
and regulation, and the implications for accessibility, quality and affordability (Objective 4). 
The fifth and final objective is addressed in Chapter 13, which focuses on policy implications 
that can be drawn from the results and analysis. 
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PART III 
RESULTS 
CHAPTER 6 
FEVER/MALARIA TREATMENT OBTAINED 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the first objective of the thesis: to describe treatment seeking and drug 
purchases for fever/malaria, and assess the appropriateness of care obtained. Sections 6.2 and 
6.3 set the context for this analysis. On the demand-side, Section 6.2 provides background 
information on the study communities, through a description of the household and individual 
characteristics of household survey respondents, and the prevalence of malaria parasitaemia and 
reported fever/malaria episodes. On the supply-side, Section 6.3 reports outlet census data on 
the range and number of drug providers in the study areas, and outlet survey data on the 
fever/malaria products available. 
Sections 6.4 and 6.5 describe treatment seeking and drug purchase for fever/malaria, using two 
data sources. Section 6.4 analyses patterns of treatment seeking reported in the household 
survey; Section 6.5 reports retail audit data on the volume and value of antimalarials dispensed. 
A key feature of both sections is an analysis of the relative importance of retailers as 
fever/malaria treatment providers. 
Section 6.6 draws on a number of data sources to assess the appropriateness of fever/malaria 
care. Firstly, household survey data are used to document the speed of treatment seeking and the 
appropriateness of drugs obtained. Drug samples collected during the outlet survey are used to 
assess antimalarial packaging, labelling and drug quality. Finally, retail audit data are used to 
explore the appropriateness of total antimalarial drug volumes at a community level. Variation 
in the choice of provider and appropriateness of drugs obtained are explored through bivariate 
analysis with a range of household and individual characteristics. For two key variables, the 
probability of obtaining an antimalarial and of attaining a minimum antimalarial dose, multi- 
nomial logit regression analysis is also employed. 
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Section 6.7 highlights key similarities and differences between the three DSS areas in their 
demand and supply characteristics. Finally, Section 6.8 concludes by summarising key findings 
of the analysis, and setting the agenda for the remaining results chapters. ' 
6.2 Characteristics of Households and the Prevalence of Fever and Malaria 
Basic characteristics of households and individuals interviewed for the household survey are 
presented in Table Al. 72. Farming was by far the most common main occupation for household 
heads in all areas, and education levels were generally low, with only 13% of household heads 
having more than primary education. Religious affiliation was strikingly different between the 
three areas: over 90% of households in Rufiji were Muslim, compared with 57% in Ulanga, and 
only 19% in Kilombero, where the majority were Christian. Education levels were significantly 
lower in Ruffiji, where 44% of household heads had no education, compared with 18% in 
Kilombero, and 16% in Ulanga, although the percentage with more than primary education was 
slightly higher in Rufiji (15% versus 12% in Kilombero and 9% in Ulanga). Off-farm work was 
more frequently mentioned in Rufiji (17% compared with 11% in Ulanga and 6% in 
Kilombero), reflecting a higher number of people citing small business and formal sector j obs as 
their main occupation;. There were no significant differences across the DSS areas in the 
proportion of households in each SES third, or in the mean PCA score. 
Of individuals completing the household survey, 16% reported a fever/malaria episode in the 
previous two weeks (Table A1.8). Fever/malaria prevalence was similar in Rufiji and 
Kilombero DSS areas, but significantly lower in Ulanga (11%). There was also significant 
variation by age group: episodes were most likely to be reported for under fives (28%), 
followed by adults (16%), and least likely for older children (5-14 years) (10%). Of all episodes 
reported, 27% were in under fives, 18% in older children, and 55% of adults. There was no 
difference in reported fever/malaria by gender or socio-economic group, but individuals with 
more educated household heads were significantly more likely to report an episode, although 
the difference was not large (2.8 percentage points)4. 
1 data on key measures of the appropriateness of treatment are included as tables or figures in the text. 
Background and supplementary data are described in the text, and presented as tables or figures in Annex 
1 (prefixed by Al). 
2 data are presented only for households which completed the detailed survey (Group A). There were no 
significant differences between Group A households and the Group X households which completed the 
less detailed survey in terms of household head's religion, education, main job or SES. 3 our analysis indicated that it would have been preferable to ask whether households had any source of 
off-farm income, rather than asking about the household head's main occupation. This would have 
highlighted all households with other income-generating activities undertaken by any household 
members, even where the household head's main activity was fanning. The question has been rephrased 
in this way for subsequent IMPACT surveys. 4 only household head education was collected during the survey. One might have expected a stronger 
relationship between health or treatment choice variables and education of the individual for adults or the 
caretaker for children (Filmer, 2002). 
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Of 3,329 individuals with microscopy data, 23% tested positive for P. falciparum malaria on the 
day of interview. Parasitaemia was most common in Rufiji DSS (25%), followed by Ulanga 
(22%), and lowest in Kilombero (20%). Parasitaemia was significantly more likely in people 
under 15 years, with a prevalence of 41% in under fives, 38% in older children, and 10% in 
adults. Individuals in the better-off third of households were significantly less likely to be 
parasitaemic (18%) than those in the middle third (26%) or poorest third (25%). There was no 
significant variation across gender or household head's education. There was no difference in 
parasitaemia prevalence between those with a fever/malaria history and those without (24% 
compared with 23%). Conversely, of those with parasitaemia, only 18% reported fever/malaria. 
This is not surprising, as many fevers would have stemmed from non-malarial causes, and some 
patients who had experienced malaria in the previous two weeks would not have been 
parasitaemic by the day of interview. Others who were parasitaemic on the day of interview 
may have had low-density asymptomatic infections, that may or may not have led subsequently 
to fever. 
6.3 Providers Stocking Drugs 
In the DSS areas manufactured pharmaceuticals were provided by health facilities, drug stores 
and general shops/stalls. The study areas contained 27 facilities: 18 government facilities (4 
health centres and 14 smaller dispensaries), 9 private facilities (7 mission dispensariess, 1 
mission hospital and 1 commercial dispensary) (Table Al. 9). There were no Part I pharmacies 
in the DSS areas, but drugs were very widely available from other retail outlets. During the 
outlet census in mid-2001 there were 32 Part II drug shops; 30 were commercially owned, and 
two were recently opened village-run stores. We also identified 535 general retailers with drugs 
in stock on the day visited. An additional 28 general retailers had no drugs on the day of 
interview but reported having stocked drugs within the previous 2 months6. All commercial 
drug stores, general stores and the commercial dispensary were run on a for-profit basis, and all 
government facilities, mission facilities and village-run drug stores on an officially not-for- 
profit basis. 
During the outlet census 2001 there was one general retailer stocking drugs for every 262 
people, compared with one drug store for every 4386, and one health facility for every 5198. 
Drug stores tended to locate relatively close to facilities, and were generally limited to the more 
S One of the mission dispensaries in Kilombero was open during the outlet census and retail audits, but 
temporarily closed at the time of the outlet survey because the DHMT believed it to have been 
contravening its licence. In addition there was a first-aid post run by a construction company in Rufiji 
which provided services to the company's workers only. 6 Seven general retailers could not be interviewed and their drug stocking patterns were therefore 
unknown. 
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populous areas and main roads. General shops were much more scattered, reaching right out to 
remote communities. Coverage of private facilities was very patchy, and they were often located 
in the same area as government facilities. 
Data on fever/malaria drugs stocked are reported from the outlet survey (Nov/Dec 2001), which 
included all facilities and drug stores in the DSS areas, and a sample of general stores stocking 
drugs7'8. Full details of stocking patterns are presented in Table A1.10. Of outlets stocking 
fever/malaria drugs all but one (a government health centre) had painkillers. The most 
commonly stocked were aspirin and paracetamol tablets, with many commercial shops also 
selling paracetamol syrup and combination tablet products containing aspirin+caffeine or 
aspirin+paracetamol+caffeine. Other painkillers stocked regularly in facilities and commercial 
drug shops included ibruprofen, diclofenac and indomethacin. 
Antimalarials were stocked by all facilities and drug stores, but by only 14% of general stores 
stocking drugs. The antimalarials available were chloroquine and quinine as tablets, syrups and 
injectables; SP and amodiaquine as tablets and syrup; and artesunate as tablets9. SP tablets were 
the most widely stocked in facilities and commercial drug shops, with chloroquine, 
amodiaquine and quinine tablets also common. Many facilities and commercial drug shops also 
stocked chloroquine and quinine as injectables, and many private facilities and commercial drug 
shops stocked a range of antimalarial syrups. Artesunate was very rare, only found in tablet 
form in one drug store. By contrast chloroquine was the only antimalarial available in the two 
village-run drug shops, demonstrating that more than three months after the official change to 
SP, the policy was not yet implemented at this level. Chloroquine tablets were also the 
antimalarial most commonly found in general stores (9%), followed by amodiaquine (3%), with 
other antimalarials stocked by less than 1% of these outlets, and none stocking artemisinin 
derivatives. 
The stocking patterns reflect the situation in late-2001, but these patterns were not static. Over 
the period of data collection we witnessed a dramatic decline in chloroquine availability, with 
the percentage of commercial drug stores stocking chloroquine falling from 96% during the first 
outlet census in mid-2000 to 88% during the second outlet census in mid-2001,60% during the 
outlet survey in late 2001,48% during the first retail audit in early 2002 and 29% during the 
7 the sample of general stores for the outlet survey was drawn from those stocking drugs during the 2001 
outlet census. By the time of the outlet survey, 23 (10%) no longer had any fever/malaria drugs in stock 
and were therefore excluded from these figures. 8 data on drugs stocked were also collected during the outlet census, but data from the outlet survey are 
reported, because they are likely to be more reliable due to the use of a more comprehensive drug 
checklist and better trained staff. 9 the following antimalarials were not permitted in shops: quinine and artesunate tablets, SP and quinine 
syrup, and all injectables. In addition, chloroquine was officially withdrawn in August 2001. The 
prevalence of illegal activity in shops is discussed in Chapter 10 on retail regulation. 
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second retail audit in mid-2002. Over the same period the availability of SP, amodiaquine and 
quinine increased in all outlet types 
6.4 Choice of Fever/Malaria Treatment Provider 
Of the 628 individuals reporting fever/malaria during the household survey, 90% of under fives 
and 83% of older children and adults sought some kind of treatment (Table 6.1). Three-quarters 
sought treatment from a health care provider. Retailers were the most frequent source: 28% had 
attended a health facility, while 54% had visited shops. Both types of retail outlet were 
important sources, with 26% visiting drug stores and 29% general shops. Reported use of 
traditional healers and community health workers was very rare. Only four visits to traditional 
healers were reported, and in 3 of the 4 cases, one or two other providers were visited first, 
indicating that traditional healers may be used after other strategies were perceived to have 
failed. Drugs were obtained from home or neighbours by 13% of individuals reporting episodes. 
Obtaining drugs from home/neighbour was significantly more likely for individuals in Ulanga 
(22%) than in Kilombero or Rufiji (both 11 %). 
Table 6.1 Sources of treatment for individuals reporting fever/malaria episode 
of individuals reporting fever/malaria using the specified source of treatment) 
Under 5 years Over 5 years Total 
N 172 456 628 
Any treatment 154 (90%)* 377 (83%)* 531(85%) 
Any provider visit 131(76%) 337(74%) 468(75%) 
Government facilit 60 (35%)* 81 (18%)* 141(22%) 
Private facility 18 (10%)* 22 (5%)* 40(6%) 
Drug store' 42(24%) 124(27%) 166(26%) 
General shop 35 (20%)* 150 (33%)* 185(29%) 
Traditional healer 2(1%) 2(0.4%) 4(0.6%) 
Community health 
worker 
00 2 (0.4%) 2 (0.3%) 
Lymphatic filariasis 
roject2 
00 2 (0.4%) 2 (0.3%) 
Drug from home/ 
nei hbour 
28 (16%) 52 (11%) 80 (13%) 
'significant difference between over and under 5s (chi2 test with Rao and Scott correction, p<0.05) i it was not possible to distinguish between commercial and village-run drug stores from household survey data 2 patient visited by project workers at home. 
Source: Household Survey May-Sep 2001. 
Only 13% of individuals visited more than one provider, although two children made 5 visits 
each (Table Al. 11). By far the most common pattern for multiple visits was to visit a health 
facility first followed by a drug store, and the second most common to visit a general store 
followed by a health facility. 
102 
Of total visits, 65% were to shops, and 33% to facilities (Figure 6.1). Government facilities 
accounted for over three-quarters of facility visits. Dispensaries, the lowest level of care, were 
responsible for 70% of facility visits, compared to 27% at health centres, and only V% at 
hospitals. 
Figure 6.1 Breakdown of provider visits for fever/malaria by provider type 
n=577 visits to providers for fever/malaria 
Source: Household Survey May-Sep 2001 
Government facilities were most frequently visited in Ulanga DSS, drug stores in Kilombcro, 
and general shops in Rufiji although there was a very slight overlap in 95% confidence intervals 
for drug and general stores across DSS areas (Table 6.2). Christian households were more likely 
to use drug stores, and Muslim households were more likely to use general stores, reflecting the 
greater proportion of Muslims in Rufiji. There was no difference by household SES in the 
probability of visiting government facilities, drug stores and general stores, or in obtaining 
drugs from home/neighbour. However, households in the better-off third were significantly 
more likely to use a private facility (13% of individuals reporting fever/malaria, compared with 
3% in the poorest and middle thirds). The knowledge of the household head was significantly 
associated with choice of provider; individuals were more likely to visit private facilities and 
drug stores if the head had completed primary education, or if the head knew that SP was more 
effective than chloroquine. 
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Table 6.2 Variation in choice of provider by household and patient characteristics 
(o/ of individii k rennrtin¢ fever/malaria visiting specified r rovider) 
Providers visited 
Government Private Drug Shop General 
facili facility Shop 
Characteristics of household 
DSS area: 
Kilombero 203 35 (17%)* 18 (9%) 67(33%) 47(23%) 
Ulanga 85 28 (33%)* 8 (9%) 25 (29%) 23 (27%) 
Ruft'i 340 78(23%) 14(4%) 74(22%) 115(34%) 
Religion : 
Christian 220 42 (19%) 21 (10%) 70 (32%)* 47 (21%)* 
Muslim 407 99 24% 19 (5%) 95 (23%)* 138 34% * 
SES: 
Poorest third 179 43(24%) 5 (3%)* 51(28%) 53(30%) 
Middle third 212 45(21%) 7 (3%)* 51(24%) 72(34%) 
Better-off third 208 48(23%) 27 (13%)* 57(27%) 54(26%) 
Household head education: 
Less than primary 328 67 (20%) 7 (2%)* 72 (22%)* 106 (32%) 
Completed primary or more 300 74(25%) 33 11%a * 94 (32%)* 79(26%) 
Household head perception 
of relative efficacy of SP: 
SP better 211 53 (25%) 22 (10%)* 70 (33%)* 57 (27%) 
Chloroquine better, both 417 88 (21%) 18 (4%)* 96 (23%)* 128(31%) 
equal or don't know 
Characteristics of patient 
Age of patient: 
Under 5 years 172 60 (35%)* 18 (10%)* 42(24%) 35 (20%)* 
Over 5 years 456 81 (18%)* 22 (5%)* 124(27%) 150 33% * 
Gender of patient: 
Male 208 46 (22%) 12 (6%) 64 (31%) 65 (31%) 
Female 277 70(25%) 19(7%) 67(24%) 82(30%) 
Perceived severity of illness: 
Life in danger 162 50 (31%)* 14 (9%) 59 (36%)* 44 (27%) 
Life not in danger 414 90 (22%)* 24(6%) 96 (23%)* 121 29% 
' individuals reporting a fever/malaria episode for which relevant characteristics were known 2 excludes one individual following traditional religion. 
*significant difference in visiting given provider type across specified household/patient characteristics (chit test with 
Rao and Scott correction, p<0.05). 
Source: Household Survey May-Sep 2001. 
There was significant variation between over and under fives in providers visited, but no 
significant variation between older children and adults. Of children under five with 
fever/malaria, 44% visited a health facility compared with only 22% of over fives. The 
probability of visiting a drug store did not vary significantly by age group, but general shops 
were less likely to be used for children under five, although this was still common (20%). These 
age patterns meant that under fives made up 44% of visits at government facilities, 45% at 
private facilities, 26% at drug stores and 20% at general stores (implying that the majority of 
cases seen at all outlet types were not in this vulnerable group). Of the other patient 
characteristics, there was significantly greater use of government facilities and drug stores for 
episodes perceived as life-threatening, but no significant differences by gender. 
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6.5 Antimalarial Drug Volumes and Values 
During the antimalarial retail audits in 2002, sales were documented of tablets and syrup 
formulations of chloroquine, SP, amodiaquine and quinine, and injectable formulations of 
chloroquine and quinine. It was estimated that 233,606 equivalent adult antimalarial doses were 
dispensed per annum from all facilities and shops in the 3 DSS areas, equivalent to 1.7 doses per 
capita (Table A1.12). The total value of antimalarials dispensed was estimated at 
Tshl03,225,647 (US$108,643), equivalent to $0.77 per capita. 
SP and amodiaquine accounted for 69% and 17% of antimalarial volumes, with all other drug 
types responsible for less than 5%. This breakdown was similar for facilities or drug stores 
alone, but not for general stores where chloroquine still made up more than half antimalarial 
volumes (Table A1.13). The results in value terms were quite similar, although the share for 
quinine tablets was considerably higher than with volumes (21% compared with 4% of all 
sales), reflecting its relatively high cost per dose, and giving it the second highest sales value 
after SP tablets. 
Figure 6.2 shows the breakdown of antimalarial volumes by provider type. Pooling data across 
all three DSS areas, the government was the biggest individual supplier, followed by 
commercial drug stores and then private facilities. The private sector as a whole was very 
important, supplying 58% of antimalarial volumes, mostly through the retail sector which 
accounted for 39% of total antimalarial volumes. Within the retail market, commercial drug 
stores were the main suppliers, providing 88% of drug volumes, and this percentage was fairly 
constant across DSS areas. However, there were important differences between the areas. The 
private sector supplied 80% of antimalarial volumes in Kilombero, two-thirds in Ulanga and 
approximately half in Rufiji. The role of the retail sector was also larger in Kilombero and 
Ulanga (66% and 52% respectively) than in Rufiji (23%). 
In value terms, the private sector supplied 90% of antimalarials and its retail component, 60% 
(Figure Al. 2). Private and retail market shares were greater in value than in volume terms, 
reflecting the different mix of antimalarials provided in the public and private sectors, and the 
valuation of government antimalarials which assumed zero markup over international reference 
prices and delivery costs. Within the retail market, commercial drug stores supplied 90% of 
antimalarials in value terms 
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Figure 6.2 Antimalarial volumes dispensed by source (% of equivalent doses) 
Kilombero DSS 
Rufiji DSS 
Commercial 
Private Facilities, Drug 
25% hops, 21 % 
Government 
Facilities, 52% 
General Stores, 2% 
Source: Retail Audits Feb/Apr & Jun/Jul 2002 
Ulanga DSS 
Private 
Facilities, 12' ® -ýý General 
Government 
Facilities, 36% 
Total 
Stores, 6% 
Private ^ Commercial Drug 
Facilities, 21% \ Shops, 34% 
Government Facilities, 
41% 
Mean antimalarial volumes per outlet per annum in Rufiji were highest for private facilities 
(8,580), followed by government facilities (8,129), which both dispensed more than six times as 
many doses as the average commercial drug shop (1,325) (Table A1.14). However, in 
Kilombero and Ulanga commercial drug shops had the highest average volumes per outlet 
(3,893 and 4,784 respectively), 1.4 and 2.1 times mean government facility volumes 
respectively, and 2.9 and 3.6 times greater than commercial drug stores in Rufiji. Overall, 
general stores stocking antimalarials sold a mean of 74 doses per annum, meaning that on 
average a commercial drug store sold 31 times as many antimalarials as a general store stocking 
antimalarials. In value terms, a commercial drug store sold antimalarials of an average value of 
Tshl, 644,423 (US$1,731) per year, 46 times that of general stores stocking antimalarials which 
averaged Tsh35,681 (US$38). 
Retail audit data were not collected for painkillers, but rough estimates of sales volumes 
obtained during qualitative interviews suggested that commercial drug stores also had much 
higher painkiller sales per outlet than general stores, on average selling 6 times as many aspirin 
tablets and 12 times as many paracetamol. However, as there were 17 times as many drug- 
stocking general stores as drug stores, it was not surprising that the overall share of painkillers 
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reported in the household survey from general stores exceeded the drug store share (45% vs 
28%). 
6.6 Appropriateness of Care Obtained 
The appropriateness of care obtained by individuals reporting fever/malaria was assessed 
through analysis of the speed of treatment and appropriateness of drugs obtained from the 
household survey, tablet packaging and labelling from the retail audits, and drug quality from 
the outlet survey samples. The appropriateness of total antimalarial volumes on a community 
level was assessed using retail audit data. 
6.6.1 Speed of Treatment Seeking 
Treatment seeking was generally rapid, with 69% of all visits taking place within 24 hours of 
the onset of fever/malaria symptoms, and 79% within 48 hours (Table 6.3). General stores were 
visited most promptly of the four main outlet types. The next most rapid group were drug stores, 
followed by private facilities, and government facilities. The proportion of visits within 24 
hours was lower in Rufiji (63%) than in Kilombero (76%) and Ulanga (74%), reflecting less 
rapid use of all outlet types, but these differences were not significant. If only the initial 
provider visited were considered, the percentage of visits within 24 hours increased for each 
outlet types, with general stores, drug stores and private facilities all over 80%. 
Table 63 Speed of treatment seeking: all visits and first visits to outlets taking place 
within 24 hours of symptom onset 
(as a% of all visits to each outlet type) 
n 
Government facilit 
Private facilit 
Drug store 
General shoo 
Community health 
worker 
Traditional healer 
Lymphatic filariasis 
project 
Total 
I 
136 
38 
160 
184 
2 
4 
I 
525 
All visits 
Visits within 24 
hours of 
fever/malaria onset 
8361% 
26(68%) 
112(70%) 
14U770ý 
2 (100%) 
00- 
0 (-) 
364(69%) 
n 
108 
30 
116 
159 
2 
1 
1 
417 
Number of provider visits for which time of symptom onset and provider visit recorded. 
Source: Household Survey May-Sep 2001. 
First visits 
First visits within 24 
hours of fever/malaria 
onset 
74(69%) 
24 (80%) 
96(83%) 
131 (82%) 
2 (100%) 
M- 
0 (-) 
327 (78%) 
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6.6.2 Drugs and Doses Obtained 
Obtaining manufactured drugs of some kind was very common, reported for 89% of under fives 
and 82% of over fives with fever/malaria. Antimalarials accounted for 35-37% of manufactured 
medicines obtained for fever/malaria treatment from facilities and commercial drug stores, but 
only 10% from general stores, meaning that overall antimalarials made up 26% (Figure 6.3). 
The majority of drugs obtained were simple painkillers, such as paracetamol (38%), aspirin 
(18%), or combinations of aspirin, caffeine and paracetamol (2%). Anti-anaemia drugs such as 
ferrous sulphate and folic acid were rarely obtained (1%). Antibiotics accounted for 7%, 
including co-trimoxazole, amoxicillin, ampicillin, cloxacillin, chloramphenicol, doxycycline, 
erythromycin, metronidazole and tetracycline. Only locally prepared medicines were obtained at 
the 4 reported visits to traditional healers. A further three individuals used traditional remedies 
at home. 
Figure 6.3 Manufactured medicines obtained for fever/malaria treatment reported during 
the household survey 
Unknown 
4% 
Other Antimalarials 
4% ýI 26% 
Ferrous/Folic acid 
n=960 drugs obtained 
from providers &/or home/neighbours 
Source: Household Survey May-Sep 2001 
The appropriateness of drugs obtained was assessed using the household survey indicators 
described in Section 5.4.3: the proportion of individuals reporting fever/malaria obtaining an 
antimalarial and a minimum antimalarial dose (for all antimalarials, and effective antimalarials 
only (SP, amodiaquine and quinine)); the proportion obtaining injectable antimalarials and 
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antibiotics, and the proportion of these likely to be inappropriate; the proportion of under fives 
obtaining aspirin; and the proportion of non-febrile individuals obtaining antimalarials (data 
were not collected on the quantity and timing of drugs actually consumed). The results are 
shown by individual in Table 6.4 (including all providers visited during the episode), and by 
provider visit in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.4 Drugs obtained by patients for fever/malaria treatment 
(% of individuals reporting fever/malaria obtaining specified drugs over the course of the 
episode') 
Drugs obtained Under 5 years Over 5 years Total 
Any manufactured drugs* n=172 n=456 n=628 
153(89%) 375(82%) 528(84%) 
Painkillers only* n=153 n=436 n=589 
45(29%) 187(43%) 232(39%) 
Antimalarial* n=160 n=440 n=600 
84(53%) 138(31%) 222(37%) 
At least minimum dose of n=157 n=439 n=596 
antimalarial* 65(41%) 93(21%) 158(26%) 
Effective antimalarial* n=159 n=438 n=597 
45(28%) 53(12%) 98(16%) 
At least minimum dose of n=156 n=438 n=594 
effective antimalarial*2 29(19%) 41(9%) 70(12%) 
Injectable antimalarial n=158 n=441 n=599 
12(8%) 7(2%) 190%) 
Any antibiotic* n=157 n=437 n=594 
24(15%) 32(7%) 56(9%) 
Drugs containing aspirin* n=154 n=442 n=596 
28 1 8% 142 32% 170(29%) 
'significant difference across age groups (chit test with Rao and Scott correction, p<0.05) 1n refers to individuals reporting fever/malaria for whom sufficient drugs obtained were known to judge the specified 
variable (interviewees were unable to name 41 (4.3%) of the 960 manufactured drugs reported). 2 SP, amodiaquine or quinine (excludes chloroquine). 
Source: Household Survey May-Sep 2001. 
Only just over half of children reporting fever/malaria under 5 obtained an antimalarial, and 
only 41% obtained at least a minimum antimalarial dose (Table 6.4). Including only effective 
antimalarials reduced these proportions to 28% and 19%. All of these frequencies were 
significantly lower among older children and adults (31% for any antimalarial, 21% for 
minimum antimalarial dose, 12% for an effective antimalarial, and 9% for minimum effective 
antimalarial dose). Low use of antimalarials reflected the finding that a high percentage 
obtained painkillers only (29% of under fives, 43% of over fives). 
Consumers obtained painkillers only at 85% of visits to general stores, 33% to drug stores, 14% 
to private facilities and 13% to government facilities (Table 6.5). No drugs at all were obtained 
at 17% of visits to government facilities, but only 5% to private facilities, and less than 1% of 
general and drug stores. 
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Table 6.5 Drugs obtained during provider visits 
! o/ of vie; tc to nrnvirlere of earh tvne were specified drugs obtained' 
Drugs obtained Government Private Drug General 
facility 
-facility 
Store Store 
Any drugs n=149 n=42 n=178 n=199 
Under 5 years 55 (83%) 19 (100%) 46 (100%) 40 (100%) 
Over 5 years 68(82%) 21(91%) 131 (99%) 158 (99%) 
Total 123(83%) 40(95%) 177(99%) 198(99.5%) 
Painkillers only n=136 n=36 n=165 n=199 
Under 5 years 3 (5%) 00 12 (28%) 35 (88%) 
Over 5 years 14(18%) 5 (24%) 42 (34%) 134 (84%) 
Total 17(13%) 5(14%) 54(33%) 169(85%) 
Antimalarial n=139 n=37 n=168 n=199 
Under 5 years 32 (53%) 13 (87%) 30 (67%) 5 (13%) 
Over 5 years 40(51%) 12(55%) 62(50%) 19(12%) 
Total 72(52%) 25(68%) 92(55%) 24(12%) 
At least minimum dose of 
antimalarial n=138 n=37 n=166 n=199 
Under 5 years 25 (42%) 12 (80%) 20 (47%) 5 (13%) 
Over 5 years 28 (36%) 10 (45%) 46 (37%) 7 (4%) 
Total 53(38%) 22(59%) 66(40%) 12(61/o) 
Effective antimalarial n=138 n=37 n=168 n=199 
Under 5 years 16 (27%) 10 (67%) 19 (42%) 1(30/o) 
Over 5 years 14 (18%) 7 (32%) 30 (24%) 1 (0.6%) 
Total 30(22%) 17(46%) 49(29%) 2(1%) 
At least minimum dose of 
effective antimalarial n=138 n=37 n=166 n=199 
Under 5 years 11(18%) 9 (60%) 9 (21%) 1(3%) 
Over 5 years 12 (15%) 6 (27%) 22 (18%) 00 
Total 23(17%) 15(41%) 31 19% l(0.5%) 
Injectable antimalarial n=137 n=36 n=165 n=199 
Under 5 years 4(70/o) 2 (13%) 6 (14%) 0(-) 
Over 5 years 2 (3%) 2 (10%) 3 (2%) 0(-) 
Total 6(40/o) 4(11%) 9(5%) 0- 
Antibiotic n=137 n=37 n=166 n=199 
Under 5 years 10 (17%) 8 (53%) 5 (11%) 00 
Over 5 years 11(14%) 6 (27%) 17 (14%) 1 (0.6%) 
Total 2105%) 14(38%) 22(13%) 1 (0.5%) 
Any drug containing aspirin n=140 n=36 n=165 n=199 
Under 5 years 7(12%) 2(13%) 3(7%) 15(38%) 
Over 5 year 34 (42%) 1 (5%) 24 (20%) 76 (48%) 
Total 41(29%) 3(8%) 27(16%) 91(46%) 
n refers to nrnvvier vicit. rennrfeA fnr fever/malaria for whic h sufficient drugs were known to judge the specified 
variable (interviewees were unable to name 41 (4.3%) of the 960 manufactured drugs reported). 'SP, amodiaquine or quinine (excludes chloroquine). 
Source: Household Survey May-Sep 2001. 
Of the outlet types, private facilities performed best on the antimalarial indicators (Table 6.5). 
At least a minimum antimalarial dose was obtained at 59% of visits for fever/malaria to private 
facilities, 40% to drug stores, 38% to government facilities, and 6% to general stores 
(significant difference between general stores and all others). Under fives were more likely than 
over fives to obtain a minimum antimalarial dose at each outlet type, but not significantly so. 
One might expect antimalarials to be more frequently provided at higher-level government 
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facilities, but in fact they were less frequently obtained at government health centres than at 
government dispensaries (43% and 57%, difference not significant). The proportion of 
antimalarials dispensed as under-doses was 21% from private facilities, 29% from government 
facilities and drug shops, and 50% from general stores (differences not significant) (Table 
A1.15). Quinine tablets were by far the most likely to be obtained from providers as under- 
doses (86%). Roughly a third of chloroquine tablets and amodiaquine tablets were under-doses, 
but only 13% of SP tablets. All patients obtaining chloroquine syrup or chloroquine injections 
obtained at least the full dose10. 
Considering only effective antimalarials widened the gap between government facilities and 
private outlets (Table 6.5). An effective antimalarial was obtained at 46% of visits for 
fever/malaria to private facilities, 29% to drug stores, 22% to government facilities, and 1% to 
general stores. At least a minimum dose of an effective antimalarial was obtained at 41% of 
visits to private facilities, but at only 19% to drug stores, 17% to government facilities, and 
0.5% to general stores. 
One would expect the share of antimalarials in the "effective" category to have increased since 
the 2001 household survey, as chloroquine was phased out. This has been borne out by 
preliminary analysis of the 2002 IMPACT household survey, which showed that one year later, 
the percentage of individuals obtaining an antimalarial remained constant at 37%, but the 
percentage obtaining an effective antimalarial had increased from 16% to 34% (Kachur et al., 
unpublished data, IMPACT collaboration). This explains the differences between the results of 
the 2001 household survey and retail audits conducted in 2002. While chloroquine tablets were 
the most common antimalarial obtained during the 2001 household survey (44% of 
antimalarials reported), by the second retail audit in mid-2002, chloroquine was responsible for 
only 6% of total antimalarial sales volumes (although it was still available in nearly a third of 
commercial drug stores and 44% of government facilities)". 
The antibiotic co-trimoxazole was obtained by patients at 4% of visits for fever/malaria to 
government facilities and 6% to private facilities, but not at any visits to shops. While not 
generally prescribed for malaria, cotrimoxazole does have an antimalarial action. Adding 
cotrimoxazole drugs to the "effective antimalarials" group increased the proportion obtaining an 
effective antimalarial to 25% in government facilities and 51% in private facilities. 
10 only an initial pre-referral dose was deemed to be required for injectables, according to the National Treatment Guidelines. 
11 Audit volumes were calculated in equivalent doses, so one would expect, ceteris paribus, drugs frequently under-dosed to have a smaller share in retail audit sales volumes than in household data on the 
number of times obtained. This may to some extent explain the difference in the share of chloroquine 
tablets between the household survey and second retail audit (see Table Al. 15 on under-dosing by 
antimalarial). 
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As it was particularly surprising to find the proportion of under fives obtaining an antimalarial 
to be so low at government facilities, the case histories were explored in more depth for the 25 
children under five concerned for whom all drugs were known. In 12 cases (48%) an 
antimalarial was obtained from a drug shop on the same day, after the government facility visit, 
strongly suggesting antimalarial stockouts at government facilities. In a further 11 cases other 
drugs such as antibiotics, salbutamol or oral rehydration solution (ORS) were dispensed at 
government facilities, or obtained the same day from other outlets, suggesting that health 
workers had made a non-malarial diagnosis. However, in nine of these 11 cases during free- 
listing of symptoms the respondents volunteered one of the terms generally associated with a 
high temperature (joto/chemchem/kuchemka/homa), suggesting that a malaria diagnosis should 
not have been ruled out. 
The possible inappropriate procurement of antimalarials, antibiotics and aspirin was also 
considered. Twenty individuals obtained antimalarials but did not report a fever or malaria 
episode, representing 7% of all antimalarials obtained. Of these 20,19 had obtained the 
antimalarial from a government facility, and one from a private facility. One might expect this 
to be due to the use of prophylaxis during pregnancy, but 15 of these 20 were either male and/or 
under 15 years. 
Children under five with fever/malaria were given injectable antimalarial treatment at 13% of 
visits to private facilities and 14% to drug stores (Table 6.5). The proportion of all antimalarial 
treatments in injectable form was 8% in government facilities, 9% in drug stores and 12% in 
private facilities. No injectable antimalarials were obtained at general stores. Of the 19 
individuals who received injections, 10 (53%) did not report any symptoms of severe febrile 
illness indicating that an injection might be warranted (vomiting, unable to eat, convulsions, or 
loss of consciousness). 
Rates of antibiotic dispensing at private facilities were high, provided at 53% of visits for under 
fives and 27% for older children and adults with fever/malaria (Table 6.5). Antibiotic provision 
was significantly less common in government facilities and drug stores (15% and 13% 
respectively), and very rare at general stores. Of the 56 individuals who received antibiotics, 24 
(42%) did not report any symptoms suggesting that an antibiotic might be warranted (cough, 
fast breathing, diarrhoea or severe febrile illness). 
It was disturbing to note that aspirin was obtained for 18% of under fives with fever/malaria 
(Table 6.4). This was particularly common at general store visits (38%), but aspirin was also 
supplied at over 10% of government and private facility visits for under fives (Table 6.5). 
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The above analysis included all fever episodes, regardless of whether they were completed. 
Some individuals were still ill on the day of interview, and others who felt well, may have 
subsequently suffered a recrudescence. Restricting the analysis to individuals reporting feeling 
well on the day of interview made little difference to measured treatment quality. The 
percentage of individuals obtaining an antimalarial was 40% for completed episodes, compared 
to 37% for all episodes, and the percentage obtaining at least a minimum antimalarial dose was 
28% for completed episodes and 26% for all episodes. 
Variation in drugs and doses obtained 
Bivariate analysis showed that patients with fever/malaria were significantly more likely to 
obtain antimalarials if the household was in the better-off third than in the poorest third (Table 
6.6). This reflected greater use of private facilities where antimalarials were more often 
obtained, and less use of general stores, rather than a significant difference in the probability of 
obtaining antimalarials by SES at a given outlet type. Patients were also significantly more 
likely to get an antimalarial if the household was Christian, had a better educated household 
head, or if the household head knew that SP was more effective. Patients in Rufiji DSS were 
significantly less likely to get antimalarials than those in Kilombero or Ulanga, mainly 
reflecting less frequent dispensing of antimalarials at shops. In terms of individual 
characteristics, patients were more likely to get an antimalarial if they were under five, or if the 
illness was perceived as life-threatening. Males were more likely to obtain an antimalarial, but 
not significantly so. Similar patterns were observed for obtaining an effective antimalarial and 
for minimum doses. 
The importance of the same household and patient characteristics was evaluated in a 
multinomial logit regression of the probability of patients with fever/malaria obtaining an 
antimalarial, specified in Table 6.7. The household PCA score was used as an independent 
variable, rather than dummy variables for each SES third, in order to maximise variation in 
household status captured. Age was left as the categorical variable of being under five, as it was 
hypothesised that there was likely to be a dichotomous difference in treatment obtained between 
Young children and adults, rather than a linear relationship across all age groups. Results are 
shown in Table 6.8. 
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Table 6.6 Appropriateness of treatment obtained per episode: variation by household and 
patient characteristics 
(% of individuals reporting fever/malaria obtaining specified treatment) 
Drugs obtained' 
Antimalarial At least min. Effective At least min. 
antimalarial antimalarial dose of effective 
dose antimalarial 
Characteristics of househo ld head 
DSS area: (n=600) (n=596) (n=597) (n=594) 
Kilombero 88 (45%)* 63 (33%)* 35 (18%) 24 (13%) 
Ulanga 39 (48%)* 28 (34%)* 15 (19%) 11(14%) 
Rufiji 95 (29%)* 67 (21%)* 48 15% 35(11%) 
Religion : (n=599) (n=595) (n=596) (n=593) 
Christian 95 (45%)* 66 (31%) 38 (18%) 24 (11%) 
Muslim 126 (33%)* 91(24%) 59(15%) 45(12%) 
SES: (n=572) (n=568) (n=569) (n=566) 
Poorest third 53 (31%)* 38 (23%) 18 (11%)* 14 (8%)* 
Middle third 70 (34%) 47(23%) 25 (12%) 13 (6%)* 
Better-off third 91 (46%)* 68(35%) 48 (24%)* 38 (19%)* 
Education: (n=600) (n=596) (n=597) (n=594) 
Less than primary 87 (28%)* 60 (19%)* 34 (11%)* 25 (8%)* 
Completed primary or 135 (47%)* 98 (34%)* 64 (22%)* 45 (16%)* 
more 
Household head 
perception of relative 
efficacy of SP: (n=600) (n=596) (n=597) (n=594) 
SP better 105 (53%)* 70 (36%)* 55 (28%)* 35 (18%)* 
Chloroquine better, both 117 (29%)* 88 (22%)* 43 (11%)* 35 (9%)* 
_Sgual or 
don't know 
Characteristics of patient 
Age of patient: (n=600) (n=596) (n=597) (n=594) 
Under 5 years 84 (53%)* 65 (41%)* 45 (28%)* 29 (19%)* 
Over 5 ears 138 (31%)* 93 (21%)* 53 (12%)* 41 (9%)* 
Gender of patient: (n=461) (n=457) (n=458) (n=455) 
Female 94 (36%) 59 (23%)* 38(15%) 25 (10%) 
Male 84(43%) 64 (33%)* 42(21%) 31 (16%)* 
Perceived severity of 
illness: (n=549) (n=545) (n=546) (n=543) 
Life in danger 73 (49%)* 61 (42%)* 39 (26%)* 33 (23%)* 
Life not in danger 144 (36%)* 94 (24%)* 57 (14%)* 36 (9%)* 
-n in each case refers to individuals reporting a fever/malaria episode for which relevant characteristics and drugs 
were known. 
2 excludes one individual following traditional religion. 
* significant difference in % of individuals obtaining specified treatment across household head or patient 
characteristics (chit test with Rao and Scott correction, p<0.05) 
Source: Household Survey May-Sep 2001. 
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Table 6.7 Definition of variables for logit models of the probability of patient with 
fever/malaria obtaining an antimalarial and a minimum dose of an antimalarial 
Variable Definition Mean 
Dependent variables 
Obtain AM =1 if antimalarial obtained 0.37 
Obtainmindose AM =1 if at least minimum dose of 
antimalarial obtained 
0.27' 
Independent continuous 
variables 
PCA Household PCA SES score 0.07 
Education Years of education of household head 4.44 
Independent dummy variables 
DSS area of residence: 
Kilombero (omitted) 
Rufiji 
Ulanga 
=1 if individual in Kilombero DSS 
=1 if individual in Rufiji DSS 
=1 if individual in Ulanga DSS 
0.32 
0.54 
0.14 
Religion of household head : 
Muslim (omitted) 
Christian 
=1 if household head is Muslim 
=1 if household head is Christian 
0.65 
0.35 
SP better =1 if household head perceived SP to be 
more effective than chloro uine 
0.34 
Under 5 =1 if patient is under 5 years 0.27 
Gender =1 if patient is male 0.43 
Life threat =1 if illness perceived as life threatening 0.28 
' figure slightly different to the percentage reported in Table 6.4 because individuals without complete data on all independent variables were excluded from the regression analysis. 2 excludes one individual following traditional religion. 
Source: Household Survey May-Sep 2001. 
Table 6.8 Logit regression of probability of obtaining an antimalarial 
Number of observations=3811: F<0.001 
Explanatory 
variables 
PCA 
Education 
Rufi'i 
Ulan a 
Christian 
SP better 
Under 5 
Gender 
Life threat 
COILS 
Regression results 
Logit I Standard I p-value coefficient error 
0.138 
0.040 
0.378 
0.332 
0.019* 
0.063 0.029* 
0.039 
-0.894 
-0.032 
-0.143 
0.619 
1.067 
0.129 
0.762 
-1.004 * coefficient significant at the 5% level. 
0.371 
0.316 
0.259 
0.259 
0.219 
0.242 
0.425 
0.931 
0.651 
0.017* 
<0.001 * 
0.557 
0.002* 
0.019* 
Marginal effects 
dY/dx Standard p-value 
error 
0.033 0.015 0.029* 
0.009 
-0.206 
-0.008 
-0.034 
0.148 
0.258 
0.031 
0.184 
0.009 
0.083 
0.088 
0.075 
0.062 
0.061 
0.052 
0.059 
0.331 * 
0.013* 
0.930 
0.650 
0.016* 
<0.001* 
0.557 
0.002* 
' 247 observations dropped because of missing data for 28 observations on Obtain. AM, 143 on gender. 52 on life threat, 36 on education, 29 on PCA, and I -on religion. Z dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
Source: Household Survey May-Sep 2001. 
The variables significantly associated with obtaining an antimalarial were being under five, 
perceived severity of illness, household head's perception of SP efficacy, SES and DSS area. 
Marginal effects analysis showed that perceiving the illness as life-threatening increased the 
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probability of obtaining an antimalarial by 18 percentage points, knowing that SP was more 
effective by 15 percentage points, and being under five by 26 percentage points. An increase of 
1 in the household PCA score increased the probability by 3.3 percentage points. A quadratic 
education term was tested, but found to be insignificant. To investigate the potential for 
collinearity between explanatory variables, the pairwise correlation matrix was calculated. The 
only pairwise correlation with a correlation coefficient greater than 0.5 was between district and 
religion (r= 0.7). However, dropping either of the correlated variables from the model made no 
significant difference to the remaining coefficients, nor to their significance at the 5% level. The 
number of observations was limited by missing variables, particularly due to missing data on 
gender for 143 individuals reporting fever/malaria. However, dropping gender from the 
regression, and so increasing the number of observations to 492, made no difference to the 
variables found significant, and led to minimal changes in logit coefficients. 
The results for a regression on the probability of obtaining at least a minimum antimalarial dose 
were similar, with the exception that DSS area and perception of SP efficacy were no longer 
significant (Table 6.9). 
Table 6.9 Logit regression of probability of obtaining at least a minimum dose of an 
antimalarial 
Number of observations=378'; F<0.001 
Explanatory 
variables 
PCA 
Education 
Rufi'i 
Ulan a 
Christian 
SP better 
Under 5 
Gender 
Life threat 
-cons 
Regression results 
Logit 
coefficient 
0.156 
0.044 
-0.712 
-0.259 
-0.277 
0.366 
1.037 
0.282 
1.063 
-1.490 * Coefficient significant at the 5% level 
Standard 
error 
0.064 
0.046 
0.427 
0.414 
0.364 
0.271 
0.263 
0.254 
0.260 
0.471 
p-value 
0.016* 
0.335 
0.096 
0.533 
0.448 
0.178 
<0.001 * 
0.267 
<0.001 * 
0.002* j 
ayiä 
0.030 
0.009 
-0.134 
-0.048 
-0.054 
0.073 
0.221 
0.055 
0.225 
Marginal effects 
Standard 
error 
0.012 
0.009 
0.077 
0.074 
0.070 
0.054 
0.059 
0.050 
0.057 
p-value 
0.015* 
0.332 
0.081 
0.513 
0.5443 
0.181 
<0.001 * 
0.269 
<0.001 * 
1 247 observations dropped because of missing data for 32 observations on Obtain. _mindose . 
AM, 143 on gender, 52 
on life threat, 36 on education, 29 on PCA, and I on religion. 2 dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
Source: Household Survey May-Sep 2001. 
6.6.3 Antimalarial Tablet Packaging and Labelling 
From a public-health perspective packaged tablets are preferable to those sold loose for several 
reasons. The consumer is more likely to take away information on the name and dosing of the 
drugs; tablets are less likely to be damaged or subject to degradation; and shopkeepers are less 
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likely to decant tablets into other containers. However, of antimalarial tablets dispensed, only 
9% of sales volumes were sold packaged (Fable 6.10). In value terms packaged tablets made up 
16% of the antimalarial tablet market. Packaging was particularly rare at government facilities 
(less than 1% of antimalarial volumes and values). According to the regulations, all tablets sold 
in shops should be in unit packs, but packaged tablets made up only 22% of tablet sales volumes 
in the retail sector. At commercial drug stores they accounted for less than 20% of tablet 
volumes, and less than 25% of tablet values, although they formed a larger share of tablets sold 
from general shops (39% and 44% respectively). Packaged sales were more common in shops in 
Rufiji DSS than in Kilombero or Ulanga. 
Table 6.10 Percentage of antimalarial tablet sales volumes and values packaged 
Kilombero 
DSS 
Ulanga 
DSS 
Rufiji 
DSS 
Total 
Sales Volumes 
Government facility 4.4% 0% 0.6% 0.9% 
Private facility 1.6% 13.0% 3.2% 3.3% 
Commercial drug shop 10.1% 12.1% 36.8% 18.7% 
Village-nm drug shop 74.4% - - 74.4% 
General shop/stall 47.3% 0% 100% 39.0% 
Total 12.1% 5.6% 8.7% 9.3% 
Sales Values 
Government facility 1.9% 0% 0.5% 0.7% 
Private facility 0.7% 4.7% 1.3% 1.5% 
Commercial drug shop 12.6% 14.3% 46.5% 24.2% 
Villa e-run drug shop 59.2% - - 59.2% 
General shop/stall 52.5% 0% 100% 44.1% 
Total 14.4% 8.0% 20.1% 16.4% 
Source: Retail Audits Feb/Apr & Jun/Jul 2001, Outlet Survey Nov-Dec 
Drug products purchased over-the-counter (OTC) should at a minimum include information on 
their international non-proprietary name (INN), strength, indication, route of administration, 
warnings and age-specific dosing, in a way that is understandable to the average consumer 
(Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency 2003). At drug stores loose tablets 
were generally taken away in home-made paper envelopes, labelled with a handwritten 
abbreviated drug name and dose, which was often illegible. In general stores they were often 
provided unlabelled in just a twist of newspaper. Even on packaged drugs, labelling was 
woefully inadequate. Labelling was assessed for the 20 packaged SP tablet products on the 
market (15 branded, 5 unbranded), in the form in which tablets were usually sold for an adult 
dose. The government communications campaign accompanying the change in drug policy used 
the abbreviation SP, but this was printed on only one of the products. The others had the generic 
or INN in full, often in such small letters that it was very difficult to read. Moreover, the generic 
name varied for different types of SP, meaning that customers were left to make sense of the 
long and variable names of "sulphadoxine pyrimethamine", "sulphamethoxypyridazine 
pyrimethamine" and "2-sulphanilamido-5-methoxy-pyrazine pyrimethamine"! Much bigger 
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letters were used for the 15 different SP brand names. Secondly, dosing instructions were 
inadequate and inconsistent. Ten of the products gave no guidance on dosing, stating only "as 
directed by your physician". Of the products with dosing instructions, one had no information 
for children below school-age, and only one gave the dose for a 2-year-old in accordance with 
the national guidelines. Thirdly, few people spoke good English in the study sites, yet there 
were no instructions in KiSwahili on any of the tablets. This situation may be even worse in 
practice, as if adult packs are broken up to sell smaller doses for children, the outer packaging is 
separated from the foil wrapped tablets, and any instructions not written on the base packaging 
are lost. 
6.6.4 Antimalarial Drug Quality 
Samples of all SP tablets stocked were collected during the outlet survey, and 70 samples were 
tested for quantity of active ingredient. All the samples contained some quantity of 
sulphadoxine and pyrimethamine, and therefore none appeared to be deliberate fakes. However, 
the sulphadoxine content ranged from 17% to 110% of the specified amount, and 
pyrimethamine content from 81% to 128% (Green et al., unpublished data, IMPACT 
collaboration). Of the samples evaluated, 7% has less than 90% of the specified content for 
pyrimethamine, and 33% for sulphadoxine. All those with an insufficient quantity of 
pyrimethamine also had insufficient sulphadoxine, meaning that the overall failure rate was 
33% for either chemical. A further 36% of samples had an excessive quantity of pyrimethamine. 
Tables 6.11 shows the proportion of samples with an insufficient quantity by outlet type, 
country of manufacture and type of packaging. It was not possible to draw firm conclusions 
from these data, because the number of tablets analysed per sample was inadequate for USP 
specifications. However, in general it appears that poor quality tablets were common in all 
outlet types 12, for both packaged and loose tablets, and for many different countries of 
manufacture, including Europe. 
6.6.5 Assessing the Appropriateness of Total Antimalarial Drug Volumes 
The assessment so far has considered appropriateness of drugs on the basis of individual patient 
characteristics. It is also of interest to compare total antimalarial sales volumes from the retail 
audits with estimated need at a community level. The total quantity of antimalarials consumed, 
and the frequency of poor quality drugs and under-dosing, are believed to be linked to drug 
pressure and the development of resistance (Basco 2004; White et al. 1999). 
12 In September 2001 SP supplied to public facilities were found to include a locally produced product 
that had failed quality tests conducted by the NMCP. The drugs were recalled, but implementation of this 
instruction took some time. 
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Table 6.11 Number of SP samples containing an insufficient quantity of active ingredient 
(% of samples tested with <90% of specified active ingredient) 
Failures 
n Pyrimethamine Sulphadoxine Either 
Pyrimethamine or 
Sul hadoxine 
Total 70 5(7%) 23(33%) 23(33%) 
Outlet type 
Government facility 17 00 3(18%) 3(18%) 
Private facility 27 1(4%) 9(33%) 9(33%) 
Commercial drug store 24 3(13%) 10(42%) 10(42%) 
General store 2 1(50%) 1(50%) 1(50%) 
Country manufacture' 
Tanzania 42 2(5%) 13(31%) 13(31%) 
Other Africa 14 3(21%) 4(29%) 4(29%) 
Asia 4 0- 0- 0- 
Europe 9 0- 6(67%) 6(67%) 
Type of packaging 
Packaged 23 2(7%) 10(43%) 10(43%) 
Loose 47 3(6%) 13(28%) 13(28%) 
Country of manufacture data were missing for one sample. 
Source: Green et al, unpublished data, IMPACT collaboration (samples from Outlet Survey Nov-Dec 2001). 
From the 1.7 equivalent adult antimalarial doses dispensed per annum one could estimate that 
roughly 2.04 age-adjusted doses were dispensed (assuming 40% of doses are for children with 
on average a half dose), although the frequency of under-dosing implies that the number of 
people receiving any antimalarials will be considerably higher. It is difficult to judge whether 
these volumes represent under- or over-treatment. The overall annual fever rate per person for 
Tanzania can be estimated at 5.2, based on 180,781,000 fevers (Snow, Eckert and 
Teklehaimanot 2003) in a population of 34,837,000 (World Population Prospects Population 
Database, 2002 Revision 13). However, many of these febrile episodes will not have been 
malarial, and particularly in adults it may not be appropriate to treat every febrile case with 
antimalarials. It is also possible to compare with data on malaria incidence. Snow et al. estimate 
1 clinical attack of malaria per child 0-4 years, 0.25 per child aged 5-14 years, and 0.4 per adult 
per annum in stable endemic African settings (Snow et al. 1999), providing a weighted average 
of 0.46 episodes per person per year in Tanzania (based on the population age structure from 
World Population Prospects Population Database, 2002 Revision). This would imply that the 
number of antimalarial doses dispensed in our study sites was over 4 times the number of 
malaria cases but under half the number of fevers. However, it is not possible to tell whether the 
antimalarial drugs were taken by those people with malaria, still leaving the question unresolved 
of whether this indicates over- or under-treatment. 
13 http: //esa. un. org/unpp/ 
119 
6.7 Comparison of DSS areas 
The markets for fever/malaria treatment in the three DSS areas had many important similarities. 
In terms of household characteristics, the populations were all rural, and in all areas, household 
heads were mainly engaged in farming activities and had relatively low levels of educational 
attainment. The SES distribution was also similar across DSS areas. However, there were 
significant differences in religious affiliation, and fever prevalence was somewhat lower in 
Ulanga than Rufiji or Kilombero. 
On the supply-side, the three areas had the same categories of provider, and the range of 
painkiller and antimalarial products in the market and patterns of availability across provider 
types were similar. There were differences between the areas in the role of the retail sector. The 
retail sector had a more important role in antimalarial supply in Kilombero and Ulanga than in 
Rufiji. Retailers provided nearly two-thirds of antimalarial volumes in Kilombero and half in 
Ulanga but just under a quarter in Rufiji, with government facilities taking a larger share. 
However, in terms of provider visits for fever/malaria, the share of the retail sector in Rufiji was 
as high as Kilombero (both 67%), and higher than Ulanga (57%). This discrepancy reflected 
differences in the type of retailer visited. In Kilombero and Ulanga more than half of retail visits 
were to drug stores, but in Rufiji 61% were to general stores, where antimalarials were less 
likely to be obtained. This appeared to be the main factor behind the lower probability of 
obtaining an antimalarial in Rufiji (29%), compared with 45% in Kilombero and 48% in 
Ulanga. 
6.8 Summary and Conclusions 
The first objective of the thesis is to describe treatment seeking and drug purchase for 
fever/malaria, and assess the appropriateness of care obtained. This chapter has described 
treatment-seeking patterns, and shown that coverage of some kind of treatment was high, with 
85% of patients reporting fever/malaria seeking care, either from a provider or home/neighbour. 
It has demonstrated that retailers were an important source of fever/malaria drugs. Of visits for 
fever/malaria, 65% were to shops, and all socio-economic groups were equally likely to visit 
drug and general stores. Shops supplied 38% of antimalarial sales volumes and 60% of 
antimalarial sales values, the lion's share of retail sales being through commercial drug stores. 
Treatment seeking was generally rapid; 69% of visits took place within 24 hours of symptom 
onset, and 79% within 48 hours. However, most individuals with fever/malaria obtained 
inappropriate or inadequate treatment. 
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Ten key concerns on the quality of care obtained have been identified: 
1. A relatively low share of patients received an antimalarial -- only half of under fives and 
less than a third of over fives. 
2. Antimalarial under-dosing was common -- a third of all antimalarials were dispensed as 
under-doses. 
3. Frequent use of ineffective chloroquine in mid-2001 - during the household survey 
chloroquine was frequently obtained from all provider types, despite its low efficacy. While 
chloroquine use declined following the change in first line drug policy, this demonstrates 
the persistence of retail demand for familiar antimalarials, even when severely 
compromised by drug resistance. 
4. Poor treatment quality at both retail outlets and government facilities -- general stores 
were least likely to dispense antimalarials, but they were only dispensed at just over half of 
visits to drug stores and government facilities. Similarly, 50% of antimalarials from general 
shops were dispensed as under-doses, and 29% from both drug stores and government 
facilities. 
5. Inequitable access to antimalarials-- patients in the better-off SES third were most likely 
to obtain appropriate antimalarials and correct doses because they more frequently visited 
private facilities, where appropriate treatment was most frequently obtained. 
6. High share of treatment visits for adults -- over fives are less vulnerable to severe 
disease, but accounted for the majority of visits at all outlet types. However, over fives were 
less likely than under fives to visit facilities or to obtain antimalarials. 
7. Indications of inappropriate drug use -- although firm judgments could not be made, it 
appeared likely that there was unnecessary provision of antibiotics and injectable 
antimalarials. Despite its potential harmful effects, 18% of under fives obtained aspirin, the 
majority from general stores. 
8. Inadequate drug labelling and packaging - labelling of the INN and dosing regimen was 
inadequate on SP packaged products, and never in KiSwahili; the problem was even more 
severe for unpackaged tablets, which accounted for 91 % of total antimalarial tablet volumes 
9. SP tablets of poor quality -- 33% had an insufficient quantity of active ingredient. 
10. Potential unnecessary contribution to drug pressure -- although firm conclusions could 
not be drawn, it is possible that frequent under-dosing, poor quality antimalarials, and 
unnecessary antimalarial use were contributing to the development of antimalarial drug 
resistance. 
These problems indicate the presence of substantial market and/or government failures in the 
provision of fever/malaria treatment. The remaining four results chapters explore potential 
causes for these failures, through an analysis of the nature of market structure, price and non- 
price competition and regulation. 
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CHAPTER 7 
MARKET STRUCTURE 
7.1 Introduction 
The second objective of the thesis is to analyse the nature of competition in the fever/malaria 
treatment market. As specified in the conceptual framework, the nature of competition arises 
from the interaction of market structure, provider conduct and consumer demand. This chapter 
analyses market structure, building on the description of the range of sellers and products 
provided in Chapter 6. 
A preliminary step in any analysis of market structure is to identify the competitors which make 
up the market, or to define the market. This is addressed in Section 7.2, drawing on Tirole's 
definition of a market as a group of buyers and sellers of a set of products in sufficiently close 
contact for their, transactions to affect the terms on which the others buy or sell (Tirole 1988). 
Market definition is considered along product and geographical lines. Product definition can be 
considered from the perspective of substitutability in demand or supply (Zwanziger, Melnick 
and Eyre 1994). As the focus of the thesis is on treatment for a specific set of health problems, 
the analysis focuses on substitutability in demand. In other words, the products should be good 
substitutes for fever/malaria treatment from the consumer's perspective. This is assessed in 
Section 7.2.1 in terms of both the providers and products making up the market. The assessment 
is based primarily on evidence from the household survey on sources and products widely used 
for fever/malaria treatment. This is supplemented with evidence from qualitative interviews 
with providers on the outlets perceived as close competitors. 
The next step in Section 7.2.2 is to define the geographical boundaries of competition between 
providers. As described in Chapter 3, geographical definition is subject to many methodological 
and empirical challenges (Zwanziger, Melnick and Eyre 1994). The most straightforward 
methods are based on political boundaries or fixed radii, but can be misleading. To investigate 
this, the suitability of different administrative boundaries, such as the village, ward and DSS 
area, are considered using the insights of the shipment method (Zwanziger, Melnick and Eyre 
1994). This method evaluates whether a given area is a "self-contained" market based on the 
proportion of the population in the market area using providers outside it, and the proportion of 
customers using providers in the market area who live outside it. It was not possible to evaluate 
the latter, as the household survey was restricted to the DSS areas and exit interviews were not 
undertaken, so the assessment was based on the former, using the village of residence and 
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location of provider visits reported in the household survey. The analysis of geographical 
definition leads to the division of the DSS areas into 12 sub-markets. 
An essential element of market structure is the degree of market concentration, which provides 
an important indication of the potential for the exercise of market power. This is considered in 
Section 7.3 using antimalarial retail audit data. Section 7.3.1 considers antimalarial 
concentration among providers for each geographical sub-market. As described in Chapter 3, a 
number of different concentration measures exist. Three measures are used in this analysis, the 
simplest being the number of drug providers per capita. However, this gives no indication of the 
relative size or importance of different outlets, so two additional summary measures are 
employed. The 3-firm concentration ratio is selected because of its ease of interpretation, and 
the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) is calculated, as it summarises information across all 
firms, and the results can be compared with anti-trust guidelines. The degree of vertical 
integration between providers is also assessed, based on ownership links and any evidence of 
long-term coordination. In Section 7.3.2 concentration is considered briefly from a different 
perspective -- that of the drug manufacturer. This is assessed by evaluating the total number of 
antimalarial products in the market, and the 3-firm concentration ratio by brand. 
The methods used to assess market definition and concentration are based on current patterns of 
utilisation, but the nature of competition may also be shaped by the contestability of the market 
(Baumol, Panzar and Willig 1988). Section 7.4 therefore considers barriers to entry and exit for 
fever/malaria treatment providers. In Section 7.4.1 barriers are assessed on a descriptive basis 
using evidence from qualitative interviews on providers' perceptions. Section 7.4.2 explores 
indirect evidence for entry and exit barriers by analysing evidence on the turnover of retail 
outlets over the one-year period between the first and second outlet census. 
Most of the analysis in the thesis focuses on the providers directly serving fever/malaria 
patients. However, the wholesale supply market may also have an important influence on 
competition. Section 7.5 therefore briefly considers the structure of the wholesale market 
supplying retailers in the study sites, in terms of the type of providers, market concentration and 
turnover. Retail audit data were not collected at the wholesale level, but it was possible to get 
some indication of concentration through analysis of the number of retailers reporting use of 
each wholesale source. 
Regulatory systems, which can also be considered as part of market structure, are covered in 
Chapter 10 
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7.2 Market Definition 
The definition of the market for fever/malaria treatment is considered along product and 
geographical lines. 
7.2.1 Product Definition 
The product definition specifies the providers and products forming part of the same market. 
Household survey data showed that government and private facilities, drug stores and general 
stores were all widely used to obtain fever/malaria treatment (Table 6.1), indicating some 
degree of substitutability in demand across these providers. Other potential sources of 
competition were not important. Itinerant vendors were never mentioned during the household 
survey. Community health workers (CHWs) accounted for only 2 visits (0.4% of all visits), both 
from the same household. Traditional healers accounted for five visits (0.9%) and did not 
provide any manufactured drugs. The only other source was a lymphatic filariasis project in 
Rufiji which accounted for two home visits. CHWs, traditional healers and other projects were 
never volunteered as important competitors during qualitative interviews with providers. When 
probed specifically on traditional healers, interviewees at all three dispensaries said they 
received fever/malaria patients who had already visited traditional practitioners and not 
recovered, indicating that there may be some competition between traditional healers and 
dispensaries for complicated cases. However, most shopkeepers said they were not competitors 
because very few people visited them now that faith in modem medicines had replaced 
traditional beliefs. Others said that traditional healers did not treat fever/malaria, but were more 
concerned with problems related to supernatural causes, such as satans, devils and bewitchment. 
As retailers were the main focus of this analysis and use of traditional healers was very rarely 
reported during the household survey, traditional practitioners were not included in the product 
definition. As a result, the product definition for providers was set as government and private 
facilities, drug stores and general stores. 
However, from qualitative interviews it was clear that the relative intensity of competition 
varied between different outlet types. When asked who they considered to be their main 
competitors for customers for the treatment of fever/malaria, interviewees at drug stores 
mentioned nearby drug stores and/or local public and private facilities. Only one drug store 
seller mentioned general stores, with others explaining that they were not key competitors 
because they stocked a much more limited range of drugs or had few drug customers. General 
shopkeepers mainly mentioned other general stores as their competitors; a few also mentioned 
drug stores but none mentioned facilities. However, it was clear from household survey data 
that these provider categories were all widely used for fever/malaria. Moreover, in qualitative 
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interviews fever/malaria was said to be the most common, or one of the most common, health 
problems bringing customers to all outlet types. The differences in the relative intensity of 
competition were therefore considered as indications of product differentiation, rather than 
evidence of distinct product markets. 
In terms of the products forming part of the same market, the household survey showed that 
88% of all identified drugs obtained for fever/malaria were painkillers or antimalarials (Figure 
6.3). The share of other drug categories was relatively small (e. g. 7% for antibiotics, 1% for 
ferrous/folic acid). The product definition was therefore set as antimalarials and painkillers 
stocked in facilities, drug stores and general stores. Other related services such as diagnosis and 
consultation were considered as complements. Inevitably there would have been some 
substitutability and complementarity with providers and products outside this definition, but it is 
argued to capture the main axes of competition. 
7.2.2 Geographical Definition 
The main competitors specified by all interviewees during qualitative interviews were located 
nearby, generally in the same market centre or village, and most general stores did not report 
wider competition. However, definition of completely distinct geographical market areas would 
be unrealistic because outlets had overlapping catchment areas, which varied in size by outlet 
type. Some drug store customers were reported to travel for several hours if they had no closer 
drug store, and all dispensary interviewees said people travelled long distances. A few 
interviewees from both general and drug stores reported receiving customers from farming 
areas, generally located several hours' walk from the main roads, who bought substantial 
quantities of drugs to keep as a reserve at home. One mission dispensary received customers 
from the whole district and even some patients from a neighbouring district, although this 
appeared to be rare. 
Household survey data on the village of residence and location of providers visited were used to 
consider the suitability of the DSS area, ward (2-8 villages) and village as guides to 
geographical definition. Table 7.1 shows the proportion of visits to facilities, drug stores and 
general stores which took place outside the care seeker's own village, ward and DSS area. Only 
4% of visits took place outside the DSS area of residence. Of the sources mentioned outside the 
DSS areas, only three outlets were mentioned more than once: St Francis Hospital (four times), 
and two drug stores (both twice), all of which were located in Ifakara Town. Kilombero and 
Ulanga DSS areas were clearly part of separate markets, despite their proximity. No one was 
ever reported to travel between the two for care, reflecting their separation by the Kilombero 
River, and the necessity of passing through Ifakara in order to reach the only ferry crossing. By 
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contrast, movement within each DSS area was relatively easy: it was possible to travel between 
all parts without leaving the DSS area, and they were designed so that all villages were within 
two hours' drive of the research bases. 
Table 7.1 Proportion of provider visits taking place outside the careseeker's own village, 
ward, sub-market and DSS area by outlet type 
as a% of all visits to providers of this type) 
R2 Outside own 
village 
Outside own 
ward 
Outside 
own sub- 
market' 
Outside 
own DSS 
area 
Government 
facilities 
149 79 (53%) 26 (17%) 6 (4%) 3 (2%) 
Private facilities 42 26(62%) 17(40%) 12(29%) 5(12%) 
Drug stores 178 79(44%) 28(16%) 17(10%) 10(6%) 
General stores 199 39(20%) 8(4%) 7(4%) 2(1%) 
Total 568 223(39%) 79(14%) 42(7%) 20 4% 
defined as equivalent to ward with the following exceptions: 
" Mavimba village from Minepa ward in Ulanga was included in Lupiro Area 
" Ikwiriri, Umwe and Mgomba wards in Rufiji were combined into Ikwiriri Area 
" Bungu ward was separated into Bungu Area (villages of Bungu A, Bungu B, Nyambunda and Pagae) and 
Jaribu Area (villages of Jaribu Mpakani, Mjawa and Uponda) 2 Number of visits to outlets within product definition 
Source: Household Survey May-Aug 2001. 
Use of the DSS area as the market definition would however overstate market size, as 86% of 
visits took place in the ward of residence. The smaller category of village could not be 
considered a self-contained market, as while the majority of visits were to outlets within the 
village of residence, 39% were to other villages. Leaving the village was more common for 
visits to facilities and drug stores than for general stores, but even for the latter 20% of visits 
were outside the village of residence. 
The ward was therefore judged the most appropriate administrative boundary as a starting point 
for geographical definition, but some adjustments were made to account for local circumstances. 
First data from each ward were analysed to identify any self-contained areas of two or more 
villages within a ward, which were then defined as a separate sub-market'. As a result Bungu 
ward was divided into Bungu Area and Jaribu Area, as no careseekers reported travelling 
between the two. Secondly, in any cases where more than 15% of visits from a given ward were 
to another ward, the geographical definition was examined in more detail. This affected three of 
the 13 wards (Mgomba, Umwe and Minepa), and as a result Ikwiriri, Mgomba and Umwe 
wards in Rufiji were combined into Ikwiriri Area, and Mavimba village in Ulanga was included 
in Lupiro Area, rather than Minepa Area, although it is located in Minepa Ward. 
1 the use of a single village as a sub-market was deemed inappropriate as, even where it appeared self- 
contained from household survey data, this may have reflected the small number of provider visits 
reported for some villages. 
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In all other cases geographical markets were defined on the basis of wards. This gave a total of 
5 sub-markets in Rufiji DSS, 3 in Kilombero, and 4 in Ulanga (Table 7.2). On this basis 93% of 
visits took place within the local sub-market (92% in Kilombero and Rufiji and 96% in Ulanga). 
The percentage was over 90% for each sub-market with the exception of Mchukwi in Rufiji. 
Any shipment cut-off point is essentially arbitrary, and current utilisation patterns do not 
necessarily reflect contestability. It was accepted that there would be some competition with 
providers outside these areas (e. g. St Francis Hospital in Ifakara), and that some outlets within 
them would not consider themselves as direct competitors, but these sub-markets are argued to 
capture the vast majority of geographical competition, and therefore formed a good basis for the 
estimation of market concentration. 
Table 7.2 Provider visits outside careseeker's own sub-market (by sub-market) 
(as a% of all visits by careseekers resident in that sub-market) 
Sub-markets Population' n 
(no. of visits by careseekers 
resident in sub-market) 
Provider visits outside 
careseeker's own sub- 
market2 
Kilombero 
Idete 10511 62 6(10%) 
Mbinp, u 9523 40 3(8%) 
Mchombe 17030 70 5(7%) 
Ulanga 
Min a 7861 23 1(4%) 
Lupiro 12037 55 3(5%) 
Iragua 4353 7 00 
Kichangani 5188 4 0(_ 
Rufi'i 
Ikwiriri 19232 56 00 
Kibiti 24244 117 4(3%) 
Mchukwi 9029 46 12(26%) 
Bun 12627 64 6(9%) 
Jari bu 8707 24 2(8%) E 
Avera a 11695 568 42(7%) 
sources: 
I DSS systems, May 2001 
2 Household Survey May-Sep 2001 (for providers within product market definition). 
The vast majority of outlets operated all year-round in a fixed location. However, outlet census 
2001 data showed that 21 of the 277 general stores in Kilombero and Ulanga (8%) reported 
either moving to another location, or closing down for part of the year, mainly in response to 
population movement during the main farming seasons2. Some shopkeepers closed their shops 
while they were away working on their fields, and others moved their shops to the farms to 
serve the migrant population. For analytical purposes they were considered as part of the 
geographical sub-market where they were located at the time of interview. 
2 questions on seasonal operation did not appear well understood in general. Moreover, the questions were 
only asked of the smaller general shops considered by data collection staff to be "kiosks/stalls", so some 
seasonal changes in the operation of larger shops could possibly have been missed, although field staff 
believed this to be very unlikely. 
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7.3 Market Concentration 
7.3.1 Concentration by Provider 
To assess the market power of private providers, concentration is considered by sub-market to 
reflect geographical market definition. The concentration measures are also based on the 
product definition of the market, in that they include all facilities, drug stores and general shops. 
However, they are calculated on the basis of antimalarial sales alone, excluding painkillers. 
Retail audit data were collected for antimalarials only because they were of greatest importance 
in public health terms for malaria treatment, and the inclusion of all painkillers would have 
made the audit logistically infeasible. Concentration in the market for drugs for fever/malaria 
treatment in general is likely to have been lower than that for antimalarials alone, because 
painkillers were more widely supplied by general stores. 
Concentration is considered in terms of three measures: the number of drug providers per capita, 
the 3-firm concentration ratio and the HHI. The latter two measures allow an assessment of the 
relative size of firms. The 3-firm ratio is defined as the percentage of antimalarial sales 
accounted for by the three largest providers. The HHI is calculated as the sum of the squared 
market shares of each firm, and therefore depends on both market share inequality and firm 
numbers, ranging from 0 (large number of competitors with small market shares) to 1 (single 
monopoly supplier). 
To calculate the concentration ratio and HHI, sales values rather than volumes were used, to 
more closely reflect turnover, profitability and commercial decisions. All private outlets were 
included, but not government facilities, as their large market shares would have obscured the 
impact of private sector concentration on private outlets, which was assumed to be the most 
important factor influencing their competitive decisions. By contrast, government facilities were 
assumed not to compete on a local basis, but instead to follow models of service provision and 
prices set institutionally by their District Health Management Team (DHMT), or more centrally 
by the MOH. There was at least one government facility in each sub-market, so private 
providers were likely to have faced a similar residual private market in each area. 
Results were calculated by owner, rather than by outlet, as there was some degree of horizontal 
integration in the market, and outlets with common ownership were likely to be run as single 
businesses. The owners of 58% of commercial drug stores and 11% of general stores 
interviewed in the outlet survey had more than one shop, but in most cases the other shops were 
located outside the DSS areas. However, two drug store owners owned multiple shops within 
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the DSS areas; one had two drug stores in Kilombero DSS and another six drug stores in the 
Rufiji DSS. Three general store owners in Rufiji also owned two general shops each in the DSS 
areas. All mission facilities in the DSS areas of Kilombero and Ulanga were owned by the 
Roman Catholic Church, and two of the facilities in Rufiji were owned by the Pentecostal 
Church. 
Table 7.3 shows the population per antimalarial stockist in each sub-market, which was highly 
variable, ranging from 414 in Mbingu Area to 1729 in Kichangani Area. Of the 353 outlets 
listed in the top 3 private antimalarial providers in each sub-market, 20 were drug stores, 8 
general stores and 7 private facilities. Only 2 of the 9 private facilities were not listed in the top 
3 in their area. Drug stores were the top provider in 8 of the 12 sub-markets, private facilities in 
3, and general stores in one. 
Table 7.3 Concentration measures by sub-market 
Sub- 
markets 
Population 
/antimalarial 
stockist' 
% antimalarial 
sales values 
from private 
outlets2 
3-firm 
concentration 
ratio for private 
antimalarial sales 
values by owner2 
HIII for 
private 
antimalarial 
sales values by 
owner2 
Kilombero 
Idete 657 79% 90% 0.35 
Mbin 414 87% 87% 0.33 
Mchombe 473 98% 69% 0.24 
Ulan a 
Minepa 786 98% 89% 0.72 
Lu iro 1204 94% 96% 0.57 
Ira a 544 77% 93% 0.74 
Kichan ani 1729 7% 100% 1.00 
Ruti i 
Ikwiriri 712 92% 92% 0.47 
Kibiti 1276 86% 87% 0.34 
Mchukwi 1003 73% 98% 0.87 
l3un 601 60% 85% 0.28 
Jaribu 512 85% 75% 0.24 
Avera a 826 78% 88% 0.51 
sources: 
1 Outlet Survey Nov/Dee 2001 
2 Retail Audits Feb/Apr & Jun/Jul 2002 
The 3-fum ratios and HHIs indicate high levels of concentration among private sellers in each 
sub-market. As a rough guide, US anti-trust guidelines state that an HHI below 0.1 is 
considered unconcentrated, 0.1 to 0.18 moderately concentrated, and greater than 0.18 is highly 
concentrated (Gaynor and Vogt 2000). On this basis, all the sub-markets would be considered 
highly concentrated, although there was considerable variation. Some areas were relatively 
close to the 0.18 cut-off (Bungu and Jaribu Areas in Rufji, and Mchombe Area in Kilombero), 
3 In Kichangani only 2 antimalarial providers were documented in total 
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while others were at or close to a monopoly situation. The relationship between SES and 
antimalarial concentration was unclear, although the 3 most concentrated sub-markets also had 
the highest percentage of households in the lowest SES third (Figure 7.1). 
Figure 7.1 Socio-economic status and concentration in private sector antimalarial sales 
by sub-market 
100% 
80% 
60% 
40% 
20% 
096 
Source: Household Survey May-Sep 2001, Retail Audits Feb/Apr & Jun/Jul 2002. 
Provider market power could also be influenced by vertical integration, but this was not 
observed between DSS retailers and their wholesalers or distributors4. The degree of vertical 
coordination was also very limited; there were no examples of long-term contracts or product 
tie-ins. A couple of shops reported receiving recommended retail prices from distributors, but 
this was not a practice passed on by the more commonly used static wholesalers. 
7.3.2 Concentration by Product 
The main focus of the thesis is competition between providers directly serving customers in the 
DSS areas, but competition could also be considered between drug manufacturers. A brief 
assessment of concentration by antimalarial product is therefore provided. The geographical 
market definition for competition between manufacturers is inevitably much broader than that 
for competition between fever/malaria treatment providers, operating on a regional, national or 
even international scale. The concentration by product was therefore considered across the 
4 one drug store owner in Rufiji also owned a general wholesalers, but the drug store did not usually 
obtain its supplies through this wholesaler. 
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combined DSS areas, including all public and private providers. The concentration was 
investigated using the total number of antimalarial products in the market, and the market shares 
by brand. 
The total number of antimalarial products identified during the outlet survey was 81, of which 
47 were branded and 34 unbranded (Table 7.4). The number was particularly high for SP tablets 
for which there were 15 different brand-named products, plus 5 unbranded versions by different 
manufacturers. Retail audit data showed the lead brand to be OrodarT", manufactured in Kenya 
by Elys. The top 3 brands represented 70% of branded SP tablet sales, but only 23% of all SP 
tablet sales, as 67% of sales volumes were unbranded. Even among shops, which had a higher 
percentage of branded tablets, the top 3 brands represented only 36% of all SP tablet sales5. 
Table 7.4 Number of antimalarial products identified across all DSS areas 
Innovator 
Brands 
Branded 
Generics 
Unbranded 
Generics 
Total 
Tablets 
Chloro uine 0 3 4 7 
SP 2 13 5 20 
Amodia uine 0 6 2 8 
uinine 0 2 8 10 
Artesunate 0 1 0 1 
Total Tablets 2 25 19 46 
-Syrups Chloro uine 0 2 4 6 
SP 0 4 0 4 
Amodia uine 0 6 0 6 
Quinine 0 2 2 4 
Total Syrups 0 14 6 20 
In'ectables 
Chloro uine 0 3 8 11 
Quinine 0 3 1 4 
Total Injectables 0 6 9 15 
Total Antimalarial 
Products 
2 45 34 81 
Source: Outlet Survey Nov/Dec 2001 
Definitions: 
Innovator brand -- the product first authorised worldwide for marketing Branded generic -a product which is not the innovator brand, but is marketed under a brand name. Unbranded generic -a product marketed under the International Non-Proprietary Name (INN) only. 
7.4 Barriers to Entry and Exit 
Two approaches are taken to investigate the importance of entry and exit barriers. Firstly, in 
Section 7.4.1 barriers are assessed on a descriptive basis using evidence from qualitative 
interviews on providers' perceptions. Secondly, Section 7.4.2 explores indirect evidence for 
S it was not possible to calculate concentration ratios or the HHI by product as data on the manufacturer of 
unbranded antimalarials were not collected during the retail audits. 
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entry and exit barriers, by analysing evidence on the turnover of retail outlets over the one-year 
period between the first and second outlet censuses. 
7.4.1 Providers' Perceptions of Entry and Exit Barriers 
During qualitative interviews the most commonly mentioned barrier to entry for both drug and 
general stores was access to funds to set up the shop. 
"The first problem is the availability of capital, struggling to get capital. " General shopkeeper #3 
No interviewees were aware of any governmental or formal local institutions from which a loan 
could be obtained. Credit might be available from some wholesalers, but only for retailers who 
were already established and well-known. In general it was therefore necessary to rely on 
savings from other activities to establish a shop. Most general shopkeepers were also farmers, 
and they usually relied on profits from farming cash crops such as cashews, oranges or rice to 
generate capital. 
Other entry barriers less frequently mentioned included the high cost of taxes and licences, and 
the problem of identifying trustworthy sales staff. There was the occasional mention of 
regulatory hurdles, but most interviewees did not volunteer them as a key problem. However, in 
drug stores we mainly interviewed sellers who may not have understood all the regulatory 
barriers owners faced in obtaining permits and complying with regulations on premises and 
serving staff (see Chapter 10). 
Despite these barriers, most interviewees thought entry by other retailers was likely, and that 
many people were interested. 
"Now anyone who wants to do it does it, so the number of shops increases every day. " General 
shopkeeper #3 
"They will start and there will be many of them. " Drug store seller #2 
Most interviewees agreed that exit was also common. General and drug store interviewees 
mentioned the erosion of capital as a key cause for shop closure. This might arise due to poor 
management, for example reckless expenditure, overgenerous credit policies, or handing over 
control to irresponsible relatives or employees, or due to high expenditures, such as school fees 
or health care costs. In some cases there was a circular flow of funds, with the agricultural 
surplus being used as capital for the shop, and some of the shop's profits being reinvested in 
farming. A bad harvest might lead to a break in the cycle and force the closure of the shop. A 
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couple of drug store interviewees and one general store interviewee also mentioned the potential 
risk of being closed down for contravening business or drug regulations, although no specific 
examples of such closures were provided. 
7.4.2 Turnover of retail outlets 
The interviewees' perceptions of high levels of entry and exit were borne out by evidence of 
turnover. Data comparing the outlet censuses in 2000 and 2001 for commercial shops stocking 
6 drugs are shown in Table 7.5 and Figure 7.2. 
Table 7.5 Turnover of commercial drug shops and general retailers stocking drugs 
between mid-2000 and mid-2001 (as % of shops functioning in mid-2000 in brackets) 
Ulanga Kilombero Rufiji 
DSS DSS DSS Total 
Total functioning in mid-2000 2 8 13 23 
100% (100%) (100%) (100%) 
Of which by mid-2001: 
Still functioning 2 7 12 21 
(100%) (88%) (92%) 91% 
Closed 0 1 1 2 
- (13%) (8%) (9%) 
New shops functioning by mid-2001 0 1 8 9 
- 13% (62%) 39% 
Total shops functioning in 2001 2 8 20 30 
100% 100% (154%) 130% 
(b) General Retailers stocking drugs 
Ulanga Kilombero Rufiji 
DSS DSS DSS Total 
Total functioning and stocking drugs in 106 146 229 481 
mid-2000 (1000/0) (100%) (100%) (100%) 
Of which by mid-2001: 
Still functioning and still stocking drugs 65 94 144 303 
61% 64% (63%) (63%) 
Still functioning but not stocking drugs 10 12 13 35 
(9%) (8%) (6%) (7%) 
Still functioning and not interviewed 1 0 2 3 
0.9% - 0.9% (0.6%) 
Closed 30 40 70 140 
(28%) 27% 31% (29%) 
New shops functioning and stocking drugs 50 54 112 216 
b mid-2001 47% 37% 57% (45%) 
Shops started stocking drugs by mid-2001 6 6 2 14 
-(Open 
but not stocking drugs in 2000) (6%) (4%) 0.9% (3%) 
Stocking drugs in mid-2001 and open but 1 1 0 2 
not interviewed in mid-2000 0.9% 0.7% - (0.4%) 
Total shops functioning, interviewed and 122 155 258 535 
stocking drugs in 2001 115% (106%) (113%) 111% 
Source: Outlet Censuses May-Sep 2000 & 2001. 
6 any outlets incorrectly omitted during either census would be erroneously included as entries or exits. 
These figures may therefore slightly overestimate turnover. 
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Of the 23 commercial drug stores operating in 2000,2 had closed down by 2001 (1 each in 
Kilombero and Rufiji). Over the same period 9 new drug stores had opened, 8 of which were in 
Rufiji, and 1 in Kilombero, giving a total of 30 in 2001, reflecting the more than 50% increase 
in Rufiji. After the 2001 outlet census the number of commercial drug stores continued to grow. 
By the second retail audit in mid-2002 a further five new commercial drug stores had opened (2 
in Kilombero, I in Ulanga and 2 in Rufiji), with only one closure in Kilombero. 
The antimalarial stocking patterns of commercial drug stores in Kilombero and Ulanga 
remained fairly constant between the two outlet censuses, but there was a sizeable increase in 
the antimalarial range stocked in Rufiji, with the proportion stocking SP rising from 23% to 
88%, amodiaquine 23% to 81%, and injectable antimalarials from 23% to 69%. The median 
number of antimalarial products stocked in Rufiji increased from 3 to 7.5, but was unchanged in 
the other areas. These changes did not indicate that the retail market was relatively developed in 
Rufiji by mid-2001. Rather the widening of antimalarials stocked reduced the differential 
between Rufiji and Kilombero/Ulanga, and the expansion in the number of stores brought the 
population per drug store in Rufiji close to that in Kilombero (3692 and 3706 respectively), 
while Ulanga remained much the worst served (14,720 people per drug store). 
There was very high turnover among the general retailers. In mid-2000,481 general retailers 
stocking drugs were identified. By mid-2001, only 63% were still stocking drugs; 29% had 
closed down, and 7% were open but no longer stocked drugs. These reductions were more than 
compensated for by new stockists. By mid-2001 an additional 216 general retailers stocking 
drugs had opened, and 14 existing shops had started stocking drugs, giving an overall increase 
in the number of general retailers stocking drugs of 11% over the year. These patterns were 
similar across the 3 DSS areas. 
The proportion of general retailers stocking drugs which stocked antimalarials in the two 
censuses was constant in Kilombero and Ulanga (at 15% and 37% respectively) but fell in Rufiji 
from 30% to 22%. These general trends disguise even greater variation in the stocking patterns 
of individual shops. Of the 138 general retailers stocking antimalarials in mid-2000, only 40% 
were still stocking antimalarials in mid-2001; 49% were still open but not stocking 
antimalarials, and 12% had closed down. Of the 76 stocking antimalarials in 2001 but not in 
2000,40 had operated in 2000 but not stocked antimalarials, and 36 were new startups. 
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Figure 7.2 Turnover of retail outlets stocking drugs between mid-2000 and mid-2001 
60% 1 
General Stores 
48% 
40% 1 
20% -I 
o io 
-20% 
'40% 
Closed Stopped stocking Closed 
down drugs down 
-29% 
-7% 
Source: Outlet Censuses May-Sep 2000 & 2001. 
7.5 Market Structure among Wholesale Suppliers 
Drug Stores 
-9% 
39% 
New stockists 
As the wholesale market may also influence competition among retailers, wholesale market 
structure is briefly considered in this section, through an assessment of the type and patterns of 
wholesale supply, concentration and turnover. 
During the outlet censuses, all shops stocking drugs were asked about their sources of wholesale 
drug supplies, which demonstrated that the distribution chains were quite different for drug and 
general stores (Table 7.6). Drug shops generally used dedicated drug suppliers, with 65% of 
sources specified being drug wholesalers or Part I pharmacies, and 21% other Part II drug 
shops. There were no dedicated drugs wholesalers in the study districts, so their suppliers were 
nearly all located several hundred kilometres away in Dar es Salaam, generally closely gathered 
in the Kariakoo area within 200m of each other. In qualitative interviews, drug shop staff 
explained that they did not always visit the same wholesaler, but shopped around for the best 
prices. Most drug stores used public buses or trains to obtain their supplies, restocking at least 
once a month. 
New stockists 
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Table 7.6 Type and location of retailers' wholesale sources for drug supplies' 
(% of all sources/locations specified) 
Drug shops General retailers 
stocking drugs 
Type of wholesale source : 
General wholesaler or retailer 5 (15%) 729 (92%) 
Drugs wholesaler or Part I pharmacy 22 (65%) 8 (1%) 
Part If drug shop 7(21%) 37(5%) 
Distributor 0(-) 16(2%) 
Total sources specified 34(100%) 790(100%) 
Location of wholesale source : 
Dar es Salaam 31(91%) 84 (11%) 
District/Regional Headquarters 2 (6%) 250 (32%) 
Local market centre 1(3%) 454(58%) 
Total locations specified 34 (100%) 788 (100%) 
' interviewees were asked to name up to two sources of drug supplies for their shop 2 there was a significant difference between drug shops and general retailers in type and location of wholesale. 
sources (Chi2, p<0.001) 
Source: Outlet Census May-Sep 2001. 
By contrast, general stores restocked with drugs much less frequently; the majority had no 
special schedule and just purchased whenever their stocks ran out. This was rarely in under a 
month, and might be as infrequent as every two or even three to four months. In the outlet 
census, 92% of sources mentioned by general retailers were general wholesalers, which stocked 
a wide range of other products. General retailers stocking antimalarials were not significantly 
more likely to use drug wholesalers than those that did not. General retailers' sources were 
usually located in local market centres (58%), or in District or Regional headquarters (32%). 
They generally fetched their supplies by bicycle, with the round-trip taking anything between a 
few minutes and half a day. The main criteria for choosing between wholesalers was proximity, 
and they also preferred larger shops stocking the whole range of products that they sold, and 
shops where they were well-known and therefore more likely to get good deals. Although they 
mentioned price as an important factor in choosing local outlets, they generally agreed that 
prices were the same across all the district-level general wholesalers. They knew that prices 
were lower in Dar es Salaam, but felt unable to cover the cost of transport to the city because 
their capital was so small. Mobile distributors who travel from retailer to retailer were never 
mentioned at drug shops, and were not a common source for general retailers (2% of sources 
specified). 
In addition to providing products, wholesalers and distributors were also the most important 
source of information for shopkeepers about new drugs, mentioned by 43% of outlet survey 
interviewees at drug stores and 57% at general stores. The next most common source was the 
radio (40% at drug stores and 46% at general stores), with newspapers, health care workers and 
drug shop owners also often cited. 
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Although general retailers mentioned a large number of different wholesalers, a few accounted 
for a high proportion of all sources cited. In the Kilombero DSS area for example, 122 general 
retailers named a specific source, with a total of 40 different wholesalers mentioned. However, a 
high proportion of the retailers mentioned at least one of the 5 most frequently specified 
wholesalers (Figure 7.3). Moreover, two of the wholesalers in the Kilombero top five purchased 
their supplies from other wholesalers in the top five. Averaging across the DSS areas, the 
proportion of general retailers mentioning at least one of the top 3 wholesalers in their DSS was 
55%, and of the top 5 wholesalers, 66%. Although these data do not necessarily reflect the 
volume of wholesale purchases, they are indicative of high levels of concentration in the 
wholesale market for general stores. 
Figure 7.3 General retailers with drugs in stock mentioning at least one of the top 3 and 
top 5 wholesale sources for general retailers 
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n= number of general retailers with drugs in stock mentioning at least one wholesale source 
Source: Outlet Census May-Sep 2001. 
The pattern of wholesale supply to general retailers appeared to be relatively stable, with little 
change in the top 5 wholesale sources in each DSS area between the 2000 and 2001 outlet 
censuses. In Ulanga the same 5 wholesalers were in the top 5 in 2000 and 2001, and in Rufiji 
and Kilombero 4 of the top 5 were the same. 
For drug stores, data were available on specific wholesale sources for 14 retailers only, making 
wholesale concentration difficult to assess. However, these 14 sellers mentioned 15 different 
suppliers, indicating that in relation to these specific study sites there was no rapid narrowing of 
the number of suppliers at the next level of the distribution chain. However, as these Dar es 
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Salaam wholesalers served drug shops from most areas of the country, the wholesale market 
may be highly concentrated at a national scale. 
7.6 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter aimed to analyse the structure of the market for fever/malaria treatment in the 
study sites. The definition of the market for fever/malaria treatment was considered on a product 
and geographical basis. The product definition was set as antimalarials and painkillers stocked 
in facilities, drug stores and general stores. For the geographical definition local sub-markets 
were defined based mainly on wards but adjusted where necessary using the shipment method. 
There were many different antimalarial products on the market, and concentration by product 
did not appear particularly high. Concentration of antimalarial sales by provider was high; all 
sub-markets could be considered as highly concentrated, with some approaching a monopoly 
situation. However, the market appeared relatively contestable for retailers with high rates of 
entry and exit, particularly for general stores, which also regularly changed their drug stocking 
patterns. 
The distribution chains for drug and general stores were distinct, with drug stores mainly 
purchasing from drug wholesalers in Dar es Salaam and general stores from district level 
general wholesalers. There were indications of relatively high concentration among these 
district level suppliers, which also appeared relatively stable over time, indicating that entry and 
exit barriers may be higher among the suppliers than among their retail customers. 
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CHAPTER 8 
PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND NON-PRICE COMPETITION 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter continues the analysis of the nature of competition in the fever/malaria treatment 
market (Objective 2 of the thesis). Market structure was considered in Chapter 7; the analysis 
now turns to an assessment of provider conduct. Conduct has been divided into two key 
elements, reported in separate chapters. Product differentiation and non-price competition are 
considered in this chapter, pricing and price competition in Chapter 9. (In addition, response to 
regulation is covered in Chapter 10). It might be considered more conventional for an economic 
analysis to address price before non-price competition. However, assessing non-price 
competition first facilitates the generation of hypotheses about likely sources of price variation, 
which are explored in the following chapter. 
Competition over non-price attributes of fever/malaria treatment reflects perceived 
differentiation between products or between outlets, leading buyers to prefer one firm's product 
over a rival's at the given price (Scherer 1970). Perceived differentiation may result from 
inherent characteristics, or be deliberately engineered by the provider to enhance their 
competitive position. It is a key influence on treatment obtained because competition between 
retailers is likely to enhance only those product/service features that consumers view as 
important. Moreover, non-price competition can temper price competition by endowing certain 
sellers with market power. 
The importance and nature of non-price competition will vary across markets. The key axes of 
differentiation in the fever/malaria treatment market were therefore identified empirically, by 
asking providers during qualitative interviews what factors were important in attracting 
customers to their outlet, and what factors led customers to seek care elsewhere. The most 
commonly mentioned issues concerned the range and reliability of drug stocks, expertise of 
staff, convenience, credit availability and good consumer relations. 
In this chapter, qualitative data from provider interviews are used to explore each of these issues 
in some depth, and assess their likely influence on consumers' ranking of different outlet types. 
Hypotheses about the ranking by outlet type generated from these qualitative discussions are 
tested where possible using quantitative data from the household survey, outlet censuses, and 
outlet survey. From this analysis, a body of evidence is constructed which allows the provider 
types to be compared across each key issue. The findings are summarised in Section 8.7, where 
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rough rankings are assigned for 8 key non-price characteristics, and the relative overall 
performance by provider type is illustrated using spider diagrams 1.2. 
8.2 Product Range and Reliability 
During qualitative provider interviews, the most frequently raised issues said to affect choice of 
provider concerned drugs, in terms of the drug product range, stock reliability and perceived 
drug quality. These are discussed below. From a technical perspective of treatment quality, one 
would also expect the availability of confirmed diagnosis and injectable antimalarials to 
influence preferences for providers. The reasons why these aspects were not volunteered are 
also explored. 
8.2.1 Drug Product Range 
Consumers were said to choose a drug store or facility instead of a general store because of the 
wider range of drug products, which were not limited to painkillers. This is corroborated by 
outlet survey data which showed that in terms of most drug availability measures, private 
facilities ranked highest, followed by drug stores, with government facilities ranked as third, 
and general stores last. As described in Chapter 6, antimalarials were available in only 14% of 
general stores stocking drugs, meaning that to be confident of obtaining an antimalarial 
customers needed to visit facilities or drug stores. In total, general shops had a median of 3 
fever/malaria drugs3, compared with 7 in government facilities, 11.5 in private facilities and 
13.5 in drug stores. Of those outlets stocking antimalarials, private facilities had the widest 
choice, with a median of 7 antimalarial products, compared to 6 in drug shops, 5 in government 
facilities and only one in general stores (Table 8.1). General shops usually had only 
chloroquine, whereas SP, amodiaquine and quinine were frequently found in facilities and drug 
stores, and many drug stores stocked several brands of each antimalarial type. 
1 Chapters 8 and 9 explore price and non-price competition between government facilities, private 
facilities, commercial drug stores and general stores. The village-run drug stores were excluded from the 
analysis in these two chapters as there were only two in the study areas, making it difficult to generalise 
from their results, and both were located in the same sub-market, meaning that they were only practical 
options for 10% of the study population. 2 Unless otherwise stated, only general shops stocking drugs at the time of the interview are included in 
outlet survey results. 3 defined to include painkillers and antimalarials. 
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Table 8.1 Number of antimalarial products stocked per outlet (for outlets stocking at least 
one antimalarial) 
n Minimum Maximum Mean Median 
Government facilities 18 1 11 4.9 5 
Private facilities 8 3 10 6.8 7 
Commercial drug shops 30 1 17 6.9 6 
General stores 30 1 3 1.3 1 
Source: Outlet Survey Nov/Dec 2001. 
The availability of amodiaquine and quinine in commercial drug stores and private facilities was 
better than in government facilities, and the wide availability of SP in these private outlets pre- 
dated the national change in first line policy in August 2001 (Figure 8.1). During the 2001 outlet 
census just before the policy change, SP was already available (illegally) in 81% of commercial 
drug shops, and (legally) in all private facilities. More than a year earlier during the 2000 outlet 
census it was available in 43% of commercial drug stores and 88% of private facilities. The new 
second line, amodiaquine, was already stocked by 26% of commercial drug stores and 38% of 
private facilities in mid-2000, and 73% and 33% respectively in mid-2001. By contrast, at the 
time of both censuses, chloroquine was the only antimalarial in the core drug kit in government 
primary health care facilities, with a sub-set of facilities receiving only a very limited amount of 
SP and quinine. 
Bivariate analysis indicated that general stores were significantly more likely to stock 
antimalarials if they possessed a business licence, and if they stocked garments, the latter 
probably acting as an indicator of a relatively high stock value (Table 8.2). There were also 
indications that antimalarial stocking was more likely if the shop had better educated staff, a 
permanent building, and was on the main road (differences not significant). 
The low level of antimalarial stocking in general stores leads one to question why they do not 
try to compete with drug stores to meet antimalarial demand. The stated reasons why general 
retailers did not stock chloroquine or SP are shown in Table 8.3. The most frequently given 
reasons were that they were not permitted, a shortage of customers, the high cost of purchase, 
their lack of expertise, and problems with wholesale availability. For SP, many respondents also 
said they did not know the drug. 
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Table 8.2 Characteristics of general shops stocking antimalarials 
(as a% of all general shoes stocking drugs') 
Number stocking 
antimalarials 
DSS area n=213 
Kilombero 12 (22%) 
Ulanga 3 (7%) 
Rufiji 15 13% 
Licence status (n=209): 
Licensed 25 (23%)* 
Unlicensed 5 (5%)* 
Location (n=213): 
Market centre 7 (11%) 
Rural village 19 (15%) 
Farming area 4( 17%) 
On main road (n=213): 
Yes 20 (19%) 
No 10 (10%) 
Regular serving staff with at least primary education (n=205): 
Yes 27 (16%) 
No 2 (6%) 
Length of time shop has been open (n=143): 
Less than one year 6( 16%) 
More than one year 13 (12%) 
Wall construction (n=213): 
Permanent 22 (20%) 
Temporary 8 (8%) 
Stocks mosquito nets (n=213): 
Yes 5( 33%) 
No 25 (13%) 
Stocks garments (clothes, cloth, kanga or kiten a (n=213): 
- Yes 17 ( 29%)* 
No 13 8%* 
' variations in n reflect differences in the number of interviewees able to supply the relevant information 2 permanent = stone, cement, bricks; temporary = wood, iron sheets, mud, mud & sticks, coconut palms, grass, 
cardboard. 
* significant difference across specified characteristics (Chi2 with Rao and Scott correction, p<0.05) 
Source: Outlet Survey Nov/Dec 2001. 
The proportion of general stores stocking antimalarials had declined over time in all DSS areas, 
from 29% of general stores stocking drugs in the 2000 outlet census and 24% in the 2001 outlet 
census to 14% in the outlet survey, and there was no evidence of a resurgence in antimalarial 
stocking in the retail audits in 2002. This reflected the official withdrawal of chloroquine, the 
main antimalarial stocked in general stores, but almost no move to start stocking the new first 
line, SP, and only very limited adoption of the new second line, amodiaquine. As a result, 
general shops were becoming less and less competitive on drug range over time. 
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Table 8.3 Reported reasons why chloroquine and SP were not stocked by general retailers 
Reasons why drug not stocked Chloro uine SP 
No. responses % No. res ponses 
Not allowed to sell 83 (37%) 45 (18%) 
No or few customers 40 (18%) 54 (22%) 
High cost or lack of capital to buy 37 (16%) 40 (16%) 
Don't have expertise to sell 22 (10%) 39 (16%) 
Not available at wholesalers 21 (9%) 24 (10%) 
It can have harmful or dangerous effects 8 (4%) 3 (1%) 
Does not work well 7( 3%) 0 (0%) 
Not yet bought new stocks 3( 1%) 2 (1%) 
Don't know where to buy it 3( 1%) 8 (3%) 
People buy from nearby drug stores/facilities 2( 1%) 4 (2%) 
Don't know this drug 0 (-) 26 (11%) 
Other 1 (-) 4 (2%) 
Total Responses 226( 100%) 245 (100%) 
' interviewees could specify more than one reason. 
Source: Outlet Survey Nov/Dee 2001. 
8.2.2 Stock Reliability 
During qualitative interviews almost every interviewee reported that consumers avoided 
government facilities because of their frequent drug stockouts of both antimalarials and 
painkillers. 
"They come here for drugs that are not available there (at the government dispensary). It's not 
that they prefer it, it's that they can't get drugs. " General shopkeeper #3 
This was borne out by household survey data which showed that no drugs were obtained at 17% 
of visits to government facilities (compared with 5% at private facilities and less than 1% at 
drug and general stores). The use of shops as a drug source when government facilities had 
stockouts had been semi-formalised through the use of cheti, informal prescriptions from 
government staff. These were normally written in exercise books, and described the drug and 
dose required. During qualitative interviews all drug stores reported getting many customers 
with cheti for painkillers, antimalarials and antibiotics; in one drug store such patients made up 
around half of their customers. This was also reflected in the most common pattern for multiple 
provider visits documented in the household survey, a health facility visit followed by a drug 
store. Cheri were quite rare in general stores, but many general shops said sales increased at 
times of government stockouts, because patients were sent to shops by health care workers, or 
chose to go directly to shops once news of the stockout had spread. A couple of general stores 
had even started stocking syringes to cater for demand when government stocks ran out. Two 
drug stores and one general store linked their weekly sales patterns to patients directed from 
government facilities, with sales peaking on the days when the facility had most customers. 
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In contrast stockouts were never mentioned as a problem in private facilities. This was backed 
up by outlet survey data on drug stockouts in the previous month4. Stockout data were collected 
for chloroquine, SP, aspirin and paracetamol tablets. Data for chloroquine are not presented as it 
had been officially withdrawn by this time, so a stockout may have reflected a decision to 
discontinue this product. Data on SP are presented, but may not be representative of typical 
stock reliability at government facilities, as it had been introduced in most of the public sector 
only in the previous two months, meaning that their stocks may have been atypically high at the 
time of the survey. Much higher government stockout rates for chloroquine were observed 
across Tanzania when it was still the first line drug (Abdulla 2001). 
Table 8.4 shows that on average private facilities were the most reliable stockists. Drug stores 
were the next most reliable; although they had frequent stockouts, they were half as likely as 
general stores to run out of aspirin or paracetamol, and one sixth as likely for SP. Respondents 
in qualitative interviews suggested that general stores were used because of high stockout rates 
in government facilities, but outlet survey data showed them to be equally unreliable 
themselves, with average stockout rates for aspirin and paracetamol of 34% in general stores 
and 36% in government facilities, although in most areas patients would have had the option of 
trying several general shops. General stores in farming areas were particularly likely to have 
aspirin and paracetamol stockouts (46% and 48% respectively). However, stockouts in drug and 
general shops were remedied relatively rapidly, usually in three or four days, in contrast to 
government facilities where the median stockout period was over a week. 
Table 8.4 Outlets reporting stockouts of tablet products in the previous month' 
Outlets reporting stockout Median number of days out 
(as % of those stocking in of stock (where stockout 
previous month 2 took place 3 
Aspirin PCL SP Aspirin PCL SP 
Government facilities 5 (28%) 8 (44%) 1 (6%) 8 8 7 
n=18 n=18 n=16 n=5 n=8 n=1 
Private facilities 2 (25%) 00 0(-) 7 n/a n/a 
n=8 n=8 n=8 n=2 
Commercial drug 5 (17%) 5 (17%) 3 (11%) 3 3 3 
shops n=29 n=30 n=28 n=5 n=5 n=3 
General stores 59 (31%) 77(37%) 3 (60%) 4 4 7 
n=183 n=209 n=5 n=57 n=77 n=3 
PCLrParacetamol 
i stockouts were defined as any occasion when the provider completely ran out of a product, even if it was restocked 
on the same day. 2 n= number of outlets which have stocked this product in the previous month and where interviewee knew whether 
stockouts had taken place. 3 n=number of outlets with stockout in previous month. 
Source: Outlet Survey Nov/Dec 2001. 
4 Stockout data were collected for outlets which currently stocked the relevant product, or had stocked it 
in the previous month, and therefore include some general shops with no drugs in stock at the time of the 
interview, which were excluded from other analysis. Stockouts lasting more than a month were not 
captured. 
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8.2.3 Perceived Drug Quality 
Concerns over drug quality, and expired drugs in particular, were said to lead consumers to 
avoid certain outlets, especially general stores. 
"People tell you that you can buy drugs from a certain individual and even if you are given the 
whole tub and you swallow them all, they will not be helpful. " General shopkeeper #12 
Although advertising or marketing of drugs was very rare in these rural areas, restricted to the 
odd, often out-dated poster, consumers were said to have well-developed views about the 
relative merits of different products. In qualitative interviews, three drug characteristics were 
reported to be associated with higher quality, and to command price premiums: the country of 
origin, packaging and brand name. Most antimalarials were manufactured in Tanzania, followed 
by other African countries (mainly Kenya), Asia (mainly India), with the smallest percentage 
coming from Europe (mainly Belgium and Italy). In general, those from Europe were perceived 
to be the highest quality. For example, one interviewee explained that British drugs were 
believed to be best, followed by those from Kenya, with Indian and Tanzanian products seen as 
the poorest quality. As with drug availability in general, private facilities had the highest 
proportion of European products (21% of products stocked), followed by drug stores (19%), 
compared with only 3% in general stores (Fable 8.5). Government facilities were particularly 
likely to have Tanzanian products, with more than half of all their antimalarials being 
domestically manufactured. 
Table 8.5 Proportion of drugs stocked having characteristics argued to be associated with 
high quality 
Antimalarials Antimalarial Painkiller SP tablets 
manufactured tablets tablets innovator 
in Europe 1%2 packaged %3 packaged %° brands (%5) 
Government 11 (13%) 1 (2%) 00 00 
facilities n=86 (n=49) n=33 n=19 
Private facilities 11(21%) 7 (20%) 4 (13%) 2(11%) 
n=53 n=35 n=32 n=19 
Commercial 39 (19%) 85 (67%) 52 (37%) 14 (23%) 
drug sho s (n=206) n=127 n=142 n=61 
General stores 1 (3%) 25 (76%) 484 (60%) 00 
n=37 n=33 n=811 n=2 
n--number of antimalarial products where country of manufacture was known 2 as a% of all antimalarials stocked 3 as a% of all antimalarial tablets stocked 4 as a% of all painkiller tablets stocked 3 as a% of all SP tablets stocked 
Source: Outlet Survey Nov/Dec 2001. 
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Tablets packaged in foil or paper were said to be perceived as more valuable than those sold 
loose. Packaged drugs were particularly rare in government facilities, representing only 2% of 
antimalarials (Table 8.5). Shops were much more likely to stock packaged items, which 
accounted for 67% of antimalarials in drug shops and 76% in general stores. Similar patterns 
were observed for painkiller tablets. 
Certain brands were reportedly viewed as of superior quality. For SP tablets the innovator 
brands of FansidarlM and MetakelfmTm were best known, and perceived as of higher qualitys. 
These brand names made up almost a quarter of SP products in drug shops, compared with 11 % 
in private facilities, and were never found in government facilities or general stores (Table 8.5). 
Other well-known brands were often imitated by other companies, who chose brand names, 
presentations and packaging very similar to the original product. For example, SmithKline 
Beecham in Kenya produced PanadoVTM (paracetamol) and CafenolTM (aspirin + caffeine), two 
leading painkiller brands, which had been imitated by a much less well-known Zambian firm 
with its two products, PanadoT"' and CafemoV . 
Shopkeepers argued that customers placed considerable weight on country of manufacture, 
packaging and brand in assessing product quality. However, the basic SP tablet content tests 
reported in Table 6.11 provided no evidence that these attributes were associated with better 
quality drugs. Many packaged and loose tablets were found to fail, as were products 
manufactured in Europe, including one innovator brand. 
8.2.4 Availability of Injections and Confirmed Diagnosis 
One might have expected facilities to attract custom through the provision of products/services 
that could not be provided in shops, notably antimalarial injections and malaria microscopy, but 
this type of non-price competition was never mentioned in qualitative interviews. This was not 
surprising as injectable antimalarials were at least as widely available in drug stores, being 
stocked by 80% of drug stores, compared with only 61% of government facilities (although they 
were stocked by all private facilities). All shopkeepers stated that they did not administer 
injections, and that patients had to go to the health facility to be injected. When pressed about 
what the patient would do if they needed an injection when the health facility was shut, one 
drug store said they might be able to help, and another said there was a local health worker who 
could assist. However, we did not see any evidence of drug stores providing injections on a 
routine basis. 
s innovator brands are those first authorised worldwide for marketing (normally as a patented product); 
such brands did not exist for other common antimalarials 
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Only 4 of the 18 government facilities and 5 of the 8 private facilities had functioning 
microscopy services, with no functioning services at all in the Ulanga DSS area. The most 
common reason for the lack of microscopy was that the facility did not have a microscope, with 
other problems being the lack of supplies and appropriate staff, and that the microscope did not 
work (Table 8.6). Even where facilities did offer microscopy, it was typically not provided on a 
routine basis for all suspected malaria cases, and the protocols on which patients should receive 
laboratory confirmation were unclear. There were no private laboratory services in the study 
sites6. 
Table 8.6 Reasons for lack of microscopy in public and private facilities 
n7-number of facilities without functioning microscopy') _ Facilities reporting 
n=17 facilities 
No microscope 7 (41%) 
No supplies for microsco 5 (29%) 
No laboratory staff 6 (35%) 
Microscope does not work 4 (24%) 
No electricity for microscope 1 (6%) 
Lack of appropriate building 1 (6%) 
Don't know / Not specified 3 (18%) 
Total responses 27 100% 
several interviewees gave more than one reason 
Source: Outlet Survey Nov/Dec 2001 
8.3 Staff Expertise 
Staff expertise was not said to be seen as crucial by all fever/malaria patients. Many participants 
in qualitative interviews commented that customers did not feel the need to visit a facility 
because malaria was common, they could self-diagnose, and knew which drugs they required. 
They therefore felt confident in obtaining treatment directly from shops. 
However, all interviewees from dispensaries and drug stores believed their expertise attracted 
custom, and some general storekeepers volunteered their lack of knowledge as a reason why 
customers preferred to go elsewhere. Variation across outlet type in perceived expertise was 
reflected in the agency roles played by staff. Household survey data showed that 100% of drugs 
obtained in government facilities were selected by the provider, and 91% in private facilities, 
compared with 47% in drug stores and less than 4% in general stores. 
In general stores the role of owner/manager/seller was combined and taken by one person, a 
husband and wife team, or group of men. Their reported agency roles were normally very 
6 although a private laboratory opened after the study in 2002 in Ulanga DSS, and there were several in 
Ifakara Town 
7Providers may act as an agent for the consumer, advising on appropriate health care demand if providers 
are perceived as better informed than their customers. 
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limited because in most cases customers knew what drugs they wanted, and general 
shopkeepers did not perceive themselves to have the expertise to provide advice. 
"Customers themselves come and ask for the drugs specifically. I depend on the drugs 
customers ask for. " General shopkeeper #5 
One general shopkeeper said persuading a customer to buy a different drug would be akin to 
persuading him to buy trousers instead of a shirt. When prompted, some said they would give 
advice on drug choice only if a customer requested it, or the drug they wanted was not available. 
They did not perceive themselves to have the expertise to advise on a regular basis: 
"The biggest sellers for these drugs are the drug stores, because most of us believe that the 
sellers there have education about drugs, so they sell more than we do. " General shopkeeper #12 
In drug stores the role of seller and owner was nearly always split. Owners rarely served in 
shops, but were responsible for stock choice, price setting and the purchase of supplies. The 
sellers manned the shop and perceived their expertise as important in attracting custom. 
Interviewer: "How do you attract more customers to come to your shop? " 
Drug store seller #16: "The fact that this is a drug store and the seller here has studied 
medicines, she is an expert. That is a sufficient criterion. " 
One seller encouraged this association by wearing a nurse's uniform to signal her expertise. 
Their agency role depended on the customer, but many clients requested advice, treating sellers 
with the respect due to medical experts. The seller often effectively took a short history, asking 
about the nature and duration of symptoms, the age of the patient, and which drugs had been 
used in the past, and then advised on drug choice and dosage. When a patient came with a cheti, 
the seller often explained it, and helped them prioritise if their money was insufficient. 
Customers reportedly visited health facilities in order to consult a daktari, which literally means 
doctor, but in this context referred to a range of lesser-qualified health-care workers. Health 
dispensary staff noted that patients visited them if they were still sick after taking shop-bought 
drugs, presumably because the greater expertise of a daktari was perceived to be required with 
treatment failures. Some drug stores were owned by a daktari, and their occasional presence 
was seen as a particular draw. 
Facility staff said that some patients asked for specific drugs, but that the final decision rested 
with the health care worker. By contrast in drug stores if a customer insisted on a certain drug, 
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the seller would give it to them. One seller said if a customer requested chloroquine, he would 
advise against it because of drug resistance, but if they insisted he would happily sell it, in the 
knowledge that he was using up his stock. 
These perceived differences in expertise across outlet type were reflected to some degree in 
provider knowledge and qualifications. Interaction during qualitative interviews showed that 
drug store staff were familiar with the drug categories of painkillers, antimalarials and 
antibiotics, and with common brands, and aware of antimalarial resistance and the change in 
first line drug. By contrast many general shopkeepers were unable to categorise the drugs they 
sold by generic type, and had not heard of the recent policy change nor its justification. Three 
general store interviewees had never even heard of SP. General shopkeepers also seemed easily 
influenced by brand names; for instance we were told that MifupenTM (aspirin + caffeine) was 
the best drug for body pains (mifupa means bones in KiSwahili). HedexTM was argued to be best 
for headaches, and MaraMojaTM, meaning immediately, was said to be particularly fast acting 
(both HedexTM and MaraMojaTM contain paracetamol + aspirin + caffeine). 
In terms of the qualifications of staff regularly serving customers, the results for facilities and 
drug stores were quite similar (Table 8.7). With the exception of one government dispensary, 
they all had at least one staff member with health qualifications. However, this did not imply 
that customers were always treated by a qualified person; the percentage of regular serving staff 
lacking health qualifications was 3% in drug shops, 17% in private facilities and 28% in 
government facilities. Government facilities also performed more poorly than private facilities 
and drug stores in terms of total years of education, with a median of 12 years in private 
facilities, 11 in drug stores, and 8 in government facilities. Of those with health-related 
qualifications, staff in private facilities on average had the most training, with a mean of 2.8 
years, compared with 2.7 years in government facilities (both having a median of 2.0 years). 
The mean was 1.4 in drug shops, where most staff were Nurse Assistants, with one year's 
training. More than a quarter of drug shop owners had no health-related qualifications. 
Education levels were much lower in general stores, with a median of seven years total 
education. While 83% of general stores had a member of staff serving regularly with at least 
primary education, only 14% had one with more than primary education, and none had a regular 
server with health qualifications. Thirty general store staff regularly serving customers (11%) 
had no education at all. It has been argued that general stores are frequently staffed by children, 
but we found this to be rare. Only II children under 16 years served regularly, and 11 
occasionally (4.2% of regularly serving staff and 2.7% of all serving staff for whom age was 
known). 
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ed customers' 
% of shops with at least one staff member % staff Of staff 
regularly serving customers with: regularly regularly 
serving serving 
customers customers 
with: with health 
qualifications: 
At least More than Any health Any health Mean years of 
primary primary qualification qualification health training 
education education 
Government 18 (100%) 17 (94%) 17 (94%) 70 (72%) 2.7 
facilities n=18 n=18 n=18 n=97 n=66 
Private facilities 8 (100%) 8 (100%) 8 (100%) 40 (83%) 2.8 
n=8 n=8 n=8 n=48 n=38 
Commercial 30 (100%) 29 (100%) 30 (100%) 36 (97%) 1.4 
drug shop n=30 n=29 n=30 n=37 n=34 
General stores 171 (83%) 27 (14%) 00 00 n/a 
n=205 n=191 n=236 n=265 
' variations in n reflect the number of interviewees able to supply the relevant information 
Source: Outlet Survey Nov/Dec 2001 
Staff expertise was also evaluated through shopkeeper knowledge of the correct dose of 
chloroquine and SP tablets for a2 year old child in shops where these drugs were stocked8 
(Table 8.8). Knowledge was deemed correct if interviewees knew both the total number of 
tablets required and the timing of the dose9. No general store interviewees gave the correct dose 
of either drug. Knowledge was better in drug shops, but although most drug store staff had 
health qualifications, only 27% gave the correct chloroquine dose and 42% the correct dose of 
SP. Better performance for SP may have reflected the influence of promotional materials 
distributed at the time of the policy change. In general, confusion was greatest over the number 
of tablets, reflecting over-doses in all 15 of the incorrect chloroquine responses, but under-doses 
in 10 of the 13 incorrect SP answers. Knowledge was better in Rufiji District than in Kilombero 
or Ulanga for the SP dose (although not significantly so), but not for chloroquine, perhaps 
reflecting that some seminars for drug store staff on the policy change to SP had been held in 
Rufiji. 
9 Not evaluated at facilities. 9 For chloroquine, one to two 250mg tablets over a three-day period (Ministry of Health 1997); for SP, 
one 500/25mg tablet in a single dose (Ministry of Health 2000). 
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Table 8.8 Knowledge of antimalarial doses for a two-year-old by interviewees in shops 
stocking chloroquine and/or SP tablets 
Chloro uine SP 
n % specifying correct dose n % specifying correct dose 
No. of 
tablets 
Timing of 
dose 
Both 
correct 
No. of 
tablets 
Timing 
of dose 
Both 
correct 
Commercial 
drug sho s 
11 3 (27%) 11(100%) 3 (27%) 26 13 (50%) 21 (81%) 11 (42%) 
General 
stores 
10 2 (20%) 4 (40%) 0(-) 2 2 (100%) 0(-) 0(-) 
' excludes 10 general store interviewees who said chloroquine tablets should not be sold for a child of this age 
because the drug or formulation was inappropriate or because the child should see a doctor or be weighed first. 2 excludes one commercial drug shop where the interviewee said they would not give SP tablets to a child of this age 
Source: Outlet Survey Nov/Dec 2001. 
8.4 Convenience 
Providers gave several reasons why shops were nearly always more convenient than facilities. 
Firstly, people were said to prefer nearer outlets and, as general shops were much more 
numerous and widely dispersed, they were usually the closest source of drugs, and the only 
source in remote farming areas. Population ratios indicate clearly the relative accessibility of 
drug retailers and general stores in particular, with one general retailer stocking drugs for every 
262 people, compared with one drug store for every 4386, and one health facility for every 5198 
(Table Al. 9). The data from the household survey showed that 63% of households could reach a 
general store stocking drugs within 15 minutes, compared with only 27% for government 
facilities, 24% for drug shops, and 12% for private facilities (Table 8.9). Painkillers were 
therefore available very close to the home for most people, and some smaller general stores 
even relocated temporarily to remote farming areas during the main cultivation months. 
Table 8.9 Travel time to nearest outlet of each type reported by household heads 
No. of 
households 
<15 
minutes 
Not aware 
15-60 1-2 hours >2 hours of any 
minutes outlet of 
this type 
Government 
facilities 
Private 
facilities 
Commercial 
4i: u shops 
General 
stores 
1060 
1055 
1047 
1053 
282 (27%) 
122(12%) 
251(24%) 
659 (63%) 
Source: Household Survey May-Sep 2001. 
493 (47%) 
382 (36%) 
447(43%) 
271 (26%) 
184(17%) 
221 (21%) 
186 (18%) 
21(2%) 
101 (10%) 
184 (17%) 
116 (11%) 
5 (0.5%) 
00 
146 (14%) 
47 (4%) 
97 (9%) 
However, as general stores rarely stocked antimalarials, longer average journeys to drug stores 
or facilities would have been required to obtain these drugs. Travel time did not give drug stores 
a comparative advantage over facilities; times were very similar, and in fact government 
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facilities were reachable within an hour for a slightly higher proportion of the population. The 
similarity in travel times was not unexpected as government facilities and drug stores were 
roughly equal in number and drug stores tended to locate close to facilities. However, other 
factors were argued to make both drug and general stores more convenient than facilities. 
Service in shops was quick, while visiting facilities was perceived to be highly time-consuming, 
as there were long waiting times and patients had to go through the many time-consuming steps 
of registration, consultation, lab tests (in some facilities), prescription and dispensing. 
"There is a queue there (at the government health centre). One can go in the morning and not get 
treatment till 2pm. " Drug store seller #9 
This was clearly demonstrated by household survey data on the time customers spent at outlets 
in order to obtain treatment (Table 8.10). General stores were the quickest with 98% spending 
less than 15 minutes, and service was also fast in drug shops with 85% within 15 minutes and 
98% within an hour. By contrast, 40% of visits to government facilities and 38% to private 
facilities took over an hour. 
Table 8.10 Time spent at outlet to obtain treatment during provider visits for 
fever/malaria (excluding travel time) 
Number of 
provider 
visits 
<15 minutes 15-60 
minutes 
1-2 hours >2 hours 
Government facilities 143 22(15%) 64(45%) 23(16%) 34(24%) 
Private facilities 42 7(17%) 19(45%) 8(19%) 8(19%) 
Commercial drug shops 162 138 85% 20(12%) 2(1%) 2(1%) 
General stores 173 170 (98%) 3 (2%) 00 00 
ource: Household Survey May-Sep 2001. 
Shop opening hours were much longer than those for facilities (Table 8.11). All outlets opened 
every weekday, but less than half the facilities opened on both Saturday and Sunday compared 
with all drug shops and nearly all general stores. Typically facilities were open from 7: 30am till 
3.30pm, drug stores from 7.30/8am to 9pm, and general stores from 6/7am to 9pm. As one 
general shopkeepers said: 
"Some customers come back from the fields late, at 7.30 or 8pm, but if they come here they'll 
still be in time. " General shopkeeper #1 
The median number of hours open per week was more than twice as high in drug shops as in 
facilities. General stores were open for longer than drug stores, with the median 7 hours higher 
per week. 
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Table 8.11 Opening hours of providers 
n Open both Saturday 
and Sunday 
Median number of hours 
open per week 
Government facilities 18 8(44%) 40 
Private facilities 8 4(50%) 44 
Commercial drug shops 30 30(100%) 91 
General stores 213 210(99%) 98 
Source: Outlet Survey Nov/Dec 2001. 
Shops can also be more convenient because other people can make the visit on the patient's 
behalf. The patients themselves did not travel to the provider in 68% of visits to general stores 
and 49% to drug stores, but only 14% to private facilitiesi0 and one visit (0.7%) to government 
facilities. Moreover, for 15% of general shops visits, only a child was sent to buy treatment 
(compared with 2% at drug stores, and zero at facilities). 
8.5 Strategies to Increase Affordability 
Many sellers cited credit as an important strategy for attracting business, with careseekers 
argued to choose shops where they were known as regular customers, who were trusted, 
believed to have the means to repay, and could be followed up if they defaulted. 
It might be assumed that shops were more likely to offer credit than facilities, but we found no 
significant difference across outlet type. Staff reported offering credit to fever/malaria patients 
at 57% of government facilities charging fees and 75% of private facilities, compared with 57% 
of drug stores and 60% of general stores. General shops were more likely to offer credit if they 
were unlicensed, located off a main road, or in farming areas. 
However, household survey data showed that credit was very rarely obtained in practice, being 
received for only five of the recorded visits (less than 1%), 4 of which were to drug shops (2 
from households in the better-off SES third, 2 in the poorest third), and 1 to a government 
facility (in the better-off third). This leads to the conclusion that in practice credit was not an 
important point of competition for uncomplicated fever/malaria patients. Another potential 
strategy to increase affordability, payment-in-kind, was never volunteered by interviewees as 
important. Only one incident of payment-in-kind was recorded in the household survey, which 
was a supplementary payment to government facility staff in addition to cash payments for drug 
and non-drug fees. 
A more common strategy for improving affordability may be to provide a less than complete 
drug dose, or just painkillers. As described in Chapter 6, household survey data showed that 
10 all visits to one private facility which also (illicitly) acted as a drug store 
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painkillers only were obtained at 33% of visits to drug stores and 85% to general stores (Table 
6.5). Of antimalarials purchased at shops, 29% were under-doses at drug stores and 50% at 
general stores (Table A1.15), although it was not clear whether this reflected poor customer 
and/or seller knowledge or problems of affordability. Although interviewees did not raise under- 
dosing as a way of attracting customers, when prompted they agreed it was common in both 
drug and general stores, but private dispensary staff said they insisted on providing a full dose. 
Only one drug store seller said they would not sell an under-dose, but this applied to painkillers 
only, and was to reduce the need for small change, rather than to ensure treatment efficacy! All 
other shops were happy to sell any number of tablets; customers bought as much as they could 
afford at the time, with no guarantee that they would return for the rest. 
8.6 Consumer Relations 
Finally, sellers in all types of outlet considered good relations with their customers to be key to 
increasing demand. They emphasised that people visited outlets where staff were welcoming 
and spoke warmly and pleasantly, and that they frequented the shops of their friends and 
relatives, or those where they were well-known. Once customers had established such a local 
and regular outlet they tended to come back repeatedly. 
"You know, the customer is like any beast you keep, once he is accustomed to something it is 
very difficult to change him. " General shopkeeper # 12 
8.7 Summarising Non-Price Characteristics by Outlet Type 
The relative performance of the four outlet types across 8 key non-price characteristics is shown 
in Figure 8.2, with outlet types ranked from 4 (best) to 1 (worst) on each characteristic. The 
characteristics selected were those highlighted as important during qualitative work, which 
could be quantified across outlet type. They could therefore be considered as quantifiable 
proxies for perceived quality. The characteristics comprise two elements of drug availability 
(number of antimalarial products stocked, and stock reliability), two proxies/signals for 
perceived drug quality (percentage of antimalarials manufactured in Europe and percentage of 
fever/malaria products packaged), two proxies for staff expertise (percentage of serving staff 
with health qualifications, and mean years of health-related training), and two measures of 
convenience (travel time to nearest outlet and weekly opening hours). A number of limitations 
of this presentation should be noted: the selection may exclude other important non-price factors 
(e. g. potential to buy a sub-optimal dose; availability of microscopy); the measures may not 
capture the proxies most frequently used by customers to determine perceived quality; and the 
relative weighting of these characteristics is likely to be unequal, and to vary across consumers. 
155 
Figure 8.2 Ranking by outlet type on key dimensions of non-price competition 
Government Facilities Private Facilities 
AM range AM range 
Ta 4 
Opening hrs 3 /Stock reliability Opening hrs /A lock reliability 
Travel time -ý--ý % AM European Travel time º--a--+- % AM European 
Yrs health training 
l% 
drugs packaged Yrs health training % drugs packaged 
% staff wRh health qual. 
Drug Shops 
AM range 
4 
staff with health qual. 
General Shops 
Opening hrs c -4., . Stock reliability 
Opening hrcc 3t,. Stock reliability 
21 i ,t/ Travel Limo 1: -i, W-" w/ AM Fiimnaan Travel time _ its % AM European . ....... ....... .. ý. ^` .. ý-... . .... ý... ý 
Yrs health training drugs packaged 
staff with health qual. 
Kev to FiLyure 8.2 
°ý staff with health qual. 
Characteristic Definition Source 
AM (Antimalarial) range Median number of antimalarial products Outlet Survey (Table 8.1) 
stocked 
Stock reliability I- (average stockout rate) for aspirin, Outlet Survey (Table 8.4) 
paracetamol and SP tablets 
% AM (antimalarial) European products as percentage of all Outlet Survey (Table 8.5) 
European antimalarial products stocked 
__ % drugs packaged Packaged products as percentage of all Outlet Survey (Table 8.5) 
fever/malaria tablet products stocked 
% staff with health qual. Percentage of staff often serving Outlet Survey (Table 8.7) 
customers who have a health qualification 
Yrs health training Mean years of health-related training of Outlet Survey (Table 8.7) 
staff often serving customers who have a 
health qualification 
Travel time Percentage of households reporting that Household Survey (Table 8.9) 
the nearest outlet of this type can be 
reached in under an hour 
Opening hours Median number of hours open per week Outlet Survey (Table 8.11) 
156 
Figure 8.2 shows that private facilities performed best on the drug measures, and were also 
strong on staff expertise, but weak on convenience. Drug stores came second on all drug 
measures. Bearing in mind that private facilities were not easily accessible for all DSS residents, 
drug stores were likely to be the best local fever/malaria drug source for many people. Of all 
outlet types, customers at drug stores were most likely to be served by someone with a health- 
related qualification, although their average years of training was less than qualified facility 
staff. The characteristics of general stores were very different from drug stores; in terms of drug 
availability and staff expertise drug stores had much more in common with facilities than with 
general stores. General stores excelled on convenience, but performed worst on all other 
measures, except proportion of drug products packaged. Their high proportion of packaged 
products may have reflected their low sales volumes which did not justify purchasing the pack 
sizes in which loose tablets were sold, or less access to wholesale supplies of loose products, 
which were officially intended for pharmacy or facility use only. Government facilities were 
worst or second worst on most criteria, only coming second on mean years of health training, 
and travel time, and were not first on any criteria. If customers valued each of these criteria 
equally, government facilities would have the lowest overall valuation of the four outlet types. 
The combined influence of product range and perceived staff expertise led to a distinction 
between drug and general stores in the nature of the treatment sellers perceived themselves to 
supply. Although several general stores stocked antimalarials, during qualitative interviews all 
said they provided only first-aid (huduma za kwanza), by which they meant the relief of fever, 
headache and stomach ache usually with common painkillers and anti-acids. By contrast, drug 
store interviewees said they provided both first-aid and complete treatments/cures (tiba kabisa). 
However, no drug or general shopkeepers reported treating severe cases of fever/malaria, and all 
stated that if they did get such a patient they would direct them to a health facility. 
Distinctions across outlet type conceal some variation within types. For example, general stores 
varied between those with several fever/malaria products including antimalarials, operating out 
of permanent well-established shops, to roadside stalls with just the odd painkiller. Some drug 
stores were owned by a respected health worker, and had a very wide range of drugs, with over 
a dozen antimalarial products, while others had just a handful of items, and a minimally trained 
nurse assistant. However, the evidence showed much more variation between outlet types than 
within them. 
A key dimension of provider conduct and competition not included in Figure 8.2 is price, which 
we now turn to in Chapter 9. 
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CHAPTER 9 
PRICING AND PRICE COMPETITION 
9.1 Introduction 
Chapter 8 highlighted the key dimensions of non-price competition in the market for 
fever/malaria treatment. However, in a community of poor consumers, where obtaining care is 
mainly based on out-of-pocket payment, price is likely to be a key factor affecting treatment 
choice. This chapter explores the second key dimension of provider conduct, pricing and price 
competition, which is central to an analysis of the nature of competition (Objective 2 of the 
thesis). 
The chapter describes the prices of antimalarial and painkiller drugs, and sources of price 
variation, and investigates the intensity of price competition. Background information on the 
presentation of price data is provided in Section 9.2. Section 9.3 compares median prices for 
each antimalarial and painkiller across outlet type. The implications for total patient expenditure 
by outlet type are discussed, taking into account the additional non-drug fees charged at many 
facilities. 
The subsequent sections assess the intensity of price competition faced by retailers. The extent 
of price competition is closely linked with the location of the market on the monopoly-perfect 
competition continuum. Under perfect competition firms cannot raise price above marginal cost, 
and are price-takers, all charging the same market price for a given product. Under monopolistic 
or oligopolistic competition price may exceed marginal cost because each provider has some 
market power. 
In a market characterised by strong price competition one would therefore expect shopkeepers 
to report little or no leeway in setting their prices, and to see relatively low retail markups, and 
uniform prices for a given product. These hypotheses are tested in Sections 9.4,9.5 and 9.6. 
Section 9.4 describes the price setting behaviour reported by retailers themselves during 
qualitative interviews. Their responses are analysed to assess whether they view themselves as 
price-takers or as having discretion over the prices they set. In Section 9.5 gross markups for 
antimalarials and painkillers are evaluated. Two measures of markups are employed: total 
markups over international reference prices, and retail markups over wholesale costs. Markups 
which appear excessive compared with suggested benchmarks are argued to be potential 
indicators of market power. In Section 9.6 price variation for given products is analysed to 
assess whether common market prices exist. 
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Substantial diversion from the competitive model is indicated by the analysis in Sections 9.5 
and 9.6. A range of possible explanations are considered, including geographical segmentation, 
high concentration, product differentiation and collusion. Finally, in Section 9.7, a statistical 
analysis of drug prices is presented, using OLS regression to investigate the relative importance 
of product characteristics, outlet characteristics and market concentration on retail prices. 
9.2 Reporting Price Data 
Data on antimalarial and painkiller drug prices were drawn from the outlet survey. In presenting 
price data, the aim was to facilitate comparison across products and outlet types. 
Prices are generally summarised by their median because of the skewed nature of much of the 
price data. Median prices were not weighted by sales levels, and therefore indicate the average 
price faced by consumers, not the average price paid. In many cases outlets stock more than one 
product in each generic category, and the most relevant price for comparing affordability across 
outlet type may therefore be the average minimum price rather than median price. However, 
comparing average minimum prices by outlet type made very little difference to relative prices 
for antimalarials or painkillers, so the analysis was conducted on the median price alone. 
As described in the outlet survey methods (Section 5.4.6), antimalarial costs have been 
calculated as the purchase required in order to treat a two-year-old child, as a key measure for 
affordability and public health (with syrups and injections costed at the price for a whole bottle 
or vial/ampoule, as it was not usually possible to purchase less in shops). As there was no fixed 
dose for common painkillers, prices are compared per tablet or bottle. 
Price variation was explored in more detail for the most common antimalarials and painkillers. 
The four most common antimalarial products were the tablet formulations of SP, amodiaquine, 
chloroquine and quinine, which together made up over 95% of total antimalarial volumes and 
values. The most common painkillers were the tablet forms of aspirin, paracetamol, 
aspirin+caffeine, and aspirin+paracetamol+caffeine. 
As the sample was stratified by DSS system, and drug observations may be clustered within 
outlets, standard tests for significant differences between medians, such as the Wilcoxon Rank 
Sum test, are not valid. Statistical significance is therefore explored through regression analysis. 
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9.3 Average Prices by Provider Type 
Table 9.1 a shows median prices of antimalarials by outlet type. Of the antimalarial tablets, 
chloroquine was the cheapest and quinine the most expensive at all outlet types. For example, in 
drug stores, amodiaquine was ten times the price of chloroquine, SP more than 12 times, and 
quinine 55 times. Syrup and injectable formulations were considerably more expensive than 
tablet formulations of the same drug. 
Median prices for common painkillers are shown in Table 9.1bß. The cheapest per tablet was 
generally aspirin, followed by paracetamol. Combinations of aspirin and caffeine, or aspirin, 
paracetamol and caffeine were considerably more expensive. 
For all antimalarials which they supplied, the three government facilities which reported 
charging drug fees had the lowest median price. Moreover the table excludes the remaining 15 
government facilities which did not report charging for drugs, emphasising that on average 
government facilities should be the cheapest source in terms of antimalarial costs. Drug stores 
tended to be more expensive than private facilities, with higher median prices for 7 of the 10 
antimalarials. The relative prices of general stores compared with facilities and drug stores did 
not follow a clear pattern, although the scope for comparison was limited by the small number 
of observations. For chloroquine tablets, the most frequently stocked antimalarial in general 
stores, the median price was significantly higher in general stores than in all other outlet types. 
Similarly for painkillers, reported prices from government facilities were the cheapest or equal 
cheapest source for the two products they stocked. The median prices for private facilities, drug 
stores and general stores were similar, although private facilities had higher prices for aspirin 
tablets. 
I excluding junior versions of painkillers as the quantity of active ingredient differs from the regular 
versions. 
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Table 9.1 Antimalarial and painkiller prices by outlet type (Tsh) 
(a) Median price of antimalarial purchase required to treat a two-year-old child 
(n=number of products identified) 
Government 
facility with 
drug fees' 
Private 
facility 
Commercial 
drug store 
General store 
n Median n Median n Median n Median 
Tablets 
SP 2 68 19 200 61 250 2 150 
Amodia uine 1 126 4 140 31 200 7 200 
Chloroquine 4 14 1 20 10 20 23 60 
Quinine 1 275 8 550 22 1100 1 440 
Syrup 
SP 0 - 1 800 9 1500 0 - 
Amodiauine 0 - 2 575 18 1000 1 1000 
Chloro uine 3 125 3 300 9 700 2 725 
Quinine 0 - 1 2000 10 2000 0 - 
Injectables 
Chloro uine 0 - 1 800 8 700 1 500 Quinine 0 - 9 300 23 500 1 700 
(b) Median price of common painkillers per tablet / bottle 
(n = number of products identified) 
Government 
facility with 
drug feesi 
Private 
facility 
Commercial 
drug store 
General store 
n Median n Median n Median n Median 
Tablets 
Aspirin 3 5 8 8 34 5 206 5 
Paracetamol 3 5 9 10 41 10 290 10 
Aspirin + 
Caffeine 
0 - 0 - 6 45 77 35 
Aspirin + 
Caffeine + 
Paracetamol 
0 - 0 13 40 208 40 
Syrup 
Paracetamol 0-4 500 44 500 5 400 
'price data are for the 3 government facilities which reported charging for drugs; the remaining 15 government 
facilities reported providing drugs for free. If all government facilities were included, the median price was zero for 
all antimalarials and painkillers. 
Source: Outlet Survey Nov-Dec 2001. 
Although facility antimalarial prices were generally lower than those in drug stores, total 
expenditure per patient would in some cases have been higher, as in many facilities consumers 
paid non-drug fees for registration, consultation, laboratory tests or contributions for kerosene, 
in addition to fees for drugs. Table 9.2 shows the fee charging practices reported by government 
and private facilities. No fees were reported by staff at any government facilities in Rufiji, nor at 
the two health centres in Kilombero and Ulanga. All Kilombero dispensaries reported charging 
drug and non-drug fees, and all Ulanga dispensaries non-drug fees only. Of these 7 dispensaries 
in Kilombero/Ulanga, 6 reported providing exemptions to the poor, 5 to the disabled, 2 to under 
fives, and one each to schoolchildren, the elderly, and the seriously ill. All private facilities 
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reported charging for drugs, and half reported charging non-drug fees as well. For facilities 
charging non-drug fees, the median fee for an adult outpatient with fever/malaria was reported 
to be Tsh 100 in government facilities and Tsh 500 in private facilities (Table 9.2). In addition, 
patients were required to make the one-off purchase of an exercise book for their health records 
in 14 of the government facilities and 4 of the private facilities, which cost Tsh 50-100 in local 
shops. 
Table 9.2 Fee char2ina policies reported by facility staff 
Government Private facilities 
facilities 
Number of facilities 18 8 
Drug fees charged 3 8 
Non-drug fees charged 7 4 
Median (range) non-drug fees for adult Tsh 100 Tsh 500 
outpatient for fever/malaria where non-drug (Tsh 50-400) (Tsh 200-1100) 
fees are charged 
Facilities requiring patients to bring exercise 14 4 
book for health records (cost Tsh50-100 in 
local sho s 
Source: Outlet Survey Nov-Dec 2001 
However for government facilities, actual practices documented during the household survey 
were rather different (Table 9.3). Although no government facility staff reported charging fees 
in Rufiji, 20% of visits to government facilities were reported by households to have incurred 
non-drug fees, at 6 different facilities, with a median charge of Tsh 60. Drug fees were not 
reported by consumers at Rufiji government facilities. However, they were reported in 33% of 
visits in Ulanga, and 37% in Kilombero, including the health centres in each district, although 
the Kilombero health centre, and all government facilities in Ulanga, claimed not to charge for 
drugs. Although patients over five years were more likely to be charged fees than children under 
five (62% compared with 38%), charging for children was still common, including one facility 
which stated during the outlet survey that under fives were exempt. 
In sum, fee charging policies of facilities were extremely varied and, even where care was 
officially free, unofficial non-drug and drug fees were commonly charged. However, 
government drug and non-drug fees paid remained considerably lower than those at private 
facilities. Non-drug fees in private facilities meant that, of all facility and shop types, the total 
treatment cost would usually have been highest at these outlets, more than compensating for any 
higher antimalarial prices in shops. Although government facilities had free drugs, or the 
cheapest reported drug prices where they charged, this advantage would have been partially or 
totally cancelled out by the payment of non-drug fees in many cases. Moreover, variability in 
unofficial charges and exemption implementation was likely to have led to considerable 
uncertainty among consumers about the full prices they would face. 
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Table 9.3 Facility fees paid by patients reporting fever/malaria -7 Kilombero 
DSS 
Ulanga I 
DSS 
Rufiji 
DSS 
Total T 
Government facility visits 
35 30 81 146 
Paid drug fees % 13(37%) 10(33%) 00 2306%) 
Paid non-drug fees % 15(52%) 14(50%) 16(20%) 45(33%) 
Median (range) drug fees (when 
drug fees charged) 
Tsh 200 
(60-1150) 
Tsh 100 
(50-1000) 
n/a Tsh 100 
(50-1150) 
Median (range) non-drug fees 
(when non-drug fees charged) 
Tsh 100 
(50-550) 
Tsh 100 
(50-250) 
Tsh 60 
(50-100) 
Tsh 100 
50-550 
Private facility visits 
n 19 8 14 41 
Paid drug fees (%) 11(58%) 4(50%) 1(7%) 16(39%) 
Paid non-drug fees % 3(16%) 1(17%) 3(50%) 7(23%) 
Median (range) drug fees (when 
drug fees charged) 
Tsh 220 
(50-3000) 
Tsh 380 
(140-800) 
Tsh 1000 Tsh 380 
50-3000 
Median (range) non-drug fees 
when non-drug fees charged) 
Tsh 300 
0) 
Tsh 1500 
0 
Tsh 950 
(100-5000) 
Tsh 400 
100-5000 
' visits to facilities within the DSS areas. 
2 excludes 6 visits in Kilombero and 2 in Ulanga where respondent did not know if non-drug fees were paid. 3 excludes 8 visits in Rufiji and 2 in Ulanga where respondent did not know if non-drug fees were paid. 
Source: Household Survey May-Sep 2001. 
The remainder of the chapter assesses prices in drug and general stores in more detail, exploring 
price setting, sources of variation, and the intensity of price competition. The focus is on 
retailers because the potential at facilities for cross-subsidisation between drug and non-drug 
costs complicates the interpretation of drug prices. 
Under intense price competition one would expect shopkeepers to perceive themselves as price- 
takers, retail markups to be low, and prices for given products to be uniform. These three 
hypotheses are tested below. 
9.4 Price Setting in the Retail Sector 
This section uses qualitative interview data to investigate how shopkeepers themselves 
perceived their price-setting behaviour. When asked how they set their retail drug prices, nearly 
all shopkeepers said they selected prices themselves, based on their wholesale costs. When 
asked how they chose their retail markups, they said prices were based on those charged by 
similar shopkeepers, indicating that they viewed themselves as price-takers. They were slightly 
less sure about the comparability of prices with outlets of other types, but reported that prices 
were the same for all neighbouring outlets of a given type, even for those located some distance 
from the main road. Any variation was said to lead to complaints from well-informed, price- 
sensitive customers. 
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"If you add a high profit customers will flee and buy elsewhere. If you are any different you will 
end up with nothing. " General shopkeeper #3 
Recommended retail prices (RRP) from manufacturers and distributors were rare for drugs, 
although this practice was common for other products such as cigarettes and soft drinks. RRP 
were reported for drugs from two neighbouring general stores only, purchased from a mobile 
distributor, and were never said to be passed on by static wholesalers2. 
Although shopkeepers generally said retail prices were fixed, they occasionally reported varying 
the price of drugs, as a function of the quantity purchased (second-degree price discrimination), 
or the characteristics of the purchaser (third-degree discrimination). Second-degree price 
discrimination was reported to take place in just over half the shops, either at large general 
shops where discounts were given to customers buying wholesale for their smaller outlets, or to 
any retail customer buying several different drugs or many tablets. Some traders said they used 
the zawadi (gift) custom of giving one or two extra tablets, in the way they might for a purchase 
of tomatoes or sweets. In terms of third-degree discrimination, all drug store interviewees and 
about half of those in general stores said they gave discounts or free drugs to poor customers. 
However, it seems likely that social desirability bias influenced these responses, especially as 
interviewees often only said that they gave such discounts after considerable probing. What is 
clear is that any third-degree discrimination was ad hoc, and for a few isolated cases. 
As described above, shopkeepers described a market with a high degree of price competition. If 
this were the case, one would expect to see uniform prices across retailers, and low retail 
markups, indicating that prices were close to marginal cost. These hypotheses are investigated 
below. 
9.5 Price Markups in the Retail Sector 
Under intense price competition one would expect to find low retail markups. This section 
evaluates the level of markups using two methods. Firstly, total markups are reported over 
international reference prices (IRPs), and secondly, retail markups are reported over wholesale 
costs. 
Total markups of average shop prices over IRPs are shown in Table 9.4 and Figure 9.1. IRPs 
were based on the median supplier price per tablet/capsule from the International Drug Price 
Indicator Guide, 2001 (Management Sciences for Health 2001). IRP were reported for loose 
2 other data collection by the author has found that RRP were used to some degree further up the 
distribution chain. 
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tablets. As packaging costs vary, a range of 5-25% was added to estimate IRPs for packaged 
drugs;. Total markups were generally high; only loose chloroquine in drug stores, and loose 
quinine in general stores, had overall markups under 100%. The retail price for loose SP tablets 
was almost six times the IRP, and for packaged tablets, 9 to 10 times. For amodiaquine the retail 
price of packaged and loose tablets was 4 to 6 times the LRP. In several cases we observed local 
wholesale prices lower than the IRP, e. g. loose chloroquine at a wholesale price of Tsh 3.5 per 
tablet, compared with an IRP of Tsh 7.1. This may reflect the small number of suppliers 
included in the IRP estimates4. It implies that the drugs stocked came from a cheaper source 
than those used in the IRP calculation, and total markups were therefore even higher in practice. 
There is no standard rule of thumb for an appropriate total markup, but Srinivasen argues that a 
250% markup over the government tender prices should be seen as "very liberal", and for an 
off-patent medicine a total markup over IRP greater than 100% has been described as a cause 
for concern (Srinivasan 1999; WHO & HAI 2003). 
Table 9.4 Average total markups in shops (median shop retail price over median IRP 
EU per tablet' 
(Tsh) 
Total markup over IRP2 
Drugstores Generalstores 
Antimalarial tab lets 
Loose SP 21.5 599% 599% 
Chlor uine 7.1 40% 111% 
Amodia uine 13.9 621% - 
Quinine 25.4 175% 57% 
Packaged SP 22.5-26.8 899%-1089% - 
Chlorouine 7.5-8.9 - 293%-368% 
Amodia uine 14.6-17.3 477%-586% 477%-586% 
uinine 26.7-31.8 214%-274% - 
Painkiller tablets 
Loose As pinn 1.5 238% 103% 
Paracetamol 2.7 273% 273% 
Packaged Aspirin 1.6-1.9 1522%-1831% 1251%-1509% 
Paracetamol 2.8-3.4 496%-610% 1093%-1320% 
'Loose Tablets: Median supplier price per tablet/capsule, International Drug Price Indicator Guide, 2001; Packaged 
Tablets: IRP for loose tablets plus 5% - 25% to cover packaging costs; converted using an exchange rate of $1=Tsh925 (htt2: //www. oanda. com for I' Dec 2001). 2 total markup of median retail prices from Outlet Survey over IRP. 3 IRP were not available for combination painkillers. 
Source: Outlet Survey Nov-Dec 2001 and International Drug Price Indicator Guide, 2001 
3 pers. comm.: Julie McFadyen, Management Sciences for Health; Ian Boulton, GlaxoSmithKline 
46 for SP, quinine and paracetamol, 5 for aspirin, 2 for chloroquine, and I for amodiaquine 
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Figure 9.1 Average ratio of retail prices to IRPs for antimalarials in commercial drug 
shops 
14 ,- 
12 
i Chloroquine Quinine Loose Tablets Amodiaquine SP Quinine Amodiaquine SP Packaged Tablets Source: Table 9.4 
Retail markups form part of total markups and are the component most likely to be influenced 
by local competitive conditions. Data on retail markups over wholesale prices for common 
antimalarial and painkiller tablets were assembled from two sources. Firstly, data on wholesale 
purchase prices and retail sale prices were obtained during qualitative interviews from 9 general 
stores and 2 drug stores (n=56 products) (Source A). As we found knowledge of wholesale 
purchase prices to be poor among interviewees, this method was not used for the outlet survey. 
Instead wholesale prices were collected from wholesalers, and retail prices from retailers, and 
median wholesale and retail prices compared (Source B). Data collection from 11 general sub- 
wholesalers, which mainly supplied general stores, was undertaken at the time of the outlet 
survey (n=50 wholesale price observations). Data collection from drugs wholesalers (mainly 
supplying drug stores) was delayed for logistical reasons and did not take place until 
September/October 2002 (8 drugs wholesalers; n=200 wholesale price observations). The delay 
of 10 months between retail and wholesale price data collection makes estimation of these 
markups less robust. 
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rkuns over wholesale drug costs in shops 
Uru Stores General Stores 
Data Source AB AB 
Antimalarial tablets 
Loose SP - - - - 
Chlorouine 167% - - - 
Amodia uine - 669% - - 
Quinine - 150% - - 
Packaged SP 100% 436% - - 
Chlorouine - - 29% 
Amodia uine 504% 270% 16% - 
Quinine - 203% - - 
Painkiller tablets 
Loose Aspirin 410% 355% 233% 67% 
Paracetamol 208% 335% 233% 100% 
Packaged Aspirin - 400% 117% 16% 
Paracetamol - 186% 17% 18% 
Aspirin+Caffeine 118% 200% 106% 33% 
Aspirin+Caffeine+ 
Paracetamol 
- 8% 25% 40% 
Sources: 
A- Qualitative Interviews Aug-Sep 2001 - retail and wholesale purchase prices reported by retailers 
B- Outlet Survey Nov-Dec 2001 - retail prices reported by retailers and wholesale prices reported by wholesalers 
(wholesale prices were collected at the time of the Outlet Survey for general wholesalers, but 10 months later for 
drug wholesalers). 
It is clear from Table 9.5 that retail markups were highly variable within shop type, both across 
data sources and across drugs. There was no evidence of a standard percentage markup, and in 
fact markups appeared quite ad hoc, with no indication that there was a systematic difference 
between antimalarials and painkillers. In general, retail markups were high. The majority of 
drugs had retail markups of more than 50% over wholesale prices, and for two-thirds the 
estimates exceeded 100%. There was an indication that markups were higher in drug stores, 
with a mean estimate for drug stores across data sources of 312% for antimalarials and 278% for 
painkillers, compared with 23% and 84% respectively in general stores. One drug store had 
markups of 233% for chloroquine tablets, 300% for quinine injections, and 669% for aspirin 
tablets. As with overall markups, there is no standard appropriate retail markup, but as a point of 
reference, gross retail markups averaged 25% in the US during much of the 20th-century 
(Larson and Rosen 2002). A request on the e-drug listserve for information on retail markups 
elicited responses for developing countries of between 25% and 50% as the level recommended 
by pharmaceutical companies or governments5. 
There are a number of possible explanations for these high markups. It is possible that they 
reflected high overhead costs such as staff salaries, transport, buildings and taxes, and were not 
necessarily indicative of high profit margins. It was not possible to collect such overhead data, 
but the above comparisons with rules of thumb for total and retail markups indicate that 
5 E-drug listserve archive: http: //www. essentialdrugs. org/edrug/archive/200301/msg000I2. php 
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markups were probably far in excess of overhead costs, even if such costs were relatively high 
in these remote areas. High markups may reflect a lack of competition due to high local market 
concentration. As demonstrated in Chapter 7, in terms of private sector antimalarial sales all 
sub-markets could be considered as "highly concentrated" on the basis of the HHI, and some 
areas were close to a monopoly situation. 
Higher markups in drug stores than in general stores might have reflected higher overhead costs, 
or the lower wholesale prices drug stores could obtain from drugs wholesalers in Dar es Salaam, 
which were not passed on to consumers. Drug stores may also have had the ability to charge 
higher retail prices because of market power derived from product differentiation in outlet or 
drug characteristics. 
All but one interviewee firmly rejected explicit price collusion. 
"There is no cooperation or debate amongst us on this. Everyone sets his own price. " General 
shopkeeper #3 
However, it is possible that higher markups reflected implicit collusion, with sellers unwilling to 
antagonise their fellow businessmen, or start a price war. This was suggested by the observation 
that many interviewees were uncomfortable discussing other shopkeepers as "competitors", 
which appeared to have negative, aggressive connotations, preferring to use the more neutral 
term "fellow sellers". 
Two other factors were mentioned during qualitative interviews, which might have made prices 
"sticky" downwards. Several shopkeepers said they could not make minor price reductions 
because change was not available in denominations under Tsh 5. One seller also remarked that 
consumers might see a price below the market rate as a signal that there was something wrong 
with the drugs. 
9.6 Retail Price Variation 
In a market characterised by strong price competition one would expect uniform prices for given 
products. This section explores the degree of price variation across given products in shops. For 
each common antimalarial, Table 9.6 shows the total price range in drug shops, interquartile 
range (IQR) and quartile coefficient of variation, a non-parametric dispersion measure 
standardised by absolute priceb (Owen and Jones 1990). The evidence indicates considerable 
variation in price for each drug category, with for example the price of a child's dose of 
6 Quartile coefficient of variation = 50*IQR/Median 
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packaged SP tablets ranging from Tsh 167 to Tsh 750, and of packaged amodiaquine tablets 
from Tsh 100 to Tsh 400. 
Table 9.6 Price dispersion for antimalarial tablets in drug shops (child's dose in Tsh 
n Median Range IQR Quartile 
coefficient of 
variation 
Loose SP 9 150 100-300 50 17% 
Chloro uine 10 20 20-20 0 0% 
Amodia uine 12 200 100-300 200 50% 
Quinine 9 770 550-1100 330 21% 
-Packaged 
SP 52 268 167-750 200 37% 
Chloro uine 0 - - - - 
Amodiauine 19 200 100-400 0 0% 
Quinine 13 1100 660-2640 220 10% 
' number of products identified. 
2 Quartile coefficient of variation = 50*IQR/Median. 
Source: Outlet Survey Nov-Dec 2001 
There are a number of possible explanations, including geographical segmentation, and weak 
price competition due to product differentiation or imperfect information. While geographical 
segmentation may well have played a part, considerable variation remained among shop prices 
within each sub-market, with for example ranges for packaged SP of Tsh 167-350 in Mchombe 
Area, and Tsh 200-750 in Ikwiriri Area. 
One might expect higher price variation for products that are relatively new to the market or 
with small market shares, with variation decreasing as they become more established in the 
market, and as the intensity of price competition increases. Chloroquine which was historically 
the most established antimalarial was sold at a uniform price, which might suggest that SP 
dispersion would decrease over time as it became established as the new first line. 
The influence of product and outlet characteristics on drug prices is explored in Section 9.7 
below. However, some variation in price remained even if the same brand in the same 
packaging was considered in the same sub-market and outlet type. For example, five sub- 
markets had more than one observation in drug shops for packaged OrodarTM, the most popular 
SP brand, but in three of these the price varied between drug shops, for example between Tsh 
167 and Tsh 200 in Mchombe Area. The price for the two most popular painkillers, loose 
unbranded aspirin and loose SheladolT'" (paracetamol) tablets in general stores varied in 7 of the 
12 sub-markets, for example in Kibiti between Tsh 2.5 and Tsh 5 per tablet for aspirin and Tsh 
5 and Tsh 10 for Sheladoih. Such residual variation could have reflected unobserved outlet 
differentiation, changes in wholesale prices over time, or imperfect information and/or price 
insensitivity on the part of consumers. 
169 
9.7 Regression Analysis of Retail Prices 
Tables A1.16 and A1.17 in Annex 1 provide bivariate analysis of antimalarial and painkiller 
drug prices, and a range of outlet and product characteristics. Antimalarial prices tended to be 
higher for packaged products than loose tablets, and there was a premium attached to innovator 
brands of SP over branded generics. Imported drugs tended to be more expensive, and for SP 
and quinine, prices were higher for those from Europe. Some similar patterns were observed for 
painkillers. For aspirin and paracetamol tablets, prices were higher for packaged products and 
for branded generics compared to unbranded ones. Prices for combination painkillers were 
higher in rural villages than in market centres. 
The interpretation of this bivariate analysis is complicated by the considerable correlation 
between drug and outlet characteristics (e. g. packaged antimalarials were significantly more 
likely to be found in Rufiji than in Kilombero or Ulanga). This makes it difficult to assess the 
relative importance of different factors, or the magnitude of their marginal impact. The 
influences on prices charged for antimalarials and painkillers by drug and general stores were 
therefore explored using regression analysis. 
An OLS log-lin regression model for the price of a child's dose of antimalarial tablets is 
specified in Table 9.7. The dependent variable was logged to reflect the skewed nature of price 
distribution. It was regressed on the generic drug type, type of packaging, country of 
manufacture, brand status, DSS area, outlet type and outlet location, and market concentration 
as measured by the HHI for private outlets in the sub-market (Table 9.8)'. The svyregress 
command was used to allow for clustering of drug prices within shops, and the stratification of 
the sample between the two DSS systems of Kilombero/Ulanga and Rufiji. 
7 The HHI is calculated from retail audit data collected in 2002,2-8 months after the price data used as 
the dependent variable. 
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Table 9.7 Definition of variables for model of the price of antimalarial and painkiller 
tablets in shops 
_ Variable Definition Means for Means for 
antimalarial painkiller 
regression re ression 
Dependent variables 
Log price AM Log of price for child's dose of 5.29 I 
antimalarial tablets (Tsh) 
a 'ý. 
" ;'ý 
Lo rice_PK Log of price per painkiller tablet (Tsh) . 2.72 
Independent continuous variables 
Antimalarial market Hirschman-Herfindahl index for 
concentration: antimalarial sales value by sub-market, 0.38 0.43 
HHI for all private sector sales 
Independent dummy variables 
Antimalarial type: 
Chloroquine (omitted) =1 if antimalarial is chloroquine 0.22 0 Amodiaquine =1 if antimalarial is amodiaquine 0.24 1 4WK'i 
Quinine =1 if antimalarial is quinine 0.14 
SP =1 if antimalarial is SP 0.40 
Painkiller type: Ak Aspirin (omitted) =1 if painkiller is aspirin , 0.28 
Paracetamol =1 if painkiller is paracetamol 0.38 
Asp+Caf =1 if painkiller is aspirin+caffeine rr 0.09 
Asp+Caf+Par =1 if painkiller is aspirin+caffeine 0.25 
+ paracetamol 
Type of packaging: 
Loose (omitted) =1 if tablets are sold loose 0.31 0.45 
Packaged =1 if tablets are sold packaged 0.69 0.55 
Country of Manufacture : 
T i i anzan a (om tted) =1 if manufactured in Tanzania 0.37 
Other africa =1 if manufactured in another African 0.40 
country 
ri 
Asia =1 if manufactured in Asia 0.08 
Europe =1 if manufactured in Europe 0.15 
Brand Status: 
Unbranded-generic =1 if unbranded generic 0.25 0.26 
(omitted) 
Innovator =1 if innovator brand 0.09 0 
Branded . generic 1 if branded generic 0.66 0.74 
DSS area: 
Kilombero (omitted) =1 if in Kilombero DSS area 0.29 0.22 
Ulanga =1 if in Ulanga DSS area 0.07 0.14 
Rufiji =1 if in Rufiji DSS area 0.64 0.64 
Outlet Type: 
Drug store (omitted) =1 if outlet is a commercial drug store 0.79 0.11 
General store =1 if outlet is a general store 0.21 0.89 
Outlet location: 
Market centre (omitted) =1 if outlet is in market centre 0.55 0.32 
Rural village =1 if outlet is in rural village 0.43 0.60 
Farming-area =1 if outlet is in farming area 0.02 0.08 
' Country of manufacturer data were not collected for painkillers. 
Source: Outlet Survey Nov-Dec 2001, HHI from Retail Audits Feb/Apr & Jun/Jul 2002. 
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Table 9.8 OLS log-lin regression of antimalarial and painkiller tablet prices for shops 
Explanatory 
variables 
Antimalarials' 
n=154; F<0.0001" R2=0.9057 
Painkillers 
n=875" F<0.0001" R2=0.9376 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
p-value Coefficient Standard 
Error 
p-value 
HHI 1.017 0.325 0.003* 0.023 0.052 0.660 
Amodia uine 1.711 0.139 <0.001 
Quinine 3.497 0.140 <0.001* 
SP 1.939 0.124 <0.001* 
Paracetamol 0.463 0.048 <0.001* 
Asp+Caf 0.353 0.574 <0.001* 
Asp+Caf+Par 0.559 0.050 <0.001 * 
Packaged 0.381 0.092 <0.001* 1.651 0.047 <0.001 * 
Other africa -0.141 0.105 0.184 = 
Asia -0.031 0.151 0.840 "; - 
Europe 0.103 0.139 0.460 
Innovator 0.555 0.167 0.002* - - - 
Branded eneric 0.159 0.104 0.129 0.240 0.058 <0.001* 
Ulanga -0.322 0.156 0.044* 0.029 0.042 0.489 
Rufi'i 0.117 0.091 0.200 -0.362 0.030 <0.001* 
General store 0.388 0.129 0.004* -0.201 0.057 0.001 * 
Rural village 0.076 0.087 0.386 0.004 0.025 0.859 
Fannin area -0.344 0.181 0.063 0.060 0.051 0.238 
_cons 2.670 0.153 <0.001 
* 1.672 0.064 <0.001 * 
'Five observations were dropped because of missing data on country of manufacture or tablet size. 
* coefficient significant at 5% level. 
Source: Outlet Survey Nov-Dec 2001. 
The antimalarial model had an RZ of 0.9. Antimalarial prices were significantly affected by HHI, 
generic type, packaging, brand status, DSS area and outlet type. Compared with a baseline of 
chloroquine tablets, a child's dose of amodiaquine had a mean price 1.7 times higher, SP 1.9 
times higher and quinine 3.5 times higher. Being sold from a general store rather than a drug 
store increased the price by 39%. Packaging increased the price by 38% compared with loose 
tablets. The price of innovator brands was 55% higher than unbranded generics, and innovator 
brands were also significantly more expensive than branded generics (F test: p=0.035). Prices in 
Ulanga were significantly lower than in Kilombero (p=0.044) or Rufiji (p=0.009). Country of 
origin and location type were not significant. Higher market concentration led to higher prices, 
with a 0.1 increase in the HHI leading to a 10% increase in antimalarial prices. However, it is 
possible that the HHI may have been correlated with remoteness, and that higher prices in more 
concentrated areas reflected higher transport costs rather than less intense competition. This was 
difficult to assess as all the sub-markets contained some areas on and off main roads. 
A similar model for the price of the most common painkiller tablets in private outlets is also 
specified in Table 9.7, with results presented in Table 9.8. In the absence of a measure of market 
concentration for painkillers, that for antimalarials was used. The RZ was 0.94. Painkiller prices 
were significantly affected by generic type, packaging, brand status, outlet type and DSS area. 
Compared with a baseline of aspirin, the mean price of paracetamol was 46% higher, 
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aspirin+caffeine 35% higher and aspirin+paracetamol+caffeine 56% higher. Packaging 
increased the price by 165%, and prices of branded generics were 24% higher than those for 
unbranded products. Prices were significantly lower in Rufiji DSS than in Kilombero and 
Ulanga (F test: p<0.0001). In contrast to antimalarials, painkiller prices in general stores were 
significantly lower than in drug stores by 20%. 
The HHI for antimalarial sales did not have a significant impact on painkiller prices, which was 
not surprising as painkillers were much more widely available through general stores than 
antimalarials, and market concentration was therefore likely to differ for the two groups of 
drugs. 
9.8 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has assessed the price of antimalarial and painkiller drugs across provider types, 
and analysed the degree of price competition faced by retailers. Government facilities had the 
cheapest drug prices, and antimalarial prices tended to be higher at drug stores than at private 
facilities. Total expenditure at government and private facilities was increased by non-drug fees, 
which were highly variable across facilities. Unofficial drug and non-drug fees were commonly 
charged where care should have been free. The provision of exemptions appeared ad hoc and 
haphazard. Once fees were included, government facilities may no longer have been cheaper 
than drug and general stores. Private facilities were likely to be the most costly source of care. 
Although retailers argued that they faced stiff competition on price, this was not backed up by 
analysis of prices. There was considerable evidence of both high retail markups, and price 
variation for given products, features of a market characterised by weak price competition. 
A number of potential explanations are proposed, including geographical segmentation, high 
concentration, imperfect consumer information, and collusion. It is not possible to draw firm 
conclusions on the sources of weak price competition, but in statistical analysis, higher prices 
were linked to market power arising from product differentiation, differentiation by outlet type, 
and for antimalarials, the level of market concentration. 
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CHAPTER 10 
RETAIL REGULATION 
10.1 Introduction 
The third objective of the thesis, to assess the impact of government regulation on the operation 
of retailers, is addressed in this chapter. 
Shops were regulated for both business and health-related purposes. Business regulation was 
undertaken by district authorities for large shops, or village authorities for small shops and 
stalls. Business regulation encompassed approving the operation of the outlet, granting business 
licences, and collection of a range of taxes. Health-related regulation had two components. 
Firstly, all retailers should have been inspected regularly by an environmental health officer, 
generally a health assistant based at the local health centre. Their remit was to approve the outlet 
premises, and inspect the safety and appropriate storage of products, including expiry dates on 
drugs and foodstuffs. In addition, drug stores fell under the jurisdiction of the Pharmacy Board, 
and the 1978 Pharmaceuticals and Poisons Act. They were required to obtain a Pharmacy Board 
permit each year from the Regional Commissioner, and to meet certain specific conditions, 
related to the premises, qualifications of the seller and products stocked (Ministry of Health 
1998). Drug shops should have been inspected on a quarterly basis by an appointed 
representative of the Pharmacy Board. 
Drug stores were permitted to stock only Part II drugs and basic medical supplies. Part II drugs 
were over-the-counter medicines, so classified because they were relatively safe, used for minor 
and self-limiting conditions, and their use was well understood by the public. Part I 
(prescription-only) drugs were not permitted. This category included painkillers such as 
diclofenac, indomethacin and nimesulide; antimalarials such as artesunate and quinine; all non- 
topical antibiotics; and injectables of any kind. The legal position on the drugs that general 
stores could stock was unclear because they were not covered under the 1978 Pharmaceuticals 
and Poisons Act. Discussions with staff responsible for drug regulation at a national and 
regional level indicated that strictly general stores were not allowed to stock any drugs, but in 
practice were permitted to sell some over-the-counter medicines, such as common painkillers. 
Chloroquine was generally permitted when it was the first line antimalarial, and one might 
therefore expect SP to be permitted following the change in policy. 
All Part II medicines were required to be sold in unit packs, accompanied by the manufacturer's 
instructions for use. In addition, all imported drugs were required to be registered with the 
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Pharmacy Board (locally manufactured drugs were exempt from registration at the time of data 
collection). There was no regulation on drug pricing. The health-related regulation of retailers 
was a purely government activity, with no role taken by professional or consumer organisations. 
This chapter begins by assessing regulatory compliance at drug and general stores. In Section 
10.2 the coverage of business licences is assessed. This element of business regulation was 
investigated because of its potential importance for identifying retailers that could be involved 
in fever/malaria treatment interventions in the future. Compliance with health-related regulation 
is considered in Section 10.3. The regulations investigated were selected as those most likely to 
affect the quality of fever/malaria treatment, and the potential for future collaboration or 
interventions. In drug stores this covered the presence of a Pharmacy Board permit, and the 
qualifications of selling staff. In all retailers, infringements of regulations on drugs stocked were 
assessed, in terms of the stocking of Part I drugs, unpackaged tablets, and unregistered or 
expired antimalarials. The assessment draws mainly on outlet survey data, supplemented by 
information from the outlet censuses, household survey and retail audit. Finally, data from 
qualitative provider interviews are used to assess the extent of drug leakage from government 
facilities. 
Widespread infringements of a number of regulations are demonstrated below, the most 
ubiquitous being the stocking of Part I medicines in drug stores. Understanding why this takes 
place has the potential to shed light on implementation by regulatory staff, the response to 
regulation by shopkeepers, and the relationship between regulators and regulatees. The reasons 
for this infringement are therefore explored in Section 10.4, which uses data from the outlet 
survey and qualitative interviews to assess possible explanations, covering poor knowledge of 
regulations, lack of inspections, lack of sanctions, successful concealment of Part I products, 
and tacit permission by regulatory staff. 
10.2 Business Licences 
All drug stores were required to have a business licence from the District authorities, renewed 
annually and displayed in the shop. During the outlet survey 4 drug shops (13%) had no licence, 
3 of which were new start-ups, having opened within the previous year. The median fee paid by 
drug stores for business licences was Tshl 00,000 per annum (US$108). 
As licence fees vary depending on stock value, they were on average much lower at general 
stores, where the median was Tsh20,000 per year ($22), although it ranged between Tsh8000 
and Tsh200,000 (US$9-$216). Of the general stores stocking drugs, 49% said they were 
licensed. General retailers were significantly less likely to be licensed if they were located in 
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farming areas (8%, chit test with Rao and Scott correction, p<0.001). The lack of a licence did 
not necessarily imply that they were operating illegally. General retailers are divided into two 
groups for the purpose of business regulation: dukas (larger shops) which are required to be 
licensed, and genges (smaller shops or stalls), which can operate unlicenced with the permission 
of the Village authorities. During qualitative interviews, many unlicensed retailers expressed 
concern about being reclassified as a duka because of the higher taxes and licence fee. The level 
of tax paid and classification between duka and genge were blurred and involved considerable 
negotiation with Village and District officials. Interviewees variously suggested the defining 
characteristics of dukas as that they had more goods, a permanent structure, used weighing 
scales, or sold manufactured goods (which would imply that genges could not officially stock 
drugs). General shops stocking antimalarials, or cloth/garments were significantly more likely to 
be licensed (83% and 70% respectively, p<0.001). However 20% of those one would expect to 
be categorised as dukas because they stocked cloth/garments and had permanent roof and wall 
structures remained unlicensed, suggesting that a significant minority evaded this regulation. 
However, it appeared unlikely that any shop could operate completely without the knowledge of 
the authorities for long; as a genge owner explained, the sub-village chairman would know all 
the outlets operating in his area. 
103 Health-Related Regulation 
Violations of a range of regulations are assessed below, related to Pharmacy Board permits and 
staff qualifications in drug stores, and to drugs stocked by all retailers (Table 10.1). 
Table 10.1 Infringement of health-related regulation 
of shops infringing regulations) 
Drug shops General shops 
n=30 (n=213) 
Pharmacy Board permit not displayed 11(37%) 
Regular selling staff not appropriately qualified' 30(100%) 
Stocked Part I painkillers 16(53%) 0(-) 
Stocked Part I antimalarials' 27(90%) 3(1%) 
Stocked unregistered imported antimalarials 19(63%) 2(1%) 
Stocked loose painkillers 29(97%) 195(92%) 
Stocked loose antimalarials 22(73%) 7(3%) 
Stocked expired antimalarials 4(13%) 3(1%) 
. excluding oral chloroquine formulations. 2 excluding all chloroquine formulations. 3 defined as having less than 4 years medical training. 
Source: Outlet survey Nov/Dec 2001. 
Drug store permits 
In addition to a business licence, drug stores required a permit issued annually by the Pharmacy 
Board, at a cost of Tshl 0,000 (US$11). Such permits were displayed in only 19 drug stores 
(63%). Of the 9 drug stores with permits in Kilombero and Ulanga, 2 were out-of-date, and in 7 
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shops the registered seller specified on the permit was not working there'. During a qualitative 
interview, an owner explained that it was easier to get a renewal if you did not change the 
names of the owner or seller. 
Drug store staff qualifications 
Drug store serving staff were required to have a "basic knowledge of pharmaceutical science, 
medical science, veterinary science, agricultural science or to be a dispenser approved by the 
Pharmacy Board" (Ministry of Health 1998). In a meeting with the Regional Pharmacist for 
Morogoro, he interpreted this to mean a minimum of four years training (e. g. nurse, pharmacy 
assistant). However during the outlet survey, none of the 37 regular serving staff had such 
qualifications, and the median years of health training was one year. 
Stocking of Part I medicines 
Neither drug stores nor general shops were permitted to stock any Part I drugs. However, outlet 
survey data showed that stocking of Part I medicines was very common in drug stores, with 
53% stocking Part I painkillers, and 90% Part I antimalarials2. By contrast this was very rare in 
general stores. None stocked Part I painkillers, and only 3 stocked Part I antimalarials (1%), all 
of which were located in Kilombero, 2 in farming areas, and one in a village. Data on antibiotics 
were not collected during the outlet survey, but outlet census data from mid-2001 showed they 
were stocked by 92% of drug stores and 11 % of general retailers stocking drugs. These rates of 
stocking Part I products should be considered as minimum estimates: while Part I products were 
sometimes openly displayed, they were usually concealed from view in a side room or in a box 
under the counter and interviewees may not always have revealed their presence during the 
survey. The illegal stocking patterns in drug stores were also reflected in household survey data, 
which showed, for example, that patients reporting fever/malaria obtained injectable 
antimalarials at 5% of drug store visits and antibiotics at 13% (Table 6.5). 
Stocking loose tablets 
According to the regulations, all drugs sold in shops should be in "unit packs" i. e. packaged as 
single doses. However, the sale of loose tablets from pots was found to be widespread during 
the outlet survey, with 97% of drug stores and 92% of general stores selling loose painkillers, 
and 73% of drug stores and 3% of general stores selling loose antimalarials. Retail audit data 
showed that packaged drugs made up only 39% of antimalarial sales volumes in general stores 
and 19% in drug stores (Table 6.10). 
1 the Rufiji permits did not display these details. 2 oral chloroquine formulations were not included in Part I products for these estimates because they had 
been removed from the Part II list only 3-4 months before the survey, and shops were still using up their 
remaining stocks during this transition period. 
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Stocking of unregistered imported antimalarials 
Stocking of imported antimalarial brands unregistered in Tanzania was also common. 
Unregistered imported antimalarials were found in 63% of drug shops and 1% of general stores, 
including unregistered brands of SP tablets and syrup, amodiaquine tablets and syrup, quinine 
tablets and artesunate tablets3. 
Stocking expired antimalarials 
Expired antimalarials were found in 4 drug shops (13%) and 3 general stores (1%). Each shop 
had only one expired product, representing 3% of all retail antimalarial products; for a further 
3% of products no expiry date was shown. However, expired antimalarials were not found only 
in shops; while none were observed in private facilities, they were found in 26% of government 
facilities, accounting for 5% of all antimalarial products in government stocks. 
The remaining shelflife of unexpired antimalarials was also investigated, showing that 21% of 
products in general stores were within one year of their expiry date, but only 3% in drug stores 
(Table 10.2). Time since manufacture is also potentially important, particularly as new 
antimalarials may have a shorter shelflife, such as the two years for artemether-lumefantrine. 
Only 2% of antimalarials in drug stores had been manufactured more than two years previously, 
but this was much more common in general stores (29%). 
Table 10.2 Shelflife of antimalarial products (all formulations) 
of antimalarial products in each shelflife category) 
Dru g shops General shops 
n=208 products) n=38 products) 
Time to expiry: 
Expired 4 (2%) 3 (8%) 
=<1 year 6( 3%) 8( 21%) 
>1 year 191 (92%) 26 (68%) 
Not shown 7( 3%) 1 (3%) 
Time since manufacture: 
>2 ears 5( 2%) 11 (29%) 
=<2 years 177 (85%) 19 (50%) 
Not shown 26( 13%) 8( 21%) 
Source: Outlet Survey Nov/Dec 2001. 
Leakage of drugs from government facilities 
A form of illegal behaviour much discussed by researchers and commentators working in the 
region is the leakage (i. e. theft and illicit sale) of drugs from government health facilities to 
private shops. During qualitative interviews, the majority of interviewees said they had never 
come across such behaviour, although this was obviously a sensitive area, where they could 
have had strong incentives to conceal information. One general shopkeeper said that because 
3 excluding all chloroquine formulations as they were not included in the new registration system. 
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government health facilities ran out of drugs quickly, some people might erroneously assume 
that the drugs had been stolen when this was actually due to genuine shortage. Such suspicions 
had affected another general shopkeeper who had started to sell syringes because the local 
dispensary had such frequent stockouts but had been forced to stop because local people 
suspected they had been leaked from the dispensary. 
Three interviewees reported having heard of specific incidents of leakage, including one general 
shopkeeper who had been offered drugs himself by a health worker from the local dispensary. 
He said he had refused, noting that he would have been in danger of being caught because the 
logo of the government's drugs might have been recognised, and he would not have had receipts 
for their wholesale purchase. 
No direct evidence of leaked drugs was observed during data collection, but it would have been 
difficult to detect, as many government drugs were not labelled with the Government or 
Medical Stores Department (MSD) logo on the packet or tablet. This leads to the tentative 
conclusion that drug leakage was not an everyday occurrence, but may have taken place from 
time to time. 
Perhaps a more common financial relationship between facilities and shops was the referral of 
patients by health care staff to shops for drug purchase. Although in some cases this reflected 
actual stockouts at government facilities, during qualitative interviews many customers were 
observed coming with cheti from the local government health centre foi SP, while independent 
sources reported that the health centre still had SP in stock. Possible explanations could be 
conservation of drug supplies by government health workers for particular groups of patients, or 
arrangements between health workers and drug store owners in order to increase the business of 
the latter, but in the absence of more detailed investigation it was not possible to draw firm 
conclusions. 
10.4 Explaining Infringements of Pharmaceutical Regulation 
The potential causes for these frequent infringements of health-related regulations are explored 
below, particularly the stocking of Part I medicines in drug stores, to assess whether this could 
be attributed to poor knowledge of regulations, lack of inspections, lack of sanctions, successful 
concealment of products, or the tacit permission of inspectors. 
Knowledge of regulations 
Poor knowledge of regulations was reflected in the considerable confusion among shop staff 
about which drugs they were allowed to stock. At that time, chloroquine had been withdrawn, 
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yet more than half the drug store staff still thought they could stock chloroquine (Table 10.3). 
Of drug shop interviewees, 90% knew they were allowed SP. For general shop interviewees, the 
percentages who thought they could stock chloroquine or SP were both low, reflecting the 
general confusion about the legality of general store antimalarial sales. 
Table 103 Shop interviewee knowledge of whether they were allowed to stock chloroquine 
and SP' 
(% of interviewees believine they could stock specified drug) 
n Chloro u ine SP 
Yes No Don't know Yes No Don't know 
Drug shops 30 18 
(60%) 
8 
(27%) 
4 
(13%) 
27 
90% 
2 
(7%) 
1 
(3%) 
General 
stores 
236 17 
(7%) 
175 
(74%) 
44 
(19%) 
15 
(6%) 
165 
(70%) 
56 
24% 
` At the time of the study chloroquine had been withdrawn; SP was allowed in drug shops, and the legal position was 
unclear for general stores. 
Source: Outlet survey Nov/Dee 2001. 
Confusion was also evident during qualitative interviews. Most general shopkeepers were vague 
about the drugs they could stock, generally suggesting that they were allowed painkillers, first- 
aid, or baridi drugs, but not antibiotics or strong medicines. All drug store sellers knew they 
were only allowed to sell baridi drugs but they were not clear which products this included. 
Baridi is the KiSwahili term used informally for over-the-counter Part II products. It literally 
means cool or cold, or could be translated as weak or mild. When asked what they understood 
by baridi, no shopkeepers interpreted it to mean specifically over-the-counter or non- 
prescription. Some said it meant drugs that were for first-aid, or were not powerful or 
poisonous/harmful. Others said they were termed baridi because they cool down the patient's 
fever, were not bitter tasting (chloroquine is very bitter), or did not need refrigeration (being 
already cold! ). Staff knew that common painkillers were baridi, and that antibiotics were 
prohibited, but were unclear on the status of antimalarials: 
"They're not antibiotics, so that's OK isn't it? " Drug store seller #16 
While some of the drug store staff had copies of the Pharmacy Board regulations (often 
outdated), none of the general shopkeepers had any written regulations on which drugs were 
allowed, and new shopkeepers tended to just copy the stocking patterns of similar shops. 
"I just trusted because I saw them being sold in other shops and so I also bought them. " General 
shopkeeper #5 
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This confusion may explain to some degree the widespread availability of oral quinine, although 
one would expect any Part I products to have been removed during inspections. Furthermore, 
antibiotics were widely stocked, although all sellers knew they were prohibited. 
Frequency of regulatory inspection 
Both drug stores and general stores were supposed to receive regular environmental health 
inspection visits from the Ward Health Assistant, known locally as "Bwana Afya" (literally "Mr 
Health"). During qualitative interviews the main concerns of Bwana Afya were said to be the 
cleanliness of the shop, building conditions, food storage, and expiry dates for products 
including drugs. They were not reported to have any other drug-related role. 
Environmental health inspections were reported to take place quite regularly in general. In the 
outlet survey, over three-quarters of drug shops and general stores recalled being visited by 
Bwana Afya, and this percentage did not vary across DSS areas (Table 10.4). Of interviewees 
who recalled the date of the visit, 35% reported a visit in the last three months, 56% within the 
last six months, and 68% within the last year. Shops were significantly less likely to recall a 
visit if they were located in fanning areas (54%), if their roof was constructed from temporary 
materials (56%), or if the outlet was categorised by interviewers as "poorly built" (62%), or 
"dirty" (33%). It was unclear whether inspectors were less likely to visit these less formal 
outlets, or whether the poor standards of building and cleanliness were the outcome of a lack of 
environmental health inspection. 
Table 10.4 Regulatory inspection: visits by Environmental Health and Drug Inspectors 
recalled by interviewees 
(% of interviewees recallinL, any visit) 
Environmental Health Inspectors Drug Re ulato Inspectors 
n Ever visited % n Ever visited 
Drugs sho s 29 22(76%) 30 24(83%) 
General stores 223 172(77%) 227 12(5%) 
- variations in n reflect the number of interviewees able to supply the relevant information. 
Source: Outlet survey Nov/Dec 2001. 
In addition to visits from Bwana Afya, drug stores should have received drug regulatory 
inspections on a quarterly basis. In the study sites responsibility for these inspections was 
delegated to the District Health Management Teams (DHMT). The inspectors reportedly looked 
for prohibited products, as well as checking drug expiry dates, the permit, and the competence 
of the seller. 83% of drug shop interviewees recalled such a visit (94% in Rufiji, 78% in 
Kilombero, but neither interviewee in the two drug stores in Ulanga DSS). Of the drug shops 
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where the interviewee recalled the date of the visit, 15% reported a visit in the last three months, 
56% within the last six months, and 70% within the last year4. 
No clear patterns were detected to indicate that either type of regulatory inspection had a 
constraining impact on regulatory violations. There were no significant relationships between 
the frequency of visits by Bwana Afya or drug inspectors and the probability of outlets stocking 
Part I drugs, unregistered antimalarials, expired antimalarials, loose antimalarial or painkiller 
tablets, or lacking a pharmacy board permits. 
Imposition of sanctions 
In theory a failure to comply with regulations could lead to the outlet being fined or closed 
down. During the outlet survey, 5 of the 30 drug store interviewees said that inspectors had 
reprimanded them for stocking Part I drugs during their most recent visit; in two stores such 
drugs had been confiscated, and one store had been fined. At the time of the study the maximum 
fine for drug stores was still set at the nominal level fixed at the time of the 1978 
Pharmaceuticals and Poisons Act of Tsh5,000 ($5). During qualitative interviews, none of the 
interviewees knew of specific examples of shops being closed down. In sum, it appeared that 
the penalties of being caught were low because no heavy sanctions were implemented, and the 
cost of confiscation of a few bottles of antibiotic syrup was small compared with the profits to 
be made from selling these high-value and popular products. 
Concealing Part I products 
Widespread stocking of Part I drugs could have reflected inspectors' imperfect information 
about retailer operation. However, although sellers hid some Part I drugs, their availability was 
well-known, particularly by customers, and presumably by inspectors, who were also local 
District residents. 
"I sell them (antibiotics) via the back door, and they know that we sell via the back door. In fact 
you can tell someone openly that you sell them. " Drug store owner #10 
4 for Kilombero the frequency of inspection over the previous six months may have been higher than 
usual. The District Medical Officer informed us that between May and October 2001 Pharmacy Board 
officials from Dar es Salaam visited Ifakara twice to look for counterfeit drugs and Part I products. Such 
visits were extremely unusual. 3 the lack of statistical significance may reflect the small sample sizes of only 31 drug stores and 30 
general stores stocking antimalarials. 
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Tacit permission 
It is possible that there was an element of regulatory capture. Of the 30 drug stores, 10 owners 
had jobs in the formal health sector, the majority being health-care workers at local government 
facilities. Inspectors may also have been personal acquaintances of shop staff, as in this case: 
"When they come I know how to deal with them..... I know the Regional Pharmacist, I know the 
District Pharmacist well. We have eaten ugali and beans together...... " Drug store owner #10 
Perhaps more importantly, inspectors may have given their tacit permission, recognising that 
shops met a genuine need in communities without Part I pharmacies, in particular acting as a 
reserve drug source for government facilities. As one seller noted: 
"I normally have (cotrimoxazoleb) syrup because it is prescribed to many people and it is not 
available in the health centre. " Drug store seller #9 
Finally, inspectors may have recognised that eliminating such a widespread and popular practice 
would have been infeasible. As one drug store owner said: 
"They should make changes because they forbid things which cannot be forbidden. For instance, 
they say Part II drug stores should not sell antibiotics, but the truth is that people are selling 
them and they are bought a lot. " Drug store owner #10 
10.5 Summary and Conclusions 
The health-related regulatory infringements investigated were relatively uncommon in general 
stores, with the exception of stocking loose tablets. General stores very rarely stocked Part I 
medicines, or unregistered or expired antimalarials, reflecting the low frequency of antimalarial 
stocking in these outlets in general. However, only around half of general shops were licensed, 
possibly limiting the potential for interventions or collaboration with these retailers; some were 
too small to require a licence, but others appeared to have evaded the regulation. 
Although most drug stores had business licences, infringement of health-related regulation was 
extremely common in these outlets. Many lacked Pharmacy Board permits and several others 
had permits which were invalid in some way. It was the norm for drug stores to stock Part I 
medicines and loose tablets, most stocked unregistered products, and a minority had expired 
antimalarials. All drug store serving staff were underqualified. 
6 Part I antibiotic 
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Potential explanations for widespread infringement of the regulations concerning Part I drugs 
were investigated. Knowledge of regulations was quite poor, but it was well-known that certain 
Part I products, such as antibiotics, were prohibited. It appeared more likely that infringement 
reflected a combination of relatively infrequent regulatory inspections, a failure to ever 
implement heavy sanctions, successful concealment of Part I products by drug store staff during 
inspections, and the tacit permission of local regulatory staff. 
The implications of these findings are explored in more depth in Chapter 12, which considers 
the evidence from the results chapters in the light of the existing literature, leading to an 
analysis of the nature of competition and regulation in the fever/malaria treatment market. 
Before turning to this discussion, the methodological strengths and weaknesses of the study are 
considered in Chapter 11. 
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PART IV 
DISCUSSION, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
CHAPTER 11 
METHODOLOGICAL STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS 
11.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the methods and data used in the five results chapters, and explores their 
strengths and weaknesses. It begins with the strengths, looking in Section 11.2 at insights gained 
from the conceptual framework, and in Section 11.3 at the strengths of the data collection 
methods. Section 11.4 raises a number of concerns about the reliability and validity of the study 
data, focusing on the small sample sizes for some analyses, and the dangers of relying on 
reported behaviour and characteristics. Three areas subject to particular measurement problems 
are discussed: SES, the appropriateness of treatment obtained, and market concentration. 
Section 11.5 on data gaps identifies a number of areas where additional information would have 
been beneficial to aid the analysis. Finally, Section 11.6 addresses three key methodological 
challenges; developing appropriate market definitions, understanding behaviour in the context 
of relatively homogeneous study areas, and analysing a market changing over time. 
11.2 Insights from the Conceptual Framework 
The use of an explicitly economic framework, based on market structure, provider conduct and 
consumer demand, is argued to have provided fruitful lines of inquiry and interesting insights 
into fever/malaria treatment. Considering treatment provision as a market led to analytical 
choices which can be seen as key strengths of this research. Firstly, both the demand and supply 
sides of the market were considered, allowing for validation of findings, and an understanding 
of the way providers and consumers respond to one another's preferences, incentives and 
decisions. Secondly, the full range of consumers and competitors were included. The demand 
analysis considered all age groups, in contrast to most similar household surveys which have 
focused on children under five; although children are the most biologically vulnerable group, in 
this setting the majority of fever/malaria patients treated were over five, which through their 
purchasing power therefore influence providers' behaviour and overall market development. 
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On the supply-side, collection of comparable data on all provider types, from formal health 
centres to roadside stalls, allowed comparison of their advantages and disadvantages from both 
the consumer and public-health perspective. Including government facilities and private 
providers demonstrated that they acted as both substitutes and complements for one another, 
and highlighted the extent of government failure in service provision. In previous studies, 
general shops and drug shops have often been grouped under the broader categories of "retail" 
or "no treatment" (i. e. no formal health facility treatment). In this analysis they were clearly 
distinguished in demand and supply analyses, thus highlighting the major differences in services 
offered and treatment provided. 
Viewing providers explicitly as economic agents facilitated incorporation of their wide range of 
financial and non-financial incentives, and shed light on the force and limitations of price and 
non-price competition. Economic concepts argued to have provided particular leverage include 
product differentiation by outlet and drug, and market concentration, both of which can 
influence private provider market power, and the accessibility, affordability and quality of 
treatment. Other market failures highlighted by the research arose from imperfect information 
and consumption externalities. At the same time, the inclusion of regulatory considerations 
showed how rule-based regulations interacted with financial incentives, and demonstrated that 
government failure was prevalent in regulation as well as provision. 
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On a more practical level, a key strength of the data collection was its foundation on reliable 
sampling frames, drawn from the DSS systems for demand and the outlet census for supply, 
facilitating the selection of representative samples of households and outlets for quantitative 
surveys, and an informed sample for qualitative provider interviews. Data on treatment seeking 
were based on reported behaviour for actual episodes, which is more reliable than responses to 
hypothetical scenarios (McCombie 1996). The DSS systems provided excellent background 
information, their staff were knowledgeable about the study areas, and the household survey and 
outlet census were undertaken by their experienced local field staff. We benefited from 
extremely high participation rates, even among commercial retailers. These high rates were 
likely to have reflected the skilful and sensitive invitations to participate provided by local DSS 
field staff. Working within the IMPACT partnership allowed the organisation and management 
of the household survey to be shared, widening the potential scope for thesis data collection. In 
addition, the author benefited from advice on data collection and analysis from more 
experienced team members. 
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The comparison of data collected through five different activities allowed for considerable 
triangulation, with identification of discrepancies between sources leading to a better 
understanding. For example, user fees reported by government facility staff proved very 
different from those said to have been paid in practice by household survey respondents. Credit 
was widely argued by shopkeepers to be an important competitive practice during qualitative 
interviews and the outlet survey, but the household survey indicated that it was very rarely 
given in practice. Despite the insistence of shopkeepers in qualitative interviews that they faced 
stiff price competition, the outlet survey revealed high markups and variable prices. On the 
other hand, the utility of qualitative methods, relatively rarely used by economists, was 
demonstrated in the in-depth discussions of, for example, relationships with regulators, and the 
interdependence of drug stores and facilities, which could not have been gleaned from 
structured surveys. 
11.4 Reliability and Validity Concerns 
Despite these benefits of triangulation, a number of concerns about the reliability and validity of 
study data remain. Firstly, some sample sizes were relatively small. Qualitative data from the 
semi-structured interviews were based on only 18 private providers. Even for the larger scale 
quantitative outlet survey and retail audits, the number of facilities and drug stores was 
constrained by the total number operating in the DSS areas, although all were selected. Within 
the outlet survey, the number of antimalarial products in general stores was very low because 
they were so rarely stocked. Had the detailed household survey been administered to all 
households sampled rather than just Group A, the sample sizes for the analysis of treatment 
seeking behaviour would have been doubled. However, concern about the potential time 
requirements led us to restrict the more detailed survey to 50% of households interviewed. The 
size of the samples for these quantitative surveys of both households and outlets limited the 
potential to demonstrate statistical significance for some comparisons. 
Nearly all data collection relied on interviews with householders or providers, about their 
opinions and reported behaviour. For a number of reasons these data may not be a valid guide to 
actual behaviour. Reported behaviour may be affected by poor recall. Even for the two-week 
period used in the household survey, respondents may have struggled to remember exact details 
of all illness episodes and drugs obtained (McCombie 2002). Mild or untreated illnesses may be 
most likely to be forgotten. Recall on drug use has been improved in some settings by using 
photo-illustrated drug charts, or a tray of samples of common medicine brands (Amin et al. 
2003; Hamel et al. 2001). These memory aids were felt to be impractical in this setting, where 
there were 81 different antimalarial products alone, in addition to painkillers, antibiotics and 
other drugs. Moreover, as 91% of antimalarial tablets were dispensed loose, and most tablets 
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looked very similar, packaging would have been of limited use as a memory aid. Recall on drug 
quantities obtained might be expected to be particularly poor, calling into question the validity 
of estimates of minimum antimalarial doses obtained. In some cases this might have been 
improved through reference to patient-held records of facility care, but such documentation 
would not have been available for non-facility visits. Providers were asked for longer recall 
periods for some questions, for example one month for drug stockouts, and even longer for 
regulatory visits. In addition, in many general stores and most drug stores we interviewed the 
main seller, who was frequently not the owner. These interviewees were knowledgeable about 
the day-to-day running of the outlet, but may not always have been well-informed about topics 
such as sources of capital, wholesale supplies and regulatory compliance. Finally, some 
qualitative interviews were long, with several exceeding two hours, which may have led to 
respondent fatigue, and therefore less accurate or complete responses. 
Even for householders with good recall, there is some controversy over whether caretakers can 
accurately recognise fever in children. The evidence suggests that the sensitivity of identifying 
fever is relatively high, but specificity may be low in some settings. In Ghana, 22% of children 
with a report of fever were afebrile (Dunyo et al. 2000). In Guinea, 55% of children reported as 
febrile had a normal temperature, and a high temperature was found in 38% of children 
identified as sick but afebrile, and in 13% of children considered healthy (Diallo et al. 2001). In 
the Tanzanian setting, these issues were potentially compounded by the interpretation of the 
question on whether individuals had experienced homa au maleria (fever or malaria). The term 
homa can apply to a broader range of symptoms, which may not necessarily be associated with 
a high temperature (Winch et al. 1994). For example, it may be used for respiratory conditions 
(homa za vifua) or gastrointestinal illnesses (homa za matumbo) (Tarimo et al. 2000). We also 
recorded specific symptoms free-listed by respondents, which included a code for a number of 
terms used to signify high temperature (chemchem / joto / kuchemka / homa). Of those 
responding positively to homa au maleria, 35% did not specifically report a high temperature 
during free-listing. This percentage was much lower in under fives (11%) than in over fives 
(43%). This might have indicated more frequent use of homa to describe non-febrile illness in 
older patients. On balance it is possible that a significant minority of the illness episodes 
analysed were non-febrile. It should also be noted that all fever episodes are not commensurate 
in their nature or severity. Despite the inclusion of information on whether the illness was 
perceived as life-threatening, the analysis may not have controlled adequately for disease 
severity in choice of provider or drug. 
Even with good knowledge and recall, respondents may deliberately misrepresent their 
behaviour or views, perhaps with the aim of meeting the interviewer's approval. This social 
desirability bias might, for example, have led consumers to under-report use of traditional 
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healers, or led providers to overstate the help they provided to the poorest consumers or the 
severely ill. 
Other topics covered with providers were sensitive for commercial and/or legal reasons, 
especially those related to regulatory infringements. We tried to address this problem by 
emphasising that we were unconnected with any regulatory body, and by asking more sensitive 
questions on business and health regulation towards the end of the outlet survey and qualitative 
interviews, once a reasonable rapport had been developed. As a result it proved feasible to raise 
these issues, and many interviewees were very open in their discussion. However, concerns 
about participation were clearly expressed by a sub-set of interviewees; some required 
considerable reassurance before consenting, or refused to answer certain questions. Reported 
rates of illegal behaviours should therefore be considered a minimum. 
To some degree qualitative interviews with providers ensured a conducive forum to probe these 
issues in more depth than was feasible during structured surveys. However, no qualitative data 
collection was undertaken with householders, so the qualitative assessment of factors 
influencing consumer demand has relied on provider perceptions. For providers themselves, the 
social distance between the interview team and interviewees was much greater for the 
qualitative interviews, conducted by the author and two Tanzanian university graduates, than for 
quantitative data collection undertaken by local field staff. Many interviewees, particularly 
those in smaller shops, had never talked to a European at any length before, and the Tanzanian 
qualitative research assistants were also outsiders, being highly educated, relatively wealthy, 
urban residents, from other areas of Tanzania. The seller in one drug store was reluctant to allow 
the tape recording of discussion about the drugs she could legally stock; and at one general shop 
the interview was cut short after the landlord became suspicious about the purpose of questions 
relating to revenue and staff pay. 
All data collection focused on the DSS areas in the three districts, but for policy-makers the 
district itself would be a more appropriate unit of implementation. Care should be taken in 
generalising these results to the whole district, as the DSS areas excluded the towns where 
district headquarters were located, and some of the most remote locations. 
Three specific areas were subject to particular measurement problems: SES, the appropriateness 
of treatment obtained, and market concentration. The SES index has not been validated against 
consumption or income measures in these areas. Validation of similar indices has been 
undertaken in other settings (Filmer and Pritchett 2001; McKenzie 2003), although neither 
consumption or income provide a gold standard, as both are subject to significant measurement 
problems. Concerns remain over how well such indices represent true variation in wealth, 
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especially in these relatively homogenous and poor communities, where the range of assets may 
not be broad enough to differentiate SES across all households (Filmer 2002). Even with a valid 
index, the assessment of variation in fever prevalence by wealth may be compromised if some 
assets contributed independently to fever risk (e. g. water supply), or if SES groups had different 
propensities to report ill health they had experienced (Filmer 2002). An oft-cited advantage of 
asset indices is that they are not subject to the seasonal variation that affects consumption and 
income measures (McKenzie 2003). However, this may have been a disadvantage in this 
analysis, if treatment choice was influenced by seasonal variation in cash availability at the 
household level. Finally, we have explored variation in treatment seeking by individual 
household SES only. However, Filmer found that levels of wealth in the community in which 
the household lived influenced treatment more than the wealth of the household itself, and for 
Tanzania, Khan et al. found that community wealth had an independent effect on health status 
as measured by Body Mass Index and height-for-age (Filmer 2002; Khan et al. 2003). 
Variation in the appropriateness of treatment obtained proved difficult to assess. As described in 
Chapter 5, it was not possible to judge quality definitively for individual patients from the 
household survey because of recall and social desirability bias, problems in accurate 
identification of febrile cases and completed episodes, and because in the absence of a clinical 
examination it was frequently unclear what the ideal treatment should have been. If such 
weaknesses were randomly distributed across reported episodes, comparison of quality across 
outlet type or socio-economic group would have remained valid. However, it was possible that, 
for example, in high SES groups recall of symptoms and drugs obtained may have been better, 
or that social desirability bias may have been higher. In addition, data were collected only on 
drugs obtained; if adherence to doses obtained varied across outlet type, relative performance 
may have differed for the quality of treatment obtained and that actually consumed. On the other 
hand, in comparing outlet survey data on quality indicators across provider type, the analysis 
was restricted to the use of proxies, such as staff qualifications and drug range. It was not 
possible to assess their validity as proxies for perceived quality, and their impact on technical 
treatment quality is not clear. 
On concentration, it was reassuring that the HHI and r-firm ratios gave similar indications of 
relative concentration (correlation coefficient across sub-markets of 0.79, t test, p=0.002). 
However, they suffered from empirical limitations, as sales data had to be extrapolated for one 
facility and the majority of general stores (Annex 6). Extrapolations based on mean sales for 
each category are likely to have biased the HHI through an underestimation of sales variation, 
and may also have affected the r firm ratio if total sales estimates were inaccurate. 
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11.5 Data Gaps 
Data on some important factors influencing provider behaviour were not included in the 
analysis. Firstly, information on private provider cost structure proved too sensitive to collect, 
even in qualitative interviews. Such data are required to move from an assessment of gross price 
markups to one of retail profit margins, which would provide a better guide to the intensity of 
price competition. This is likely to require long-term data collection activities, which allow the 
development of a trusting rapport with shopkeepers. 
The main focus of the study was the retailers themselves. They are the most visible part of the 
market, but depend on their wholesale suppliers, who have a major influence over the prices and 
availability of products in retail outlets, and are also an important source of information for 
retail sellers. Particularly for general stores, there may be relatively little choice over product 
range, which is determined further up the distribution chain. Data have been gathered on the 
supply chain serving the study retailers, and their analysis will form the next phase of this 
project. 
Inclusion of additional data collection activities, such as observation in outlets, exit interviews 
or undercover care-seekers could have added value by providing more robust measures of 
treatment quality, and addressing the deliberate misrepresentation of true views and practices 
during interviews. These activities were not pursued for a number of reasons. Observation and 
exit interviews potentially suffer from the Hawthorne effect of influencing participant behaviour 
through the very presence of the researchers. This effect may diminish as participants become 
accustomed to the researcher's presence, but time constraints prohibited long-term study in 
individual outlets. In addition, many general shops saw relatively few fever/malaria patients, 
and so would have required long study periods to obtain a sufficient number of relevant 
encounters. Undercover care-seekers raise both ethical and practical issues in the maintenance 
of deception (Madden et al. 1997), and were considered inappropriate in this setting, where any 
discovery could have damaged working relations for the whole IMPACT project, and the long- 
standing DSS systems themselves. 
11.6 Key Methodological Challenges 
This section considers three key methodological challenges faced in the analysis: the definition 
of markets, the relative homogeneity of the study areas, and the changing nature of the market 
under analysis. 
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11.6.1 Market Definitions 
Product and geographical market definitions were inevitably not clear-cut. It is always difficult 
to distinguish between separate markets and segmentation/product differentiation within a 
single market. On the geographical side, the shipment cut-off points used for definition of sub- 
markets were essentially arbitrary, and the reliance on household survey data meant they 
reflected current utilisation patterns only, and not contestability. For example, two outlets may 
be in competition but consumers may only visit one of them if it is perceived as superior value 
for money. 
The focus on treatment for fever/malaria led to a product definition around antimalarials and 
painkillers. This excluded antibiotics, which made up only 7% of drugs obtained for 
fever/malaria. However, as relatively expensive medicines, they may have been more significant 
in terms of private sector profits. The focus on fever/malaria was chosen to reflect the consumer 
and public health perspectives, but from a provider perspective the market may be defined 
around the products, whether they are used for fever treatment or not. While only 7% of 
antimalarials were obtained by non-febrile patients, the percentage of painkillers used for other 
reasons was much higher (36%), and the focus on fever/malaria therefore entails only a partial 
market analysis for these drugs from the provider's perspective. 
11.6.2 Homogeneity of Study Areas 
The potential to understand factors underlying the nature of competition was restricted by the 
lack of variation across the study areas. The sites were chosen deliberately to be relatively 
similar and homogenous to serve the purposes of the main IMPACT evaluation. As a result, the 
lack of variation in variables such as SES and market concentration restricted the leverage to 
explore their influence on competition. While some significant relationships were discovered, 
these variables would be likely to emerge as more important in a Tanzania-wide analysis, 
incorporating district and regional towns, and very remote locations. 
11.6.3 Analysing a Changing Market 
The timing of data collection activities was highlighted in Section 5.4.9 and Table 5.7. The 
outlet censuses were conducted in May-September 2000 and 2001, the latter in tandem with the 
household survey. The qualitative provider interviews took place in August/September 2001, 
the outlet survey in November/December 2001, and the retail audits in February/April and 
June/July 2002. The activities were scheduled in this way for logistical reasons, and to allow the 
results of each activity to inform the design of subsequent data collection. The timing poses two 
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potential challenges for data analysis, related to seasonal variation, and long-term changes in the 
market. 
One could expect seasonal variation in fever incidence, parasitaemia prevalence, cash 
availability, farming activities and physical accessibility (Sauerborn et al. 1996). There are 
generally two rainy seasons in the study districts: the short or light rains in October to 
December, and the long and heavy rains from March to May. Particularly during the heavy 
rains, road travel may become difficult, although villages within the DSS areas are rarely 
inaccessible. Malaria transmission is perennial, but may vary seasonally. An active case 
detection study in under fives in Ifakara Town in 2000/2001 found a peak in both fever and 
clinical malaria in January, one month after the light rains had begun, and a peak in parasitaemia 
prevalence in March (Schellenberg et al. 2003). However, the authors note that transmission in 
Ifakara Town is lower than that in the surrounding rural areas, where the thesis study sites were 
located. It is also possible that the timing of peaks varies from year to year, depending on the 
rains. The timing of agricultural activities varies among the different crops cultivated. However, 
the major rice harvest takes place mid-year. In the run-up to the harvest, income levels tend to 
be at their lowest (the hungry season), and agricultural activity is most intense, with many 
people moving temporarily to their shamba (farm). One might therefore expect higher need for 
fever/malaria treatment during the first six months of the year, but demand to be tempered 
towards the end of this period by accessibility problems during heavy rains, low cash 
availability and the high opportunity cost of time pre-harvest. 
Such seasonal variation could imply that the data collected through each activity were not 
representative of the whole year. Moreover, the thesis is structured by presenting the 
fever/malaria treatment obtained, and then aiming to explain these findings in the light of 
market analysis; there is a risk that, for example, outlet survey data on provider characteristics, 
such as drugs stocked or stock reliability, do not reflect the conditions faced by consumers at the 
time of the household survey. On the other hand, the staggered timing of the activities provides 
some leverage to investigate seasonal variation in demand and supply. In addition, the retail 
audits were conducted at two different points, and questions about seasonal variation were 
asked during the second outlet census, and the qualitative provider interviews. 
On the supply side, there was seasonal variation in the operation of a small minority of smaller 
general shops, with 8% of kiosks/stalls in Kilombero and Ulanga DSS areas reporting moving to 
another location, or closing down for part of the year (Section 7.2.2). However, the vast 
majority of outlets operated all year round in a fixed location. Stocking patterns also did not 
appear subject to seasonal variation. For example, a wide range of antimalarials and painkillers 
were available from drug stores during the outlet censuses, outlet survey and both retail audits, 
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which in combination spanned most months of the year. Prices were only recorded during the 
outlet survey, but there were no indications from qualitative work that these varied at different 
times of year, nor of seasonal changes in outlet staffing or wholesale supplies. 
One might expect greater variations in demand. The household survey stretched over four 
months, from mid-May to mid-September, allowing some limited analysis of demand over time. 
Comparison of households interviewed during the first half of the survey (up to July 25th) with 
households in the second half, showed that the prevalence of reported fever/malaria was 
slightly, but significantly, higher during the first half (19% vs 13%, chi2 with Rao and Scott 
correction, p<0.0001). This might be expected, as the first half more closely followed the long 
rains. Of those reporting fever/malaria, there were no differences in the probability of obtaining 
appropriate antimalarials, or of visiting different provider types, between the first and second 
half of data collection, with the exception of private facilities, which were less commonly used 
during the second half (8% vs 3%, p=0.047). There was therefore no evidence to suggest that 
the hungry, harvest season, at its peak during the first half of the survey, led to less use of more 
expensive providers, or avoidance of longer journey times. However, the SES of households 
interviewed in the first half was significantly higher than in the second half, which may have 
obscured such effects. 
The retail audits were conducted deliberately at two different times, to attempt to capture 
seasonal variation in antimalarial sales, but the findings were inconclusive. Sales in June/July 
were 82% higher than in February/April in Kilombero DSS, but almost the same in Rufiji, and 
35% lower in Ulanga (Annex 6). During qualitative interviews, drug store staff said that sales of 
fever/malaria drugs did vary seasonally, with most reporting peaks during the heaviest rains 
(March/April), and a few also mentioning a smaller increase post-harvest (July to October). This 
tallies with routine data from sentinel government facilities in Kilombero and Ulanga in 2002, 
which showed a peak in malaria outpatient diagnoses in April. It is possible that the audits were 
not well timed to distinguish this peak period. 
In sum, there did not appear to be strong seasonal variation in supply. Seasonal variation in 
demand was more likely, but firm conclusions could not be drawn. Seasonality patterns may 
vary between years depending on the rains, which were relatively good in 2001 and 2002; 
national agricultural growth was over 5% in both years, largely due to good weather conditions, 
compared with an average of 3% in the previous four years (Government of Tanzania 2004). 
Comparison with IMPACT household survey data from 2000 and 2002 did not indicate that 
2001 was atypical in terms of parasite prevalence or reported fever/malaria (Kachur 2004). 
194 
There was strong evidence of longer-term changes taking place in the market during data 
collection. The number of drug stores was expanding over time, particularly in Rufiji; from a 
starting point of 13 drug stores in the Rufiji DSS area in mid-2000, the number grew to 20 in 
mid-2001, and 22 in mid-2002. Another key change was in antimalarial stocking patterns, in 
reaction to the official change in policy to SP in August 2001. The outlet censuses and 
household survey were undertaken before the change, but the other data collection activities 
took place during the year in which it was gradually implemented in the public sector. Most 
drug stores and private facilities had been stocking SP well before the official change, but this 
became universal by June/July 2002, with amodiaquine and quinine stocks also increasing. The 
stocking of chloroquine dramatically declined in facilities, drug stores and general shops over 
this period. As few general shops began to stock SP or amodiaquine instead, the proportion 
stocking any antimalarials was falling over time. 
There were therefore some important long-term changes taking place in the market during the 
period of data collection. The thesis has attempted to highlight these were possible, but their 
implications for the nature of competition are difficult to gauge. For example, antimalarial 
competition is likely to have been increased by an expansion in the number of drug stores, but 
reduced by a fall in general stores stocking antimalarials. This dynamism is an inherent issue in 
the analysis of markets, which can and do change rapidly over time, particularly where entry 
and exit barriers are relatively low, as in this setting. Change has obviously continued since the 
study, and the implications of these subsequent developments for drawing policy lessons from 
the thesis results are considered in Chapter 13. 
11.7 Conclusions 
Key strengths of the analysis included the insights provided by the economic framework, the 
quality of sampling frames, and the potential for triangulation across data collection tools. A 
number of limitations and omissions have been discussed. The most important relate to 
concerns about unvalidated proxies for SES and treatment quality, and the reliability of some 
provider and consumer responses. For some variables, such as doses obtained or travel time, one 
would expect the error in responses to be random, but for others systematic bias may have been 
introduced. In particular, the interpretation of homa is likely to have led to an overestimation of 
fever, and fear of regulatory sanctions probably resulted in an underestimation of illicit provider 
behaviours. 
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CHAPTER 12 
DISCUSSION 
12.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws together the findings of the five results chapters, and considers them in the 
light of the literature on fever/malaria treatment reviewed in Chapter 2, and the literature on 
markets and competition in Chapter 3. Section 12.2 briefly summarises the evidence presented 
in the thesis on the relative roles of retailers and facilities. Section 12.3 compares these and 
other findings with available evidence from the literature on fever/malaria treatment in sub- 
Saharan Africa. The chapter then turns to the fourth objective of the thesis, to analyse the 
implications of competition and regulation for the accessibility, quality and affordability of 
fever/malaria care obtained. The nature of competition is considered in Section 12.4, through an 
assessment of the market's place in the monopoly-perfect competition continuum, and potential 
insights from models of monopolistic and oligopolistic competition. The links between 
competition and treatment accessibility, quality and affordability are analysed, leading to the 
identification of a number of market failures. Finally, Section 12.5 discusses the nature of 
regulation, and the extent to which the regulatory system controlled for market failures. 
12.2 The Relative Roles of Retailers and Facilities 
The majority of provider visits for fever were to retail outlets. Although the proportion due to 
malaria was unknown, it was likely to have been a significant cause. Shops treated only 
relatively mild cases, but as the treatment of uncomplicated malaria affects the probability of 
progressing to severe disease (Greenwood et al. 1987), they were likely to have had an 
important indirect effect on severe disease and mortality. 
There were a number of reasons for the popularity of shops, reflecting the interplay of market 
structure, provider conduct, demand and regulation. Retailers offered long opening hours, 
friendly and courteous service, and the potential to avoid the non-drug fees charged at most 
facilities. In addition, drug stores attracted consumers through the perceived expertise of their 
staff, and the reliability of their drug stocks. Partly as a result of the lack of regulatory 
enforcement, they generally stocked a wider range of products than government facilities. They 
were also more likely to stock antimalarials perceived to be of higher quality due to their 
packaging or country of manufacture. General stores had the advantage of proximity for most 
households, and their convenient but unspecialised services were seen as adequate for common 
fevers, which were not perceived as serious illnesses. 
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By contrast, government facilities had longer waiting times, shorter opening hours, and much 
longer travel times than general stores. They had a more limited drug range than drug stores, 
mainly consisting of poorly perceived domestically manufactured products, and were known for 
their frequent stockouts. However, as demonstrated in Chapter 8, no one outlet type was clearly 
perceived to be of higher quality all round. Despite their limitations, government facilities 
remained responsible for 26% of fever/malaria visits, perhaps reflecting the perception that they 
were appropriate providers for more severe disease, especially in children, combined with their 
highly subsidised or free drugs. However, their affordability was likely to have been 
undermined by their frequent official and unofficial non-drug fees, and the indirect costs of 
waiting time. Private facilities generally had better drug ranges and stock reliability, and more 
frequently had functioning microscopy services. However, they mainly served the better-off 
households, reflecting the high level of their drug and non-drug fees. 
In sum, retailers were very important providers in the fever/malaria treatment market. They 
acted as both substitutes for government facilities, and as complements in providing a 
supplementary drug source for government facility patients. In addition, there were other links 
between the two sectors, with a third of drug shops owned by MOH personnel, and drug and 
general store staff frequently citing public facility staff as sources of information on drugs. 
123 Comparison with the Literature on Fever/Malaria Treatment 
No comparative studies were identified analysing the nature of competition in African 
fever/malaria treatment markets. However, there were many overlaps in the data collected with 
studies describing features of both demand and supply. The thesis results are compared with 
their findings below, beginning with other studies within Tanzania, and then broadening the 
comparison to the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. 
It is possible to identify a number of common features with other Tanzanian studies in terms of 
treatment-seeking behaviour and market structure. Several studies also found that traditional 
practitioners are rarely used for mild malaria symptoms, but that retailers are an important 
source (Alilio et at. 1997; Nsimba et al. 1999; Okoli 2001). Comparison of treatment obtained 
within Tanzania is restricted by the limited number of community-based household surveys 
reporting treatment seeking during actual episodes. A similar survey in the thesis study districts 
(plus Morogoro-Rural) for the evaluation of IMCI found slightly lower use of antimalarials in 
febrile under fives (42% compared with 53% in this study) (Armstrong Schellenberg et al. 
2003), perhaps reflecting that the IMCI survey covered all rural areas of the districts, rather than 
just the DSS sites, and therefore included more remote locations. Nationally representative data 
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are provided by the Demographic Health Surveys (DHS), which found that in 1999,52% of 
children under five with fever had received an antimalarial, a figure very close to that obtained 
in this study (National Bureau of Statistics Tanzania and Macro International Inc. 2000). 
On the supply-side, the characteristics of drug and general stores in terms of staff and stocking 
patterns seem relatively standard in other studies, although they are insufficiently detailed for a 
comprehensive comparison (Alilio et al. 1997; Massele et al. 1993; Nsimba et al. 1999; Okoli 
2001). Similar inadequacies in regulatory implementation were reported in drug shops in Dar es 
Salaam, where 85% of undercover caretakers obtained prescription-only drugs without a 
prescription from drug stores and pharmacies (Kumaranayake et al. 2003). Government failures 
in public sector provision have been widely reported across Tanzania, such as drug stock-outs, 
long waiting times, poor geographical accessibility and corruption (Abdulla 2001; Abel-Smith 
and Rawal 1992; Gilson, Kitange and Teuscher 1993; Gilson, Magomi and Mkangaa 1995). 
However, the geographical focus of Tanzanian studies is quite limited, almost entirely restricted 
to the eastern half of the country, with only one small study identified from western Tanzania 
(Okoli 2001). 
Household and outlet surveys elsewhere in Africa demonstrate a number of similarities in the 
market for fever/malaria treatment across countries. The problems of poor quality of public 
facility care are echoed by the similar issues raised in consumer-focused research from many 
areas (Williams and Jones 2004). Studies in a wide variety of settings cite similar advantages 
with retailers, including accessibility, speed of service, potential to purchase by proxy, drug 
availability, friendly staff and lower costs (Adome, Whyte and Hardon 1996; Kachur et al. 
unpub. report; McCombie 1996; Molyneux et al. 1999; Snow et al. 1992; Van der Geest 1987; 
Williams and Jones 2004). 
The problems with retail treatment quality found in this study have also been described in other 
settings. From a review of the literature, McCombie estimated that overall only a third to a half 
of febrile illnesses were treated with antimalarials, meaning that this study's figure of 37% is 
fairly typical (McCombie 2002). Frequent antimalarial underdosing has also been widely 
reported (Amin et al. 2004; Marsh et al. 1999; McCombie 2002), although it is not possible to 
compare the thesis figures for drugs obtained directly with those for drugs consumed from other 
settings. Persistent demand for chloroquine, even when it is highly ineffective, was also 
observed in Malawi, even after their official policy change to SP (Kachur et al. unpub. report). 
Other studies have also shown frequent use of inappropriate drugs. Similar rates of aspirin use 
in children were documented in coastal Kenya (Marsh et al. 1999). Much higher rates of 
antibiotic provision from drug shops for childhood fevers were observed in Uganda (48% vs 
11 % in this study) (Nshakira et al. 2002). However, antibiotic use appeared slightly greater than 
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in Burkina Faso, where only 4% of drugs provided were antibiotics, compared with 7% in this 
study (Muller et al. 2003). The illegal stocking of prescription medicines by retailers is very 
widely observed across the literature (Adikwu 1996; Adome, Whyte and Hardon 1996; Fassin 
1988; Geissler et al. 2000; Murray et al. 1998; Oshiname and Brieger 1992; Van der Geest 
1987), and poor quality antimalarials on the private market have also been documented in many 
countries (Amin et al. 2004; Basco 2004; Minzi et al. 2003; Ogwal Okeng, Okello and Odyek 
1998; Risha et al. 2002; Shakoor, Taylor and Behrens 1997; Taylor et al. 2001). 
The high total markups over 1RP reported in this study have also been found in surveys using 
the WHO/Health Action International medicine pricing methodology in private retail 
pharmacies, although evidence from non-pharmacy outlets is very limited (WHO & HAI 2003). 
In Kenya, the median ratio of retail prices to IRPs for a range of essential drugs in private 
pharmacies was 17 for innovator brands, and 4 for the lowest priced generic in each drug 
category (Madden 2004). In Ghana these ratios were 14 and 3. This compares with a ratio of 6 
for loose SP and 10 for packaged SP reported in this study. 
The limited evidence available also indicates some similarities in market segmentation, with 
households with higher education levels also more likely to obtain an antimalarial in Malawi 
(Slutsker et al. 1994), and higher SES associated with greater use of private facilities across sub- 
Saharan Africa, but little variation by SES in use of lower-level government facilities or shops 
(Filmer 2002). The higher use of facilities for children than for adults reported in this study 
followed patterns in other endemic settings (Agyepong and Manderson 1994; Geissler et al. 
2000; Krause and Sauerborn 2000), in contrast to the relative homogeneity of treatment seeking 
patterns across age groups reported in epidemic-prone regions (Guyatt and Snow 2004; 
Lindblade et al. 2000). 
However, the evidence demonstrates some important cross-country variation, particularly in the 
frequency of shop use, and the types of retailers. The percentage of care-seekers using shops 
during recent childhood illness ranged from 15% to 82% across Africa (Brieger et al. 2004). In 
the thesis study sites 44% of under fives used shops, locating the market in the middle of this 
range, similar to areas of Kenya, Somalia and Nigeria, but much higher than the Gambia, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
There were also some important differences in the types of retailer involved in drug selling. In 
Uganda, drug and general shops were the main retail suppliers, as in the thesis study sites, but 
drugs were also sold in markets (Adome, Whyte and Hardon 1996). In coastal Kenya, a higher 
percentage of general retailers stocked antimalarials (73%, compared with 14% in this study in 
late 2001), perhaps due to the absence of drug stores in those rural areas (Molyneux et al. 1999). 
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In West Africa, itinerant vendors are often an important retail supplier of drugs (Djimde et at. 
1998; Faye et al. 1996; Oshiname and Brieger 1992; Van der Geest 1987), but these were never 
observed in this study. 
There were some similarities in the patterns of wholesale supply documented by other East 
African studies, particular in the use of general wholesalers by general retailers, and wholesale 
pharmacies by drug stores (Adome, Whyte and Hardon 1996; Marsh et al. 2004; Tavrow, 
Shabahang and Makama 2003). In contrast, mobile vendors frequently supplied rural 
shops/kiosks in Western Kenya, and in Nigeria, sales reps from pharmacies and pharmaceutical 
companies were a principal source of drugs (Adikwu 1996). 
In sum, the evidence indicates many similarities in the demand and supply of fever/malaria 
treatment within other settings in Tanzania and elsewhere in Africa. However, there are some 
important cross-country differences in the market structure of the retail sector and its 
importance for fever/malaria treatment. The potential for comparison with the existing literature 
was very limited for a number of the study findings, such as those concerning market definition, 
market concentration, entry and exit and price competition. These are closely related to the 
nature of competition, to which the analysis now turns. 
12.4 The Nature of Competition 
12.4.1 How Competitive is the Market for Fever/Malaria Treatment? 
At first glance the market for fever/malaria treatment might appear relatively close to the 
competitive end of the monopoly-perfect competition continuum. Each DSS area had a high 
number of drug providers, with the prevalence of microenterprises reflecting the structure 
observed in markets for other products elsewhere in Africa (Fafchamps 1997). The shops sold a 
wide range of antimalarial and painkiller products. The drugs were largely based on standard 
formulations and therefore were potentially relatively homogenous goods, and none of the 
products were on patent. Households obtained treatment regularly, so repeat purchases should 
have allowed consumers to become familiar with products and prices. The service was relatively 
simple, and most drug treatments were fully tradable after purchase (in contrast for example to 
inpatient care). Consumers were likely to be price sensitive because of their low SES and the 
overwhelming predominance of out-of-pocket payment. In such settings, the role of providing a 
financial safety net is likely to have fallen to extended family and/or other informal structures, 
which were unlikely to have nearly such a significant impact on price elasticity of demand as 
formal insurance. With the exception of two village drug stores, all retail outlets were run on a 
commercial basis, and therefore would be expected to reflect profit-maximising objectives. The 
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agency role of the provider was less important than in other health care markets; consumers had 
a free choice of provider and in shops were free to choose their own treatment if they wished. 
Contestability was relatively strong in the retail market, especially for general stores which 
experienced extremely high turnover. General shopkeepers frequently combined shop-trading 
with other activities, such as farming, a pattern frequently observed by small-scale traders 
elsewhere (Fafchamps 1997). In fact it appeared that any farmer who could raise a little capital 
from cultivation could become a small general shopkeeper almost overnight. Once established 
as a general trader, it was very easy for shopkeepers to add or subtract commonly available 
drugs from their product range. Despite the regulations on establishing drug stores, high levels 
of entry were taking place for these outlets as well. We did not witness attempts by providers to 
change market structure through, for example, large advertising campaigns, predatory pricing 
policies, or horizontal integration. Finally, the degree of vertical integration or coordination with 
providers further up the distribution chain was very limited; there were no examples of long- 
term contracts, product tie-ins, or aggressive detailing by pharmaceutical company reps, and 
only a couple of shops reported receiving recommended retail prices from distributors. 
However, closer examination highlighted a number of reasons why the competitive model is 
inappropriate. Markups were high, and there was considerable evidence of product 
differentiation and segmentation by geographical area and product and provider type, as 
commonly observed in other health care markets (Dranove and Satterthwaite 2000). 
The evidence presented in Chapter 9 demonstrated considerable price variations and high retail 
markups, especially in drug stores. It was not possible to assess how far this reflected the high 
overhead costs of running remote outlets. In addition, consumers may have limited their 
investigation of relative prices due to search-related costs, which would be relatively high when 
treatment was needed for an urgent illness. However, it seemed likely that to some degree prices 
diverged from marginal cost due to the exercise of market power derived from strong product 
differentiation and high sub-market concentration. 
In practice, drugs were far from homogenous goods. As in much of the pharmaceutical industry, 
we observed considerable deliberate product differentiation on the basis of formulation, 
packaging and brand name, with significant price premia attached to superior characteristics. 
Strong product differentiation reduces the cross-price elasticity of demand between different 
providers and between different products, thus tempering the intensity of price competition. For 
SP we observed the situation described as the "generic competition paradox" (Scherer 2000), 
where the post-patent market was segmented, with innovator brands (FansidarT" and 
Metakelfintm) maintaining a price premium, although in theory other SP products were identical 
in technical terms. It was presumably more profitable for their producers to serve relatively 
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price insensitive consumers at a high price, than to lower the price to attract those with a more 
price elastic demand. However, SP was the exception; such innovator brands were not found in 
the market for other antimalarials, although there remained considerable variation across brands. 
The product market definition for uncomplicated fever/malaria treatment was set as 
antimalarials and painkillers supplied by facilities, drug stores and general stores. However, the 
intensity of competition varied across these outlet types, with greater perceived competition 
between facilities and drug stores than with general stores. The perception of drug stores as 
providers for "complete cures" with qualified staff and good quality drugs, compared with 
general stores for "first aid" only, may have enhanced quality by directing customers to more 
knowledgeable sellers, but also restricted competition by encouraging the view of drug stores as 
the only appropriate retail source for antimalarial treatment. Competition between general stores 
may also have been reduced by the tendency of consumers to use local shops where they were 
well known and had good relations with the owner or serving staff. 
Even within DSS areas, the market was strongly geographically segmented, with the majority of 
sub-markets having populations under 10,000. Such segmentation or fragmentation has been 
observed in many African markets (Jones, Lindauer and Roemer 1991). As a result, competitive 
conditions differed for the supply of antimalarials and painkillers. Antimalarial availability had 
become increasingly restricted over time in general stores, and concentration based on 
antimalarial sales was high in all geographical sub-markets. The significant link between private 
sector concentration and antimalarial retail prices suggested that concentration was an important 
factor raising price above marginal cost. It was notable that general store prices were higher 
than those in drug stores for antimalarials, but lower for painkillers. This also pointed to the 
important influence of concentration on price, as the general store market segment had much 
lower concentration for painkillers than for antimalarials. However, although there were many 
alternative painkiller sources in most sub-markets, evidence indicated a rapid narrowing of the 
number of providers involved in general store supply as one moved up the distribution chain. 
12.4.2 The Relevance of Models of Monopolistic and Oligopolistic Competition 
Monopolistic competition was likely to have been an appropriate characterisation for the market 
for painkillers in most geographical sub-markets. In these settings of relatively low 
concentration, there were a substantial number of firms whose services were good but not 
perfect substitutes. In the short-run, shops may have made economic profits. In the long-run 
these would have been eroded by entry of new shops but, even in long-run equilibrium, price 
would have remained above marginal cost because shops were likely to have faced downward- 
sloping demand curves. 
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However, in other geographical and product segments, the potential for oligopolistic behaviour 
clearly existed. It has been suggested that where the 4-firm ratio exceeds 40%, oligopoly is 
likely to occur (Scherer 1970). For antimalarials, even the 3-firm ratio was 69% or above in all 
sub-markets. With such high concentration and significant barriers to entry for drug stores, 
private firms were likely to consider the behaviour of their competitors in making decisions on 
price and quality, the defining characteristic of oligopolistic competition. Even for painkillers, 
oligopoly conditions may have prevailed in some sub-markets which had relatively few drug 
outlets overall, or among the wholesalers serving general retail stores. 
A potentially oligopolistic market structure does not determine the type of competitive 
interaction that will take place. Several oligopoly models may provide insights, especially those 
modelling the firm's choice of price (as opposed to quantity supplied), as this most closely 
reflects the reality of retail competition. 
One might expect facilities to be the market leader(s) in each sub-market, drawing on oligopoly 
models of price leadership (Varian 1999). Unlike leaders in conventional models, government 
facilities were unlikely to take retail behaviour into account in setting their prices or capacity, 
which were generally fixed by the government to meet goals unrelated to profit-maximisation. 
However, one could consider retailers as conventional followers, taking facility price and 
capacity as given, and proceeding to set their own prices to maximise profits. Standard price 
leadership models assume homogenous goods, and therefore that followers are obliged to 
behave as perfect competitors, charging the price set by the leader. As retail products in these 
markets were differentiated by product and outlet characteristics, retailers would have had more 
discretion over their prices, and may have chosen to exceed or undercut those of facilities. 
In view of the inequality of sales volumes across retailers, drug stores may have played a 
leadership role within the retail sector. As profit maximisers, they would then set their price 
given the likely supply of general retailers at each drug store price, and general stores would 
have set prices given the choice of the leading drug store. This would lead to a tiered model, 
with price and product range set by drug stores taking facility decisions as given, and by general 
stores given both facility and drug store choices. 
The kinked demand model (Clarke 1985) may provide some insights into the high retail 
markups observed. Once a substantial markup was established in the market it may have 
resisted erosion if retailers believed their competitors would match their price cuts, but not their 
price increases. As a result, relatively large falls in wholesale costs would be required before 
retailers would cut prices. 
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Finally, models of tacit collusion among retailers may also be of use (Chamberlin 1933). 
Several factors argued to be conducive to the prevention of cheating in cartels were present in 
the retail sub-markets. The number of outlets was small, and it would be relatively easy to 
observe cheating, as retailers could obtain information on competitors' prices from customers, or 
by visiting the shops themselves. In addition, general stores had "multi-market" contact (Tirole 
1988), so general retailers may have avoided price cuts on drugs if competitors were likely to 
retaliate on other household goods. Even with the narrower product range of drug stores, the 
number of different drugs sold may have led them to fear a damaging price war across their 
product range if they dropped the price on one popular item. If such collusion did prevail, one 
would have expected firms to act collectively to maximise total market profits, and therefore 
price could have been set as high as the monopoly level. 
The models of competition described above are based on the underlying assumption that 
providers have profit-maximising objectives. One might expect this to be a central objective for 
commercial shop owners, but the full picture is likely to be more complicated. Ownership was 
separated from control of day-to-day selling in most drug stores, although owners generally 
retained control of pricing and product range. However, both owners and serving staff may have 
included variables other than profits in their objective functions, such as their reputation in the 
community, the assistance of vulnerable groups, or good relations with their fellow traders 
(Goel et al. 1996). While there was no explicit system of professional ethics among drug or 
general store staff, there were likely to be informal social constraints at the community level in 
these small rural settlements. Moreover, they may have followed the norms of cooperation, 
rather than competition, as observed among other African microenterprises (Fafchamps 1994; 
Tripp 2003). As a result, retailers may not have fully exploited their market power to raise 
prices even where this potential existed. 
It is not possible from the data collected to say that any one model is most appropriate in these 
markets. Both monopolistic and oligopolistic conditions existed in different market segments, 
and a range of non-collusive and (tacitly) collusive/cooperative pricing strategies were probably 
employed. It might be considered surprising that shopkeepers argued in qualitative interviews 
that price competition was very strong. A similar discrepancy was observed in work by Amin, 
who found that Bangladeshi hospital owners perceived their markets to be very competitive, 
although the markets were highly concentrated (Amin 2002). He argues that this may reflect a 
lack of consideration of market segmentation and unequal market shares by owners, or a fear of 
competition heightening its perception. 
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12.4.3 Competition and Treatment Accessibility 
Retail competition clearly increased the geographical and temporal accessibility of drugs in the 
DSS areas. In comparison with facilities, shop opening hours were longer, visits were less time- 
consuming, and it was not necessary for the patient themselves to attend. In addition, general 
shops were very numerous and widely dispersed, meaning that painkillers were available close 
to the home for most households, even in remote farming locations. However, antimalarial 
accessibility was much more restricted. This reflected the product range of general stores and 
the location of drug stores, which tended to be very close to facilities. According to Hotelling 
Models of product differentiation, there may be maximal or minimal differentiation, depending 
on the market characteristics (Hotelling 1929). The minimal geographical differentiation in this 
case may have reflected the economics of agglomeration in locating in areas where demand was 
greatest, and the weakness of price competition (Tirole 1988). Perhaps more importantly, drug 
stores often acted as complements rather than substitutes for facilities on the frequent occasions 
when government facilities experienced drug stockouts, and therefore benefited from being as 
close as possible to attract the frustrated consumers. The lack of antimalarials in general stores 
reflected a mixture of supply side, demand side and regulatory influences. Antimalarials were 
difficult to obtain from their normal wholesalers, expensive to purchase given the limited capital 
of shopkeepers, and rarely requested by their customers. Shopkeepers argued that they lacked 
the expertise to sell these drugs, and a high proportion believed it was illegal for them to do so. 
These influences resulted in significant barriers to entry into antimalarial supply, reducing 
contestability in this market segment. 
12.4.4 Competition and Treatment Quality 
Treatment quality depends on many factors: prompt care-seeking, accurate diagnosis, staff 
expertise, availability and quality of drugs, drug packaging, appropriate dosing, and the 
likelihood that staff act in the patient's best interests. Non-price competition could lead to 
higher quality standards if providers competed over characteristics correlated with these aspects 
of technical quality. While the evidence demonstrated that non-price competition was important 
for shops, it will lead to improved outcomes only if consumers can observe quality, value it, and 
have the ability to pay for it. 
Consumers were reported to base their choices on some easily observable quality attributes, 
such as drug availability, proximity, opening hours and waiting time. As discussed above, shop 
competition over these attributes had no doubt increased the relative accessibility of care. To a 
large extent this explains the high coverage of treatment of some kind, and the promptness of 
treatment seeking. 
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Consumers were also reported to base their choices on perceptions of drug quality, and the 
expertise and trustworthiness of staff, which one might expect to be positively correlated with 
technical quality. However, in practice we noted widespread use of inappropriate drugs and 
doses and poor quality SP. This reflected in part the information characteristics of fever/malaria 
treatment. Painkillers and antimalarials have some characteristics of experience goods which 
consumers can judge after consumption, such as taste and minor side-effects. In general, 
however, they would better be characterised as credence goods, as quality is difficult to observe 
even after treatment, because there are many other influences on treatment outcome (Darby and 
Karni 1973). Even if appropriate malaria treatment were recommended, the patient may not 
recover if the illness was not caused by malaria, the patient did not adhere to the dosing 
regimen, or they succumbed to another infection. On the other hand, if the patient makes a full 
recovery this may be attributed to the most recent therapy used, when in reality it was a result of 
acquired immunity or the delayed action of drugs taken earlier. Finally, there is potential for 
confusion over the antipyretic and antimalarial effects of some products; chloroquine reduces 
fever independently of its antimalarial action, and may therefore be perceived as effective 
against non-malarial febrile illnesses. It is thus hard for consumers to make informed decisions 
on whether to re-visit a provider or re-use a given product in the event of a recurrence or future 
episode, and repeat purchases therefore fail to discipline the market. This problem was evident 
from the persistently high demand for chloroquine up until the change in first line drug policy, 
even though resistance levels were extremely high. 
Where consumers cannot assess quality directly, they tend to use observable proxies. Customers 
were said to use several proxies for drug quality including outlet type, packaging, country of 
manufacture and brand name. Some consumers were willing to pay significantly more for well- 
known brands, reflecting the accumulated goodwill and reputation of these products, combined 
with concern over the quality of other products. However, the potential for branding to 
communicate useful information may have been compromised for three reasons. Firstly, the 
importance of well-known brands led other manufacturers to locate their products as close as 
possible to lead brands in product space, in order to "borrow" the product's reputation. 
Secondly, the sheer number of branded generics, particularly for SP and amodiaquine, is likely 
to have caused confusion in itself, making it difficult for consumers to remember their 
reputation or even which active ingredient they contained. This could lead to a situation 
analogous to the "increasing monopoly" model (Pauly and Satterthwaite 1981), with an increase 
in the number of brands decreasing consumer experience and information about each one, 
making them less price sensitive and providing established providers with greater market power. 
Thirdly, these drug quality proxies clearly conferred significant price premia on certain drugs, 
but evidence on their correlation with actual quality is very limited. In Cameroun, packaged 
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antimalarials were much better quality than loose tablets (Basco 2004). However, in the basic 
tests of content for SP tablets reported in Chapter 6, there was no clear relationship between 
quality in terms of the proxies of packaging, country of manufacture, outlet type or brand. If 
these proxies and their associated price premia do not reflect true quality differences, the market 
will be inefficient, and the economic burden on poor consumers will be unnecessarily increased. 
For staff expertise, customers were reported to rely partially on the proxy of outlet type, leading 
some to favour drug stores over general stores, or to use facilities more for severe cases and 
treatment failures. We found this to be only partly justified. Consumers would be correct on 
average to assume that drug store sellers were better informed than general shopkeepers. 
However, the trust placed in drug store sellers may in some cases have been misplaced; they 
often had minimal pre-nursing training and made basic errors in dosage recommendations. 
Although the average length of training was longer for government staff, consumers were 
actually more likely to be served by someone with a health qualification in a drug store than in a 
government facility. The poor quality of government facility treatment in terms of 
appropriateness of drugs and doses may have been influenced to some degree by drug 
availability, but was also likely to have reflected poor provider knowledge, which has been 
documented in similar facilities elsewhere (Clarke et al. 1992; Massele et al. 1993). 
Even where providers have greater expertise than their clients, they may not use this asymmetry 
of information in the interest of their patients. There may be a temptation to engage in supplier- 
induced demand, recommending unnecessary costly treatments. This did not appear to be a key 
problem in this market. For general shopkeepers, it was unlikely because their agency role was 
so limited. In government and mission facilities, staff did not officially have financial incentives 
to induce demand, but this may have occurred where unofficial fees were charged or official 
fees diverted to individuals. It is possible that supplier-induced demand contributed to the 
frequency of antibiotic and injectable antimalarial provision in drug stores. However, household 
survey data did not indicate that these drugs were more likely to be selected by the drug store 
seller, as opposed to the consumer, than other medications supplied. Sellers in drug stores may 
have chosen not to exploit the potential for demand inducement where it existed for ethical 
reasons, or to preserve their reputation among customers and fellow sellers. 
Other elements of non-price competition may be negatively correlated with technical quality. 
Quality may be reduced by competition on strategies to increase convenience for customers, 
such as the potential to avoid waiting for consultations and lab tests, or the potential to purchase 
on the patient's behalf, which makes it harder for providers to judge the appropriateness of 
treatment. Competition over strategies to increase affordability may have a similarly negative 
effect, with financial incentives leading shopkeepers to supply antimalarial under-doses or just 
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painkillers. Only 6% of visits for fever/malaria to general stores are estimated to have led to 
patients obtaining at least a minimum antimalarial dose, and only 40% at drug stores (although 
the latter was still greater than the proportion at government facilities). 
Finally, consumers may have chosen to under-dose or over-use antimalarials and antibiotics, 
because most of the costs of such behaviour in terms of drug pressure fall on other community 
members, not the individual concerned (Hanson 2004). Such negative consumption externalities 
may accelerate the development of antimicrobial resistance. 
Analysis of developed country health care markets, such as the US hospital market, has 
frequently focused on models of quality competition, where the equilibrium level of quality is 
potentially excessive in efficiency terms, and an increase in competition may result in a rise in 
price due to the cost of high quality, rather than a fall (Dranove and Satterthwaite 2000). This is 
believed to reflect consumers who are quality sensitive but insensitive to price. However, in this 
market the reverse appeared to hold, with concentration and price being positively linked, as one 
would expect from standard economic theory. In this setting of imperfectly observable quality 
and price sensitive consumers, the fear is that there will be a "rush to the bottom", where 
providers are unable to demonstrate their superior quality so a "market for lemons" emerges in 
which "low price -- low quality" practitioners compete better quality providers out of existence 
(Akerlof 1970; Leonard 2000). While there were elements of this characterisation in the 
fever/malaria treatment market, these tendencies appeared tempered to some degree. This may 
have reflected some level of consumer information on this common cause of illness, the 
willingness to rely on provider advice, and the broader incentives of providers to serve the 
community well, rather than to aim purely for short-term profit maximisation. 
12.45 Competition and Affordability 
The level of price markups on drugs substantially increased the absolute differential between 
antimalarial and painkiller prices. For example, a child's dose of SP cost on average Tsh200 
compared with a couple of paracetamol tablets at Tsh2O. This was likely to be a strong 
explanatory factor in the use of painkillers alone in 39% of fever cases. Differences in 
percentage markups between chloroquine and SP also contributed to the more than sixfold 
difference in their median prices, partly explaining why although 37% of fever cases obtained 
an antimalarial, the drugs were only categorised as "effective" for 16%. However, preliminary 
analysis of the IMPACT 2002 household survey did not indicate that the official introduction of 
SP as first line drug and the decline in chloroquine availability had led to the fall in antimalarial 
utilisation one might expect; in fact the percentage of fever/malaria patients receiving an 
antimalarial remained constant at 37%, of which 34% were classified as effective (Kachur et al, 
208 
unpublished data, IMPACT collaboration). This appeared to reflect a decrease in the probability 
of getting an antimalarial at shop visits, combined with an increase in the proportion of patients 
visiting facilities and drug stores, where antimalarials were more often supplied. Further 
analysis is warranted to investigate why treatment seeking patterns changed, and whether the 
economic burden on households has increased. 
A range of institutional and market-based mechanisms should have been in place to protect the 
poorest from the costs of treatment seeking, but in practice they did not function well. In 
government facilities, fees were often charged for services which should have been provided 
free, and in government and private facilities, implementation of exemptions appeared limited 
and haphazard. Moreover, the uncertainties surrounding total fees for consumers at these 
facilities may have led risk averse consumers to choose retailers instead, even if average shop 
costs were similar or higher. 
In the private sector, credit was rarely given in practice for fever/malaria treatment, and third- 
degree price discrimination was restricted to a few ad hoc discounts. There was no systematic 
sliding scale, analogous to that used historically by private doctors in the West (Jacobs 1997). 
This was not surprising in view of the potential for arbitrage with highly tradeable goods such 
as fever/malaria drugs, in contrast to more complex medical treatments which tend to be 
embodied in the treated patient. 
It was therefore not surprising that the appropriateness of treatment obtained and SES were 
significantly linked; individuals from households with higher SES were more likely to get an 
antimalarial and to get at least a minimum dose. However, even in the better-off third only 19% 
of individuals obtained an adequate dose of an effective antimalarial, indicating that price was 
likely to have been an important barrier to all groups, no doubt reflecting that nearly all 
households in the DSS areas were poor by absolute standards. 
12.5 The Nature of Regulation 
This section considers whether regulation provides an efficient solution to the market failures 
identified. The impact of regulation should be considered in terms of both its costs and benefits, 
including outcomes such as accessibility, consumer safety, quality, price and equity (Jan, 
Palmer and Mills 2004; Kirkpatrick 2001). Regulatory costs were not evaluated in this study, 
but some general observations can be made. Including drug issues in environmental health 
inspections was likely to have added little to government implementation costs. However, drug 
store inspections involved separate visits by DHMT staff, and consumed scarce professional 
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time and transport resources at district level. The opportunity cost of drug store regulation may 
have included less facility supervision and fewer district planning activities. 
Regulatory systems may benefit consumers and facilitate competition through rules controlling 
for the market failures that endanger treatment quality and consumer safety. However, such 
strategies may also provide market power to certain providers, potentially restricting price and 
non-price competition. The regulatory system had this double-edged effect in this market 
through the barriers to entry for establishing drug stores. Official designation as a drug store 
acted as a signal of quality, clearly differentiating drug stores from general stores, because the 
former were seen as sources of medical expertise and better quality drugs. To a limited degree 
this addressed the market failure of imperfect information, but also provided market power to 
incumbent drug stores. 
In many countries, legal entry for an entrepreneur is very time-consuming and expensive 
because of the number, nature and cost of the procedures involved (Djankov et al. 2000). For 
drug stores, the health-related regulatory entry barriers were relatively high. They were required 
to obtain a Pharmacy Board permit, which involved a fee and a complex process, with 
permission required from the village authorities, the District Medical Officer, the Regional 
Pharmacist, and the Regional Pharmacy Board, before the permit was signed by the Regional 
Commissioner. To be approved they were required to meet a set of conditions covering the shop 
premises and qualifications of the seller. Although rarely adhered to precisely, they were 
generally met partially, and were likely to have incurred significant costs for owners, and 
therefore restricted the total number of drug stores, and reduced contestability. However, the 
rapid growth in the number of drug stores during the study period demonstrated that 
overcoming these barriers was frequently considered worthwhile. In theory drug shops were 
allowed to open only in areas currently "under-served". This was clearly not universally 
enforced, as we found many closely located drug stores and some market centres with clusters 
of five or six. However, to the degree it was followed it could effectively have provided existing 
drug stores with a local monopoly, and may have discouraged potential entrants, rather than 
diverting them to other areas. In contrast, regulatory entry barriers were relatively insignificant 
for general stores, especially those operating on a small-scale. This was demonstrated by the 
very high turnover of general retailers, indicating a highly contestable market. During 
qualitative interviews general retailers very rarely mentioned regulatory hurdles as a key barrier 
to entry, and were much more likely to raise the problem of obtaining capital. Neither general 
nor drug store interviewees volunteered difficulties in entering the market due to corruption or 
bribery, although this has been found to be of great significance in other settings (de Soto 1990). 
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Beyond these eligibility requirements, health-related regulation at the retail level was not 
designed to influence directly the majority of the public health concerns arising from market 
failure; it did not cover pricing, dosing, increasing drug accessibility, or address drug quality at 
the retail level beyond the checking of expiry dates. Instead, as with most drug regulation, it 
focused on preventing the harmful use of medicines by restricting their availability to outlets 
with suitably qualified staff. Even in these terms, the benefits for treatment quality appeared 
small. Health-related inspections of general stores were limited to the environmental health 
visits of the Ward Health Assistant, who had very narrow responsibilities concerning drugs, 
limited to checking cleanliness and expiry dates. Moreover, the lack of clarity in the regulatory 
system over which drugs were allowed in general stores may have had a negative impact on 
antimalarial accessibility. 
Most drug stores were regularly inspected on drug matters, but this activity seemed unlikely to 
affect treatment quality significantly. Inspections did not ensure that the registered individual 
staffed the outlet, nor control the sale of prohibited or inappropriately packaged drugs. 
Inspections may have had a role in reducing the prevalence of expired products, but retail 
inspectors had no way of assessing other potential causes of sub-standard drugs, such as poor 
manufacturing quality. They could have checked whether brands were registered in Tanzania 
and had therefore been approved by the Pharmacy Board, but this was never raised as part of the 
inspection. Government failure in regulation therefore contributed to the sale of inappropriate 
medicines and packaging, and unregistered products of unknown quality. While this failure may 
have contributed to poor quality treatment and increased antimalarial and antibiotic drug 
pressure, to some degree it also had important benefits for treatment accessibility, as drug 
supplies were more reliable and varied in shops than in facilities. For example, effective 
antimalarials were stocked illegally in drug stores before the policy change to SP when most 
government facilities had only ineffective chloroquine. 
Drug stores had strong financial incentives to operate partially outside official regulations, and 
to make a good living may have been obliged to do so. Although government officials went 
through the motions of performing inspections and occasionally confiscating openly displayed 
antibiotics, we concluded that they did not seriously attempt to eliminate these practices. This 
probably reflected imperfect information about retailer behaviour, and some element of 
regulatory capture, with vested self-interests successfully influencing regulatory 
implementation. Perhaps more importantly, inspectors may have viewed elimination as 
infeasible, and/or harmful to community drug access. A similar approach to regulatory 
infringements has been documented among pharmacy inspectors in Sri Lanka, who took a 
"passive role" in their dealings with unlicensed pharmacies in remote areas, because they felt 
the service provided had important social benefits (Attanayake and Siyambalagoda 2003). In the 
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Tanzanian study sites, tacit permission of infringements led to a division between the official de 
facto regulations, and a locally legitimate de jure version, creating uncertainty for retail staff, 
who were never sure whether they would be apprehended, and giving an adversarial tone to 
inspections. This contrasted with the quarterly supervisions of private dispensaries by the same 
DHMT team, which were seen in a positive light by staff, who commented that they were 
helpful and informative, a source of information on government policy, and an opportunity to 
discuss operational problems. No interviewees volunteered any such positive, educational 
aspects to drug store inspections. 
12.6 Summary and Conclusions 
Retailers played an important role in the treatment of uncomplicated fever/malaria, acting as 
both substitutes and complements to facility services. Their high use reflected a number of 
perceived advantages, related to their opening hours, location, courtesy, cost, expertise, product 
range and stock reliability. Frequent use of retailers also reflected the poorly perceived services 
of public sector facilities. Government failure in the provision of fever/malaria treatment in its 
own facilities was therefore likely to have contributed to the growth and development of the 
retail drug sector. 
Comparison of the study findings with other literature on fever/malaria treatment demonstrated 
many similarities in the demand and supply of care in other settings in Tanzania, and elsewhere 
in Africa. However, there are some important cross-country differences. Firstly, the proportion 
of care seekers using the retail sector varies considerably, with this study falling roughly in the 
middle of the range reported. Secondly, the type of retailers selling drugs is different in some 
other settings where, for example, itinerant vendors play a larger role, or drug shops do not 
exist. 
Retail providers increased the accessibility, range and reliability of drug stocks in the study 
areas, and were partly responsible for the high coverage of some kind of treatment and prompt 
treatment-seeking observed. However, the market for fever/malaria treatment exhibited a 
number of market failures. In their discussion of market failure and the pharmaceutical industry, 
Henry and Lexchin state that "Markets work well for society when there is price competition, 
comprehensive and accurate information, an adequate supply of drugs, where consumers are 
able to make informed unpressured choices between competing products, and where there are 
few barriers for entry to the market" (Henry and Lexchin 2002). A number of these 
considerations were not met in the market under analysis. Market concentration was high, price 
competition was weak, information on treatment quality was poor for both consumers and 
providers, antimalarial supplies were not easily available from general stores, and there were 
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important consumption externalities from inappropriate antimicrobial consumption. In addition, 
vulnerable patients were likely to have been excluded from more appropriate care due to an 
inability to pay. These failures contributed directly to many of the observed inadequacies in 
treatment described in Chapter 6: low antimalarial coverage, inequitable access to quality care, 
frequent under-dosing, and frequent use of ineffective, poor quality and poorly packaged 
antimalarials. Health-related retail regulation was not designed to address most of these market 
or equity failures. Moreover, there was clear evidence of government failure in the poor 
implementation and enforcement of the regulations that existed. However, although health- 
related regulation obviously fell far short of its own targets, its evaluation is hampered by the 
difficulty in assessing what would have happened in its absence. Without these inspections it is 
possible that an anarchic system might have prevailed, with much wider availability of Part I 
medicines from people with no health-related training, such as market traders and itinerant 
vendors, possibly passing themselves off as qualified practitioners. This degree of illegal private 
sector activity was not observed. 
In sum, the market exhibited evidence of both market failures, and failures in government 
provision and regulation. The next chapter considers the implications of this analysis for policy 
to improve fever/malaria treatment. 
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CHAPTER 13 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
13.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the fifth and final thesis objective: the identification of policy implications 
for improving malaria treatment, and the delivery of artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT) 
in particular. The scientific and political momentum behind ACT has grown greatly over the last 
few years, in response to concerns about the development of resistance to monotherapies, and 
growing unwillingness to accept current rates of drug efficacy (Attaran et al. 2004; Institute of 
Medicine 2004; Kindermans et al. 2002). WHO recommends that all countries experiencing 
resistance to conventional monotherapies should use combinations, preferably ACTs (WHO RMB 
2004). By mid-2004,15 African countries had decided to adopt ACT, and six had begun 
implementation. Tanzania itself plans to introduce ACT in 2006, and has made a successful 
application to the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria to fund the process of policy change and 
initial drug costs. Although thesis data collection was undertaken in the current monotherapy era, it 
is therefore most relevant to consider the policy implications under a future of ACT. 
This thesis is based on data collected in three neighbouring rural districts, between mid-2000 and 
mid-2002. The chapter begins in Section 13.2 by assessing the applicability of the analysis to the 
current Tanzanian policy context, in terms of generalisability beyond the study sites, and over time, 
as there have been a number of policy developments since data collection. Section 13.3 sets the 
scene by presenting potential models for ACT delivery, distinguished by where ACT is made 
available, and for whom. In Section 13.4 and 13.5, the implications of the thesis findings are 
discussed for a facility-only ACT strategy, and one encompassing the retail sector. 
13.2 Applicability of Analysis to the Tanzanian Policy Context 
The applicability of the analysis is considered in terms of its generalisability to other areas within 
Tanzania, and its generalisability over time, given any changes in the fever/malaria treatment 
market since data collection, or foreseen in the near future. 
The malaria transmission risk in the study sites is typical of that experienced by the majority of 
Tanzanians (75%) (de Savigny et at. 2004). Moreover, the patchy evidence discussed in Chapter 12 
indicates that there are a number of common features with markets for fever/malaria treatment 
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elsewhere in rural Tanzania. However, during consultancy visits to other areas the author has 
observed some variation (Battersby et al. 2003); for example, in Mwanza Region in northern 
Tanzania, mobile distributors appear to be a more common source of drugs for general retailers, and 
a higher proportion of antimalarial products are reportedly sourced from Kenya and Uganda. In 
Mtwara and Songea Regions in the south, retail drug inspection is conducted from the regional 
level, further restricting the capacity of inspectors to cover all drug shops. Finally, the situation is 
quite different in urban areas, where Part II drug stores are much more common, and Part I 
pharmacies, private laboratories and commercial private clinics are often found. Further 
investigation of rates of shop use and shop characteristics in areas previously unstudied is therefore 
warranted. However, one could argue that there is evidence of sufficient similarities across 
Tanzanian's regions to justify qualified application of the study findings. 
General observation in the study sites does not indicate dramatic changes in market structure or the 
nature of competition since the data for this thesis were collected. However, there has been a 
continued decline in chloroquine stocking, and it is now very rarely available in drug or general 
stores. Few general stores within the study sides were found to have started stocking other 
antimalarials, such as amodiaquine or SP, even by mid-2004. 
A number of pilot interventions have been launched at a sub-regional level with implications for 
fever/malaria treatment. These include the introduction of ACT in government and private mission 
facilities in Rufiji District in January 2003 as part of the IMPACT project. In Kilombero District the 
ACCESS project began a programme of provider training and consumer information to improve 
fever/malaria treatment in 2004. Small-scale training and community education activities have also 
been undertaken by CARE in Dar es Salaam and Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF) in Kigoma. In 
Songea Region, the Strategies for Enhancing Access to Medicines (SEAM) project in collaboration 
with the Pharmacy Board established Accredited Drugs Dispensing Outlets (ADDOs) during 
2003/4 (Part II drug stores which meet specified quality criteria, where staff have undergone a 
training programme, and which are permitted to stock some prescription-only medicines) (Sigonda- 
Ndomondo 2004). 
There have been important changes in drug regulation since 2002. The Pharmaceuticals and Poisons 
Act 1978 was replaced with the Food, Drugs and Cosmetics Act in 2003, and a new Tanzanian 
Food and Drug Authority (TFDA) was established, which has replaced the Pharmacy Board. The 
new Act does not refer to Part II drug stores, making reference only to ADDOs, which the TFDA 
says will be introduced nationwide in the future. The legal status of Part II stores is thus somewhat 
ambiguous, although in practice they continue to operate and are regulated as pre-2003. The new 
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Act replaces the Part I/Part II drug classification with three groups: controlled drugs, prescription 
drugs and general sale drugs. SP, amodiaquine and common painkillers are classified as general 
sale, and quinine and artemisinin derivatives as prescription-only. The availability of controlled 
drugs is very restricted. Prescription drugs can be sold only in Part I pharmacies. The Act states that 
"any general sale drug may be sold either by way of retail or wholesale in an open shop", which 
should clearly indicate that SP and amodiaquine are permitted in both general and drug shops'. In 
addition, a set of strategies to improve drug quality has been put in place by the TFDA, including 
training on Good Manufacturing Practice for Tanzanian pharmaceutical manufacturers, and the 
introduction of mini-labs at major ports of entry to test the quality of some imported drugs, 
including SP, quinine and artesunate (Battersby et al. 2003). 
In sum, while there have been changes in official drug classification, and some shift in stocking 
patterns since 2002, for Tanzania in general there is not evidence of significant changes in the 
competitive environment nor in regulatory implementation in the retail sector for fever/malaria 
treatment. However, the planned nationwide introduction of ACT is likely to have major 
implications for the retail sector and fever/malaria treatment in general. In mid-2004, the Tanzanian 
Government applied to the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria for funds to introduce ACT as 
first line drug in public facilities in 2006 (http: //www. theglobalfund. org/en/). Implementation plans 
are to date only roughly sketched out, but distribution is likely to begin in formal facilities only. 
Funds for operational research on the potential for increasing the use of confirmed diagnosis, and 
for involving the retail sector, have been requested. While plans are not finalised, the most likely 
ACT candidate is currently artemether-lumefantrine (AL), a patented product under the public 
access name Coartem"". The use of AL is expected to increase treatment efficacy and speed of 
recovery. However, it will also increase the complexity of the dosing regimen (6 doses over 3 days, 
compared to a single dose of SP). It will increase drug costs substantially, with a change in the 
factory gate price of an adult dose of the first line therapy from $0.10/$0.15 for SP to at least $2.00. 
AL is likely to be selected because it is the only co-formulated ACT currently available, and 
because the companion drug (lumefantrine) is not widely available in the retail sector. For some 
other potential companions to artemisinin, such as SP or amodiaquine, widespread use of the 
companion as monotherapy is expected to undermine the hypothesised higher efficacy and slower 
development of drug resistance on which the case for ACTs is based. The retail sector has therefore 
already had an important influence on policy design. Many more questions remain about its role in 
ACT implementation. 
' However, in mid-2004, some regulatory officials in the IMPACT study sites were interpreting the law to 
mean that SP could not be stocked in general stores (S. Patrick Kachur, pers. comm. ) 
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13.3 ACT Delivery Models 
When ACT is introduced, policymakers will have to decide which antimalarials should be available 
where, and to whom. This could be framed in terms of two key choices (Figure 13.1). First, should 
ACT be available in facilities only, or more widely through community members? Secondly, where 
ACT is provided, should it be universally available to all suspected malaria cases, or targeted to 
certain groups? The default (Option 1) would be to maintain the existing status quo for antimalarial 
distribution, of universal provision through facilities only. ACT would simply replace SP in all 
public facilities. Drugs would continue to be free or heavily subsidised for all groups in the public 
sector, and availability outside facilities would be determined by the operation of the free retail 
market. 
Figure 13.1 ACT delivery models 
Universal coverage Targeted coverage 
Facility-only Option 1. Status quo for antimalarial Option 3. Tighter targeting 
provision delivery 
Free or very subsidised public sector Facility provision only, targeted by 
facility delivery for all suspected malaria confirmed diagnosis, age group, 
cases; unsubsidised free market outside pregnancy status or area 
facilities 
Facility and Option 2. Widening access Option 4. Targeted widening of 
community- access 
based Free or very subsidised provision through Free or very subsidised provision 
provision public facilities and community members through public facilities and 
e. g. CHWs, trained mothers, retailers community members, targeted by 
confirmed diagnosis, age group, 
pregnancy status or area 
However, there is growing pressure for effective treatment to be available more easily and promptly 
(Option 2). Many argue that the best approach to reducing malaria morbidity and mortality is to 
make antimalarial treatment widely and freely available down to the most peripheral level (Bloland, 
Kachur and Williams 2003). This approach is often referred to using the umbrella term of "home- 
based management", although a number of intermediaries outside the home may be used to deliver 
care (WHO 2004). Alternative delivery channels include retailers, community health workers, 
trained mother coordinators, or newly established community drug stores. Implementing home- 
based management with ACT would be likely to increase costs substantially, but is argued by some 
to be essential to the achievement of Abuja treatment target (WHO 2004). 
By contrast, due primarily to the high cost of ACTs, proposals to target their delivery more tightly 
are also being seriously considered (Option 3). Tighter targeting may also address some concerns 
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about drug safety, excessive drug pressure, and mis-treatment of non-malarial cases. Targeting 
could be based on confirmed diagnosis using microscopy or rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs). ACT 
could also be targeted on the basis of biological vulnerability, proxied by area of residence, age 
group or pregnancy status (Snow, Eckert and Teklehaimanot 2003). Targeting by region might be 
appropriate for epidemic-prone areas, or in areas where current monotherapies are least effective. 
Targeting ACT to pregnant women and children less than 5 years of age would be expected to 
maximise reductions in malaria-associated morbidity and mortality per treatment. This targeting 
approach could reduce the incremental public antimalarial budget for ACT introduction by roughly 
two-thirds; as this study has shown, over fives make up over half of visits for fever to government 
facilities, and of course consume higher antimalarial doses. 
Targeting could be applied within a purely facility-based programme, but targeting and widening 
accessibility are not necessarily mutually exclusive strategies (Option 4). For example, ACT could 
be made available through community workers, but only for children under five, or through retail 
outlets, but only with a positive RDT result. 
Sections 13.4 and 13.5 draw on the thesis findings to identify implications for policy under firstly, a 
facility-only model of ACT provision, and secondly a model including retail sector distribution. As 
mentioned above, retailers are only one possible channel for widening ACT access. Key advantages 
of using the retail sector are that it provides a pre-existing, self-sustaining distribution system and, 
as shown in the thesis, already reaches remote rural areas, and plays an important role in 
fever/malaria treatment. This is not to dismiss the utility of other intermediaries as alternative or 
complementary channels, but to recognise that consideration of these is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
ACT is being adopted to improve the efficacy of the first line therapy in the short and medium-term. 
However, as this analysis has demonstrated, the weaknesses in fever/malaria treatment are much 
broader than the problems of drug efficacy, encompassing low antimalarial coverage, frequent 
under-dosing, poor quality drugs, inappropriate packaging and labelling, and inequitable access to 
better quality care. These issues may have a similar or even greater impact on public health than a 
decline in the efficacy of the first line medicine (Amin et al. 2004). Any plan for ACT 
implementation must therefore consider failures in the health system and retail market, as well as 
treatment efficacy. 
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13.4 Implications for Facility-only ACT Provision 
The implications of the thesis findings for facility-only ACT provision are considered firstly, for the 
facility sector itself, and secondly, for a non-ACT retail sector. 
13.4.1 Government Facility Quality and Utilisation 
The thesis findings indicate that simply changing the first line drug policy will not address many 
causes of poor quality care, because government facilities are used by only a minority of patients, 
and drugs and doses provided in the public sector are frequently inappropriate. For example, 
antimalarials were obtained at only 52% of government facility visits for fever/malaria, and a 
minimum antimalarial dose at only 38%. If a facility-based model is adopted, it will be important to 
raise the technical quality of government services, and to improve their perceived quality to 
increase utilisation. This would be important under any model of ACT implementation, but 
particularly so where facilities are the only subsidised ACT source. 
An assessment of strategies for improving the technical quality of public sector care is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, requiring detailed study of the way staff behaviour is influenced by knowledge, 
supervisory structures, consumer demand and financial considerations. Suffice it to say that quality 
problems have been widely observed over many years, and a number of strategies including 
training, supervision and restructured incentives have already been targeted at these complex issues. 
Tanzania is in the process of scaling up the Integrated Management of Childhood Illness (IMCI) to 
address weaknesses in technical quality, particularly for under fives. The IMPACT study districts 
were the site for an evaluation of this programme, with IMCI implemented in Rufiji District (and 
Morogoro-Rural), while Kilombero and Ulanga acted as controls. A facility-based study for the 
IMCI evaluation in 2000 found that children in IMCI districts were significantly more likely to be 
diagnosed and treated correctly than in non-IMCI districts (Armstrong Schellenberg et al. 2004). 
However, although Ruffiji began implementing IMCI in 1997, household survey data from this 
thesis in 2001 showed that the probability of a fever patient under 5 getting a minimum antimalarial 
dose at a government facility visit did not vary significantly across DSS areas, indicating that even 
well-implemented IMCI may not solve these problems. 
As described above, facility provision could be for all patients, or restricted to those with confirmed 
diagnosis, or to certain biologically vulnerable groups. This study has shown that targeting parasite 
positive patients only would require a major increase in the accessibility of confirmed diagnosis, as 
during data collection only 4 of the 18 government facilities, and 5 of the 8 private facilities in the 
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study sites, had functioning microscopy. Even at such facilities, most first-time patients are not 
tested. The use of RDTs could facilitate an expansion of confirmed diagnosis because they require 
less equipment and staff expertise. However, successful deployment would be dependent on the 
supply chain to public facilities, which this and other studies have shown to be erratic for drugs. In 
addition, the high rates of afebrile parasitaemia documented in the household survey lead one to 
question the potential for health workers to assess whether parasitaemia detected is the cause of 
presenting illness in these areas of high transmission. 
With or without confirmed diagnosis, it will be important to ensure that a high proportion of 
patients actually use facility services. This study found that only 22% of patients reporting 
fever/malaria visited a government facility and 6% a private facility. One might expect the 
provision of a more effective drug to encourage a shift in utilisation to facilities. Although the 
credence characteristics of antimalarials could make demand insensitive to drug quality, the higher 
efficacy of ACT may be relatively easy to observe because artemisinin derivatives are extremely 
fast acting (Adjuik et al. 2004). The impact on overall utilisation will depend on the targeting 
policy. If targeted by biological vulnerability, no increase in utilisation would be anticipated for 
non-pregnant adults. The impact on utilisation of targeting by confirmed diagnosis is unclear: the 
opportunity for a test could attract patients, although in this study providers did not mention this as 
an important form of competition. On the other hand, tests could increase waiting times and non- 
drug fees, which interviewees emphasised to be important deterrents for patients. The thesis 
findings indicate that any increase in utilisation of private facilities adopting ACT is likely to be by 
the better-off groups, who currently make up the majority of their customers. This reflects their 
relatively high fees, which led private facilities to be on average the most costly source of care in 
the study sites. 
A key strategy to increase government utilisation would be the removal of user fees, which were in 
the process of being gradually introduced in Kilombero and Ulanga Districts during data collection, 
and were sometimes unofficially charged in all three DSS areas. Evidence from other settings has 
shown that utilisation can be increased substantially when fees are removed (Yates 2004). In 
addition to lowering the average cost for care-seekers, such a clear policy may increase utilisation 
by removing the variability in fee rates and exemption eligibility described in the thesis, which 
would have led to considerable uncertainty for consumers. A clear policy of free care would also 
diminish the potential for unofficial charges, which were found to be common during the study. 
Although fees at government facilities were lower in Rufiji than in Kilombero or Ulanga, the 
proportion of patients using government facilities was actually higher in Ulanga DSS, and only 
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slightly lower in Kilombero, demonstrating that user fees were not the only reason for low 
utilisation. The analysis of non-price competition indicates several aspects of service provision on 
which government facilities are perceived to perform poorly, including stock reliability, waiting 
times and opening hours. One might therefore expect utilisation to be increased if consumer 
confidence in drug availability were raised, or if opening hours were made more flexible, for 
example, to include some weekend hours. The importance attached to good customer relations by 
private providers in this study contrasts with frequent consumer complaints of rudeness and 
indifference at government facilities reported in other research (Gilson, Kitange and Teuscher 
1993), highlighting another area where improvements could potentially be made. 
Two unintended impacts of facility-only provision may be an increase in drug leakage and in 
counterfeit products. This study did not uncover evidence of deliberately counterfeited drugs, nor 
widespread theft from facilities, although the latter topic is inherently difficult to research. 
However, with an unsubsidised private market, the highly subsidised public provision of a drug 
with a high retail sector value could provide a powerful incentive for such illegal activities. One 
would expect these incentives to be magnified if facility provision of ACT were restricted to under 
fives and pregnant women. Many counterfeit artemisinin derivatives have been reported in South 
East Asia, where these products are more widely used (Newton et al. 2003; Newton et al. 2002; 
Rozendaal 2001), and the IMPACT project has already experienced several incidences of leakage of 
ACT to urban retail outlets (S. Patrick Kachur, pers. comm. ). Evidence on regulatory 
ineffectiveness in general from this study suggests that the system does not have the capacity to 
prevent the development of such black markets. This could further harm consumer relations and 
stock reliability in the public sector, and the safety and efficacy of private sector products. 
13.4.2 Non-ACT Treatment in the Retail Sector 
There are likely to be limits to the potential for increasing government facility utilisation. The 
problems of poor public sector quality have proved persistent in the face of similar initiatives in the 
past. Moreover, shops will remain the closest and quickest sources for most people, who were said 
by shopkeepers to value prompt care, and to feel that febrile illness often does not require the 
attention of a health care worker. The retail sector is therefore likely to continue to be widely used, 
even for targeted groups. 
Among care-seekers in an unsubsidised rural retail sector, current patterns of drug purchase indicate 
that the cost of artemisinin monotherapy would be likely to keep its demand very low, which could 
be important in maintaining the efficacy of ACT. However at free market prices, ACT utilisation 
221 
would also be very low. At current monotherapy prices, an antimalarial was obtained at only 55% 
of visits to drug stores and 12% to general stores. ACT at 10 to 20 times the cost would be likely to 
be purchased by the very wealthiest consumers only. Treatment for the vast majority of people 
using shops would therefore be unaffected by the policy change, and would be contrary to the new 
national guidelines, with nearly all retail customers using non-artemisinin monotherapies or no 
antimalarial at all. Moreover, in this context the government would be unlikely to embark on any 
major strategies to improve retail treatment quality through a communications campaign with 
consumers or retailer training, because such strategies would need to address the appropriate use of 
cheaper monotherapies. This would lead to conflicting messages, as there would be effectively two 
sets of treatment guidelines, one for facilities and one for shops, which would probably be seen as 
undesirable. 
However, in the absence of such communications or training, the thesis findings suggest that 
significant improvements could still be made to treatment obtained from shops by improving the 
standard of drugs in the retail sector, in terms of their chemical quality, packaging and labelling. 
Insufficient quantities of active ingredient were discovered in a third of all SP tablet products, and 
sub-standard quality of common antimalarial monotherapies has been demonstrated by other 
Tanzanian studies (Minzi et al. 2003; Risha et al. 2002). Due to the credence good characteristics of 
antimalarials, consumers are unlikely to be able to gauge these problems, either before or after 
treatment, so a greater government role in quality assurance is likely to be beneficial. Several 
important steps towards improving quality undertaken by the Tanzanian government since 2002 
were described above, but more could be done. Further reform might include regular quality testing 
of locally manufactured drugs; local products currently require testing prior to registration only, in 
contrast with imported drugs which are subject to routine tests at ports of entry. The government 
could consider providing reliable signals of drug quality on product packaging. This would provide 
an alternative to the product differentiation proxies currently used by consumers, such as packaging, 
brand name and country of manufacture, which this study has found to be unreliable. Products 
which maintain high quality standards over time could be marked with a government quality seal, 
and consumers advised to purchase marked products only. If lower-priced products performed well 
enough to receive this stamp, this strategy could erode the market power currently enjoyed by 
manufacturers of higher-priced products, reducing price variation and consumer costs. 
Labelling and packaging quality should be treated with the same rigour as the quality of the 
medicine itself. Tanzania has some regulation in place on this issue, but our evaluation of SP tablets 
demonstrated that existing labelling was woefully inadequate. Labelling of the INN and age- 
specific doses were found to be incomplete and/or incorrect on most packaged products, and 
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instructions were only provided in English. To address this situation the government could insist 
that no general sale antimalarial be registered or re-registered without fulfilling the following 
criteria. Firstly the INN (e. g. SP, amodiaquine) should be marked in large clear letters, ideally larger 
than the brand name, to avoid confusion over product identity. Such a strategy was adopted for SP 
products in Malawi following their change in first line drug in 1993 (Marsh and Kachur 2002). 
Antimalarials for OTC use should require dosing instructions for all age groups, strictly in 
accordance with government guidelines. This would address the issue that many products observed 
had no instructions for young children, and resolve dosing inconsistencies. All information should 
be provided in KiSwahili. Currently manufacturers can use English and/or KiSwahili, but most just 
use English, which the majority of the rural population do not understand. Finally, manufacturers 
should be required to demonstrate that their labelling has been subject to user testing for 
comprehensibility in the relevant consumer groups. 
By using the leverage of the registration process to enforce these changes, improvement in product 
quality and consumer information could be implemented rapidly on a nationwide scale, with costs 
borne largely by the pharmaceutical manufacturers. Moreover, in view of the international nature of 
antimalarial trade, it might be possible to develop some co-ordinated strategies with other East 
African governments. Additional regulations might discourage some marginal manufacturers from 
registering their products in Tanzania. However, in view of the very high number of antimalarial 
products currently on the market (81 products in our study areas alone), the loss of a few brands 
would be unlikely to restrict competition significantly, and might have the beneficial side-effect of 
reducing consumer and retailer confusion. 
These improvements in labelling will do nothing to address the extremely poor information 
provided with loose tablets, which retail audit data showed made up 91% of all antimalarial tablets 
dispensed and 78% of those from shops. Enforcement of the existing regulation that only drugs in 
unit packs be sold over-the-counter has the potential to both improve labelling and to guard against 
tablet contamination and degradation. However, this may increase the cost of antimalarials to 
consumers, further reducing the proportion of patients who purchase at least a minimum 
antimalarial dose. Regression analysis showed that packaging increased antimalarial tablet prices by 
38% on average. However, this was likely to reflect the market power enjoyed by manufacturers of 
packaged products, as well as their increased manufacturing costs. Wider competition between 
packaged antimalarials may therefore bring down their prices significantly. Although packaged 
tablets may remain somewhat more costly, this is likely to be a price worth paying for appropriate 
packaging and labelling, which has been demonstrated to improve treatment adherence (WHO 
2004). 
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Improving quality, packaging and labelling standards for registered products will not address the 
quality of unregistered antimalarials. These were found in 63% of drug shops in the study sites, and 
no shopkeepers reported regulatory inspection of the registration status of the drugs they stocked. 
Since thesis data collection, the government has taken the important step of requiring that the 
registration number be printed on the outer packaging, and has provided port of entry inspectors 
with up-to-date registration information (Battersby et al. 2003). However, this will not cover any 
products imported through unofficial channels. To address this at the retail level, local regulators 
and shopkeepers need information on which products are registered, and the importance of the 
registration system in quality control. This could be achieved by providing a regularly updated 
checklist of all currently registered general sale products to inspectors, wholesalers and retailers, so 
that any drug could quickly be checked against the list. It would be particularly beneficial for Ward 
Health Assistants, the only inspectors of general stores, who do not have expertise in 
pharmaceuticals and may be unsure of even the generic category of many drugs. 
Even under a model of facility-only ACT provision, some improvements could therefore be made to 
retail sector treatment at a relatively low-cost. However, nearly all retail consumers would continue 
to purchase antimalarial monotherapies or painkillers only. One way to make a more fundamental 
difference to the quality of care they receive would be to distribute ACT through retail outlets as 
well, a model we turn to in the next section. 
13.5 Implications for Retail Sector ACT Distribution 
This section focuses on the potential role of the retail sector in improving access to ACT. The main 
advantage of involving the retail sector would be to expand the coverage of ACT to the high 
proportion of patients not attending facilities. In addition, as this thesis has demonstrated, care 
seeking through shops is relatively prompt, and retailers represent an important alternative source of 
drugs when government stocks run out. 
Home-based management through retailers or other community members has been gaining 
acceptance among national and international policymakers in recent years (WHO 2004). However, 
the change to ACT presents important practical challenges to its implementation. Governments and 
donors are struggling to raise funds for ACT in the public sector alone, and it is unclear whether 
there will be sufficient resources, or sufficient artemisinin, to cover a wider range of outlets 
(Institute of Medicine 2003). This section considers the implications of the thesis findings for the 
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design of a potential retail sector intervention in the event that international efforts to ensure an 
adequate and subsidised supply of medicines are successful in the medium-term. 
A report by the Institute of Medicines (IOM) has proposed that ACT should be heavily subsidised at 
the global level at the point of pooled supra-national procurement, with subsidised drugs made 
available to both the public and private sectors, including retailers (Institute of Medicine 2004). If a 
patented drug were selected for private sector distribution, such as AL, a single product would by 
necessity be subsidised. Where off-patent ACTs are selected, an alternative strategy could be to 
support a limited number of brands. AL is currently available to developing country governments at 
a price of $2.40 for an adult dose, and $0.90 for the youngest age group, although use of alternative 
ACTs might reduce the price per adult dose as low as $1.50 (Coleman et al. 2004). The IOM 
recommended that ACT should not cost patients more than chloroquine monotherapy, implying a 
90-95% subsidy for AL (Institute of Medicine 2004). The subsidy could be provided to all age 
groups, or targeted to under fives through packaging in paediatric doses, and appropriate labelling 
and marketing. Such an approach has been used in monotherapy social marketing programmes in 
Nigeria and Madagascan. 
The design of a comprehensive retail sector strategy is highly complex, including choices about 
products and sources, subsidy mechanisms, product packaging, labelling and branding, product 
placement, the role of diagnostics, communication with consumers, wholesalers and retailers, 
quality control and monitoring. This section focuses on four areas where the thesis findings may 
provide insights: the choice of retailers for product distribution, retail pricing, training and 
communications, and amendments to retail regulation. 
13.5.1 Choice of Retailers for ACT Distribution 
The thesis has demonstrated important differences in the characteristics and utilisation of drug and 
general stores, which are highly relevant to the consideration of their appropriate roles in ACT 
distribution. The analysis suggests that providing ACT through Part II drug stores could have a 
number of important advantages. They are established sources for fever/malaria treatment, 
responsible for 88% of retail antimalarial sales in the study areas. Sellers have some health-related 
education, and are perceived by consumers as a good source for advice. Stockouts of key 
fever/malaria medicines occurred in 10-20% of drug stores per month, but were less common than 
in government facilities, much rarer than in general stores, and generally relatively short-lived. One 
2 see PSI website at http: //www. psi. org/our programs/products/ppt. html 
225 
might have expected drug shops to be more frequently used by better-off households, but survey 
data showed no significant difference in the probability of visiting a drug store by SES, or in 
obtaining an antimalarial at a drug store visit. This implies that a subsidy on the scale suggested by 
the IOM should not be captured by relatively well-off groups only. However, despite recent market 
entry, drug shops remain sparsely located in rural areas, and are generally in market centres or on 
main roads, and close to facilities. As a result, only 24% of households could reach their nearest 
drug store in under 15 minutes, compared with 63% for general stores. Moreover, of the twelve 
geographical sub-markets identified, three had no drug shops, representing 13% of the total study 
population. 
By contrast, the network of general shops was shown to reach more remote populations, including 
households that moved seasonally for farming activities. In addition, general shops have the longest 
opening hours and shortest waiting time of all outlet types. Expanding ACT distribution to include 
general stores would therefore increase accessibility. Moreover, evidence of a significant and 
positive association between the HHI and price suggests that decreasing concentration in 
antimalarial supply could put downward pressure on prices. 
However, even if general shops are given the opportunity to stock ACT, take-up may be very low. 
Of general stores stocking drugs, the percentage stocking antimalarials had fallen from 29% in mid- 
2000 to 14% in late-2001. Analysis of the reasons why general shops did not stock antimalarials 
suggested that this decline could be reversible to some degree if antimalarials became more 
available in general wholesalers, and if the regulatory position for retailers was clarified. A more 
deep-rooted problem may be perceived low demand from consumers, who reportedly view general 
stores as a source of first aid, rather than complete cures. In addition, even if subsidised to a level 
similar to current monotherapies, ACT would be relatively costly for the smaller general shops with 
limited capital. 
The thesis findings indicate several other potential disadvantages in using general stores for ACT 
distribution. They are relatively prone to stockouts, perhaps reflecting the erratic drug purchasing 
patterns they reported. The remaining shelflife of antimalarials stocked was on average shorter than 
in drug stores, and 8% of antimalarials in general stores had expired. For AL this may be a 
particular problem because of its short shelf-life of two years (compared with 5-6 years for most 
antimalarial tablets); in general stores, 29% of antimalarials had been manufactured more than two 
years previously, compared with only 2% in drug shops. 
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A further problem with general stores could be the calibre of their serving staff. Although 82% of 
staff serving regularly had completed primary education, 11 % had no education at all, and none had 
any health qualifications. In addition, no general store sellers stocking antimalarials knew the 
correct doses for chloroquine or SP. General stores are not included in the pharmaceutical 
inspection framework, and drug-specific inspections of the thousands of general stores in Tanzania 
would be infeasible. If ACT stocks were kept in general stores, regulatory implementation would 
need to rely on the much less qualified Ward Health Assistants. Finally, in view of the sheer 
number of general stores, their high turnover, and frequent changes in stocking patterns documented 
in this study, the potential to monitor ACT retail distribution would be severely constrained. 
In conclusion, restricting ACT to Part I and Part II drug stores would seem the most sensible course 
of action in most areas. However, some flexibility would be required in remote areas not served by 
drug stores. In these settings, one or two well-established general shops, with relatively educated 
staff and good storage conditions could also be included, perhaps at the discretion of the DHMT. 
13.5.2 Retail Pricing 
The level of subsidy proposed by the IOM may seem high, but it should be noted that, even at 
current monotherapy prices, a minimum antimalarial dose was obtained at only 40% of 
fever/malaria drug store visits, and 6% of general store visits. As a result, many consumers may still 
not purchase ACTs at the highly subsidised price. 
In addition, it is possible that the subsidy will not feed down to the point of purchase. This study has 
strongly suggested that existing levels of competition in the fever/malaria treatment market do not 
ensure competitive retail prices. The high markups documented in the retail distribution chain could 
mean that even drugs heavily subsidised at source could end up beyond the reach of most rural 
customers. Synergistic strategies must therefore accompany subsidy at source to ensure that low 
prices are passed on to consumers. If ACT is restricted to drug stores, the potential to achieve this 
through competition will be limited in rural areas, because of strong geographical segmentation, and 
high concentration in antimalarial sales within sub-markets. 
Alternative strategies could include reducing drug store overheads, the use of recommended retail 
prices (RRP), or price regulation. Retail overheads include staff, transport, rent, taxes, licence and 
permit fees. More information is needed on their relative importance, to assess whether and how 
they could be reduced through, for example, tax breaks to drug stores, or by reducing travel costs 
for drug sourcing by establishing drugs wholesalers closer to target markets. Price regulation is 
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unlikely to be feasible to administer, given the weak regulatory capacity documented. Moreover, it 
requires sensitive adjustments to changes in producer costs, as if prices are set below the 
competitive price, shortages are likely to arise and parallel markets with unregulated prices will 
develop (Bennett, Quick and Veläsquez 1997). 
RRP may provide a less rigid tool for achieving the same goal. Although most drug manufacturers 
and importers provide distributors with schedules of recommended wholesale and retail prices, 
these were very rarely found to feed down to the periphery, and most retailers were totally unaware 
of the recommendations. However, RRP are widely used for common products in general stores, 
such as soft drinks and cigarettes, and have been used for socially marketed products, such as ITNs 
and condoms. Using a similar approach, recommended prices could be printed on ACT product 
packaging, and price information could be included in a communications campaign. 
13.5.3 Training and Communications 
The thesis demonstrated a number of poor treatment practices in the retail sector that should be 
addressed if the benefits of expanded ACT distribution are to be achieved. At drug store visits, 
antimalarials were obtained by only two-thirds of under fives, and half of over fives, and 29% of 
antimalarial purchases were under-doses. These figures were much worse at general stores, where 
only 13% of under fives and 12% of over fives obtained of antimalarial, 50% of which were under- 
doses. There was also evidence of inappropriate drug use in under fives, with injectable 
antimalarials purchased at 14% of drug store visits, and aspirin at 7% of drug store visits and 38% 
of general store visits. 
Retail sector distribution therefore needs to be accompanied by the provision of information on 
appropriate ACT use. The study findings indicate that key messages should include the importance 
of obtaining ACT for vulnerable groups; age-appropriate dosing and the importance of completing 
the full course, particularly in view of the complex dosing regimens of ACT; and the dangers of 
inappropriate use of injections and aspirin in children. 
A key question is how these messages would best be delivered. One potential strategy is to use 
training sessions for shop staff, which could be a requirement for accreditation as an ACT stockist. 
There have been calls for shopkeeper training in Tanzania, some pilots have been conducted, and a 
draft training package has been developed by NMCP. However, the literature in this area repeatedly 
shows that one-off knowledge-based training alone does not lead to long-lasting behavioural change 
(Marsh and Kachur 2002). Key features of successful programmes which maintain knowledge and 
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motivation are regular refresher training and monitoring visits, and complementary community 
mobilisation activities (Marsh et al. 2004). Such programmes are therefore not cheap, and require 
considerable on-the-ground implementation capacity (Goodman et al. Submitted). As a result they 
have tended to operate to date on a relatively small scale. 
The number and turnover of general stores documented in this study indicates that maintaining a 
cadre of trained general store staff would be very difficult and expensive. If ACT were to be 
distributed mainly through drug stores, such face-to-face interaction would be more feasible, as they 
are relatively few in number, subject to relatively low turnover, and their staff already have some 
basic medical training. However, providing an effective nationwide training programme to 
Tanzania's 6000-plus Part II stores would still place a great financial and managerial burden on the 
MOH. Moreover, the poor quality of care and frequent stockouts observed in government facilities 
indicate that the MOH currently struggles to provide appropriate supervision and commodity 
supplies to its own primary care facilities. This raises the question of whether such an ambitious 
shopkeeper training programme would be feasible and sustainable, and whether it would distract 
attention from the government's core responsibility of ensuring good facility care. 
However, interventions focused on retailers themselves are not the only way to improve retail care, 
and may not be the most efficient approach. Retailers are the most visible part of a complex market, 
but this analysis has shown retail behaviour to be influenced by manufacturers, distributors, 
regulators, facility and retail competitors, and consumer demand (Figure 13.2). It may therefore be 
more appropriate to place greater emphasis on the provision of information to consumers, 
wholesalers and regulators, rather than retailers. 
The analysis demonstrated that wholesalers have an important influence on retailers through their 
product range and pricing, and are their most important source of information on new drugs. 
Working through wholesalers to spread key messages and distribute information, education and 
communication (IEC) materials may therefore be an effective method for reaching the retail 
interface, possibly building on the model piloted in western Kenya (Tavrow, Shabahang and 
Makama 2003). 
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Figure 13.2 Actors Influencing Retailer Behaviour 
Pharmaceutical 
regulation 
RETAILER 
BEHAVIOUR 
Consumer demand 
Competition with health 
facilities 
However, the most important target group is likely to be the patients and caretakers themselves, 
who have the greatest incentive to achieve a high-quality outcome. Moreover, household survey 
data showed that in many cases consumers do not rely on provider advice, selecting over half of 
drugs obtained at drug stores themselves, and over 95% at general stores. The evidence on the 
effectiveness of such communications strategies is very limited, as few public education 
interventions include impact evaluations (Fresle and Wolfheim 1997; Mills et al. 2002). When SP 
was introduced, the National Malaria Control Programme (NMCP) produced posters, magazines 
and user-friendly guidelines containing key messages. This represented a major improvement on 
pre-change IEC, but was mainly restricted to these print media, most of which were distributed to 
health facilities. Moreover, it was a one-off effort. A health issue of this importance could be argued 
to require an ongoing communications campaign of a different order of magnitude. A possible 
model would be the TIN campaign, which has successfully used mass media and local roadshows to 
communicate informative and persuasive messages, and been partly responsible for a substantial 
increase in net and insecticide treatment coverage (PSI 2003). Unlike a shopkeeper training 
programme, a consumer communications campaign would involve less face-to-face interaction with 
small groups, potentially benefiting from significant economies of scale. In the absence of formal 
training for retailers, drug store staff could be involved in the roadshows to ensure that they receive 
appropriate information, and that the public understand the place of retailers in fever/malaria 
treatment. 
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13.5.4 Retail Regulation 
ACT provision in shops would require a change in the regulations, to give ACT the general sales 
status currently granted to SP and amodiaquine. This could provide an opportunity to address the 
gulf demonstrated in this thesis between the official regulations on drugs permitted and the drug 
range tacitly accepted in drug stores by local regulators. There are three options: the government 
could clamp down on illegal stocks, imposing severe penalties such as shop closure and heavy 
fines; it could proceed with the status quo of tacit acceptance of widespread infringements; or it 
could change the regulations to bring de facto regulatory implementation more in line with its de 
jure counterpart. 
The evidence suggests that, given regulatory capacity constraints, government facility stockouts, 
and consumer demand, a concerted attempt to remove all prohibited drugs from drug stores would 
be very costly and time-consuming and probably infeasible. Moreover, the public health 
implications would be unclear. While it might reduce antimalarial and antibiotic drug pressure, and 
so slow the development of drug resistance, it would also reduce access to much-needed drugs for 
poor rural populations. On the other hand, remaining with the status quo of widespread regulatory 
contraventions could affect the potential for government or other agencies to work with retailers to 
distribute ACT, and perpetuate an antagonistic relationship between drug store staff and MOH 
personnel. 
Although more investigation is warranted, there is a strong argument for widening the range of legal 
drug store stocks to include, for example, a small set of oral antibiotics, as permitted for ADDOs in 
the pilot project in Songea. Officially allowing drug stores to stock a wider range of products than 
general stores would reflect their far greater suitability as medicine providers. In addition, 
acknowledging the reality of stocking patterns would open the way to provision of supportive IEC 
for products frequently purchased. Concerns about treatment quality would remain, but it should be 
noted that according to the measures used in the study, treatment quality was no worse in drug 
stores than in government facilities. Wherever the boundaries are set, some infringement is likely to 
continue, but bringing the official and locally legitimate situations closer into line should create a 
more positive environment for public-private collaboration. 
Such regulatory revision could pave the way for a more constructive engagement between drug 
store staff and regulators. In the absence of training, regulatory visits could provide an important 
opportunity for face-to-face contact if the role of the inspector were widened to include more 
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supportive activities, following the model for private facility supervision. For example, they could 
provide information on essential drugs, registered brands, appropriate dosing and consumer advice, 
and respond to queries and comments from shopkeepers. 
13.6 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has aimed to identify the policy implications of the thesis for improving malaria 
treatment, and in particular for the delivery of ACT, which Tanzania plans to adopt in 2006. 
Although there is some variation in fever/malaria treatment within Tanzania, and certain regulatory 
changes have taken place since the study, the thesis findings are argued to be broadly relevant to the 
current national policy context in rural areas. 
Policymakers face two key decisions concerning the model for ACT delivery: whether ACT should 
be universally available or targeted at certain groups; and whether its distribution should be 
expanded beyond the formal health sector. If a facility-only model of ACT provision is followed, 
the analysis indicates that it will be particularly important to improve the quality and utilisation of 
government services. Nonetheless, a high proportion of patients are likely to continue to use the 
retail sector, purchasing antimalarial monotherapies or painkillers only. It is argued that significant 
and affordable improvements could be made to the treatment they receive by improving the 
chemical quality, packaging and labelling of retail sector drugs. 
Subsidised retail sector ACT distribution has not yet been adopted by African countries changing to 
ACT, all of which have requested funds for the public sector only (Institute of Medicine 2004). In 
this chapter it has been argued that key advantages of involving retailers are that they are an 
important source of fever/malaria treatment, are likely to remain so in the future, and have the 
potential to increase the coverage of prompt ACT treatment significantly. The thesis findings 
suggest that Part II drug stores would be the most appropriate outlet for retail sector ACT, and that 
ACT distribution should be accompanied by strategies to maintain low retail prices, communicate 
key messages on treatment practices, and harmonise the official and tacitly accepted regulations on 
drugs stocked. 
Ultimately the decision of whether to opt for retail sector distribution will involve wider 
considerations, beyond the scope of this thesis. Firstly, insufficient funding may preclude any ACT 
distribution outside the formal health sector. The IOM estimates that the proposed subsidy would 
cost $300-500 million per year for all endemic nations. However, Snow et al. estimate that this sum 
would be required to cover Nigeria alone, and that achieving 60% coverage in the formal sector 
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would cost between US$1.6bn and US$3.4bn per year (Snow, Eckert and Teklehaimanot 
2003). 
The appetite of donors for such an increase in malaria funding is as yet untested. It is possible that 
ACT prices will fall over time, as production capacity increases, or synthetic artemisinins are 
introduced, but this is likely to take time. A second fundamental concern relates to the impact on 
drug resistance. Increased drug pressure on ACT component drugs as a result of widening access 
may be seen as a major threat, especially in view of the limited number of alternative drugs 
available for the future. Data have not been collected systematically on the impact that widespread, 
easy access to antimalarials has on resistance (Bloland, Kachur and Williams 2003). In the light of 
current uncertainty, some policymakers may feel maximum effort should be put into increasing 
access to effective care now, while for others the potential risks for drug resistance may be too 
great. 
Whatever the choice of ACT delivery model, the current importance of the retail sector, and its 
likely continued significance, mean that the intended role of the retail sector should be considered 
from the outset. To date, the government approach has been largely reactive, allowing the private 
market to determine the products, prices and information provided by retailers, with only limited 
and relatively ineffective attempts to influence this through drug registration and retail regulation. 
Whether policymakers plan facility-only or wider provision of ACT, it is argued to be preferable to 
take a proactive stance to the retail sector, deciding what balance of facility/retail utilisation is 
desirable, which drugs should be available OTC, and the standards drugs should meet, and then to 
design a set of interventions focused around these goals. 
Much more work is needed to test a range of approaches to improving retail sector treatment, both 
with and without ACT. Intervening retailer by retailer on a national scale would present huge 
challenges, even for drug stores alone, in view of their sheer number and the limited government 
capacity. An alternative approach would be to target the bulk of resources to interventions with 
other actors, such as manufacturers, distributors, and consumers themselves. Such an approach may 
facilitate the achievement of sustainable national level interventions. In an ideal setting, the 
distributional power of the retail market would be harnessed, by ensuring that good quality, well- 
labelled, affordable products enter the top of the distribution chain, are distributed safely and 
efficiently around the country, and that consumers have the information to demand a high-quality, 
safe and appropriate service at the chain's end. 
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CHAPTER 14 
CONCLUSIONS: NEW KNOWLEDGE AND RESEARCH PRIORITIES 
14.1 Policy Context 
Malaria is a treatable disease that affects some of the world's most vulnerable people. Rates of 
appropriate treatment in Africa are scandalously low, and mortality rates appallingly high 
(Snow et al. 1999; WHO & UNICEF 2003), though their power to shock may have waned 
through their familiarity. Despite national and international efforts, malaria treatment has 
deteriorated in much of sub-Saharan Africa over the last two decades, due to the growth of 
resistance to commonly used and relatively cheap antimalarials (Bloland, Ettling and Meek 
2000). Many now feel the situation has reached crisis proportions, and that action is needed 
urgently to improve health outcomes (Attaran et al. 2004; Institute of Medicine 2004; 
Kindermans et al. 2002; Nosten and Brasseur 2002). 
Particular attention is focusing on the introduction of ACTs in health facilities, but the choice of 
an appropriate complementary approach in the retail sector remains open to debate. Possible 
options range from restricting ACT to formal facilities on the basis of confirmed diagnosis, to 
flooding the public and private market with highly subsidised products. What is clear is that, in 
view of the current high use of retailers, the sector should not be ignored. Although retail outlets 
are widely used for fever/malaria treatment, there is considerable concern about the quality of 
care provided, and uncertainty about how this should be improved. 
14.2 New Knowledge 
This thesis has aimed to demonstrate how an economic analysis of such markets for treatment 
can shed light on the determinants of the demand and supply of care, and inform policy 
decisions. The study is the first to use the industrial organisation concepts of market structure 
and provider conduct to explore this type of health care market and its performance in terms of 
public health goals. In order to investigate the market as a whole, it encompassed all consumers 
and suppliers of fever/malaria drugs in the study sites, including patients of all ages, and the full 
range of drug providers, from formal facilities to roadside stalls. Operational methods were 
developed for the investigation of market definition, antimalarial sales volumes, market 
concentration, entry and exit, product differentiation, price competition, and substitutability and 
complementarity between outlet types. The study adds to the very limited number of household 
surveys on fever/malaria treatment seeking in Tanzania, and provides the first detailed, large- 
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scale study of retailers across several Tanzanian districts, and the first quantitative study of 
antimalarial retail sales volumes in Africa. 
The study confirmed the importance of retailers as a source of fever/malaria treatment. They 
accounted for the majority of provider visits, and a high proportion of total antimalarial 
volumes. Their popularity was based on a wide range of characteristics, including drug stock 
range and reliability, geographical and temporal accessibility, and staff expertise and courtesy. 
Retailers acted as both substitutes for facility care, and as complementary drug sources 
following facility consultation. An important finding was that drug and general retailers should 
be considered separately, as their characteristics were quite distinct. The relatively small number 
of drug stores had a much wider product range of higher perceived quality, and more 
knowledgeable staff, with a much greater agency role. As a result, they were reportedly 
perceived as sources for complete treatment/cures, competing closely with facilities, as opposed 
to the ubiquitous general stores, which were seen as first aid outlets only. Regulatory entry 
requirements and systems of inspection were also markedly different between the two retailer 
types. 
In many ways this market was closer to the competitive end of the monopoly-perfect 
competition continuum than more frequently studied health care markets, due to the number of 
providers and products, lack of patents, frequent repeat purchase, prevalence of out-of-pocket 
payment, relatively low barriers to entry, and commercial nature of the majority of providers. 
However, there was considerable evidence of market power and market failures, with 
oligopolistic competition likely to have been the norm for rural antimalarial sales. There was 
strong differentiation across drug products on the basis of packaging, brand name and country 
of manufacture. The market was heavily geographically segmented, with high concentration in 
antimalarial sales in each segment. It was therefore not surprising to find evidence of weak price 
competition in the form of considerable drug price variation and high retail markups. This is 
likely to have had a damaging impact on the affordability of appropriate treatment for most 
households in these poor communities. 
Non-price competition failed to deliver high quality care because consumers had imperfect 
information on treatment quality, and were obliged to rely on imperfect proxies for drug quality 
and staff expertise. Moreover, quality may have been compromised by competition among 
retailers to increase accessibility and affordability for patients, at the expense of appropriate 
diagnosis, drugs and doses. Finally, there may have been negative consumption externalities 
from antimalarial over-use and/or under-dosing which contributed to the development of drug 
resistance. 
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Government failures were also in evidence, and were likely to have contributed to the 
development and growth of the retail drug sector. The standard of public sector treatment was 
poor in terms of accessibility, waiting times, stock reliability, diagnostics, and the 
appropriateness and doses of drugs obtained. User charges were highly variable across facilities, 
often unofficial, and exemptions were rarely and haphazardly applied. Governmental regulatory 
oversight may have been responsible for the maintenance of some degree of order within the 
retail market, with no evidence of drug provision through itinerant vendors, market traders, or 
unofficial and unqualified "street doctors". However, regulation did not adequately address the 
many market failures, with little or no apparent impact on drug accessibility, pricing, dosing and 
quality. The potential for effective engagement with retailers was undermined by the divergence 
between the narrow drug range officially allowed in drug stores, and that deemed acceptable at a 
local level to meet community needs. 
Overall, the interaction of market structure, provider conduct, demand and regulation had both 
positive and negative implications for fever/malaria treatment. Retailers increased the 
accessibility, range and reliability of drug stocks, and were partly responsible for the observed 
high coverage of some kind of treatment, and prompt treatment-seeking. However, the nature of 
competition and regulation contributed to the observed quality problems in terms of low 
antimalarial coverage, frequent under-dosing, inequitable access to quality care, and frequent 
use of ineffective, poor quality and poorly packaged antimalarials. 
14.3 Policy Implications 
In view of the impending introduction of combination therapy in Tanzania, the thesis results 
were used to consider policy implications under a first line ACT regimen, although many of the 
findings are potentially of relevance to continued implementation of monotherapies. The policy 
implications were identified, firstly, for a facility-only model of ACT provision, and secondly, 
for a model including retail sector distribution. While a strong argument can be made for 
extending coverage to the retail sector, ultimately the choice of approach will depend on factors 
beyond the scope of this thesis, including the funding available, and the perceived threat of 
increasing drug resistance. Under a facility-only model, the analysis was used to argue that even 
if improvements in facility care were made, retail sector use was likely to remain high and of 
poor quality. Moreover, restriction of subsidised ACT to the public sector may encourage drug 
leakage and marketing of counterfeit products. The potential for improving care with the 
monotherapies available in shops through a communications campaign is likely to be limited by 
the need to maintain clarity on the national ACT policy. However, there would be potential to 
work with manufacturers, distributors and regulators to improve the chemical quality, packaging 
and labelling of drugs in the retail sector. 
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The IOM has proposed that ACT delivery include the retail sector, using a product heavily 
subsidised at a supra-national level (Institute of Medicine 2004). However, many questions 
remain about how the subsidised drug could be delivered safely, efficiently and equitably to the 
target population. The results of this thesis have been used to argue that under current regulatory 
and competitive conditions, the retail market is unlikely to deliver affordable drugs or 
appropriate treatment to the majority of its users. Key features of a retail sector strategy to 
address these problems could include the use of drug shops as a point of retail distribution; 
strategies to reduce retail prices by lowering shop overheads and the use of recommended retail 
prices; an on-going large-scale communications campaign; revisions to the regulations on drugs 
stocked in drug stores; and a more constructive role for retail regulators in improving the 
availability of essential drugs and appropriate advice. 
14.4 Research Priorities 
Before putting the above recommendations into practice, more information is needed to assess 
geographical generalisability, and to further investigate drug prices, drug quality and the 
distribution chain. The research and implementation communities will then need to collaborate 
on the evaluation of ACT introduction, and the assessment of potential interventions to improve 
ACT coverage and use. 
14.4.1 Analysing Markets in Other Settings 
The thesis is based on data from three rural areas in south-east Tanzania. While the literature 
indicates some evidence of similarities with other Tanzanian settings, it will be important to 
collect nationally representative data on fever/malaria treatment in the retail sector, to evaluate 
the generalisability of the findings at the national level. The study results may also have 
relevance for other African countries with similar levels of endemicity and economic 
development. However, the literature indicates some important sources of cross-country 
variation in both the demand and supply for drugs in the retail sector, emphasising the need for 
similar analyses of the competitive and regulatory environment in other settings. 
14.4.2 Further Investigation of Drug Prices, Drug Quality and the Distribution Chain 
In addition to expanding the geographical focus, there are three specific issues within the retail 
sector where further research is warranted: price markups, antimalarial drug quality, and the 
operation of the distribution chain. More information is needed on prices and the costing 
structure of retailers in order to calculate net retail markups. Data on retail costs proved very 
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difficult to collect in one-off interviews with shopkeepers, but are essential to assess the 
potential to reduce existing markups and costs. Such information is likely to require in-depth 
work with a limited number of retailers, based on longer-term relationships. These issues are of 
great importance in view of the proposals for subsidising ACT in the private sector, to ensure 
that such subsidies feed through to the consumers. 
Secondly, the study added to the evidence that antimalarial quality at the retail level is often 
poor, and indicated that the proxies for high-quality drugs relied on by consumers are often 
invalid. Clear policy implications cannot be drawn from these data for several reasons: the 
sample size was limited, drugs were sampled from only three districts, and the evaluation 
methods did not meet USP standards. Moreover, since the samples were collected in 2001, the 
Tanzanian government has implemented a number of strategies to improve drug quality, 
including mini-labs to test imports at borders, and collaboration with domestic manufacturers to 
improve quality assurance. However, testing of retail level quality has been very limited. A 
representative study of antimalarial retail quality should therefore be conducted, with the aim of 
both documenting the extent of the problem, and understanding the causes of poor quality. 
These issues are likely to be of increasing importance as the market share of artemisinin-based 
products increases, in view of the number of reports of deliberately faked artemisinins in Asia 
(Newton et al. 2003; Rozendaal 2001). 
In assessing both pricing and drug quality, retail providers represent only the last link in a long 
chain of providers who handle the pharmaceuticals as they travel from factory to consumer. 
Providers in this distribution chain above the retail level also have a key influence on the 
product range, pricing and knowledge of retailers, but our understanding of the distribution 
chain structure, and the characteristics of these providers, is very limited. Improving 
information in this area will be essential if governments are to manage successfully the 
introduction of new antimalarials, and the distribution of subsidised products in particular. 
14.4.3 Documenting the Impact of ACT Introduction 
Such analysis of existing retail markets should represent only the beginning of the wide-ranging 
research agenda required to address the confluence of two key policy initiatives in African 
malaria treatment -- home-based management and ACT. The initiatives generate a broad range 
of questions concerning the appropriate choice of drug, diagnostic, treatment outlet, target group 
and supportive interventions, in both the facility and retail sectors. Firstly, it is important that 
lessons are learnt from early ACT-adopters, in terms of the impact on public sector utilisation, 
the retail sector's drug range, quality, prices and practices, and potential leakage of public sector 
products. Follow-up data collection is planned in the thesis study sites to compare the retail 
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market in control and intervention areas after two years of ACT implementation through 
facilities in Rufiji. However, introduction in one district will not have the far-reaching effects of 
nationwide public sector implementation, and it is therefore essential that the retail sector 
impact is monitored following national policy changes in Tanzania and elsewhere. 
14.4.4 Evaluation of Retail Sector Interventions 
Much more than observation of retail sector activities is required. In order to improve the 
evidence base for the implementation of retail sector strategies in future, there is a need to 
expand the number of intervention evaluations in the retail sector, and to ensure that they are 
rigorous and comprehensive. The evaluations should cover a range of different strategies in a 
variety of settings, and should not be restricted to those focusing on retailers alone. The thesis 
findings suggest that it may be more feasible and efficient to improve retail care through other 
actors, such as manufacturers, distributors, regulators and consumers. It may also be appropriate 
for interventions to address a broader range of health problems, as retailers are also important 
providers of treatment for other illnesses, such as acute respiratory infections, sexually 
transmitted diseases and TB, and are actual or potential distribution points for commodities such 
as TINS and contraceptives. In all evaluations, data should be collected on consumer and 
provider behaviour, costs, and the distribution of benefits by SES. To provide comprehensive 
information to policy makers, a subset of evaluations should go beyond behavioural measures, 
to assess the impact on health outcomes and drug resistance. 
There will be significant challenges in identifying appropriate study designs for intervention 
evaluations. There have been calls for increased rigour in the evaluation of health service 
interventions through the use of randomised controlled trial methods (Editorial 2004; Victora, 
Habicht and Bryce 2004). This could include the use of cluster-randomisation to evaluate one or 
two interventions alone or in combination (Mills submitted). This approach may be appropriate 
for certain research questions which can be addressed on a relatively small scale, such as 
packaging strategies to improve patient compliance. However, interventions such as social 
marketing through mass media techniques, or the strengthening of distribution chains, are likely 
to exhibit significant economies of scale, and be most effectively implemented on a larger-scale 
than would be feasible under cluster-randomisation. In addition, a key issue in the choice of 
retail sector approach is the likely impact on antimalarial drug resistance, but it is unlikely to be 
possible to evaluate this through relatively short-term studies, or by comparison of neighbouring 
areas. 
For these reasons, cluster-randomised trials may be inappropriate or impractical for much of the 
intervention research agenda. Possible alternatives are plausibility evaluations that do not 
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involve randomisation, but attempt to document impact by including a comparison group and 
careful documentation of confounding variables, and adequacy evaluations, based purely on 
documentation of time trends following the introduction of an intervention (Habicht, Victora 
and Vaughan 1999). In some settings, adequacy designs may be the only feasible option, but the 
research community should look for opportunities to use plausibility designs where possible, 
through partnerships with implementing agencies. 
14.5 Final Conclusions 
Health care markets in developing countries are highly heterogeneous, with the importance and 
nature of the private sector varying across geographical settings and health problems. Economic 
analysis of the operation of such markets is to date very limited, despite major concerns about 
their performance in public health terms. A considerable literature exists on hospital markets in 
some developed countries, which highlights the utility of economic concepts and methods in 
understanding their performance. This study has shown that such concepts are also of value in 
the analysis of treatment markets in rural, developing country settings. Moreover, the relevance 
of economic theories of competition may be greater in these settings, due to the commercial 
nature of most providers, and the lack of large institutions such as insurance providers and 
health maintenance organisations. While the thesis findings have immediate relevance to the 
improvement of malaria treatment, it is therefore hoped that the concepts and methods 
employed will be of use in expanding our knowledge of the structure, conduct and performance 
of developing country health care markets in general. 
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uuql iagSlg oq Ilim slgozd ag oopd aannod saaumsuoo Xuuui a8 s. iapin, o. id Auuyg " uoi; iladmoa 
imp panS. iE, Cllu=aS; ng `; no aualo; ol\I " laIn; ui auTOS an, ug saug Ienpin, ipüI " MoI /Clanilelal ST II011e. 4uaou03 " ai; silodouoN 
; onpoldsnouaSouioq 
e qlim luunalaui st uoililaduioo A; tluno . lixa io A. T; ua ol slaun: g orl " 
aoud uoi; uauo,; ui; oa3aad " 
Aluo slgoid leauou alum suuT3 " ; a)laeiu ag; aouanlp. ii uuo uug alSuis ou pooB snoua20uiog 
lsoo IuuiSaeiu $ anuan, ai Iuupn: cu SU anmo puuuiap luluozuog aou3 su1.113 . s. iallas puu s. ia, Cnqjo s. iaqumu aSn? Z " uoi; i; adUioa 
Ienba liim aoud unugilmba uI . aoud3o sisug ag; uo si uoi; i; aduioZ) . moI uoi; edluaou03 " ; aa; aad 
aauBUiaopad lanpuoa aanlanalS 
slapoau uopyaumoa p. igputt3s aapun aauunt. ioj. iau puB; anpnoa "a. in; anajS I'Id aIq$, L 
dv districts 
Features Rufiji Kilombero Ulanga 
District District District 
Geographic characteristics Coastal delta, Flood plain, Flood plain, 
flood plain, escarpment highlands 
plateau 
Estimated district population in 2000 170,000 220,000 160,000 
Population density / lan 9 10 10 
Population under 5 20% 16% 16% 
Under five mortality rate 191 /1000 160/1000 160 /1000 
Malaria transmission & endemicity Intense Intense Intense 
perennial per al perennial 
Severe anaemia (Hb<8g/dL) in children 44% 37% 33% 
under 5 years 
Average household size 6 5 5 
Children under 5 years sleeping under 26% 63% 31% 
bednet 
Children under 5 years sleeping under 3% 7% 5% 
bednet treated with insecticide in last 6 
months 
Source: IMPACT-TZ proposal. 
Table A1.3 Adequacy of household survey sample size for analysis of treatment seeking 
behaviour 
Variable Estimated Estimated Difference detectable 
proportion standard between 2 equally 
/mean deviation sized rou s 
All age groups Under 5s 
pooled onl 
Proportion using formal health 53%1 12% points 25% points 
facilities 34%2 - 12% points 24% points 
Number of provider visits per 0.91 0.52' 0.13 0.26 
isode 
'Data from IMCI 1999 household survey (for under fives only) 2 Data from IMPACT 2000 household survey (adults only) 
Assumptions: 
" Total sample of Group A households: 1250 (625 in each group) 
" Wastage: 25% 
" Design effect: 2 
" Fever episodes in previous 2 weeks: 
o per household: 1.34 
o per household for under fives only: 0.34 
" Detectable difference based on 5% significance and 90% power 
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Variable Estimated Estimated Difference Required 
proportion standard to detect sample size in 
/mean= deviation each rou 
3 
Frequency of stockouts of key 20% - 20% 63 
drugs 
Staff have some secondary 50% - 20% 98 
education 
Price of loose chloro uine tablet Tsh 15 Tsh 5 Tsh 3 44 
Price of loose paracetamol tablet Tsh 7 Tsh 5 Tsh 1.4 72 
Average number of drug 20 10 4 98 
customers per day 
' based on 20% difference from estimated mean or 20% point difference from estimated proportion. 2 based on data from qualitative interviews. 3 based on 5% significance and 80% power. 
Table A1.6 Antimalarial purchase required for standard doses for a two-year-old child 
and an adult 
Drug type Standard 
unit size' 
Purchase required to 
treat a two-year-old child 
(for comparison of 
antimalarial prices) 
Purchase required per 
equivalent adult dose 
(for calculation of sales 
volumes) 
Tablets 
Chloro uine 250mg2 2 10 
SP 525mg 1 3 
Amodia uine 200mg 2 8 
Quinine 300mg 11 42 
Syrups 
Chloro uine 1O0m1 I I 
SP I Omi 1 1 
Amodiaguine 60m1 I I 
Quinine 100m1 1 1 
In'ectables 
Chloro uine 30m1 1 1 
Quinine 2m1 1 1 
'Some products were available in different unit sizes (e. g. amodiaquine syrup in 100ml and 60m1 bottles; chloroquine 
tablets of 250mg and 150mg). Where this occurred, doses were adjusted to the equivalent volumes of the most 
common unit size. 2 150mg base. 
3 Chooroquine and Quinine injection doses are for initial pre-referral treatment only, as recommended in the National 
Treatment Guidelines. The cost of purchasing a syringe and water for injection was not included. 
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household survey respondents' 
Kilonibero Ulanga Rufiji Total 
DSS DSS DSS 
Household characteristics 
Number of households 357 228 516 1101 
Education of household head: 
None 63 (18%) 37(16%) 226 (44%) 326 (30%) 
Less than primary 110(31%) 87(38%) 99 (19%) 296 (27%) 
Completed primary only 140 (39%) 83(36%) 116(22%) 339(31%) 
More than primary 44(12%) 21(9%) 7505%) 14003%) 
Main job of household head : 
Farming 336(94%) 204 (89%) 425 (83%) 965 (88%) 
Off-farm work 21(6%) 24 (11%) 85(17%) 130 (12%) 
None 0- 0- 30.6% 30.3% 
Religion of household head: 
Christian 284(80%) 95 (42%) 43 (8%) 422(38%) 
Muslim 67(19%) 131 (57%) 473 (92%) 671(61%) 
Traditional 00 2(1%) 0 (-) 2 (0.2%) 
No religion 6(2%) 0 0- 60.5% 
Household SES: 
Poorest third 130 (36%) 76 (33%) 156 (33%) 362 (34%) 
Middle third 108 (30%) 69 (30%) 166 (35%) 343 (33%) 
Better-off third 119(32%) 83(36%) 148(31%) 350(33%) 
Individual characteristics 
Number of Individuals4 1085 802 1964 3851 
Age group: 
Under five years 172(16%) 118(15%) 330(17%) 620(16%) 
Over five ears 913(84%) 683(85%) 1632 83% 3228(84%) 
Gender: 
Male 501 (51%) 343 (46%) 492(44%) 1336 (47%) 
Female 485(49%) 402(54% 629 56% 1516(53%) 
' for households answering the detailed questionnaire (Group A only) 2 data were missing on main job for 3 households in Rufiji, and on SES for 46 households in Rufiji 3 off-farm work encompassed labourer, business, driver, craftsman, formal sector, traditional healer, lumberjack, 
charcoal seller and fishing. 
4 data on age were missing for 3 individuals (2 in Rufiji and I Ulanga). Data on gender were missing for 57 
individuals in Ulanga, 99 in Kilombero, and 843 in Rufiji. The high level of missing data in Rufiji reflected the loss 
of roughly one-third of Rufiji questionnaire cover sheets, where this information was recorded. 
Source: Household Survey May-Sep 2001. 
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Table A1.8 Prevalence of reported fever/malaria episodes and P. falciparum parasitacmia 
Reported fever/malaria in P. falciparuni parasitaemia 
previous 2 weeks on day of interview 
All individuals (n=3,847) (n=3,329) 
628(16%) 768(23%) 
Household characteristics 
DSS area: (n=3,847) (n=3,329) 
Kilombero 203 (19%)* 189 (20%)* 
Ulanga 85 (11%)* 147 (22%) 
Rufi'i 340 (17%)* 432 (25%)* 
Education of household head: (n=3,847) (n=3,329) 
Not completed primary 328 (15%)* 435 (23%) 
Completed primary or more 300 (18%)* 333(23%) 
SES: (n=3,693) (n=3,198) 
Poorest third 179 (16%) 249 (25%)* 
Middle third 212 (17%) 283 (26%)* 
Better-off third 208(16%) 202 (18%)* 
Individual characteristics 
Age group: (n=3,843) (n=3,325) 
Under 5 years 172 (28%)* 226 (41%)* 
5-14 years 110 (10%)* 356 (38%)* 
15+ years 346 (16%)* 185 (10%)* 
Gender: (n=2,849) (n=2,501) 
Male 208 (16%) 282 (25%) 
Female 277(18%) 299(22%) 
*significant difference across household/individual characteristics (chi' test with Rao and Scott correction, p<0.05) 
Source: Household Survey May-Sep 2001. 
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n stock 
Ulanga Kilombero Rufiji Total 
DSS DSS DSS 
Population 29,439 37,064 73,839 140,342 
(mid-2001) 
Heath care facilities 
Government 5 4 9 18 
Private 2 3 4 9 
Total facilities 7 7 13 27 
Retailers stocking drugs 
Commercial drug 2 8 20 30 
shops 
Village-run drug 0 2 0 2 
shops 
General shops 122 155 258 535 
stocking drugs 
Total retailers 124 165 278 567 
stocking drugs 
Population ratios 
Population per 4206 5295 5680 5198 
facility 
Population per drug 14,720 3706 3692 4386 
shop 
Population per 246 239 286 262 
general shop 
stocking drugs 
Population per drug 229 215 254 236 
outlet 
Source: Outlet Census May-Sep 2001 
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Table A1.10 Fever/malaria drugs stocked 
(% of outlets in each category stocking specified medicine) 
Government Private Commercial Village-run General 
facilities facilities drug shops drug shops retailers' 
n 18 8 30 2 213 
Aspirin tablets 16 (89%) 8(100%) 29(97%) 2(100%) 173(81%) 
Paracetamol 16(89%) 8 (100%) 30(100%) 2 (100%) 188 (88%) 
tablets 
Paracetamol - 4 (50%) 27 (90%) 2 (100%) 5 (2%) 
syrup, 
Aspirin + - - 5(17%) - 63(30%) 
Caffeine tablets 
Aspirin + - - 7 (23%) - 114 (54%) 
Paracetamol + 
Caffeine tablets 
Other - 7 (88%) 16 (53%) - l (O. 5%) 
painkillers 
Any 17 (94%) 8(100%) 30 (100%) 2(100%) 213 
painkillers (100%) 
b) Antimalarials 
Government 
facilities 
Private 
facilities 
Commercial 
drug sho s 
Village-run 
drug sho s 
General 
retailers t 
n 18 8 30 2 213 
Tablets 
Chloroquine 11(61%) 4(50%) 11(37%) 2 (100%) 20 (9%) 
SP 16 (89%) 8 (100%) 27 (90%) - 2 (0.9%) 
Amodiaquine 10 (56%) 4 (50%) 23 (77%) - 7 (3%) 
Quinine 5 (28%) 7 (88%) 20 (67%) - 1 (0.5%) 
Artesunate - - 1 (3%) - - 
Syrups 
Chloroquine 10 (56%) 3 (38%) 8 (27%) 2 (100%) 2 (0.9%) 
SP - 1 (13%) 6 (20%) - - 
Amodiaquine - 2 (25%) 13 (43%) - 1(0.5%) 
Quinine - 1 (13%) 10 (33%) - - 
Injectables 
Chloroquine 10 (56%) 2(25%) 9 (30%) - 1 (0.5%) 
Quinine 10 (53%) 8 (100%) 24 (77%) - 1 (0.5%) 
Any 
antimalarials 
18 (100%) 8 (100%) 30 (100%) 2 (100%) 30 (14%) 
'n excludes general stores not stocking any fever/malaria drugs at the time of the Outlet Survey 2 including powder for syrup 
Source: Outlet Survey Nov-Dec 2001 
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Table A1.11 Number of providers visited per individual reporting fever/malaria 
of individuals reporting fever/malaria making specified number of provider visits) 
Number of visits 
per interviewee 
Total 
0 160(26%) 
1 389(62%) 
2 56(9%) 
3 18(3%) 
4 30.5% 
5 2(0.3%) 
Total episodes 628(100%) 
No significant difference in number of providers visited by age group (chit test with Rao and Scott correction) 
Source: Household Survey May-Sep 2001. 
Table A1.12 Estimated antimalarials dispensed per annum in volume and value terms (per 
capita amounts in brackets) 
T Kilombero Ulanga Rufiji ] Total _ 
DSS DSS DSS 
_ Antimalarial volumes in equivalent adult doses 
Government 11,232' 11,232 73,164 95,641 
facilities (0.3) (0.4) (1.0) (0.7) 
Private 10,465 3,705 34,357 48,540 
facilities (0.3) 0.1 (0.5) (0.3) 
Commercial 35,035 14,352 29,159 78,533 
drug shops 0.9 (0.5) (0.4) (0.6) 
Village-run 1,560 0 0 1,560 
drug shops (0.04) (0.01) 
General stores 4,659 1,978 2,761 9,397 
0.1 (0.1) (0.04) (0.1) 
Total 62,951 31,241 139,415 233,606 
(1.7) 1.1 1.9 1.7 
Antimalarial sa les values in US$ 
Government $2,031 $1,386 $7,381 $10,799 
facilities ($0.05) ($0.05) ($0.10) ($0.08) 
Private $6,777 $2,692 $23,086 $32,555 
facilities ($0.18) ($0.09) ($0.31) ($0.23) 
Commercial $26,991 $10,094 $21,759 $58,844 
drug shops ($0.73) ($0.34) ($0.29) ($0.42) 
Village-run $1,742 0 0 $1,742 
. 
drug shops ($0.05) ($0.01) 
General stores $2,446 $907 $1,350 $4,703 
($0.07) $0.03 ($0.02) ($0.03) 
Total $39,988 $15,079 $53,576 $108,643 
($1.08) ($0.51) ($0.73) $0.77 
Source: Retail Audits Feb/Apr & Jun/Jul2002 (drug prices from Outlet Survey Nov-Dec 2001) 1 It is correct that estimates for Kilombero and Ulanga government facilities are identical. 
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Table A1.13 Breakdown of sales volumes by antimalarial for each outlet type 
Government 
facilities 
Private 
facilities 
Commercial 
drug sho s 
Village-run 
drug shops 
General 
sho s 
n (equivalent 
adult doses) 
95,641 48,540 78,533 1,560 9,397 
Tablets: 
Chloro uine 3% 2% 2% 0% 51% 
SP 77% 71% 64% 73% 31% 
Amodia uine 16% 11% 24% 11% 9% 
Quinine 1% 8% 4% 13% 6% 
All Syrups 0% 2% 2% 3% 2% 
AllIn'ectables 3% 7% 4% 0% 0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Retail Audits Feb/Apr & Jun/Jul 2002. 
Table A1.14 Estimated mean antimalarial sales per outlet p. a. in volumes and values 
Kilombero Ulanga Rufiji Average 
DSS DSS DSS across DSS 
areas 
Mean antimalarial sales volume s (equivalent adu lt doses) 
Government 2,808 2,246 8,129 5,313 
facilities 
Private 3,488 1,853 8,580 5,393 
facilities 
Commercial 3,893 4,784 1,325 2,310 
drug shops 
Village-run 780 - - 780 drug shops 
General stores 91 99 50 74 
Mean antimalarial sales values in Tsh (US$ in brackets) 
Government 483,893 263,450 789,242 575,333 
facilities ($509) $277 ($831) ($606) 
Private 2,146,313 1,278,843 4,387,000 3,093,162 
facilities ($2,259) ($1,346) ($4,617) 
___j$3,255) Commercial 2,849,519 3,196,795 939,742 1,644,423 
drug shops ($2,999) ($3,365) ($989) ($1,731) 
Village-run 827,398 - - 827,398 drug shops ($871) $871 
General stores' 45,471 43,057 23,701 35,681 
($48) ($45) ($25) $38 
'General stores stocking antimalarials in 2001 
Source: Retail Audits Feb/Apr & Jun/Jul 2002 (drug prices from Outlet Survey Nov-Dec 2001). 
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Table A1.15 Proportion of antimalarials for fever/malaria dispensed as under-doses 
(a) By Provider tvue 
No. of 
antimalarials 
Underdoses (%) 
Government facility 79 23(29%) 
Private facility 34 7(21%) 
Drug shop 95 28(29%) 
General shop 24 12(50%) 
Other 2 1(50%) 
By antimalarial tvae 
Antimalarial No. of 
antimalarials 
Underdoses (%) 
SP tablets 68 903%) 
Chloro uine tablets 103 34 (33%) 
Amodia uine tablets 7 2(29%) 
Quinine tablets 28 24(86%) 
Chloro uine syrup 9 0(-) 
Chiorouine injection 11 00 
uinine injection 8 2(25%) 
All antimalarials 234 71(30% 
' Antimalarials obtained from providers only. 
Source: Household Survey May-Sep 2001. 
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Figure A1.1 Coding scheme for analysis of qualitative provider interviews 
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ANNEX 2 
FRAMEWORK FOR POTENTIAL DETERMINANTS OF 
HOUSEHOLD DEMAND AND RETAIL PROVIDER SUPPLY 
1. Potential Determinants of Household Demand 
Consumer knowledge and beliefs about fever/malaria and treatment efficacy: 
" local illness classifications and explanatory models for malaria 
" perceptions of disease severity 
" knowledge of drug treatments and dosing regimens 
" understanding of the difference between types of formulation, antimalarials and 
antipyretics, and between brand name and generic products 
" perceptions of efficacy and resistance 
" information characteristics of the products 
" branding and promotion strategies of manufacturers and distributors 
Consumer preferences for other product characteristics: 
" dosage regimens 
" antipyretic action 
" side-effects 
" taste 
(noting that some apparently unpleasant characteristics are linked with greater perceived 
efficacy) 
Consumer preferences for provider characteristics: 
" accessibility and opening hours 
" waiting times 
" reliability and range of drug supplies 
" the availability of equipment, diagnostics and examination services 
" the condition of buildings 
" courtesy of staff 
" perceived expertise of staff 
" perceived motivation of staff 
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Prices: 
" variation across individuals, providers, drugs and formulations (including any price 
discrimination, market segmentation or product differentiation) 
" price of complementary goods and services such as diagnosis, consultation, travel and time 
costs 
" additional under-the-table charges 
" mode of payment (credit availability, payment-in-kind) 
" household income (including seasonal fluctuations) 
" availability of loans or gifts 
Agency role of the provider: 
" degree of information asymmetry between consumer and provider 
" potential for opportunistic behaviour by providers 
" balance of provider /consumer roles in deciding on treatment 
2. Potential Determinants of Retail Provider Supply 
Provider knowledge: 
" knowledge of drug treatments and dosing regimens 
" understanding of the difference between types of formulation, antimalarials and 
antipyretics, and between brand name and generic products 
" perceptions of efficacy and resistance 
" beliefs about patients' attitudes and preferences 
(knowledge will be influenced by medical/pharmaceutical training, work experience, general 
levels of education, information provided through training programmes, provider and general 
public health education initiatives, and professional support) 
Provider incentives: 
" nature of provider goals (profit, satisficing, serving community, building reputation etc. ) 
" outlet ownership 
" terms of staff employment and remuneration 
" decentralisation of control over personnel and finance 
" cost structure, taxes or regulatory fees 
" promotional prospects 
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Competitive environment: 
" market concentration 
" prevalence of price and non-price competition 
" information characteristics of the products and services 
" whether demand is characterised by recurrent visits or one-off exchanges 
" access to credit and capital 
" threat of potential new entrants to the market 
" threat of exit 
Regulation and supervision: 
" scope of government regulation or supervision 
" government enforcement capability including potential for regulatory capture 
" self-regulation by professional associations 
" monitoring by consumer associations 
Distribution chain: 
" availability and prices of products to retailers 
" frequency and reliability of distribution 
" information provided by distributors 
" mode of payment and incentive schemes 
" vertical control and integration 
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ANNEX 3 
THE IMPACT-TZ EVALUATION 
The Interdisciplinary Monitoring Project for Antimalarial Combination Therapy in Tanzania 
(IMPACT-TZ) is a collaboration between the United States Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), the Ifakara Health Research and Development Centre (IHRDC), the National 
Institute for Medical Research (NIMR), the Tanzanian Essential Health Interventions Project 
(TEHIP), the Adult Morbidity and Mortality Project (AMMP), the London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicine, and the Ministry of Health (PIs: Dr. Peter B. Bloland (CDC) and Dr. 
Salim Abdulla (IIIRDC)). 
The overall aim is to evaluate the effectiveness of artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT) 
for malaria treatment in Tanzania. The evaluation is taking place in the four rural Tanzanian 
districts of Kilombero, Ulanga, Rufiji and Morogoro-Rural. Baseline data were collected in all 
areas between 2000 and 2002. In early 2003 IMPACT staff collaborated with the Rufiji District 
Health Management Team to implement ACT (SP plus three-day artesunate) as first line drug in 
Rufiji district. The evaluation of ACT in comparison with SP monotherapy in the other three 
districts is ongoing. 
The objectives of IMPACT-TZ are: 
1. To determine the effectiveness of combination therapy using an artemisinin derivative and SP 
for delaying the advent and intensification of parasitologic resistance to the separate 
component drugs. 
2. To determine the effectiveness of combination therapy using an artemisinin derivative and SP 
for decreasing malaria transmission (using gametocyte carriage rates as a proxy measure). 
3. To identify the range of factors which influence the use of antimalarials by patients, 
caretakers, and health providers, and to develop and evaluate interventions that optimize the 
recommended use of combination therapy through all available channels of distribution 
(including public, private, formal and informal sectors). 
4. To investigate the costs and cost-effectiveness of the combination therapy strategy. 
5. To describe the policy implications of combination therapy, including barriers to successful 
implementation of the policy, successful strategies for implementation, health care workers' 
understanding and use of the new policy, and use of information from this pilot 
implementation area to inform or modify policy in other districts or nationally. 
6. To measure the public health impact of combination therapy when used operationally. 
7. To support and promote capacity building within partner institutions in Tanzania. 
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IMPACT data collection includes household surveys, outpatient and inpatient facility surveys, 
in vivo and in vitro drug efficacy studies, assessment of compliance, qualitative assessment of 
illness classification, care-seeking and drug use practices, costing studies at the household, 
facility and district levels, analysis of the process of change and decision-making, demographic 
surveillance of migration, births and deaths, and adverse drug reaction / post marketing 
surveillance. 
The evaluation is supported by a number of funders including the United States Agency for 
International Development, CDC, and the Wellcome Trust. This thesis contributes to the 
achievement of Objectives 3 and 5, and was funded primarily by the Wellcome Trust. 
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ANNEX 4 
DATA COLLECTION INSTUMENTS 
" Household Economics Survey 
> Module A: Household data 
> Module B: Individual data 
D Module C: Source of treatment or medicine 
" Outlet Census 
> Questionnaire 
" Qualitative Provider Interviews 
> Guide for qualitative interviews at facilities 
> Guide for qualitative interviews at shops 
> Staffing table 
> Drugs table 
" Outlet Survey 
> Questionnaire 
> Drug Check List 
" Retail Audit 
Questionnaire 
> Stock Table 
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Interdisciplinary Monitoring Programme for 
Antimalarial Combination Therapy In Tanzania. 
IMPACT Second baseline household survey 
(Activity A, Year 2001) 
In Kilombero, Ulanga and Rufiji Districts. 
47 pT HOUSEHOLD ECONOMICS SURVEY 
MODULE A: Household data (Complete one form per household) 
District Code: Village Code: DSS Household number: 
Name of Head of Household: 
Date of interview: i-i-I/I-I-i/LLLLIL I (DD/MM/YYYY) 
Ask the following questions of the head of household or his/her representative. 
1. 
2. 
3a. 
3b. 
4. 
S. 
s. 
What is the ethnic group/tribe of the head of household? 
11=Ndamba 16=Vidunda 19=Ndengereko 22=Nyagatwa 
12=Pogoro 17=Ngindo 20=Makonde 
13=Ngoni 18=Hehe 21=Matumbi 99=Don't know 
14=Bena 
15=Mang'ati 55=Other: ýý--ýý--------------ý-ý-ý 
What Is the head of household's religious affiliation? 
1=Christian 2=Muslim 
3=Traditional 4=No religion 
5=Other. I----I--------I--I--I--I-I-I 
9=unknown 
What is the education level of the head of household? 
Enter the total number of years of education completed 
00= less than one year 01 . 20= actual number of years 99=unknown 
What is the head of household's primary occupation? 
1=farmer 2=labourer 
3=small business 4=business 
5=driver 6=fisher 
7=govemment worker/ formal sector employment 
8=other. 
9=unknown 
What Is the floor of the head of household's home constructed from? 
1=mud 
2=wood 
3=tiles 
4=cement 
5-other: IJ- 
-ýý- ----------- -ý-ý-) 9=unknown 
What are the walls of the head of household's home constructed from? 
1=Stone, cement, fired bricks 
2=unfired bricks (with or without plaster), sand, or wood 
3=corrugated tin, mud, mud and sticks, bamboo 
4=grass, cardboard 
5=other: 
-f--_ýý-I------ý_ý--1ý--ý-ý-ý 9=unknown 
What is the roof of the head of household made from? (Observe) 
1 =tiles, cement, reinforced concrete 
2=corrugated tin, asbestos 
3=coconut leaves, bamboo, thatch, sticks, mud, grass, plastic sheets, oil tins 
4=other: 
9=unknown 
i_i_i 
i_i 
i_i_i 
i_i 
1-1 
i_i 
i_i 
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7. What fuel do you usually use for cooking In this household? 
1=electricity, gas, solar 
2=firewood 
3=kerosene, Biogas, charcoal 
4=coconut husks, leftover bits of wood, grass, chaff, animal manure 
5=other. 
9=unknown 
8. 
9. 
What is the usual source of water used by people in this household? 
1=piped water inside the house 
2=private well or pump 
3=shared pump or well 
4=public standpipe 
5=water seller 
6=river or spring 
7=rain water 
8--other 
-----------------ý-ý-I 9=unknown 
What kind of toilet do people in this household use? 
1=modem flush toilet 
2=ventilated improved pit latrine (VIP) 
3=pit latrine 
4=bush 
5=other. 
------------------ý-ý-ý 9=unknown 
i_i 
i_i 
10. What is the usual source of light in this household? 
1=small oil lantern 
2= hurricane lantern 
3=electricity 
4=other: 
-----ýý-ýý_ 
ýý-ýý------ý-ý-ý 
9=unknown 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
i_i 
Which of the following Items do people In this household own or keep? READ UST: 1=items owned (even if broken), 2=items not owned 
1_1 chickens/ducks 1-1 bed 1_I clock/watch 
1_1 cows 1_1 mattress 1_I iron 
I_ 1 goats mosquito net I_I radio 
1_1 sheep 1-1 clothing cupboard 1_1 bicycle 
I_I other livestock U sofa sets 1-1 motorcycle 
1_1 car/vehicle or tractor 
What Is the nearest government health facility to your home? If they donY know the name or location, write donY know" 
Village Kitongoji or other place 
Name: Place: 
12a. How long does it take you to travel to this health facility by the way 
you usually travel? 
1=not more than 15 minutes 4=more than 2 hours 
2=15 minutes to 1 hour 8=not applicable 
3=between 1 and 2 hours 9=unknown 
What is the nearest non-government health facility to your home? 
If they don? know the name or location, write don't know" 
Village Kitongoji or other place 
Name: Place: 
13a. How long does It take you to travel to this health facility by the way 
you usually travel? 
1=not more than 15 minutes 4=more than 2 hours 
2=15 minutes to 1 hour 8=not applicable 
3=between 1 and 2 hours 9=unknown 
14a. How long does it take you to travel to this shop by the way 
you usually travel? 
1=not more than 15 minutes 4=more than 2 hours 
2=15 minutes to 1 hour 8=not applicable 
3=between 1 and 2 hours 9=unknown 
What is the nearest medicine shop or Drug shop to your home? If they donY know the name or location, write donY know! " 
Name: 
Village Kitongoji or other place 
Place: 
-1--I---------ý_ý--i-ý-ý 
i-i 
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15. 
15a. How long does it take you to travel to this shop by the way 
you usually travel? 
1 =not more than 15 minutes 4=more than 2 hours 
2=15 minutes to 1 hour 8=not applicable 
3=between 1 and 2 hours 9=unknown 
Villaae Kitonooll or other place 
Name: Place: 
If they donI know the name or location, write hajui" 
What is the nearest general shop, kiosk or au genge where you can buy medicines to your home? 
(even if they only sell common medicines like Panadol or asprin) 
1--) 
16.1 would like to ask you about each place you have mentioned for the treatment of fever or malaria. 
First I will ask about the availability of medicines, then about the knowledge of the doctors or 
salespeople about medicines and fever, then finally, the politeness or courtesy of the staff. For each 
of the places you mentioned, please Indicate whether you consider it good, somewhat good, or not 
good. 
1=good 2=somewhat good S=not good 8=not applicable (could not mention a place) 9=unknown 
16a. 
availability of 
medicines 
16b. knowledge of the 
doctors or staff 
concerning medicines and 
fever 
16c. 
politeness, 
courtesy 
Government health facility (as specified in #12) 
Non- ovemment health facility (as specified in #13) 
Dru Sho as s ecified in #14) 
General sho /kiosk/ en a (as s ecified in #15 
Now I would like to ask some questions about malaria and medicines 
17. 
18. 
In your opinion, what causes malaria? 
1=mentioned 2=not mentioned DO NOT READ LIST 
mosquitoes I_I cold weather 
hot weather being rained on 
drinking dirty water -ý 
hard work 
eating newly harvested crops 
other: 
unknown 
In your opinion, between chloroquine and Fansidar or SP, which Is better 
for treating a small child with fever or malaria? 
1=chloroquine Is better 
2=Fansidar or SP is better 
3=both are equal 
9=unknown 
1--1 
u-j interviewer checked by I-J-j 
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Interdisciplinary Monitoring Programme for 
Antimalarial Combination Therapy in Tanzania. 
IMPACT Second baseline household survey 
(Activity A, Year 2001) 
In Kilombero, Ulanga and Rufiji Districts. 
Aý''M' HOUSEHOLD ECONOMICS SURVEY 
MODULE B: Individual Data (Complete 1 form for each household member who is present at the time of 
the interview) 
District Code: I-I_i_I Village Code: 1-1.1_1 DSS Household Number: 
Name of individual: I-I-I-I-I-I-i-I-I-I--I-I-i-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I 
DSS Permanent ID: I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I Date of Birth: I-I-I/I-I-I/II-I-I-I-I 
Ask the following questions to each adult household member. For children under 12 years of age, ask the questions of the 
child's parent or primary caretaker. 
19. Specify your relationship to the Individual mentioned above. I-) 1 =self (the person is more than 11 years old) 
2=mother 
3=father 
4=grandmother 
5=grandfather 
6=auntfuncle 
7=sibling 
8=other. 
-i--i---ý_ý-----i-i-i-i-i-ý-i-i 
20. Have you had (has your child had) a severe blistering skin rash 
at any time in the past 4 months? I-I 
1=yes 2=no 9=unknown 
if it the individual is a child under 3 years of age, go to question # 18. 21. Have you (has your child) experienced a problem with walking or talking (as If drunk) 
at any time during the past 4 months? I-I 
1=yes 2=no 9=unknown 
22. During the past 14 days have you (has your child) had fever or malaria? 
1=Yes 2=no 9=unknown 
If yes, go to question # 24 
i_i 
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24. When did this illness begin? 
01=today 
02-86=actual number of days 
87=more than 86 days 
99=unknown 
25. Are you (is your child) well today? 
1=yes; 2=no*; 9=unknown' 
"If no or unknown go to question #27 
26. How many days did your illness (your child's illness) last? 
01=today only 
02-86=actual number of days 
87=more than 86 
88=not applicable 
99=unknown 
27. What symptoms did this illness have? 
1=mentioned 2=did not mention DO NOT READ LIST 
I-I fever, hot body, very high temperature I_I body aches 
I_. I headache I_I diarrhoea 
I_I chills / shivering I_I cough 
I_I convulsions, startling, twitching I_I vomiting 
I_I loss of consciousness I_I rapid breathing 
I-I dizziness 
I-I other. I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I 
I_Iother. I_I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-IJ-I-I-IJ 
I-I unknown 
28. 
29. 
30. 
in your opinion, did you think this illness was a big illness (serious), 
an ordinary illness, or a small (minor) illness? 
1 =big or serious illness 2-ordinary Illness 3=small or minor illness 9=unknown 
I_I_I days ago 
i_i 
Did you think that your life (the life of your child) was in danger because of this illness? 
1=yes 2=no 9=unknown 
boxes to indicate the sequence. 
1. Hospital/health centre/dispensary 
2. Drug shop 
3. Local doctor/mganga wa mitaani 
4. General shop/kioski/genge 
5. Traditional healer 
6. other provider: 
7. other provider: 
8. traditional medicine 9. Cosmopolitan medicines already kept at home 
1_I_I days 
i-i 
i-i 
i i 
If no or unknown, probe by asking the respondent specifically about each of the types of treatment listed below. 
If he/she went for no treatment at all, go to question #32. 
30a If yes, From what source did you first seek care? 
After the first answer continue probing: 
And after that, did you get further treatment from this person or from anyone else? 
Continue asking until the respondent has specified every single place or person from whom they sought 
treatment. Indicate number tin the first box next to the source of care they visited first, 2 next to the second 
source of care (if one is mentioned), and so on. H they did not seek care at all from one of the sources listed, 
enter a0 in the first box. Probe by asking the respondent specifically about sources of treatment that 
he/she has not mentioned. If they mentioned visiting a source of care more than once, use the second and third 
Did you (your child) obtain any kind of treatment or medicine at all for this illness? 
1=yes 2=no* 9=unknown' 
I U. Cosmopolitan medicines obtained from a 
i-i i-i i-i _> Module C Module C 
I-I I-I I-I Module C 
I-I I-I I-I Module C 
I-I i-I I-I Module C 
i-i i-i i-i i-i i-i i-i i-i L-i i-i I-I I-I I-I 
i-i i-i i-i friend, relative or neighbor (not a member of same household) 
=> 
Module C 
Module C 
_> Question 31 
_> Question 31 
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Interdisciplinary Monitoring Programme for 
Antimalarial Combination Therapy In Tanzania. 
IMPACT Second baseline household survey 
(Activity A, Year 2001) 
In Kilombero, Ulanga and Rufiji Districts. 
HOUSEHOLD ECONOMICS SURVEY 
MODULE C: Sources of treatment or medicine 
(Complete one form for each treatment site, shop, or provider that the respondent visited for this illness. If a provider 
or source of care was visited more than once, complete an additional copy of Module C for each time the provider was 
revisited. ) 
District Code: I-I-I-I Village Code: I-I-I-I DSS Household Number: 
Name of individual/patient: 
DSS Permanent ID: Date of Birth: 
Number of provider from list on question #30a (Module B): I-I 
33. Name of the source of care or drugs: 
Village Kitongoji or other place 
34. Location: 
35. 
i_i 
What type of provider Is this? 
1=government Hospital/Health Centre/Dispensary 
2=Non-governmental or mission Hospital/Heafth Centre/Dispensary 
3=drug shop 
4=local doctor/mganga wa mitaani 
5=general shop/kiosk/genge 
6=village/community health worker 
7=traditional healer 
9=other provider: 
Now I shall ask some questions about your visit to this provider. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
When did you go to this provider? 
01=today 
01-86=actual number of days 
87=more than 86 days 
99=unnknown 
I 
If the provider is a shop of any kind, go to question #37 
36a. Were you (was your child) admitted? 
I=yes 2=no* 9=unknown' 
If no or unknown, go to question #37 
36b. If yes, for how many days were you (was your child) admitted? 
004 less than one day 
01-86=actual number of days 
87=more than 86 days 
99=unknown 
Who went to this provider? 
The patient? 
Other adults? (age 12 or older) 
Other children? (less than age 12) 
How did you (they) travel to this provider? 
1 =by foot 2=bicycle 3=motorbike 
5=other (specify) 
1=yes 2=no 
(indicate the number) 
(indicate the number) 
1-1 4=public transport 
9=don't know 
i-i 
i-i-i 
ý-ý 
I-I-I 
I-I-I 
i-i 
1_1 days ago 
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39. How long did it take to travel to this provider? 
1=less than 15 minutes 4=more than 2 hours 
2=15 minutes -1 hour 8=not applicable 
3=1- 2 hours 9=don't know 
i-i 
40. How much did you pay to travel to this provider? TshL-L_J_I. _. 
I-I 
77777=free or traveled by foot, 99999=don't know 
41. After arriving at this provider, how much time did it take until you were finished? 
(Add together time for waiting, treatment, lab tests, waiting for results and getting drugs. If they were admitted, 
include the time up until admission) I-I 
1 =less than 15 minutes 4=m ore than 2 hours 
2=15 minutes -1 hour 8=not applicable 
3=1- 2 hours 9=don't know 
If the provider is a shop of any kind, go to question #43 
42. Did you (they) have to spend any nights away from home in order to visit this provider? 
1=yes 2=no* 9=don't know' 
If no or don't know go to #43 
I-I 
42a. How much did you (they) spend for lodging? TshL-I-I-I-I-I 
77777=free, 99999=don't know 
43. Did you (they) have to spend money to buy food or drinks when you visited this provider? 
1 =yes 2=no' 9=don't know' 
If no or don't know go to #44 
43a. How much did you (they) spend for food and drinks? 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
How did you (they) travel back from this provider? 
1=by foot 2=bicycle 3=motorbike 4=public transport 
5=other (specify) 9=don't know 
How long did it take to travel home from this provider? 
1=less than 15 minutes 4=more than 2 hours 
2=15 minutes -1 hour 8=not applicable 
3=1 -2 hours 9=don't know 
How much did you pay to travel home from this provider? 
Did you (your child) obtain any drugs from this provider? 
1=yes 2=no* 9=don't know' 
If no or don't know go to #49 
i-i 
i-i 
Tsnl-I-1-I-I-I 
77777=free or traveled by foot, 9999Mon't know 
1-1 
Tshl-j-_I-I, I-1 
77777=free, 99999=don't know 
1-1 
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48. 
Complete the followin_q table for each drug that was obtained (tablets, syrup, injectaaies or cream). 
Please would you tell me the names of the drugs you (the child) received, even if they were not taken. 
If they give a generic name, probe whether a brand name product was used. 
I 48a. Drug 
000000 
Qýý0 El Q 
QQQQQQ 
QQQQQQ 
Q000QQ 
48b. What 
quantity did you 
obtain? 
1=tablets 
2=bottle 
3=injection 
4=tube 
5=packet (ORS) 
9=don't know 
Code: I-. I 
#I. -I-I"I-I 
Code: I_I 
#1-I-I"I-I 
Code: I-! 
#1-I-I"I-I 
Code: I-I 
#1-1-I"I-I 
Code: I-I 
#1_I-I"I-I 
48c. Did the 48d. How much 
provider decide on did you pay for 
this drug or did you this drug? (Tsh) 
ask for it yourself? 
1 =provider 
2=patient asked 
9=don't know 
i-j 
i-i 
i-i 
i-i 
i-i 
77777=free 
99999=don't know 
iJ_LJ_iJ 
i_i_i_i_i_i 
I-I-I-I-I-I 
i_i_i_i_i_i 
i_i_i--i_i_i 
48. e If they don't know the price of each individual drug, write the total here -I-I-I-I-I 
If the provider is a shop of any kind, go to question #51 49. Now I will ask you about any other payments you made to this provider. Read the list. 
a. Registration fee 
b. Consultation fee 
c. Syringe 
d. Lab tests 
e. Informal charges / thankyou payment 
I. Other 
g. Other 
i-i-i-i} 
{h. If they are not able to separate the fees paid for each service, write the total here Tshl-I 
50. 
51. 
52. 
1=yes* 2=no 9=don't know 
if yes, explain 
i-i 
If another provider was specified In question 30a, fill another Module C. 
If the patient visited a provider twice, fill In two forms, and so on. 
1_1-1 interviewer checked by 1-1-1 
If they are not able to separate the fees paid for drugs and services, write the total payment here. If they did 
not make any payments, or if they are able to separate the fees for drugs and services, go to question #51. 
Tsh l-l-l-l-l-l 
77777=free, 88888=not applicable, 99999=don't know 
Did you make any payments in-kind to this provider? 
1=yes* 2=no 9=don't know 
Tshl-1-. 1-1-1-1 
Tshl-I-1-I-1-1 
Tshl-1-1-1-1-1 
Tshl-1-1-I-1-1 
Tshl-1-1-1-1-1 
Tshl-1-1-1-1-1 
TshI-ý-ý-I-I-) 
I-I 
*$f yes, explain 
Did you receive credit from this provider? 
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Serial Number I_1_I 
Questionnaire for census of outlets selling drugs in the DSS areas 
i 
If possible interview the In-Charge or owner of the outlet 
Information and Invitation to participate' in research: Inventory of outlets where people obtain 
drugs for treating fever or malaria. 
My name is ........................ and I am an interviewer 
from the Ifakara Health Research and 
Development Centre / Rufiji Demographic Surveillance System. We would like to learn about how 
people from this area obtain drugs for treating fever. We would also like to know more about malaria, 
one of the most common causes of sickness here in Tanzania. The results of this research will help to 
improve the availability of drugs when they are needed by people suffering from malaria. 
In order to do this we are visiting and interviewing staff in clinics, general shops, drug shops, kiosks 
and other outlets to ask about the types of drugs that they sell. We would like to know which drugs 
you stock for treating fever or malaria, which drugs people buy most often, and where you normally 
buy your drug supplies. 
This is the second year of this activity. Last year we obtained very useful information, and this year we 
are visiting to update this information to see whether there have been any changes in the number or 
type of outlets, or changes in the types of drugs available. 
We would greatly appreciate your co-operation in this research. Participation is voluntary, and you do 
not need to answer any question that you do not want to answer. The interview will only last a few 
minutes. The information obtained from this interview will be confidential, and is for research purposes 
only. Your name and the name of your business will not appear in any report that comes out of this 
study. Information from this research will be used for improving services only and will not be passed 
to any drugs regulatory authorities. 
Do you have any questions? Do you agree to participate? 
Code Number: ý 
(From the outlet list. If the outlet is new, write 8888) 
District Code: 1 Village Code: 
Name of Kitongoji: 
Date of first visit: (day/month/year) 
1. Type of provider: I 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Non-governmental Dispensary / Health Centre / Dispensary 
Private commercial Dispensary / Hospital 
Drug Shop (Baridi / Part 2) 
General Shop 
Kioski or Genge 
Traditional healer 
Other: 
296 
Was it possible to do the interview? 
1. Yes 2. No 
If yes, go to question # 2. 
If no, why not? II 
1-1 
1. You were asked to come back later 
2. The outlet was closed today 
3. The outlet had completely closed down 
4. You were refused permission to interview because 
If "1" or "2" come back later. 
If "3" or "4" go to question #10. 
If a second visit is made to the outlet: 
Date of second visit: 
(day/month/year) 
Was It possible to do the interview? ýI 
1. Yes 2. No 
If yes, go to question # 2. 
If no, why not? 1-1 
1. You were asked to come back later 
2. The outlet was closed today 
3. The outlet had completely closed down 
4. You were refused permission to interview because 
If no, go to question #10. 
2. Are there any drugs in stock today? 
1. Yes 2. No 
If Yes, go to #4. 
If No, go to #3. 
3. Have you sold any drugs in the last 2 months? 
1. Yes 2. No 
If Yes, go to #7. 
If No, go to #9. 
1-1 
1-1 
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4. First I will ask you about drugs for pain and fever, then drugs for malaria, then 
antibiotic drugs. I would like to know about the trade names of all oral and Injectable 
drugs. 
I would like to first ask about drugs for pain relief and fever. 
What drugs do you have In stock today for pain relief and fever? 
1. In stock 2. Not in stock 
and list any other drugs for pain relief and fever which are present and not included on the 
list. 
Drugs for pain relief and fever: 
Action tablets 
Anadin tablets 
Asprin tablets 
Aspro tablets 
Brufen tablets 
Cafemol tablets 
Cafenol tablets 
Dakika tatu tablets 
Dawanol tablets 
Elydol tablets 
Elydol syrup 
Elymol tablets 
Hedapan tablets 
Hedex tablets 
Mara Moja tablets 
Paindex tablets 
Panadol tablets 
Panadol syrup 
Paracetamol tablets (generic) 
Sheladol tablets 
Sheladol syrup 
Zenadol tablets 
Zendex tablets 
List below any other drugs for pain 
relief and fever: (tablets / syrup / 
Injectable) 
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S. Next I would like to ask about antimalarials? 
What drugs do you have In stock today for malaria? 
1. In stock 2. Not in stock 
anti 6ct anv nthar antimaºariaºs which are present and not included on the list. and lis t an other antimalarials wnrcn are present 
Antimalarials: 
Dawaquin tablets 
Elyquine tablets 
Elyquine syrup 
Homaquin tablets 
Malaraquin tablets 
Shelyquine tablets 
Shelyquine syrup 
Tanzanquine tablets 
Tanzanquine syrup 
Zenaquin tablets 
Chloroquine tablets (generic) 
Chloroquine syrup (generic) 
Fansidar tablets 
Orodar tablets 
Sulphadar tablets 
Sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine tablets (generic) 
Metakelfin tablets 
Sulfametopyramine and pyrimethamine 
tablets (generic) 
Amoquin tablets 
Camoquin tablets 
Emoquin tablets 
Malaridose tablets 
Amodiaquine tablets (generic) 
Fitoquin injection 
Chloroquine injection (generic) 
Quinine injection 
Quinine tablets 
Arsumax tablets 
Cotecxin tablets 
List below any other antimalarials: 
(tablets / syrup / injectable) 
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6. Next I would like to ask about antibiotics. 
What antibiotic drugs do you have in stock today? 
1. In stock 2. Not in stock 
and list any other antibiotics which are present and not included on the list. 
Antibiotics: List below any other antibiotics: (tablets / syrup / injectable) 
Amoxycillin tablets 
Ampicillin tablets 
Ampicillin syrup 
Ampiclox tablets 
Chloraphenicol tablets 
Ciprofloxin tablets 
Cloxacillin tablets 
Cotrimoxazole tablets 
Cotrimoxazole syrup 
Doxycycline tablets 
Erythromycin tablets 
Erythromycin syrup 
Flagyl tablets 
Penicillin tablets 
Pen-V tablets 
Lacilin tablets 
Septrin tablets 
Septrin syrup 
Tetracycline tablets 
7. Please would you tell me the three drugs (by trade name) which you sell most often 
for fever or malaria? 
List the names of up to three drugs or "X" the box if they don't know (specify whether tablets 
/syrup Anjection) 
Don't know 
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8. Where do you buy your drugs? 
List the two places where they most frequently buy drugs. 
TvDe outlet 
1. General wholesaler 2. Drugs wholesaler 
Registered pharmacy (Part 1) 4. Drug shop (Baridi /Part 2) 
General shop 6. Distributor 
Other (specify) 9. Don't know 
(a) Type of outlet If 7, specify 
Location (Town/Village): 
or location not known (mark "X") I-I 
Name of outlet: 
name not known (mark "X") I-I 
(b) Type of outlet If 7, specify 
Location (TownNillage): 
location not known (mark "X") I_I 
Name of outlet: 
__- -ý_ý_I_ý- ------- --ýýor name not known (mark 
MX") 
9. 
Name of interviewee 
Is the interviewee the owner or in-charge of the outlet? II 
1. Yes 2. No 
If yes, go to # 10. 
If "No", name of owner or in-charge: 
I-I-I-I-I-I-Irl-lal_-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I 
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10. 
Name of outlet: 
ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý 
11. Does this outlet have a DSS number? 
1. Yes 2. No 
i-i 
If "Yes" DSS household number: (_I-I-)--I-I-i-ý-ý 
Name of household: ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý-ý 
If "No" DSS number of nearest household: 
Name of household: 
If outlet is health facility or shop, go to end of questionnaire 
If outlet is kiosk or genge, go to # 12 
12. Does this genge or kiosk operate all year round? 
I-I 1. Yes 2. No 
If yes go to end of questionnaire 
If no, during which months does this genge or kiosk operate here? 
From I_I-I ToI-I-I 
Does this genge or kiosk operate in another location during other months of the year? 
I__I 1. Yes 2. No 
If yes, please would you tell me the name of the kitongoji where this genge/kiosk is 
moved to? 
Name of kitongoji 
Thank you very much for your co-operation. 
Do you have any questions or comments? 
Interviewer: 1-1-1 Checked by: I-I-I 
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Guide for Qualitative Interviews at Facilities 
Introduce the team, and explain where we are from. We are interested in learning more about 
the treatment of fever and malaria in this area. 
Past studies have shown that malaria is a very important cause of illness in this area. We 
have also found out that many people visit non-governmental dispensaries and shops in this 
area when they are sick, including this health center/dispensary. We would like to find ways to 
improve the services that people receive. You may already have been visited by some of our 
colleagues from the DSS, who were completing a short questionnaire about the drugs you 
stock. We are now revisiting a small number of dispensaries, to discuss the treatment you 
provide in more detail. We'd therefore like to interview the person with main responsibility for 
managing this dispensary. 
We would greatly appreciate your co-operation in this research. Participation in this activity is 
optional, and you do not need to answer any question that you do not want to. The interview 
will last one hour. The information that you provide us will be kept confidential, and is for 
research purposes only. Your name and the name of the dispensary will not appear in any 
report that comes out of this study. The information will be used for improving services only 
and will not be passed to any drug or health service regulatory authorities. 
Do you have any questions? Do you agree to participate? 
Ask for permission to record 
Switch on tape recorder 
Ownership and Staff 
1. Who owns this dispensary? 
2. Please could you explain how this dispensary was established? 
3. How many people work here? 
" What jobs do they do? 
4. What is your role in the management of this dispensary? 
5. Who makes decisions concerning the management of the dispensary? 
For example: 
" Which drugs to buy 
" When and how much to purchase? 
" Prices to charge? 
" Hiring staff and salaries? 
6. Does the owner own any other dispensaries? 
Clients 
7. What kind of health problems do people come here for? 
8. What types of patients visit you for fever and malaria? 
" Place of residence (probe: which vitongoji; do any come from far away? ) 
" Do your employees know many of the patients? 
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Services 
11. What happens when a patient arrives here with fever or malaria? 
12. Do you provide malaria blood slides here? 
If yes: 
" For what kind of patients? 
13. What kind of fees do fever or malaria patients have to pay? 
(Get fee list if available) 
Drugs 
14. Drugs stocked 
" Which painkillers or antipyretics do you stock? 
" Which antimalarials do you stock? 
(Probe: SP, Quinine tablets, Quinine syrup, Quinine or CQ injections) 
" Do you stock antibiotics? 
(Probe: Cotrimoxazole or Septrin) 
If they don't stock any kind of chloroquine: 
15. Why do you not stock any kind of chloroquine? 
If they don't stock any kind of SP? 
16. Why do you not stock Fansidar or any other kind of SP? 
17. Do you ever run out of stocks of panadol, aspirin, chloroquine, fansidar/SP (if stocked) 
If yes: 
" Why does this happen? 
18. Choice of drug 
" Who generally chooses the fever or malaria drug - does the health worker always advise 
the patient, or do you ever find that a fever or malaria patient asks for a specific drug? 
19. Setting drug prices 
" How do you decide what prices to charge for drugs? 
" Do you give any fee exemptions? 
If yes: 
" What type of exemptions? 
" Are these often given in practice? 
20. Do patients ever receive credit? 
If yes: 
" What kind of patients? 
" On what terms? 
21. What do you do with the fees? 
Probe: 
" Are they retained here or passed onto a higher level? 
" What are they used for? 
" Do the staff get any share of the fees? 
" Do you need to collect enough revenue to cover all your costs? 
22. How are the staff paid? 
Probe: 
" Salary only, or also share of income, or other incentive payments. 
" Do they get any other benefits? Do they get dispensary services at reduced prices or for 
free? 
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Competition 
23. Which places do you consider your main competitors, or the main alternatives for 
customers for fever and malaria? Why? 
" How long does it take to travel to these competitors? 
" If there are facilities or other shops nearby not mentioned, why are they not considered as 
competitors? 
" Do you compete with traditional healers for customers? 
24. Which provider in this area has the most customers for fever or malaria? 
25. Competitors' drug prices 
" Are your drug prices the same as the prices your competitors charge? 
Probe for Aspirin, paracetamol, chloroquine and SP, if stocked. 
" If yes, how does it happen that you all charge the same drug prices? 
" Do you have any sort of agreements or understandings with these other providers about 
the prices you charge? 
26. Why do your patients prefer to visit this dispensary for fever or malaria, rather than 
visiting other health facilities? 
27. Why do other patients prefer to visit shops to buy drugs? 
28. How do you try to attract more patients to this dispensary? 
29. Do you ever send patients to other providers? Where do you send them and why? 
Probe: 
" If a patient with fever or malaria is severely ill? 
" Do you ever give patients prescriptions to go and buy drugs elsewhere? 
If yes: 
o Why? 
o Where do the patients go to get the drugs? 
Regulation and Supervision 
30. Do you ever receive visits for supervision? 
If yes: 
" Who comes to visit you? 
" How often do they come? 
" When was the most recent visit? 
" What was covered and what was the outcome? 
" Do you find these visits useful? 
31. Are you required to pay taxes to the government? 
" Who do you pay? 
" How are they collected? 
" How much do you pay per year? 
32. Are you requied to get any kind of business licence or registration? 
If yes: 
" What kind of licence/registration 
" What process did you have to go through to register it / get a licence? 
" How long did it take? 
" How much did you have to pay? 
" How often are you required to renew the licence / registration? 
If no: 
" Have you tried to get a licence / registration 
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If yes: 
" Why did you not succeed? 
33. Have you ever been visited by government Inspectors? 
If yes: 
" How many times a year do they come? 
" When was the most recent visit? 
" Who visited you, what was covered and what was the outcome? 
" Did they leave any kind of inspection certificate? 
34. What are the regulations about what drugs can be provided sold in this dispensary? 
" Officially what drugs is this dispensary allowed to provide? 
" If there were no regulations concerning drugs, would you provide different drugs? 
35. Would you like to see any changes in the regulatory system? 
Change In Drug Policy 
36. Have you heard that the Government is replacing chioroquine with SP/Fansidar as first 
line treatment for malaria in Tanzania? 
" What are your views on that policy? 
" How do you think it will change your activities? 
37. Have your employees had any specific training on the policy change? 
38. Have you received any guidelines or leaflets giving information about the policy 
change? (if yes, ask to see them) 
Records 
39. What type of records do you keep of: 
" Drugs purchased wholesale? 
" Drugs dispensed? 
" Number of patients 
" Patient details (e. g. age, diagnosis, location of residence, drugs dispensed) 
(if yes, ask to see them) 
Fill in the staff table for each person. 
Fill in the drugs table for each painkiller or antimalarial stocked. 
Observation: Record a description of: 
1. Facility buildings 
(type of structure, number of rooms, orderliness, cleanliness) 
2. Facility location 
(market center/vijijini/shamba, estimated travel time to main road, bus stop, shops, nearest 
market place, nearest town, train station) 
3. Location of the interview 
4. Interviewee 
5. Services provided 
Tick if they provide: 
Inpatient Delivery Outpatient Curative MCH Lab tests Mosquito 
net Net insecticide 
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6. Location and packaging of drugs stored 
(cleanliness, direct sunlight, temperature, orderliness, are drugs kept in their original package) 
7. Check whether any drugs have passed their expiry date? 
8. Describe any adverts/promotional materials for drugs displayed? 
9. Is the facility license displayed? 
10. Are the qualifications of any of the staff displayed? 
11. Other observations e. g. customers visiting facility during interview 
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Guide for Qualitative Interviews at Shops 
Introduce the team, and explain where we are from. 
We are interested in learning more about the treatment of fever and malaria in this area. Past 
studies have shown that malaria is a very important cause of illness in this area. We have 
also found out that many people buy drugs from shops when they are sick. (Show pie chart 
from 2000 household survey). We would like to find ways to improve the services that people 
receive, but up till now little attention has been paid to shops, although we can see that they 
are a very important sources of care. You may already have been visited by some of our 
colleagues from the DSS, who were completing a short questionnaire about the products you 
stock. We are now revisiting a small number of the shops, to discuss the business of drug 
selling in more detail. We'd therefore like to interview the person with main responsibility for 
managing this business. 
We would greatly appreciate your co-operation in this research. Participation in this activity is 
optional, and you do not need to answer any question that you do not want to. The interview 
will last between one and two hours. The information that you provide us will be kept 
confidential, and is for research purposes only. Your name and the name of your business will 
not appear in any report that comes out of this study. The information will be used for 
improving services only and will not be passed to any drug regulatory authorities. 
Do you have any questions? Do you agree to participate? 
Ask for permission to record 
Switch on tape recorder 
Ownership & Staff 
1. Who owns this shop? 
2. When did this shop open? 
3. How many staff work here? 
Fill in the staffing table for each person, including the owner. 
4. Who makes decisions about managing the business? 
For example: 
" Which drugs to stock? 
" Prices to charge? 
5. Who serves in the shop? 
6. Does the owner own any other shops or businesses? 
Customers 
7. What kind of health problems do people visit this shop for? Probe: 
" First aid (huduma ya kwanza) or complete treatment (tiba kabisa) 
8. What types of customers visit you for fever and/or malaria? 
" Well off or poor? 
" Location of residence (probe which vitongoji customers come from; do any come from far 
away? ) 
" Do you know most of the customers? 
" All retail or any wholesale customers? 
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9. How many customers do you usually get per day? 
" In total 
" For drugs 
" For fever or malaria 
Drugs 
11. Drugs stocked 
" Which malaria drugs do you stock? 
(Probe: Fansidar tablets, Quinine tablets, Quinine syrup, Quinine or chioroquine injections) 
" Do you sell antibiotics? 
(Probe: Cotrimoxazole e. g. Septrin) 
If they don't stock any kind of chioroquine: 
12. Why do you not stock any kind of chloroquine? 
If they don't stock any kind of SP: 
13. Why do you not stock Fansidar of any other kind of SP? 
14. Choice of drug 
" Who generally chooses the fever or malaria drug - does the customer usually request it 
themselves or do the sales staff advise? 
" Do you try and influence the choice of product? Why? 
" Do customers ever come with prescriptions from health care staff? 
15. Do your sales of drugs for fever and malaria vary at different times? Why? 
Probe: 
" Different days of the week? 
" Different times of the month? 
" Different months of the year? 
16. Do you ever run out of stocks of panadol, aspirini, klorokwini, fansidar/SP (if stocked) 
If yes: 
" Why does this happen? 
17. Setting drug prices 
" Explain how you decide what prices to charge for drugs. 
" Do you bargain with customers over the prices? 
" Do you vary your prices? Why? 
o for different quantities purchased? 
o for different customers? (e. g. cheaper or free for poor customers) 
18. Do customers ever receive credit?? 
If yes: 
" what type of customers? 
" on what terms? 
19. How are the staff paid? 
Probe: 
" salary only, or also share of income, or other incentive payments 
" Do they get any other benefits? Do they get shop goods at reduced prices or for free? 
20. Drug Policy Change 
" Have you heard that the Government is replacing chloroquine with SP/Fansidar as first 
line treatment for malaria in Tanzania? 
" What are your views on that policy? 
" How do you think it will change your business? 
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Information & Training 
21. How do you get information about drugs? 
Probe: 
" which drugs are best? 
" new drugs? 
" correct dosing 
" side-effects? 
22. Have you had any specific training on the use of fever and malaria drugs? 
23. Have you received any guidelines or leaflets giving information about these drugs? (if 
yes, ask to see them) 
Services (If Drug Store) 
24. Do you provide consultations or diagnostic tests here? 
Microscopy 
If they provide malaria microscopy: 
25. Why do you provide microscopy here? 
26. How many slides do you usually read per week? 
27. How much do customers pay per test? 
Consultations 
If they provide consultations: 
28. Who sees the patients? 
29. What happens during a consultation for fever or malaria? 
30. What fees would a patient with fever/malaria have to pay? 
(collect a fee list if available) 
Break? 
Wholesale Goods 
31. Where do you buy your wholesale supplies of drugs? 
(ask for name of outlet, type of outlet and location) 
32. Why do you use these suppliers? 
33. Do you buy other products from these suppliers? 
34. How do you transport your stocks? 
" How often do you receive new stocks? 
" Do you have any problems with the availability of wholesale drugs? 
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35. Do you receive visits from representatives of drug companies or wholesalers? 
If yes: 
" How often do they come? 
" What takes place during these visits zo? 
" What information do they provide you with? 
36. Do you get any free products with your drug purchases e. g promotional materials, training 
materials, gifts 
37. Does the wholesaler or distributor have any rules about the products you purchase or the 
prices you can charge? 
(e. g. recommended retail price, product tie-ins) 
38. In places we have come from we have heard stories about drugs from health facilities 
getting into shops. Have you ever heard stories such as these? 
Break? 
Competition 
39. Which places do you consider your main competitors for customers for fever and 
malaria? Why? 
" How long does it take to travel to these competitors? 
" If there are facilities or other shops nearby not mentioned, why are they not considered as 
competitors? 
" Do you compete with traditional healers for customers? 
40. Competitors' drug prices 
" Are your drug prices the same as the prices your competitors charge? 
Probe for Aspirin, Paracetamol, chloroquine and SP if stocked. 
" If yes, how dose it happen that you all charge the same prices for drugs? 
" Do you have any sort of agreements or understandings with these other providers about 
the prices you charge? 
41. Why do your customers prefer to buy drugs from your shop rather than visiting a health 
center or dispensary? 
42. Why do your customers prefer your shop to other shops? 
43. How do you try to attract more customers to your shop? 
44. Why do you think some customers choose other shops instead of yours? 
45. Do you ever send customers to other providers? Why? 
Probe: 
" If a patient with fever or malaria is seriously ill? 
46. Are there other ways in which you cooperate with other providers? 
47. Do you think other people will set up similar businesses in this area in the near future? 
If no: 
" Why not? 
If yes? 
" Do you think they will take away your customers? 
48. Do shops like this often go out of business? 
" Probe: go bankrupt? 
" What sorts of factors cause this to happen? 
" Do you think that this could happen to your shop 
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Capital Costs 
49. Are you planning to expand this shop or open other shops? 
50. What problems do shopkeepers face in expanding or opening new shops? 
51. If people need to raise capital, how do they do that? 
52. How did you get the capital to start this shop? 
Regulations 
53. Is this shop registered (as large shop, small shop/kiosk, stall (genge)? ) 
54. Have you got a business licence? 
If yes: 
" What type of licence? 
" What process did you have to go through to get the licence? 
" How long did it take? 
" How much did you pay for the licence? 
55. Has Bwana Afya (Health inspector? - not sure of title in English) visited you? 
If yes: 
" How many visits to you usually have in a year? 
" When was the most recent visit? 
" What was covered and what was the outcome? 
If Drug shop: 
56. Have you got a permit from the Pharmacy Board? 
If yes: 
" What process did you have to go through to register it? 
" How long did it take? 
" What registration payments did you make? 
If no: 
" Have you tried to register it? 
If yes: 
" Why did you not succeed? 
57. What factors do you think influence whether applications for permits are successful? 
58. Have you ever received a visit from a regulatory officer? 
If yes: 
" How many visits to you usually have in a year? 
" When was the most recent visit? 
" Who visited you, what was covered and what was the outcome ini? 
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59. Which drugs is this shop officially allowed to sell? 
" Would you like to see any changes in the regulatory system? 
Records 
60. Do you keep any records of: 
" Drugs purchased wholesale? 
" Drugs sold retail? 
" Details about customers e. g. age, diagnosis, location of residence, drugs dispensed 
If yes, can we see the records?. 
Suggestions 
61. What strategies do you think could be used to improve the treatment for fever and malaria 
that people in this community receive 
Fill in the drugs table for each painkiller or antimalarial stocked. 
Observation: Record a description of: 
1. Shop buildings 
(type of structure, number of rooms, orderliness, cleanliness) 
2. Shop location 
(market center/vijijini/shamba, estimated travel time to main road, bus stop, shops, nearest 
market place, nearest town, train station) 
3. Location of the Interview 
4. Interviewee 
5. Products stocked 
Tick if there: 
Dry food Packaged food Fresh food Sodas Cigarettes 
Soap powder Toiletries Household goods Clothes Bicycle spares 
Drugs Syringes Mosquito net Net insecticide Mosq Coils 
6. Location and packaging of drugs stored 
(cleanliness, direct sunlight, temperature, orderliness, are drugs kept in their original package) 
7. Check whether any drugs have passed their expiry date? 
8. Describe any advertstpromotional materials for drugs displayed? 
9. Is the shop license displayed? 
10. Are the qualifications of any of the staff displayed? 
11. Other observations e. g. customers visiting shop during Interview 
313 
171C 
sdoqs ul 6uilaonn osP saaNIonn yOPay JoPas puuol aol agojd. 
jsqo( luaimo jaylo aouauadxa gor suo! leo! l!! enb jaylo 
uo! leonpa 
! ooyos lo sak 
Jaunno 
ol d! ysuo! le! aa aapuao 
sJA7 
86y oil!; qof aweN 
alqel buiHe; s : snnainaajui ani; e}ilenp 
SI£ 
llun 
Alloads) aolad 
alusaloyM 
(pun Alloads) 
aolid llu188 
llun aua jo awll 
slyl le ýaann aad plos 
Allluunb aluwlls3 
llun 
A}loads) Nools 
ul ý41luunC) 
aaululuoo/ 
6ul6uNoud 
lo adA1 uollulnwjod awuN puua8 
alqel sdn. iQ : senalmajul ani; e 
Code Number from Outlet Inventoryl-I-1-I-1 
Serial Number: IQI-I-I-I-I 
Outlet Survey Questionnaire: Nov/Dec 2001 
When you arrive, check that this information is correct: 
District Code: I-I-I-I 
Village Code: I, I-I-I 
Name of Kitongoji: 
Type of outlet: 
Name of shop/ facility: 
Name of owner: 
Household DSS number: 
Name of household: 
or 
DSS number for nearest household: 
Name of nearest household: 
Use Information Sheet: 
Do you need to ask about wholesale prices? 
Is It possible to do the interview? 
1=yes 2=no 
If no, why not? 
1=closed today 
3=refused: Why? 
_ 4=Other 
Date of interview: 
2=closed down completely 
i-i__i__i__i-i. -1 
i-i, i-i-i-i-ý 
i_i 
1-1 
8=not applicable (possible to do interview) 
1-1-111-1-V121010111 
(day/month/year) 
1. What are the usual opening hours of this shop (of this facility for outpatients)? 
(Kiswahill Ume) Codes for time of day 
88.88=not applicable (not open at all on this day) A=moming M=middle of the day 
99.99=don't know J=early evening U=late evening 
Open Close 
Time Time of Da Time Time of Da 
1 a. Monday 
lb-Tuesday - 1 c. Wednesday 
1 d. Thursday 
1 e. Friday ----- 1 f. Saturday 
lq. Sunday 
- -- -- - 
Staff & Ownership 
2. How many people work here? 
If health center or dispensary, go to question #3 
2a. Does this total include the owner? 
1 =yes 2=no 9=don't know 
if yes go to question #3 
2b. How many owners? 
I-I 
#1-I-I 
i_i 
#1-I-I 
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Code Number from Outlet inventoryl-I_L... L-1 
1=yes 
2=no 
9=don't know 
facility or DHMT)? 
If health center or dispensary, go to Drug Check List 
4. Does the owner or any of the staff have other work in the formal health sector (e. g. health 
i_i 
4a. 
Number 
from 
Staff 
Table 
4b. Type of work? 4c. Which organisation? 
S. Does the owner of this shop own other shops or dispensaries? 
1 =yes 2-=rio 9=don't know 
if no or don? know go to question #6 
i_i 
5a. What type of shop and how many? 
General Store/kiosk/genge: 
Part II Drug Shop: 
Dispensary: 
Other: specify #I-I-i 
6. When did this shop start trading? 
99/9999=don't know 
=> 
ý> 
=> 
fill! In the table below 
go to question #5 
go to question #5 
(month/year) 
7. On average how many customers do you usually get for drugs per day? (estimate) I-i-I-I 
999=don't know 
Dr u9s 
Fill in the Drugs Check List. 
ASP 
TAB To be completed by interviewer: 11. Do they have any kind of Aspirin only tablets in stock now? 
1=yes => question #12 
2=no => question #13 
9=don't know => question #14 
i_i 
12. In the last month have you run out of stock of Aspirin tablets of all types - i. e. (list the trade 
names of Aspirin only drugs which are sold here)? (_) 
1=yes 2=no 9=don't know 
if no or don't know, go to question #14 
12a. For how many days? (-I-I 
01-31 number of days 99=don't know 
Go to question #14 
13. Have you stocked any Aspirin tablets in the last month, e. g. Aspirin, Maxarin or Aspro 
tablets? 1=yes 2=no 9=don't know 
if no or donT know, go to question #14 
13a. How many days ago did you run out of stock of all kinds of Aspirin tablets? 
01-31 number of days 99=clon't know I-I-I 
318 
i PAR 
TAB 
co 
TAB 
Code Number from Outlet Inventoryl-I-1 
To be completed by interviewer: 
14. Do they have any kind of Paracetamol only tablets in stock now? 
1=yes => question #15 2=no => question #16 
9=don't know => question #17 
i-i 
i_i 
15. In the last month have you run out of stock of Paracetamol tablets of all types - i. e. (list the 
trade names of Paracetamol only drugs which are sold here)? 
1=yes 2=no 9=don't know 
if no or don't know, go to question # 17 
15a. For how many days? 
01-31 number of days 99=don't know 
Go to question # 17 
16. Have you stocked any Paracetamol tablets In the last month, e. g. Panadol, Sheladol, 
Dawanol or Elymol tablets? 
1=yes 2=no 9=don't know 
it no ordont know, go to question #17 
I-i-I 
i_i 
16a. How many days ago did you run out of stock of all kinds of Paracetamol tablets? 
01-31 number of days 99=don't know 
To be completed by interviewer: 
17. Do they have any kind of Chioroquine tablets In stock now? I_) 
1=yes => question #18 2=no => question #19 
9=don't know => question #21 
18. In the last month have you run out of stock of Chloroqulne tablets of all types - i. e. (list the trade names of Chloroquine drugs which are sold here)? 
1=yes 2=no Mon't know 
if no or don't know, go to question #21 
18a. For how many days? 
01-31 number of days 99=don't know 
Go to question #21 
I-I-I 
19. Have you stocked any Chloroquine tablets In the last month, e. g. Homaquine, Malarlaquine, Dawaquine or Shelyquine tablets? I_I 
1=yes 2= no 9=don't know 
i/ no or dont Imow, go to question #20 
19a. How many days ago did you run out of stock of all kinds of Chloroquine tablets? 
01-31 number of days 99=don't know 1_1_1 
20. Why do you not have any kind of Chloroquine tablets in stock now? (Probe: other reason? ) 
To be coded by supervisor 1=mentioned 2=not mentioned u sold out as many customers I-j do not know this drug not allowed to stock 
not had the chance to buy any more Lt high price I_) doesn't work well 
no or few customers for this drug not available at wholesale sources 
do not have the expertise to sell this drug don't know 
other. 
other. 
other. I-I-I-1-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I 
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SP 
TAB 
Code Number from Outlet Inventoryl_1_I 
To be completed by interviewer: 
21. Do they have any kind of SP tablets in stock now? 
I =yes => question #22 2=no => question #23 
9=don't know => question #25 
i-i 
i_i 
22. In the last month have you run out of stock of SP tablets of all types - I. e. (list the trade 
names of SP drugs which are sold here)? 
1=yes 2=no 9=don't know 
i/no or don? know=> go to question #25 if health facility 
if no or don? know => go to question #31 If shop 
22a. For how many days? 
01-31 number of days 99=don't know 
go to question #25 if health facility 
go to question #31 if shop 
i_i_i 
23. Have you stocked any SP tablets In the last month, e. g. Fansidar, Sulphadar, Orodar or 
Metakelfin tablets? 
1=yes 2=no Mon't know 
if no or don t know, go to question #24 
23a. How many days ago did you run out of stock of all kinds of SP tablets? 
01-31 number of days 99=don't know 
24. Why do you not have any kind of SP tablets In stock now? (Probe: other reason? ) 
i_i_i 
To be coded by supervisor 1=mentioned 2=not mentioned 
sold out as many customers u do not know this drug not allowed to stock 
not had the chance to buy any more high price doesn't work well 
no or few customers for this drug not available at wholesale sources 
J. 
_J do not have the expertise to sell this drug don't know other. 
other. I_I_IJ_I_I_I-I_I_I_I_I_I_I_I_I_I_I_I_I_I_I_I_I_I_I_I_I_I_I_I_I_I_I 
other. 
If the outlet is a shop of any kind, go to question #31. 
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Code Number from Outlet Inventoryl-I-I i-i 
Services and Fees (only for health center or dispensary) 
25. Do you provide the following services: 1=yes 2=no 9=don't know 
25a. MCH I_I 
25b. IP I. _I 25c. Minor surger I_I 
25d. Surgery I_I 
25e. Do you provide blood tests for malaria now? I_I 
1=yes 2=no 9 =don't know If yes, go to question #26 
25f. Why not? 
1=mentioned 2=not mentioned DO NOT READ UST 
II no microscope microscope does not work 
U no supplies for microscope no lab staff 
u don't know 
other 
other. 
other. 
26. Do fever or malaria patients need to come with an exercise book? 
1=yes 2=no 9=don't know i_i 
27. Do fever or malaria patients normally pay for drugs? I_I 
1=yes 2=no 9=don't know 
28. If an adult out-patient comes here for fever or malaria what fees will they be charged, apart 
from for drugs and for an exercise book? READ LIST 
28a. Registration fee Tshi-1-I-I-I-I 
28b. Consultation fee Tshl-1-1-1-1-1 
28c. Contribution for kerosene Tshi-I-I-I-I-I 
28d. Lab tests Tshi-I-1-I-1-1 
28e. Other Tshi-1-1-1-I-I 
28f. Other Tsh1-1-1-1-I-I 
99999=don'1 know 
If fever or malaria patients do not pay any fees at all, go to question #44 (AP Drug table) 
29. Can fever or malaria patients be treated on credit? 
1=yes 2=no 9=don't know i_i 
30. Do you give any fee exemptions for patients with fever or malaria? 
1=yes 2=no 9=don't know 
if no or don? know, go to question #44 (Jedwall fa dawa za mormivu na kushusha homa) 
30a. Which patients with fever or malaria receive these exemptions? 
1=mentioned 2=not mentioned READ UST 
I-ý poor I-] physically disabled 
I-I children under five years I-I pregnant women 
(-I all elderly I-I poor elderly 
I-I facility staff I_I family of facility staff 
(-I don't know 
other. l-I-I-I-I-i-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I 
other. I-I-I-I-I-i-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-i-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I 
other. I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I 
Go to question #44 (AP Drug table) 
31. Can customers pay for drugs on credit? I_I 
1=yes 2=no 8=not applicable (does not usually sell drugs) 9=don't know 
321 
Code Number from Outlet Inventoryl-I-I 
Knowledge & Information 
32. Where do you usually get Information about new drugs? (Probe: other source? ) 
To be coded by supervisor 1=mentioned 2=not mentioned 
radio health care staff newspapers 
District level staff -l customers 
f-ý talking to other people 
wholesalers I_I distributors I_I Instructions on the packet 
during medical training 1-1 malaria related training I_I don't know 
books or posters with malaria messages 
other 
other. 
other. 
i-i 
If they do not stock any kind of Chioroquine tablets, go to question #35 
33. Fill In Chirogoulne tablet brand name stocked In shop 
If a customer buys (Chloroquine brand name) tablets and asks for advice on how to use this 
drug for a child aged 2 years with malaria, what would you say? 
(probe how many tablets in total, when should they be taken) 
To be coded by supervisor. 
33a. Appropriate drug specified by interviewer 
lxorrect 2=Incorrect 3=unclear 
33b. Total number of tablets 
33c. Timing 
1=correct 2=incorrect 
34. Where did you get this information? 
3=unclear 
4=did not specify 
4=did not say 
i_u i_i 
To be coded by supervisor 1=mentioned 2=not mentioned 
I_I radio I_I health care staff I_I newspapers 
I_ J District level staff I_I customers I_I talking to other people 
J-i wholesalers I_I distributors J_I Instructions on the packet 
I-I during medical training J_J malaria related training I_I don't know I_) books or posters with malaria messages 
other 
other 
other. 
322 
Code Number from Outlet Inventoryl-I-I 
I-LI 
i_i 
If they do not stock any kind of SP tablets, go to question #37 
35. Fill In SP tablet brand name stocked In shop 
If a customer buys (SP brand name) tablets and asks for advice on how to use this drug for a 
child aged 2 years with malaria, what would you say?? 
(probe how many tablets in total, when should they be taken) 
To be coded by supervisor. 
35a. Appropriate drug specified by interviewer 
1 xorrect 2=Incorrect 3=unclear 4=did not specify 
35b. Total number of tablets 
35c. Timing 
1=correct 2=incorrect 3=unclear 4=did not say 
36. Where did you get this Information? 
To be coded by supervisor 1=mentioned 2=not mentioned 
I_. I radio I-I health care staff I-I newspapers I-I District level staff I-I customers I_I talking to other people 
I-I wholesalers I-I distributors I-I instructions on the packet 
-I 
during medical training i-i malaria related training I-I don't know 
I-I books or posters with malaria messages 
other. 
other. 
other. I-I-I-I-I. I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I_I_I_II-I-I-II-I_I-I-I-I-I 
Other Droducts 
37. Do you have the following goods in stock: 1=yes 2=no 9=don't know 
37a. Mosquito nets I-I 
37b. Insecticide treatment for mosquito nets (such as Zuia Mbu or Ngao I_I 
37c. Mosquito coils 
37d. Mosquito repellent body gels/creams 
37e. Syringes 
37f. Water for injection 
37g. Garments (Cloth, clothes, kanga or kitenge) 
Licence & Regulation 
38. Do you have a business licence? 
1 =yes 2=no 9=don't know 
it no or don t know, go to question #39 
38a. How much did you pay for this licence? 
i-i 
i_i i_i i_i i_i i_i 
i_i 
Tsh l-1_1-1-1-1-1_1 
9999999=don't know 
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Code Number from Outlet Inventoryl-I-I i-i 
38b. For what period did you pay this amount for? Months I-I-I 
39. Have you been visited by Bwana Afya (Health Officer)? I-I 
1=yes 2=no 9=don't know 
if no or don? know, go to question #40 
39a. When was his/her most recent visit? I-I-I/I-I-I-I-I 
99/999=don't know (month/year) 
39b. Where there any problems or did s/he have any complaints? 
1=yes 2=no 9=don't know 
if no or don! know, go to question #40 
39c. Explain 
To be coded by supervisor 
Found selling Part 1 drugs Drugs confiscated Seller not orthorised 
Drug storage conditions not met (_I Ucence not up to date Iý Drugs expired 
Other goods not properly stored Building conditions not met 
Environment dusty /not clean Kibali not up to date 
other. l-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-1J-I-I-I-I-I-t-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-1 
other. l-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I 
other. 
40. Have you been visited by Drugs Inspectors? 
1 =yes 2=no 9=don't know 
if no or don? know, go to question #41 
40a. When was their most recent visit? 
99/999=don't know 
40b. Where there any problems or did they have any complaints? 
1 =yes 2=no 9=don't know 
if no or don't know, go to question #41 
40c. Explain 
To be coded by supervisor 
I_I Found selling Part 1 drugs I_I Drugs confiscated I_I Seller not orthorised 
I_I Drug storage conditions not met I_I Licence not up to date I_I Drugs expired 
I_I Other goods not properly stored I_I Building conditions not met 
I-I Environment dusty /not clean I_I Kibali not up to date 
other. 
other. 
other: 
41. Is this shop officially allowed to sell chloroquine tablets? 
1 =yes 2=no 9=don't know 
42. Is this shop officially allowed to sell SP or Fansidar tablets? 1=yes 2=no 9-don't know 
i_i 
i_i 
i_i_iýi_i_i_i_i (month/year) 
i_i 
i_i 
i_i 
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Code Number from Outlet Inventoryl_1_I 
If they don't have any drugs in stock, go to question #46 
43. Where do you buy your drugs? 
(List the two places where they most frequently buy drugs) 
First place: 
43a. Type of shop/seller 
1. General wholesaler 2. Drugs wholesaler 
3. Registered pharmacy (Part 1) 4. Drug shop (Baridi /Part 2) 
5. General shop 6. Drugs Distributor 
7. other. 
43b. Location (village/town): 
11. Dar es Salaam 12. Morogoro Mjinl 13. Ifakara 
14. Mchombe/Mngeta 15. Makambako 16. Mbingu 
17. Kivukoni 18. Lupiro 19. Bungu 
21. IkwirirVUmwe 22. Kibiti 23. Jaribu Mpakani 
55. Other 
88. Not applicable (they are brought by distributors) 99. Don't know 
43c. Name of shop/seller: 
I-I-I 
I-I-i-I-I-I-I-I-I-1-I-I-i-I-I-I-I-1 
000000 
1--1 
i_i 
9. Don't know 
Second Place: 
43d. Type of shop/seller 
1. General wholesaler 2. Drugs wholesaler 
3. Registered pharmacy (Part 1) 4. Drug shop (Baridi /Part 2) 
5. General shop 6. Drugs Distributor 
7. Other 
43e. Location (village/town): 
11. Dar es Salaam 12. Morogoro Mjini 13. Ifakara 
14. Mchombe/Mngeta 15. Makambako 16. Mbingu 
17. Kivukoni 18. Lupiro 19. Bungu 
21. lkwirirJUmwe 22. Kibiti 23. Jaribu Mpakani 
55. Other 
88. Not applicable (they are brought by distributors) 99. Don't know 
43f. Name of shop/seller: 
1-1 
9. Don't know 
1-1-1 
000000 
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Code Number from Outlet inventoryl_I-I-I-I 
44. Fill in the table below for each kind of antipyretic or painkiller in stock (question #8). If a 
given drug is available in more than one kind of packaging, fill in a separate line for each kind 
of packaing. 
AP Tabi 
44a. Trade Name 
(or generic name if there is no other 
name) 
44b. 
Packaging 
1=Pot/Tin 
2=Paper 
3=Blister 
4=Bottle 
5=ViaVAmpoule 
7=Other 
44c. Retail price 
(for each 
tablet/bottle/vial) 
(Tsh) 
0=free 
88888=do not sell 
retail 
99999--don't know 
44d. Quantity 
in stock 
(number of tablets/ 
bottles/vials) 
44e. Price they 
sell for 
wholesale 
(Tsh) 
88888=do not sell 
wholesale 
99999=don't know 
ý1 II I I I-I-I-I-I-I-- I I-I_.. _I__I_I_. _ I_ .I 
QQQQQQ - I-I-I-I-I-I"I-I for 
ýI 
QQQQQQ I-I-I-I-I-I"I-I 
LIIIIIIIIIIIIII I I-I-I-I-I-I I I--I- I-I-i__. _ I___i 
QQQQQQ - I-I-I-I-I-I"I-I for 
LIIIIIIIIIIIIII I 1 I-I-I-I -1 I I 
I---I---1--1--1__I__. I 
QQQQQQ - I-I-I-I-I-I"I-I - - for 
LIIIIIIIIIIIIII I I-I-I-I-I-I- I I_. _i__. L.. _I__L__L_I 
QQQQQQ - IIIII I"I I tor_--.... 
_. 
LI I I I I I I I 1 I I hI I 1 I 
QQQQQQ - I-I-I-I-I-I " I-I - _ - - - - 
_. _ _ - - - 
for 
uIlIll1IIIIIII I I I I I I I i I I I-I-I-L I 1 
QQQQQQ - I_I-i-I-I-I " I-I - - - - - - 
- _ - 
for 
L. LI IIIII1111111 I I I-I-I-I-I-I_ I I_I-I_I__I_.. _L.... I 
QQQQQQ - I-I-I-i-I-I"I-I for 
l11 I-I i-I-I-I-I-I-I I-hl-hl__I___. I 
QQQQQQ IIill i"I I for 
IIIIIIIIIIIII I-I i-I-I-I-I-I- I I-I-I-I-I-I- _I QQQQQQ I-I-I-I-I-I"I-I for 
LIIIIIIIIIIII I I I-1-I_I-I_I-I L 1_I_I_. i_I I 
QQQQQQ _ i-I-I-I-I-I"I-I for 
IIIIIIIIIIIIIII I I I-I_ I I I I I L_i_I-I_1_I_. I 
QQQQQQ - I-I-I-I-I-I"I-I - _ - - . for 
45. Fill in the table below for each antimalarial or cotrimoxazole drug In stock (question #9 and 
#10). For each drug, ask to take 9 or 10 tablets / one bottle of syrup / one dose of injection. If a 
given drug Is available in more than one kind of packaging, fill in a separate line and take a 
separate sample for each kind of packaing. For SP drugs only, fill in a separate line and take a 
separate sample for each Batch Number. 
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Code Number from Outlet Inventoryl_L_j 
46. Please may I know your name, as the head researcher may need to come to visit you.. 
Name of Interviewee 
Observation Record 
i_i_i_i_i_i_i_i_i_i_i_i_i_i_i_i__i_i_i_i_i__i 
MI 
47. Location of shop {health centre/dispensary} 
1 =minor settlement 
2=village 
3=farms (shamba) 
4=lfakara Town 
9=don't know 
48. Is the shop {health centre/dispensary} on a main road? 
1 =yes 2=no 9=don't know 
49. What are the walls constructed from? 
1=Stone, cement, bricks 
2=wood, iron sheets, mud, mud and sticks, coconut palm, grass, card board boxes 
3=Other (specify: i-------------------ý-l) 
9=Don't know 
50. What is the roof made from? 
1= tiles, cement, concrete, iron sheets, asbestos 
2=thatch, coconut palm, mud, sticks, grass, plastic sheets, oil tins 
3=Other (specify: 
---------------ý-ý-ý --ý-ý) 9=Don't know 
51. What is the general state of the building? 
1 =well built 
2=average 
3=poorly built 
9=don't know 
52. Is the outlet clean? 
1=clean 
2=average 
3=dirty 
9=don't know 
53. Are there any wall paintings advertising drugs? 
1=yes 2=no 9=don't know 
if no or don't know, go to question #54 
53a. For which drugs? (write trade name) 
I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-i-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I ýD El 
I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I ýD El 
I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I ýD El 
54. Are there any paper posters advertising drugs displayed? 
1=yes 2=no 9=don't know 
if no or don't know, go to question #55 
54a. For which drugs? (write trade name) 
I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I_I_I-I-I-I-I-I_I-I-I-I-I 000 
I-II-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I_I-I_I-I-I-I 000 
000 
000 
000 
i-_i 
i_i 
i_i 
i_i 
i_i 
i_i 
i_i 
i_i 
i--i 
330 
Code Number from Outlet Inventoryl_I_1 
0110 
If not drug shop go to end of questionnaire 
55. Is it possible to see the Pharmacy Board permit? (ask interviewee) 
1=yes 2=not there 3=they refused to show 9=don't know 
if not there, they refused to show or don 7 know, go to the and of the questionnaire 
55a. Expiry Date: 
i_i 
(day/montlvyear) 
i-i 
55b. Is the registered seller specified on the permit selling In the shop now? I_I 
I =yes 2=no 9=don't know 
Many thanks for your cooperation. Interviewer. I-1-1 Checked by: 1-II-J Coded by I-I-I 
Fill in the Code Number from Outlet Inventory on the top of every page of the Questionnaire 
and Drug Check List. 
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District Code: 
Village Code: 
Name of Kitongoji: 
Type of outlet: 
Name of shop/ facility: 
Name of owner: 
Household DSS number: ----ý-ý-ý Name of household: 
or 
DSS number for nearest household: -ý Name of nearest household: 
I would like to ask about drugs for pain and fever that are sold here, then drugs for malaria, 
then cotrimoxazole drugs. I would like to know about the trade names of all oral and Injectable 
drugs. I will read you a list of trade names to help us ensure that we cover all those we are 
required to check. Afterwards I will ask you to tell me if you have In stock are any other drugs 
In this category that are present and not Included on the list. 
8. I would like to know first whether the following drugs for pain relief and fever are in stock 
now: 
1. In stock 2. Not in stock 
Aspirin only: 
Tablets Asprin tablets 
ý_( Junior Aspirin tablets 
j_J Aspro tablets 1-1 Maxarin tablets 
Paracetamol only. 
Tablets 1--j Dawanol tablets Elydol tablets 
(_I Maxadol tablets Panado tablets 
Sheladol tablets Totomol tablets 
Paracetamol tablets (generic) 
Other Painkillers: Lt Action tablets 
Dakika tatu tablets 
L_. J Cafemol tablets 
I_J Hedex tablets 
iýi-i-i 
Elymol tablets 
Panadol tablets 
ý_ý Zenadol tablets 
Aspirin 
tablets ý_ý 
Paracetamol 
tablets I_) 
1_1 Cafenol tablets 
1_I Mara Moja tablets 
Paracetamol only: 
Syrup I-I Amidol syrup I_I Elydol syrup I-I Elymol syrup 
Maxadol syrup i-I Medmol syrup (_I Panadol syrup 
Iý Panamol syrup I_I Sheladol syrup 
I-I Paracetamol syrup (generic) 
8a. Do you have any other palnkillerstantipyretics In stock which have not yet been listed? 1_I 
Code Number from Outlet Inventory I _I_I_I _I 
Serial Number: LI-I-I-I-I 
Outlet Survey Drug Check List 
332 
Code Number from Outlet Inventory I-I-I 
1 =yes 2=no 9=don't know 
ff yes, list them In the appropriate box above. 
9. I would now like to ask if the following antimalarials are In stock: 
1. in stock 2. not in stock 
i-i 
Chioroquine: 
Tablets I_I Dawaquin tablets I_) Homaquin tablets I_I Malaraquin tablets 
I_I Mediquin tablets I-I Shelyquine tablets I_I Tanzaquine tablets 
Iý Zenaquin tablets I_I Chloroquine tablets (generic) 
Chloroquine 
tablets I_I 
SP: 
Tablets I_ Falcidin tablets Fansidar tablets Malaradox tablets 
Metakelfin tablets Orodar tablets Iý S-fin tablets 
Sulphadar tablets SP (Sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine) tablets (generic) 
SP 
tablets U_J 
Amodiaqulne: Amoquin tablets u Emoquin tablets Li Malaratab tablets 
Tablets ý_ý Malaridose tablets ýý Amodiaquine tablets (generic) 
Quinine: 
Tablets Kwinil tablets 
ý_ý Quinine tablets (generic) 
Other antimalarlals 
Arsumax tablets 
ý_ý Halfan tablets 
Chloroquine: 
Syrup 
SP: 
Syrup 
Elyquine syrup 
I_ý Mediquine syrup 
1_1 Falcidin syrup 
Amodlaquine: 
Syrup ý_i Amodar syrup 
Quinine: 
Syrup (_J Quinine syrup (generic) 
I_ Quinitab tablets 
LI Artemether tablets 1-1 Cotecxin tablets 
1_1 Shelyquine syrup I--j Tanzaquine syrup 
u Chloroquine syrup (generic) 
1_1 Sulphadar syrup 
I-I Emoquin syrup 
333 
Code Number from Outlet Inventory 1-1-1 
Chloroquine: 
Injection u Chloroquine Injection (generic) 
Quinine: 
Injection j__j Kwinil injection L_j Quinine injection (generic) 
i-i 
9a. Do you have any other antimalarlals In stock which have not yet been listed? 
1=yes 2=no 9=don't know 
It yes, list them in the appropriate box above. 
10. Finally, I would now like to ask If the following cotrimoxazole drugs are In stock: 
1. in stock 2. not in stock 
Cotrimoxazole (Suiphamethoxazoie & Trimethoprim): 
Tablets L_l Biotrim tablets 1^I Septrin tablets Shetrim tablets 
ý__) Cotrimoxazole tablets (generic) 
Cotrimoxazole (Sulphamethoxazole & Trimethoprim): 
Syrup I_j Biotrim syrup Gestrim syrup I-j Shetrim syrup 
I_j Septrin syrup ý__ý Cotrimoxazole syrup (generic) 
10a. Do you have any other cotrimoxazie drugs In stock which have not yet been listed? 
I-I 
I =yes 2=no 9=don't know 
If yes, list them in the appropriate box above. 
Go to question # 11 
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Code Number I_1_I 
Retail Audit - Questionnaire: 2002 
When you arrive, check that this information is correct: 
District Code: 
Village Code: 
Name of Kitongoji: 
Type of outlet: 
Name of shop/ facility: 
Name of owner: 
Household DSS number: 
Name of household: 
or 
DSS number for nearest household: 
Name of nearest household: 
i-i-i-i i_i-i-i 
i_i_i-i-i-i-i 
i-i-i-i-i-iýi 
i! i 
335 
Code Number 
First Interview 
1. Is it possible to do the interview? 
1=yes 2=n0 
If no. why not? I-I 
i_i 
1=closed today 2=closed down completely 8=not applicable (possible to do interview) 
3=refused: Why? 
4=Other 
2. Date of first interview: 1-I-uI-1-V 20 2I (day/month/year) 
I would like to ask you about antimalarials and then cotrimoxazole. I would like to know about the trade 
names of oral and Injectable drugs. I will read you a list of trade names to help us ensure that we cover 
all those that we are required to check. Afterwards I will ask you to tell me if you have any drugs In 
stock in this category that are not Included on the list. 
3. I would like to know first whether the following antimalarlals are In stock: 
1. In stock 2. Not In stock 
ChloroquIns Tablets: 
tablets qwn Dawaquin tablets Homaquin tablets Malara 
Mediquin tablets Shelyquine tablets LI Tanzaquine tablets 
ý_ý Zenaquin tablets Chloroquine tablets (generic) 
SP tablets: 
IJ Combimal tablets _I 
Falcidin tablets 
IJ Fansidar tablets J Landox tablets 
Malostat tablets J Metakelfin tablets 
IJ Novidar tablets IJ ONU-3 tablets 
IJ Rimodar tablets IJ S-fin tablets 
IIJ SP (Suladoxine-pyrimethamine) tablets (generic) 
Falcistat tablets 
Malaradox tablets 
Mitafin tablets 
Orodar tablets 
ý_ý Sulphadar tablets 
Amodlaquine tablets: 
Amobin tablets Amodar tablets 
Emoquin tablets U Laeoquin tablets 
ý_ý Malaridose tablets 1_1 Amodiaquine tablets (generic) 
Quinine tablets: 
Kwinil tablets 
u Quinine tablets (generic) 
Other antimalarial tablets 
II Arsumax tablets 
I_J Halfan tablets 
U Quine tablets 
(--j Artemether tablets 
Amoquin tablets 
ýý Malaratab tablets 
I-j Quinitab tablets 
I--] Cotecxin tablets 
Chloroquine syrup: 
Elyquine syrup IU Shelyquine syrup I_t Tanzaquine syrup 
ý_ý Mediquine syrup 1_1 Chloroquine syrup (generic) 
SP syrup: 
Falcidin syrup I_J Falcigo syrup 
u Sulphadar syrup 
1_1 Orodar syrup 
Amodiaqulne syrup: 
(_J Amodar syrup Amoquin syrup II Chemoquine syrup 
I_J Emoquin syrup ý_ý Malarabit syrup 
Quinine syrup: 
L] Quinaquin syrup ý_J Quinix syrup 1-1 Quinine syrup (generic) 
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Code Number 1_1_I 
Chloroqulne injection: 
u C-quine injection 
Quinine Injection: 
I__) Kwinil injection 
_J 
Chloroquine injection (generic) 
Lj Quinine injection (generic) 
4a. Do you have any other antimalarials In stock which have not yet been listed? 
1=yes 2=no 9=don't know 
ff Yes, list them here: 
4a. Trade name 4b. Formulation 
1=tablets, 2=syrup, 
3=injection, 4=powder 
1-1 
u 
4c. Generic name 
5. Now I would like to ask If the following cotrimoxazole drugs are In stock: 
1. In stock 2. Not in stock 
Cotrimoxazole (Sulphamethoxazole & Trimethoprim): 
Tablets u Alprim tablets j_j Biotrim tablets j_j Cotrikant tablets 
j_i Septrin tablets U Shetrim tablets 
I_j Cotrimoxazole tablets (generic) 
Cotrimoxazole (Suiphamethoxazole & Trimethoprim): 
Syrup IJ Alprim syrup IJ Biotrim syrup IJ Combact syrup 
I_a Gestrim syrup IJ Septrin syrup JýI Shetrim syrup 
I-I Zeptron syrup I_I Cotrimoxazole syrup (generic) 
6. Do you have any other cotrimoxazole drugs In stock which have not yet been listed? 
1=yes 2=no 9=don't know 
if es, list them here: 
6a. Trade name 6b. Formulation 
7=tablets, 2=syrup, 
3=injection, 4=powder 
I 
I 
1-1 
Li 
U 
1-l 
11 
1---) 
I-1 
i_i 
If they don't have any antimalarials or cotrimoxazole, go to Question #7. 
If they have antimalarials or cotrimoxazole: 
Fill In the stock table columns A, B, C and D for each antimalarial or cotrimoxazole stocked. 
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7. We would like to return after two weeks to ask you again about your drug stocks, in order to estimate 
the quantity of drugs that you have dispensed in this period. 
7a. Did they agree to make an appointment? 1=yes 2=no 
7b. If no, why not? 
7c. We plan to return here: 
1_1_14_1_1/2002 Time: 
Day Data/Month 
1-1 
8. May I ask your name? 
Many thanks for your cooperation. When we return, we would like to know the quantity of drugs you 
have bought within this two week period. Therefore it would help us a lot if you would keep a record or 
carefully keep receipts for drugs during this period. 
Fill in the code number from the Outlet Census at the top of each page of the questionnaire and stock table. 
Interviewer. -I-J 
Checked by: I-I-I Coded by: I-I-I 
Monda Tuesda Wednesda Thursday Fr da Saturday' 
1 
Sunday 
2 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
Jul 
Tuesday =Wednesday Thursda Frida Saturda ' Sunday 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
M 
9 10 11 12 13 14 
16 17 18 19 20 21 
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
29 30 31 
Au 
Monde Tuesda Wednesday Thursday 
1 
Friday 
2 
Saturday' 
3 
Sunday 
4 
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
26 27 28 29 30 31 
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Code Number 
9. Is it possible to do the Interview? 
1=yes 2=no i_i 
If no, why not? I-I 
1 =closed today 2=closed down completely 8=not applicable (possible to do Interview) 
3=refused: Why? 
4=Other 
10. Date of second interview: 1-1-111-1-V12 1010121 (day/month/year) 
Complete the stock table columns E, F and G for each antimalarial and cotrimoxazole stocked 
during the second interview. 
Then ask: 
11. Since I was last here, have you purchased any other antimalarials or cotrimoxazole drugs? 
t=yes 2=n0 9=don't know 
!f Yes, list them here: 
11a. Trade name 
Second interview 
11b. Formulation 
1 =tablets, 2=syrup, 
3=injection, 4=powder 
i_i 
u 11 
U 
U 
11 c. Generic name 
If they have purchased another drug: 
4OPm List them In the stock fable and complete columns A, B, C and E, F, G. 
12. May I ask your name? 
Many thanks for your cooperation. 
Interviewer. I_-j Checked by: I-J-j Coded by: 1_I_I 
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Code Number 
Serial Number: IJ I_I_I_I 
Retail Audit - Stock table: 2002 
When you arrive, check that this information is correct: 
District Code: I-I-I-I 
Village Code: (-i-i-g 
Name of Kitongoji: 
Type of outlet: 
Name of shop/ facility: 
Name of owner: 
Household DSS number: 
Name of household: 
or 
DSS number for nearest household: 
Name of nearest household: 
i-i-i-i-i-i-i 
i-i-i_i-i-i-i 
340 
Ib£ 
IIII I'v3 
t-1 IýITýC-i 70 I-I'I-I-I E3 
I-I'I-I-I 73 PUB 
Irl 'tJ I-I'I-C-I-I-i-I 1-1'ITII1 33 
IIII I'v3 
I-1'I-I-1-rI-I 'Zo C-I'I-I 1 '£3 
I-1'I-I-1 73 Pug I-1'I-I-I-I1 ) 13 
IIIII 'v3 
I-1'1ýC-1 'Zo f-I'I-1-I £3 1-1'I-1-i 73 Pus 
1-1 1-Pl-i-I-1-I-1 1-I'I-1-1-I-1-I 33 
III I-I 'v3 
I-I'I-I-I-I-I-1 r-1.1-1--i '£3 
73 PUB i-1'1-1-I 
I-1 'tý C-1'1-I-I-1-1-1 _ I I'1-1-1 I-1-I ý3 
1III I'v3 
'£3 
C-I'I-C-I 23 PUB 
I-I'tý I-I'I-CýI-I-1 1-I'I-I-I-I-I-1'l3 
1-I 1II 'v3 
I-I'1-M-C'1-1 'Zo 1-Tr1-I '£3 I 11 I-1 Z3 pug 
I-i ' lrJ 1-I'I-I-1ý1-1 1-1'111I-I 1' l3 
I1II I'v3 
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ANNEX 5 
CONSTRUCTION OF AN INDEX OF 
HOUSEHOLD SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS 
A relative index of household socio-economic status (SES) was derived based on 19 
dichotomous variables. The variables included were a combination of household construction 
(walls, roof and floor), utilities (sources of water, light and cooking fuel, use of toilet), and 
ownership of assets (livestock, bed, clock/watch, mattress, iron, mosquito net, radio, clothing 
cupboard, bicycle, sofa, motorbike and car/tractor). The questionnaire allowed a wide range of 
responses for each question on household construction and utilities, many of which had very 
low frequencies. Responses were therefore collapsed into dichotomous categories in each case, 
to represent those hypothesised to be superior (i. e. positively associated with SES) and those 
hypothesised to be inferior. For example, type of roof was categorised as either manufactured 
(tiles, cement, corrugated iron) or local/second-hand (coconut leaves, bamboo, thatch, sticks, 
mud, grass, plastic sheets, oil tins). The weights for each variable in the index were derived 
using principal component analysis (PCA), based on the first principal component, which gives 
an index providing maximum discrimination between households (Filmer and Pritchett 2001; 
McKenzie 2003). Formerly, given an asset vector x, the first principal component of the 
observations, y, is the linear combination 
. Y-üý 
+a2 
x2 -x2 +... +CYp 
xp -xp 
S, SZ Sp 
whose sample variance is greatest among all such linear combinations, subject to the restriction 
a'a = 1, where a is the vector of coefficients, and xk and sk are the mean and standard deviation 
of variable x k. The construction of such indices implies the assumption that households have 
homogenous preferences for assets, and that asset prices do not vary across households. 
The index was calculated across both Group X and Group A households. Data were incomplete 
for I household in Ulanga and 87 households in Rufiji, which were therefore not assigned PCA 
scores. The first principal component explained 21% of the variability in the SES variables, 
giving greatest weight to floor and roof construction, ownership of a mattress, and light and 
cooking sources (Table A5.1). The Table also shows the difference that ownership of each asset 
made to the household PCA score, calculated by dividing the weight of each variable by its 
standard deviation (ak/sk). The assets for which ownership made the greatest change to PCA 
score were ownership of a sofa or clothing cupboard (1.39 and 1.29 respectively) and floor 
construction and cooking fuel (1.09 and 1.06). All variables had the expected positive 
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association with SES, with the exception of having a private water supply. It is possible that this 
may reflect a higher probability of sharing a water supply in areas of higher population density, 
where households may tend to be better off. 
Table A5.1 Results of principal components analysis of household survey variables to 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Weight Impact on 
PCA score2 
Definition 
floormanu 0.12 0.322 0.35 1.09 =1 if floor made of tiles or 
cement 
wallsmanu 0.21 0.409 0.27 0.66 =1 if walls made of fired 
bricks or cement 
roofmanu 0.26 0.437 0.31 0.71 =1 if roof made of tiles, 
cement or corrugated iron 
cookmanu 0.09 0.284 0.30 1.06 =1 if cooking fuel is 
electricity, gas, kerosene or 
charcoal 
waterprivate 0.18 0.383 -0.05 -0.13 =1 if water source is piped 
water inside household or 
rivate well or pump 
toilet 0.97 0.169 0.03 0.18 =1 if household has use of 
toilet 
lightmanu 0.14 0.351 0.31 0.88 =1 if light source is 
electricity or hurricane 
lamp 
Bed 0.95 0.224 0.07 0.31 =1 if household owns one 
Watch/clock 0.35 0.476 0.24 0.50 or more of each asset 
Mattress 0.33 0.469 0.32 0.68 
Iron 0.11 0.314 0.28 0.89 
Mos uito net 0.54 0.499 0.16 0.32 
Radio 0.49 0.500 0.24 0.48 
Clothing 
cu board 
0.05 0.217 0.28 1.29 
Bic cle 0.44 0.496 0.17 0.34 
Livestock 0.58 0.494 0.05 0.10 
Sofa 0.04 0.201 0.28 1.39 
Motorbike 0.005 0.068 0.01 0.15 
Car 0.003 0.053 0.04 0.75 
' Households were allocated I if at least some of construction materials or light/cooking fuel fell in these categories. 2 Impact of a change from 0 to I for each variable (weight/standard deviation). 
The PCA scores ranged from -2.46 to 8.67. Households were classified on the basis of their 
PCA scores into SES thirds of poorest, middle or better-off, with mean PCA scores of -1.6, -0.6 
and 2.2 respectively, with a cut-off point of -1.11 between the poorest and middle thirds and 
0.06 between the middle and better-off. Presentation of SES quintiles is more common, and has 
the advantage of giving a more sensitive indication of SES trends. SES thirds were used in this 
analysis because the distribution of PCA scores was highly skewed to the left (Figure A5.1), and 
there were some problems distinguishing between the poorest households (a phenomenon 
termed truncation (McKenzie 2003)). If quintiles were used the difference in mean score 
between the poorest and second poorest quintiles was only 0.55, meaning that a household 
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would shift from mid-quintile 5 to mid-quintile 4 by the ownership of just one additional asset, 
such as a mattress or watch, a difference which may not be economically meaningful. Dividing 
the data into asset thirds gives a difference in mean score between the poorest and middle thirds 
of 1.01, implying ownership of, for example, an additional mattress and watch, or a 
manufactured roof and bicycle, differences more likely to be indicative of true SES variation. In 
addition, use of quintiles would have led to small sample sizes in each SES group for the 
analysis of provider visits. 
Figure A5.1 Histogram showing distribution of PCA scores used in calculation of asset 
index 
Household head occupation and education were not included in the index but were used as an 
indication of its validity. Households where the head's main occupation was off-farm had 
significantly higher PCA scores than those who were mainly engaged in farming, with 72% of 
off-farm households in the better-off third, and only 8% in the poorest third. There was a 
significant correlation between the years of education of household head and PCA score (r=0.4, 
t test, p<0.0001), with 57% of households where the head had more than primary education in 
the top wealth third, compared with only 21 % for those with no education. 
PCA scores were not adjusted for household size, as the benefits of household construction, 
utilities and many durable assets were available at the household level (McKenzie 2003). 
Average household size was slightly higher among households of higher SES, meaning that, 
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although households were equally distributed between SES thirds by definition, 37% of 
individuals interviewed were in the better-off third, compared with 30% in the poorest third. 
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ANNEX 6 
CALCULATION OF ANTIMALARIAL SALES VOLUMES AND VALUES 
Data collected during the two retail audits were used to estimate total annual antimalarial sales 
volumes and values in the DSS areas, using the following steps: 
1. For each audit, sales of each antimalarial between the 2 visits were calculated as: 
Sales = (Total at 1$` visit) + (Deliveries between 1s` and 2nd visit) - (Stocks thrown away or 
transferred to other shops/facilities) - (Total at 2nd visit) 
2. To calculate fortnightly sales, sales volumes were scaled up or down pro rata, depending on 
the actual number of days between interviews for each outlet. 
3. To sum across different drug types to measure total antimalarial sales, volumes were 
calculated in terms of purchases required for equivalent adult treatment doses, based on the 
adult doses shown in Table A1.61. For syrup and injectables, it was assumed that one whole 
bottle or vial would have to be purchased2. The number of equivalent doses will be much 
lower than the actual number of customers, because 46% of provider visits were for patients 
under 14 years (household survey) who should receive a lower dose, and many people of all 
ages will have obtained less than the full treatment dose. 
4. Sales data were missing for 7 products in retail audit 1, and 3 in retail audit 2, in most cases 
because the interviewee did not know the quantity delivered. Calculated sales were negative 
for 2 products in retail audit 1 and 1 in retail audit 2, clearly indicating an error so these 
observations were reclassified as missing. In order to calculate total sales for the survey 
sample, all missing values were replaced with the mean sales for each drug type by 
packaging and outlet type (e. g. mean sales of loose SP tablets in commercial drug stores). 
5. To estimate total sales for all DSS areas it was necessary to approximate sales for outlets 
not interviewed. This comprised the private facility which refused in both audits, and the 
general shops stocking antimalarials not interviewed. The latter was estimated from the 
number not sampled or temporarily closed, multiplied by the estimated percent change in 
antimalarial stocking by these unobserved outlets. The percent change was calculated using 
turnover data from the outlet censuses in 2000 and 2001, which showed a 6.5% fall in the 
I an alternative approach of measuring volumes in defined daily doses was inappropriate in this context 
because of the variation in the length of antimalarial regimens. 2 in some cases more than one vial may be needed for a full dose with injectables, but our estimates were 
based on the quantity required to cover an initial pre-referral dose only, according to the Standard 
Treatment Guidelines. 
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number of general shops stocking antimalarials over the year3, leading to an estimated 3% 
fall between the outlet survey and retail audit 1 and a further 2% fall between retail audits 1 
and 2. This gave an estimated 75 general stores stocking antimalarials not interviewed in 
retail audit 1, and 68 in retail audit 2. These outlets were assigned the mean sales for each 
drug type for their outlet type. As a result the true variation in sales across outlets will have 
been underestimated. 
6. To estimate yearly sales it was necessary to extrapolate from the two 2-week periods. The 
two audits were undertaken at different times of year with the aim of capturing seasonal 
epidemiological and economic variation in total antimalarial sales and their distribution 
across outlet type. Table A6.1 shows the results for the two audits. The data did not show 
evidence of clear seasonal patterns. The total number of antimalarial doses was 12% higher 
during retail audit 2, but this concealed significant differences across DSS areas; an increase 
of 82% in Kilombero, 3% in Rufiji, and a fall of 35% in Ulanga. These patterns are difficult 
to interpret; the increase in Kilombero and fall in Ulanga were mainly due to changes in 
commercial drug shop sales, while in Rufiji a large fall in government facility doses was 
counterbalanced by a large increase for private facilities. Median sales per outlet were 
higher in retail audit 2 for facilities and drug shops, but the difference was only statistically 
significant for the latter (Wilcoxon Rank Sum test, pß. 03). There was little change in the 
overall proportion of doses sold through facilities (as opposed to shops), which was 63% in 
retail audit 1 and 61 % in retail audit 24. The number of doses sold by general stores fell by 
13%. This was likely to reflect the intermittent nature of antimalarial stocking by general 
stores, and a longer term downward trend in the proportion stocking antimalarials, rather 
than a seasonal pattern (see Chapter 7 on Market Structure). It is possible that the timing of 
the two surveys did not capture seasonal variation at other times of year. During qualitative 
interviews drug store staff said that sales for fever/malaria increased during the wet season, 
with most specifying the period of heaviest rain ("masika") in March/April, although one 
mentioned the whole rainy season from October to May. Two drug stores and the 
commercial dispensary noted that there was also a smaller increase in drug sales post- 
harvest (July to October), associated with greater cash availability. General store 
interviewees were less consistent in their assessment of seasonal variation, but around half 
also perceived an increase in fever/malaria sales during the main rainy season. As a result of 
the inconclusive nature of the analysis of seasonal variation, annual sales were estimated 
simply by summing the sales figures for the two surveys and scaling up pro rata to yearly 
sales estimates. Some justification for this approach was provided by analysis of 
3 composed of 42% stopped stocking antimalarials, 28% started stocking antimalarials, 19% closed down 
and 26% newly opened stockists (expressed as percentages of baseline antimalarial stockists). 4 We had anticipated that antimalarial volumes from Government outlets might be higher during retail 
audit 2 because it was contemporaneous with the 2002 IMPACT household survey, during which 
antimalarial availability at these facilities was ensured by the research team. However, their share was 
actually lower in retail audit 2, mainly due to a fall in Rufiji, while the share of private facilities rose. 
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government outpatient facility data which showed average monthly outpatients 
during the 
four months of the retail audit (February, March, June and July) to 
be only 3% higher than 
average monthly outpatients over the whole of 2002. 
7. The value of antimalarial sales was approximated based on outlet survey 
data on the median 
price for each drug category by packaging and outlet type (e. g. median price of 
loose SP 
tablets in commercial drug stores). These prices do not necessarily reflect the actual prices 
paid for the drug sales recorded, as prices may have changed between the outlet survey and 
retail audit, and people may have been more likely to purchase brands with a 
lower than 
average price. For three items in village health stores and two in general stores there were 
no appropriate price observations, as they were not stocked during the outlet survey. Their 
prices were approximated with the median price from commercial drug stores. 
As 
government drugs were either heavily or completely subsidised, their value was 
approximated using 2002 international reference prices (IRP) from suppliers (Management 
Sciences for Health 2002), scaled up 15% for importation costss, and 15% for internal 
transport, and using an exchange rate of US$1=Tsh950.146. 
Table A6.1 Estimated 14 day antimalarial drug volumes in equivalent adult doses for 
retail audits 1 and 2 
Mean Median Total % sales by 
antimalarial antimalarial antimalarial outlet type 
doses per outlet doses per outlet doses for all 
outlets 
Retail Audit 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Government 229 180 140 146 4122 3235 49% 34% 
facilities 
Private 134 281 62 111 1206 2527 14% 27% 
facilities 
Commercial 87 98 22 43 2707 3334 32% 35% 
drug shops 
Village-run 23 37 23 37 46 74 1% 1% 
drug shops 
General 3 3 0 0 387 335 5% 4% 
stores' 
Total 8 467 9,502 100% 100% 
General stores stocking antimalarials in 2001. 
s In fact 68% of antimalarial products in government 
facilities were domestically manufactured, and it 
would therefore have been more appropriate to exclude 
the 15% importation costs on this share of 
government medications. 
From http: //www. oanda. com/ for the 1" Jan 2002. 
351 
